Political Embers Flare as Tawang Contends for the Dalai Lama’s Reincarnation

Tshering Chonzom Bhutia, PhD, Associate Fellow, ICS

The Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang district in Arunachal Pradesh from April 7 to 11 garnered plenty of media attention. One of the most prominently discussed questions centered around the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation.

The Chinese side was unequivocal in not only objecting to the visit but also commenting on the reincarnation issue. The Chinese position, as encapsulated in remarks by scholars from important Chinese think tanks, is that the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation has to be approved by the Chinese government and selection has to be based on a combination of not just “historical rules” but also current “Chinese laws.” The reference to Chinese laws is with respect to the 2007 State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) regulation delineating procedures for the selection of reincarnated monks, including eligibility conditions, application procedures and the government and religious institutions to be approached for approval. The regulation basically excludes “any foreign organization or individual” from the reincarnation selection process, obviously in an attempt to legitimize China’s authority and exclude the Tibetan Diaspora (and others) in the selection of the next Dalai Lama.

The Chinese have consistently maintained that any reincarnation must be determined on the basis of the late 18th century procedure instituted by the Manchu Qing rulers of China. Under this “golden urn system” of selecting reincarnations, the names of prospective candidates would be placed in an urn, from which lots would be drawn to pick the real incarnation. Therefore, any other method being suggested by the Dalai Lama is seen as contrary to established rules and illegitimate, for it denies the Chinese government’s authority in the process.

Much of the recent interest in the issue was sparked by comments made by local officials in Tawang Continue reading “Political Embers Flare as Tawang Contends for the Dalai Lama’s Reincarnation”

Dalai Lama at the Namami Brahmaputra River Festival in Assam: Mixed Signals for India-China Relations

Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman, Senior Research Fellow, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati, Assam

His Holiness the Dalai Lama graced the Namami Brahmaputra River Festival[1] in Guwahati as chief guest, on 2 April 2017, as part of a 14-day visit to Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. Assam Governor Banwarilal Purohit, Assam Chief Minister Sarbananda Sonowal and several state cabinet ministers received him at the banks of the Brahmaputra in Guwahati. The Assam Government and the New Delhi-based research think-tank India Foundation, jointly organized this particular event hosting the Dalai Lama.[2] This visit combined with the Dalai Lama’s subsequent itinerary covering Tawang and Itanagar in Arunachal Pradesh lends itself to some questions about India’s China policy and in particular, the link between the boundary dispute and aspects of river-management and -sharing between India and China. Continue reading “Dalai Lama at the Namami Brahmaputra River Festival in Assam: Mixed Signals for India-China Relations”

2017 NPC: Centralizing While Attempting to Reform

Prof. Manoranjan Mohanty, Honorary Fellow, ICS & Vice-President, Council for Social Development, New Delhi

The ten-day session of China’s parliament – the National People’s Congress (NPC) – that concluded on 15 March was not an ordinary annual event that puts its stamp of approval on the already worked out policies by the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC). This was the last session of the nearly 3,000-member 12th NPC that was formed along with the assumption of the office of the president by party general secretary Xi Jinping. In many ways it gave a preview of the things to come at the 19th Congress of the CPC later this year in October-November.

Two areas threw up some conspicuous trends. First, Xi’s political leadership and his perspective on domestic and international issues were affirmed. Second, the need for strict measures to maintain stability in the country as a whole – and in Xinjiang and other ethnic minority areas, in particular – was reasserted. Whether these measures will prove adequate in coping with emerging challenges is an open question. Continue reading “2017 NPC: Centralizing While Attempting to Reform”

Does Tibet’s New Governor Signal Change?

Does Tibet’s New Governor Signal Change?

On 16 January, the Chinese government announced the appointment of Che Dalha (known as Qi Zhala in Chinese) as the new chair (equivalent to governor) of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). Che Dalha, the former party secretary of Lhasa municipality, was given his new post during the fifth session of the 10th regional congress, which was held from 10-16 January. Rumors about such a promotion had been rife for a long time, particularly among the people of Lhasa; the announcement made it official. Che Dalha is the new governor of the TAR, replacing Lobsang Gyaltsen, who occupied the post from January 2013 and will now serve as chairman of the Standing Committee of the TAR People’s Congress.

Che Dalha’s tenure as the Lhasa Party secretary has mixed reviews from the Lhasans, some of whom have welcomed his firm measures to clean up the city and give it a modern look. Continue reading “Does Tibet’s New Governor Signal Change?”

Tsai-Trump Telephone Call: Reading Trump and the Chinese Response

Jabin T. Jacob, PhD, Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen called up US President-elect Donald Trump on 3 December to congratulate him on his victory. A statement from the Taiwan Presidential Office stated that the call lasted just over 10 minutes and that Tsai and Trump ‘shared views and ideals on governance, especially on promoting domestic economic development and strengthening national defense’ and ‘also exchanged views briefly on the situation in Asia’. Tsai ‘expressed the wish of strengthening [Taiwan-US] bilateral exchanges and contacts and establishing closer cooperation relations.[1]

Trump Testing the Waters? Continue reading “Tsai-Trump Telephone Call: Reading Trump and the Chinese Response”

The 8th BRICS Summit: India Hosts, China Gains

Jabin T. Jacob, PhD, Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies

The 8th BRICS Summit in Goa in October this year, India came close on the heels of the G-20 Summit at Hangzhou in China and appears more or less to have had the same agenda except that it was smaller in size and therefore brought into sharper focus the contradictions within. The BRICS grouping remains an unbalanced one. China is in a league of its own in the BRICS – both in economic terms as well as increasingly in the political sphere. India is the only other member that has a strong economy – the other three economies are in various stages of stress. However, the grouping is also about taking political positions and here once again, China’s dominant weight has seen statements taking on anti-Western tilt. Continue reading “The 8th BRICS Summit: India Hosts, China Gains”

Tibet’s Place in China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative

Tshering Chonzom Bhutia, PhD, Associate Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies

By now, China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) is familiar to scholars and officials around the world. It has become the catchphrase for all of China’s international outreach, including conferences, seminars, and delegation visits to and from China. However, China has not completely reassured its neighbors. The various terms and phrases that have been used to refer to this idea embody the contention surrounding it – from the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and Maritime Silk Route (MSR), to One Belt One Road (OBOR), to the current BRI. More broadly, some describe it as “strategy,” others call it a “project” with the Chinese now settling on “initiative.”

Having played an important role in the whole Silk Route trade route historically, India finds China’s attempt to revive it in the modern context without any consultation with Delhi troubling. Continue reading “Tibet’s Place in China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative”

Parsing Tsai Ing-wen’s Inaugural Presidential Speech

Jabin T. Jacob, Assistant Director and Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies.

Tsai Ing-wen and Chen Chien-jen were sworn in on 20 May as the 14th President and Vice-President of the Republic of China on Taiwan, marking the third successful peaceful transition of power on the island through democratic elections. Tsai, the first female president of the island, is expected to take a more moderate position on Taiwan’s relations with China, even if her Democratic Progress Party is not likely to give up its pro-independence stance. It is this latter reality that is likely to keep the Chinese on tenterhooks about Taiwan’s direction under Tsai.

Continue reading “Parsing Tsai Ing-wen’s Inaugural Presidential Speech”

Taiwan Elections: Rejuvenated DPP with ‘Third Forces’

Bhim Subba, ICS-HYI Doctoral Fellow.

More than 18 million registered voters among 23 million people, above the age of 20 will exercise their suffrage for Saturday, January 16 in Taiwan. As expected, the mood in the island is with the Pan-Green Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) coalition under Tsai Ing-wen. The Pan-Blue Kuomintang (KMT) under Eric Chu, who replaced Ms. Hung Tsui-Chu (Deputy House Speaker), breaking the convention, is most likely to face drubbing and James Soong, former KMT heavyweight, heading the People’s First Party (PFP) rallying at the last.

Continue reading “Taiwan Elections: Rejuvenated DPP with ‘Third Forces’”

Leadership in ‘Reforming China’

Bhim Subba, ICS-HYI Doctoral Fellow.

Since the reform (gaige kaifang), much writings on Chinese politics have dealt with leadership succession in China. Many scholars argue the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is reluctant in undertaking political reforms unlike the economy. People’s democracy, as many of one-party states proclaim, is criticised because of an absence of competitive electoral party system thereby resulting in appointment of ‘rulers’ without sanctioned by the ‘ruled’. Arguably at the macro level, one can see such trepidations and the influence of the party at all levels of government, but at the same time, one cannot deny that the party’s ruling ideology, organization and leadership selection norms have not undergone transformation.

Continue reading “Leadership in ‘Reforming China’”