‘PRC Scholars React to India’s Contentious Kashmir Move’: An Analysis

One expert said that “Kashmir war escalation shows that India is a rogue state.”

Dr. Hemant Adlakha, Honorary Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies; Associate Professor, Centre for Chinese & South East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University

Scholars in the P R China have reacted quickly and sharply to the Indian government’s sudden decision to remove Kashmir’s special status under Article 370 and reorganize the state into two centrally governed territories – Jammu and Kashmir being one, Ladakh the other.  In the views of most Chinese experts, India’s ‘unilateral’ move is not only ‘irresponsible and is source of tension in one of the most complex border disputes in the region’ but it (the Indian move on Kashmir) has the potential to ‘seriously derail’ the recent consensus arrived at between the president Xi Jinping and prime minister Narendra Modi.

Echoing Beijing’s official position on the status of the state of Jammu & Kashmir, the scholarly commentaries too describe the Kashmir region as internationally acknowledged disputed area between India and Pakistan; as also established in the 13 August, 1948 UNSC Resolution, 5 January, 1949 UN Resolution on India Pakistan Commission, and 1972 Simla Agreement etc. respectively.   

Interestingly, in sharp contrast with the section of the Indian English language national media – both the print and electronic – reports last Tuesday that “India and China (on Monday) seemed to have stepped back from allowing Kashmir to become an unmanageable irritant between the two countries,” just as the visiting Indian foreign minister, Mr. S. Jaishankar was holding talks with his counterpart in Beijing, op-ed columns in the mainstream Chinese media were screaming out with contradictory tones. Take a look at the sample: “As India scraps Kashmir’s special status, Pakistan’s dream lies shattered,” “India Revoking Kashmir Special Status is Violation of China’s Sovereignty: Don’t Expect Beijing to sit by idly,” “China will Never Let India’s Kashmir Power Grab Succeed.”

In addition, even as the Indian EAM was shaking hands with the Chinese vice president, Wang Qishan, a researcher at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, SIIS, Mr. Liu Zongyi wrote in a signed syndicated column, “Due to India’s classification of Ladakh as a centrally administered area, the territory of the region, which was occupied by India in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border, will also have an impact on the stability of Sino-Indian relations.” Mr. Liu Zongyi also dons the position of a visiting research fellow at the Renmin University of China’s Chongyang Institute, an influential Beijing think tank on foreign affairs issues.

In another signed article on the same day, a Chinese scholar argued that India’s arrogant action has posed an increased security risk to the LAC in the western sector along the boundary between China and India. “China immediately and firmly opposed (India’s Kashmir move) not only because the Indian arrogant action will exacerbate regional tensions and pose a threat to China’s peripheral security, but also because the Indian action will render the LAC along the western sector of the boundary between the two countries increasingly vulnerable.” In the wild Indian imagination, the composition of the so-called Kashmir region includes the IOK – which includes Jammu, the Kashmir Valley, Baltistan and the China’s native land of Ladakh; the POK, the Chinese Aksai Chin as well as the Demchok region to the west of Aksai Chin – currently under dispute, the article claimed.    

Several Chinese commentaries view the controversial unilateral Indian push to change Kashmir’s status is aimed at fulfilling Modi government’s Hindu nationalist agenda. According to Liu Zongyi, “the Bhartiya Janta Party and its parent organization the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh have always believed India has been at the forefront of resisting the Muslim invasion for 1300 years. The revocation of the Kashmir special status is the successful accomplishment of the BJP/RSS political agenda, i e, to strengthen Indian control over Kashmir, to alter Kashmir’s demographic nature, and to fully integrate it into the Union of India.”

The article, which first appeared on the Chongyang Institute website on August 12 and was quickly picked up by various Chinese news portals claims, the Kashmir move had been hatched based on a well-synchronized strategy, with keeping in mind both national as well as international factors. Speaking of the internal factors, the article contends that the Modi government wanted to fulfil its election promises to integrate Kashmir with India, which it had failed to implement during the previous five years on account of lack of majority in the Indian parliament. Likewise, several other Chinese commentators too have interpreted the parliamentary move on 5 August as an attempt by Modi, emboldened by the recent election victory, to have greater control over Kashmir, India’s only Muslim-majority state and the main source of conflict between India and Pakistan.

On the other hand, the external factor which largely contributed to the timing of the Kashmir move was the rapid progress achieved by the US and Taliban recently. Leaving India not only marginalized and isolated in the renewed Afghan peace process but also pushing India face the risk of losing initiative on both Afghanistan and Kashmir vis-à-vis Pakistan.  Besides, Chinese commentators over time have been highlighting India desperately trying to win over the US support to isolate Pakistan/Taliban in order to strengthen control over the entire Kashmir region. It is in this context these experts see a close link behind the Indian unilateral action in Kashmir to two more possible external reasons: to alert as well as draw the US attention to the fact that India alone has the right to determine what goes on in Jammu & Kashmir; and that India will not tolerate Pakistan to make use of the Taliban militants to unleash terrorism in Kashmir.

Furthermore, typically least surprising, not one Chinese commentary so far has voiced concerns such as total clampdown on democracy in Kashmir, closing down of schools, tourists evacuation, cutting off internet connectivity, and putting some of the local political leaders under house arrest etc.; on the other hand, what is also noticeably absent in the Chinese commentaries are the worldwide heightened concerns of both India and Pakistan being the nuclear weapon possessing neighbours. Neither China’s leaders nor the experts/scholars have indicated worrying signs that any escalation might push the two South Asian hostile neighbours ‘over the edge’ and start a conventional war that might well grow into a full-on nuclear conflict. 

Finally, as already mentioned, the Chinese concerns are largely centred on how Pakistan is going to equip itself both diplomatically and otherwise to successfully thwart off the arrogant Indian move in Kashmir; whether the immediate counter measures the Imran Khan government has announced would exercise any impact on India – measures such as to downgrade diplomatic relations, to cut off economic and trade ties, to put a ban on the Indian movies, to deny air space access over Pakistan to the Indian air flights and so on. A few Chinese scholars did however warn India of serious consequences of carrying out ‘aggression’ over the Chinese sovereign areas in the so-called Union Territory of Ladakh. Likening India’s highly contentious move in Kashmir to the behaviour of a rogue state, one commentator questioned: India has been dreaming of becoming a UNSC permanent member, does India aim to achieve this by deliberately violating the UNSC Resolutions and by trampling on the authority of the UN and the Security Council?

Discovering My Father Artist Xu Beihong’s Experience in Santiniketan, India

Xu Fangfang

My visit to Santiniketan, India, in January 2019 was to continue the journey my father artist Xu Beihong had started there between 1939 and 1940. At the invitation of the Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore, Xu Beihong went to India at the end of 1939, holding an exhibition at Visva-Bharati and another in Calcutta in the following year. Rabindranath Tagore had established Visva-Bharati to offer the studies of all the components of Eastern civilization in one place and Chinese civilization was one of Tagore’s major focuses. A most influential Chinese painter and teacher, Xu Beihong came to Santiniketan as the first Chinese visiting professor of Kala Bhavana, the art school at Visva-Bharati, which had been eager to get a broad view of Chinese art. He lectured and demonstrated Chinese ink brush painting and calligraphy to Kala Bhavana students.

Xu Beihong (1895-1953) is widely known as the father of modern Chinese painting. Born into a poor family in Yixing, Jiangsu Province, he learned Chinese classics and traditional Chinese painting from his father, a self-taught artist.

One of the first Chinese art students to study in Europe, Xu Beihong in the 1920s graduated from the Ecole des Beaux Arts. Returning to China in 1927, he successfully integrated Western painting methods and techniques with traditional Chinese painting in order to develop Chinese painting. Xu Beihong pioneered China’s art education. From 1927 until his death in 1953, he trained several generations of Chinese artists.

Admiring Xu Beihong’s art, Rabindranath Tagore wrote an introduction to Xu’s exhibition. In response to Tagore’s welcome address, Xu Beihong said: “Santiniketan is a place which corresponds to my ideal of a center of art and culture. The whole world should make a pilgrimage here in order to breathe the joyful atmosphere of creative endeavour undertaken here under the direct inspiration of India’s great poet. My visit here is that of a pilgrim. I have come not to give but to receive the great gifts that India may have to bestow upon my country and people as she did in the days gone by.”

Now I understand why my father made such a comment. Rabindranath Tagore’s poetic lines, his sensitivity to the beauty in nature and his ability to capture the soul of a human being really touched my heart. Tagore’s creativity made Visva-Bharati such a vibrant place. The short, yellow-colored buildings with light grey windows appeared lively. The dark-red leaf design patterns on the pillars and around windows suggest a sense of growth, symbolizing the intellectual growth of students. I hear these design motives have remained since 1940 or earlier.

Besides observing cultural activities and the magnificent landscape of the Himalayas and Darjeeling, which are reflected in his works, Xu Beihong interacted with outstanding cultural figures including the Nobel laureate Tagore and Mahatma Gandhi. Xu Beihong was moved by Tagore’s sympathy with China’s War of Resistance and his firm denunciation of the Japanese invasion of China. In his memorial speech for Tagore in 1941, he praised Tagore’s love of humanity that resonated in the whole universe. Describing his meeting with Gandhi on 17 February 1940, Xu Beihong wrote: ‘Today I felt truly honored to live with the soul of all India’.

This rich experience enabled Xu Beihong to create during his year of residence in India, a great number of masterpieces that exemplify the pinnacle of his artistic career. These include Portrait of Rabindranath Tagore, Portrait of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains, depictions of the Himalayas and his famous ink brush paintings of horses. After his experiences with the horses in India, the horses he painted exhibit noticeably greater vigor.

There are nine original Chinese ink brush works by Xu Beihong at Visva-Bharati, including two in Rabindra Bhavana, the university museum, and seven in Kala Bhavana’s Nandan Museum. Among these works, Portrait of Rabindranath Tagore has the highest artistic merit. It is Xu Beihong’s representative Chinese ink brush portrait based on his many sketches of Tagore. A similar painting of Rabindranath Tagore is in the collection of the Xu Beihong Memorial Museum in Beijing. The accomplishment of this Chinese ink brush portrait is comparable to that of a Western oil portrait from life. Such a portrait from life revealing an individual’s facial expression and capturing his creative moment was unique in Chinese ink brush painting at the time it was done. I think that Xu Beihong must have given this portrait of Rabindranath Tagore to Visva-Bharati to honor his friendship with Tagore and also to serve as an example for the students to learn from.

To help research on Xu Beihong, I deciphered the inscriptions and seals on all the works by Xu Beihong in the twin museums’ collection and provided translation. The implications of these inscriptions and seals had not been known to scholars before. I also offered suggestions to both museums concerning preserving their fragile ink brush works by Xu Beihong so future generations in India and around the world will be able to understand and appreciate Xu Beihong’s art.

During my visit, Nandan Museum held an exhibition of paintings by Xu Beihong and other Chinese artists. Watching a Kala Bhavana professor and his students discussing the paintings at the exhibition, I was happy to share with them how Xu Beihong’s animal paintings express deeper meanings through the use of analogy implied in his inscriptions and seals. On his painting The Horse, he inscribed: “November 1940. Beihong painted this to congratulate Elder Tagore on his recovery from his illness. Gentle breeze and beautiful sun. The celestial and human worlds were celebrating.” Xu Beihong conveyed his happiness for Tagore’s recovery through this spirited horse and the artist’s inscription. One of the seals says: “Brilliant and Fluid,” expressing the joy through fluid brushwork.

Xu Beihong had received strong support for his exhibition in Calcutta, initiated by Rabindranath Tagore and held under the joint auspices of the Indian Society of Oriental Art, Calcutta, and the Sino-Indian Cultural Society, Santiniketan. Nandalal Bose, principal of Kala Bhavana, wrote an appreciation for the exhibition catalogue while another famous Indian artist Abanindranath Tagore opened the exhibition, which included among the 206 artworks Xu Beihong’s representative Chinese ink brush painting Jiufang Gao, Horse Judge and his oil history painting Tian Heng and His Five Hundred Warriors. Xu Beihong’s comprehensive exhibition strongly influenced artists and art lovers in India. He donated the entire proceeds from the exhibition to help alleviate the suffering of refugees driven from their homes in Japanese-occupied areas of China.

To learn more about my father’s experience in Santiniketan, I visited Professor Tan Yunshan’s old house behind Cheena Bhavana where Father had stayed. Tan Yunshan was founder of Cheena Bhavana. The earth color of the house is consistent with the design of other buildings in Visva-Bharati. The simplicity and openness of the architectural design allow ample space both inside and outside the house, which has several entries. I imagined Father walking in the morning around the open space next to the house, observing the large trees and birds carefully for his creative work. He made many studies of the red flowers on the huge silk-cotton trees, one of which grew in front of the Chanda house. Anil Chanda, Tagore’s secretary, and his wife Rani Chanda became Xu Beihong’s close friends. I also imagined Father chatting with his host Professor Tan in the evening, sharing his personal stories and his concerns for his country suffering from the Japanese invasion. Now the people in that once bustling house are gone, leaving only the old trees and birds to reminisce about the people and events that had taken place there.

In my lectures at Visva-Bharati I shared my understanding of Xu Beihong’s art, his Indian connection and my memoir Galloping Horses: Artist Xu Beihong and His Family in Mao’s China. Faculty and students appreciated my insight into Xu Beihong’s art and how his family and legacy had survived the turbulence of Mao’s ever-changing policies, which dictated the direction of art and music from 1949 through the devastating ten-year Cultural Revolution as described in my memoir. Students told me that I had enriched their experience. At the same time, I received inspiration from the creative environment of Visva-Bharati as my father had received in 1940. Viewing Father’s works in Santiniketan was like seeing his life experience in front of me. I felt rewarded to have contributed to Tagore’s Visva-Bharati as my father had done three quarters of a century before.

I appreciate the help from Dr. Tan Chung, Chameli Ramachandra, Srila Chatterji, and other people in Santiniketan.

The dance of dualities in the Chinese Social Credit

Unlike the conflicting nature of dual forces in western philosophy, traditional Chinese philosophy manifests this duality in the form of complementary and balancing forces exemplified in the Yin-Yang.

Nishant Dilip Sharma, Research Intern, Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi

Dualities have always held a prominent place in traditional Chinese philosophy. Unlike the conflicting nature of dual forces in western philosophy, traditional Chinese philosophy manifests this duality in the form of complementary and balancing forces exemplified in the Yin-Yang. The way in which the Chinese government has gone about experimenting and implementing the infamous Social Credit System in China is another duality at play.

What is being seen as the emergence of an Orwellian “Big Brother” age in China, is being carried out in several cities through a number of pilot projects running on a dual ‘carrots & sticks’ model. Just like any other ‘reward-punishment’ scheme, this programme offers certain incentives (carrots) to people complying with the expectations of the governing body and at the same time, has punitive sanctions (sticks) in place for non-compliance. Interestingly, the quality of the carrots and the size of the sticks has not been uniform across all pilots.

This arises from the fact that the implementation of pilot programmes is being undertaken in a two-pronged approach. At one end are the Government run mandatory SCS programmes that are operational in more than 43 Chinese cities. At the other end, there are the corporate-run Social credit systems. Unlike the Government SCS programmes (GSCS), the corporate ones (CSCS) are not mandatory. The CSC pilots do offer virtual and monetary rewards to their customers, however the real intent is to eventually become incorporated with the government’s plans. This way the corporate in question remains in the forefront when SCS is rolled out in a more comprehensive measure. Speaking of the sticks, punishments are harsher in GSCS than under CSCS. The carrots and sticks in the GSCS are in the form of ‘red-lists’ and ‘black-lists’ respectively. While one’s name in the ‘red-list’ would mean a special honor and privileged/subsidized access to public services, a name in the ‘black-list’ would mean lesser privileges or denial of certain privileges. This could mean low internet speed, ban from traveling, denial of bank loans, public naming and shaming, etc. In short, one’s social credit scores could have a great impact on his/her routine life and social reputation.

In a country which bears the tag of the most populous nation on Earth, such measurement of reputation scores for each individual is no small undertaking. This is accomplished through the creation of a systematic surveillance state where big data and artificial intelligence play a major role. Each camera captures the movement of every face and small offenses like jaywalking or walking your dog without a leash could result in an immediate fine from the government. Thus, surveillance in the eastern industrialized towns is associated more with governance and has helped bring down law enforcement costs and many governance issues.

In contrast, state surveillance in Xinjiang and Tibet is employed to address security concerns. Surveillance cameras here snoop into the personal lives of the inhabitants to stamp out any cultural expression. Any sign of resistance opens up the gates of re-education camps, the insides of which many have seen but few have come out to tell the story. Here state security is a priority while separatism is viewed as evil and surveillance becomes a tool. This dual nature of surveillance, that of governance in the eastern region and that of security in the western region, is another duality present in the Chinese system. This duality, however, begs to question the coherence of what China plans to achieve with a full-scale rollout of the SCS model in the entire Mainland China, which could be up and running as early as 2021.

These dual objectives, dual implementation models, dual outcome conditioning, raise multiple questions: Will China be successful at creating a reputation state amidst the incongruities that exist in China? The answer seems to be hooked to a second question: Will China be willing to respect the socio-geographic disparity present between the historically separatist western regions and the presently thriving eastern industrial hubs?

One way of doing so would be to prevent any punitive sanctions and credit reductions on the grounds of cultural suppression. A conundrum in the eastern region could be credit rating reductions caused due to systemic failures, human errors, or corrupt bureaucracy. As remediation mechanisms, legislations are being put in place to prevent such reputation harms. Shanghai’s local credit legislation passed in 2017 on the “right to be forgotten” provides a much-needed right to credit restoration and a reasonable requirement on administrative agencies’ query over citizens’ social credit information.

Such remediation mechanisms are also extended to cover data protection and norms for safe collection, processing and storage of personal data. These measures are limited to eastern cities like Hubei, Shanghai, and Hangzhou. The lack of such legal remedies in the GSCS pilots being run in the western region calls for a systemic shift in the way the pilots are being conducted. More polarized developments in the way the pilots are conducted could likely leave the western inhabitants estranged and brew discontent if the policy is applied without systemic planning and West-specific trials. Perhaps it’s time for the policymakers to take a hint from their traditional philosophies and create more balancing dualities than conflicting ones.

China’s Global Influence in the Film Industry

Preethi Amaresh, Former Research Officer, Chennai Centre for China Studies (C3S)

China’s rise is the economic story of the 21st Century and the entertainment industry is no exception. Cinema was introduced in 1896 in China.[i] The film industry is viewed as part of China’s modernization process and with the global influence wielded by the country’s economy, the rise of “cultural industries” in China is seen as the next step on a path from a developing nation to a world power.

Before the 1949 revolution, China had a vibrant film industry. There were studios in Shanghai – the city was known as the Hollywood of China – which made comedies, romances and melodramas on an almost weekly basis, which were very popular with domestic audiences. But during the Cultural Revolution, the ruling Communist Party of China under Mao Zedong came close to destroying Chinese cinema. Soon after the Cultural Revolution the film industry again flourished as a medium of popular entertainment. [ii]

With China’s liberalization in the late 1970s and its opening up to foreign markets, commercial considerations made its impact in the post-1980s filmmaking. Fifth-generation Chinese filmmakers who had graduated from the Beijing film academy   sought to popularize Chinese cinema abroad. Continue reading “China’s Global Influence in the Film Industry”

A Case for the Useless and Things Unsaid

Cidarth Sajith, Research Intern, ICS

The 2012 documentary ‘The Act of Killing’, in which the perpetrators of the 1965 anti-communist purge of Indonesia, re-enact and dramatize their killings is not only held by many as an audacious documentary that oversteps into the obscene due to the very gleefulness with which the protagonists oblige, but also draws consternation over the impunity and reverence with which they are held. Nevertheless, it earned an Oscar nomination and subsequently managed to reignite the debates over Indonesia’s denial and reluctant embrace of its past. But, what makes the documentary truly fascinating and relevant is how it captures the unravelling psychosis of its protagonists, their fractured realities and most importantly, what art and theatre portend for societies reeling under trauma and supressed memories. Continue reading “A Case for the Useless and Things Unsaid”

Health and Wellbeing in the Context of the 19th Congress of the CPC

Madhurima Nundy, PhD, Associate Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies

The political report delivered by Xi Jinping at the 19th Congress of the CPC is open to analysis and many interpretations. Indeed, it is a lengthy and comprehensive report where Xi attempts to cover all aspects of development in the last five years and challenges that face China today, apart from his take on socialism entering a new era. Health and wellbeing of the population is an integral component of human development which gets articulated in various sections.

It is accepted universally, that the determinants of health and wellbeing are not restricted to access to health services alone but includes social, economic, environmental and cultural factors that influence the health of the population. As a prelude to his speech, Xi gave an overview of the overall socio-economic development and that 60 million people have been lifted above poverty. Continue reading “Health and Wellbeing in the Context of the 19th Congress of the CPC”

Tibet, the 19th Party Congress and China’s United Front Work

Tshering Chonzom, PhD, Associate  Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies

What does a powerful Xi Jinping as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China mean for the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) various minority nationalities, especially the Tibetans? The nature and extent of authority accorded to the United Front Works Department (UFWD) that handles nationality, religious and overseas Chinese affairs, during Xi’s second term is an important starting point for analysis.

The UFWD organized a press conference on 21 October 2017 on the sidelines of the 19th Party Congress, in which its leadership saw the organization as an important player in Xi’s new formulation of ‘new era’. For instance, the various conferences held under its aegis in the past five years – such as the Second Central Xinjiang Work Conference (May 2014), Central Nationalities Work Conference (September 2014), 6th Tibet Work Forum (August 2015), National Religious Work Conference (April 2016) – are retroactively characterised as work convened ‘under the guidance of the new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics’. Indeed, at the national religious work conference that was held from 22-23 April 2016, Xi called upon the UFWD to take the lead in coordinating responsibilities with various organisations. In his report to the 19th Party Congress, he likens United Front work to a ‘magic weapon’ that will ‘ensure the success of the party’. Continue reading “Tibet, the 19th Party Congress and China’s United Front Work”

India’s Uncertain Demographic Dividend

Jayan Jose Thomas, PhD, Associate Professor of Economics, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi and Member, Planning Board, State Government of Kerala

A version of this article was originally published in Chinese as ‘印度不确定的人口红利’ [Yindu bu queding de renkou hongli], Diyi Caijing, 10 July 2017. This is part of a series by Indian scholars in China’s top business affairs news portal facilitated by the ICS. The English version follows below the Chinese text.

普遍的观点认为,印度将受益于所谓的“人口红利”。据世界银行估计,2010年至2030年间,印度15岁至59岁人口将增加至2亿多人。与此同时,包括中国在内的世界大部分发达地区的适龄劳动人口预计将会下降。也就是说,未来几年,印度会为全球劳动力供给的大幅增长贡献力量。

然而,实现人口红利对印度来说并不容易。首先,获得诺贝尔经济学奖的阿马蒂亚·森(Amartya Sen)指出,在卫生和教育领域,印度面临严峻挑战。2010年,印度的婴儿死亡率是每千名47例,而在中国,这个比例已减少到每千名13例。

对印度政策制定者来说的另一个重大挑战,是为新进入劳动力市场的印度人创造就业机会。事实上,大部分年轻劳动力的增长将来自印度最贫穷的地区,主要包括北方邦和比哈尔邦在内的北部和东部地区。 Continue reading “India’s Uncertain Demographic Dividend”

Key Issues in Urbanization in China

Lu Ming, Professor, Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University

A version of this article was originally published in the Business Standard as Towards sustainable urbanisation in China’, 6 May 2017. This is part of a series by Chinese economists facilitated by the ICS.

China has received enormous dividends from its decades of urbanization, which provided labour resources for the development of its industrial and service sectors and rapidly raised the income of the Chinese people. A large number of Chinese farmers became part of the country’s modernization process, allowing for poverty alleviation in rural areas. At the end of 2016, the urbanization rate of China stood at around 57%

China however, continues to face serious impediments in the urbanization process.

One of these is China’s household registration system or the hukou, which connects a person’s right to access public services with whether or not he has a resident status in a locality. The reality is that some one-third of city dwellers in China are trans-regional immigrants who actually do not possess local household registration. As a result, they do not enjoy the same level of social security and public services as local urban residents.

This is a particularly serious social problem for China. Continue reading “Key Issues in Urbanization in China”

India and China: For a Change in Mindsets

Ravi Bhoothalingam, Honorary Fellow, ICS

In the previous article (“Why China matters”, May 2), we explored four reasons why China is important for India in our journey towards vikas for our citizens. Accordingly, the article argued that it is to India’s advantage to engage strongly with China on the economic front, whilst managing our various political differences. But what assets does India bring to the table in this engagement? What steps are needed to make it fruitful? Is it possible to think of China-India cooperation as having a larger — even transformational — effect on Asia if not the world? Continue reading “India and China: For a Change in Mindsets”