Dr. Atul Bhardwaj, Adjunct Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies
Trump is no admirer of the post-war liberal international order. He is neither keen to invest to save NATO nor is he interested in subsidizing the United Nations. He wants to stop splurging and rely more on allies’ money and material to maintain American hegemony.
Besides saving precious dollars, Russia is the other crucial element in Trump’s strategy to halt the impressive march of China, its peer competitor. In his endeavour to get Russia back into the US camp, Trump has the full support of Henry Kissinger, the former secretary of state and national-security adviser under Presidents Nixon and Ford. Kissinger, a typical offensive realist is well- versed in the technique of balancing realism with restraint. He feels that in the best interest of realpolitik, America should be more restrained vis-a-vis Russia. Kissinger feels that Putin is not “a character like Hitler, He comes out of Dostoyevsky.” Continue reading “The China Factor in Russia–US Equation”
Uday Khanapurkar, Research Intern, Institute of Chinese Studies
Trade tensions notwithstanding, with the strengthening of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)1, little doubt remains that contemporary Sino-American relations are characterised by an “admixture of the methods of commerce with the logic of conflict” (Luttwak, 1990, p.19). ‘CFIUS 2.0’ is slated to exhibit an unprecedented quantum of oversight and finesse in conducting American economic statecraft with its sights fixed largely on China.
With the American foreign policy focus, having pivoted from counter-terrorism to strategic competition with a rising China, the recent iteration of CFIUS reforms2 takes due stock of the USA’s changing priorities. Interestingly, nine out of the 11 takeover bids killed or abandoned at CFIUS’ suggestion under the Trump administration originated in China.
The renewed CFIUS process is now geared toward preventing Chinese appropriation, through equity investments, of American technologies that underpin American competitiveness or which the DoD considers sensitive to military superiority. With respect to critical technologies and infrastructure 3, CFIUS is now enabled to review investments by foreign persons irrespective of whether the stake obtained is controlling (upward of 50 per cent) or not. In doing so, FIRRMA aims to safeguard even Continue reading “CFIUS 2.0: An Instrument of American Economic Statecraft Targeting China”