Will Mounting Contestations in the Economic Domain Burden Chinese Innovation and Growth?

Uday Khanapurkar, Research Intern, Institute of Chinese Studies

China and the USA, the world’s two largest economies, are currently embroiled in an acrimonious two-front geo-economic tussle. On the trade front, a 10 per cent tariff on 200 billion USD of Chinese exports to the USA came into effect on September 24, 2018; with President Trump threatening further duties on 267 billion USD should the Chinese retaliate. On the financial front, the USA enacted a law in August, 2018, aimed at strengthening the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) in order that it may undertake more meticulous scrutiny of Chinese investments in the US and prevent undesirable technology transfers. Combined, these contestations in the economic domain put China under significant pressure.

To be sure, China is at a precarious stage in its economic development. Rising wages and an aging population entail that low-quality manufacturing and assembly cannot generate more growth. Investment spending experiences decreasing returns to scale. Continue reading “Will Mounting Contestations in the Economic Domain Burden Chinese Innovation and Growth?”

CFIUS 2.0: An Instrument of American Economic Statecraft Targeting China

Uday Khanapurkar, Research Intern, Institute of Chinese Studies

Trade tensions notwithstanding, with the strengthening of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)1, little doubt remains that contemporary Sino-American relations are characterised by an “admixture of the methods of commerce with the logic of conflict” (Luttwak, 1990, p.19). ‘CFIUS 2.0’ is slated to exhibit an unprecedented quantum of oversight and finesse in conducting American economic statecraft with its sights fixed largely on China.

With the American foreign policy focus, having pivoted from counter-terrorism to strategic competition with a rising China, the recent iteration of CFIUS reforms2 takes due stock of the USA’s changing priorities. Interestingly, nine out of the 11 takeover bids killed or abandoned at CFIUS’ suggestion under the Trump administration originated in China.

The renewed CFIUS process is now geared toward preventing Chinese appropriation, through equity investments, of American technologies that underpin American competitiveness or which the DoD considers sensitive to military superiority. With respect to critical technologies and infrastructure 3, CFIUS is now enabled to review investments by foreign persons irrespective of whether the stake obtained is controlling (upward of 50 per cent) or not. In doing so, FIRRMA aims to safeguard even Continue reading “CFIUS 2.0: An Instrument of American Economic Statecraft Targeting China”