Category: Uncategorized

Abhyoday, Research Intern, ICS

Japan and China have for a good part the 2010s been able to maintain a relationship which was mutually beneficial. The economic collaboration between the two countries has kept on increasing and it was the Japanese investment which has played a big role in the rise of China as the world’s manufacturing center. However, since the trade war between the USA and China, Japan is struggling to balance its economic interests with China and strategic interests vis a vis the United States.

The two countries have their fair share of problems, be it the seasonal Yasukuni shrine problem, or the constant increase in Chinese activities in the East China Sea’s areas which are claimed by Japan as an incursion. While the Japanese have a huge dependence on the manufacturing from China and the supply chains emanating out of it, the transformed foreign policy approach of Chinese in 2020 has made it all the more difficult for Tokyo to maintain its economic interests without jeopardizing the strategic quotient.

The conundrum was in full view when in June, the Trump-led US government lashed out at the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) for their new national security legislation in Hong Kong, and as a result of which, the USA wanted to impose sanctions on Hong Kong and Mainland China. USA wanted a joint statement of G7 nations condemning China, however, only four countries came forward, them being, USA, UK, Australia and Canada. The absence of Japan raised many eyebrows. Some analysts and news reports mentioned that Japan wanted to condemn these acts by China, but not to a level to jeopardize its economic interests.

As the Chinese military maneuvering in the East China Sea has seen an uptick coupled with the larger change in Chinese diplomacy, which has become highly aggressive, popularly known as wolf warrior diplomacy, Japan finds itself in a difficult situation.

In dealing with the tensions in the East China Sea, both the countries are treading a narrow line. On the one hand, China wants to continue its activities to the extent that Japan finds it within its comfort zone to deal with it bilaterally, and on the other hand, Japan wants to maintain its sovereign rights of the Senkaku Islands (as declared in 2012) without compromising its economic interests with respect to China. Both countries maintain a level of complex interdependence, add this to their proximity and the military capabilities each one of them possesses, both want to get the largest slice of the East China Sea cake without agitating the other party beyond reconciliation.

Thus, as Japan wants to unchain from these shackles of complex interdependence to have a more independent China policy, it is looking at options to nullify this interdependence. In line with this, the Japanese have been trying to diversify their supply chains and move to manufacture away from China and to South East Asia and India.

In the process, according to a report by Bloomberg, 57 companies would receive 57.4 billion yen or $536 million in subsidies from the Japanese government to move to manufacture away from China. In addition to this, thirty other firms would receive money to move factories to Vietnam, Myanmar, Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries stated the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. The payments would come from the 243.5 billion yen that was earmarked by Government in Tokyo to reduce dependency on Chinese supply chains.

In addition to these steps for economic diversification, Japan is also taking up military modernization. Be it, converting Helicopter carriers into Aircraft Carriers or military pact with Australia (which is Japan’s second agreement on allowing a foreign military presence in its territory, the first being the 1960 Status of Forces Agreement with the US). In addition to all this, Japan has also increased its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region.

The whole visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi also has confirmed that both sides are not willing to relent on their respective positions. The differences have only widened and the fact that the two countries shied away from discussing the controversial yet important issue of Senkaku Islands means that Japan will keep on increasing its military strength, to increase its position on the negotiation table. Just recently Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi has invited German warships for naval drill with their Japanese counterparts and Japan has also decided to hold naval drills with France.

Japan, for a long time, has been constrained by its economic interests. Thus, it has not been able to act out its strategic interests. For perspective, the trade with China of Japan’s total trade in 2019 was 21.3 percent. However, as the country diversifies its economic options, the Chinese will lose the Achilles Heel (Japan’s supply chain dependence) and could increase the probability and intensity of strategic contestation. In the meantime, the attempt to showcase things as normal is in Japanese interest as it gives it time for the companies to move their manufacturing out of China and diversify its supply chains, thus, gaining the ability to act out its strategic interests and deter China’s activities in the East China Sea.

Beijing: Foreign Languages Press

Sreemati Chakrabarti, Vice-chairperson and Honorary Fellow, ICS

Writings and speeches of leaders of countries around the world and mainly in socialist states are normally called Selected Works. President Xi Jinping’s speeches have been  published with a different kind of name ‘The Governance of China’.  Perhaps someday a detailed explanation may come from the publishers and other political analysts about this title, however I will not make any guess why it is so.  This volume comprises mainly of writings and speeches delivered by the Chinese President who is also the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, between October 2017 to January 2020.Very much like the writings and speeches of his predecessors Xi’s style is simple and intelligible to the ordinary person.

 To understand contemporary China such a volume can be a very important primary source material for research as well as to understand the priorities in terms of policies of the ruling dispensation. The volume’s first section is Xi Jinping’s speech at the 19^th Party Congress on 18 October, 2017. Many scholars and analysts have already commented about this speech which runs into many pages and covers a wide range of subjects which President Xi considers significant for both the Chinese nation as well as the Chinese Communist Party. All through this Report President Xi refers to “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”. Whereas ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ as a guiding  principle was upheld since the 1980s by Deng Xiaoping and the communist party of that period but adding the words ‘new era’ shows that Xi jinping wishes to recreate and rejuvenate some old policies taking into account the new and emerging realities of the Chinese social, political, economic, cultural and environmental situation. The long speech which runs into 79 pages in its English translation while covering a whole range of issues from innovations to culture to the armed forces to national reunification and so forth, seems to give a lot of stress on the role and significance of the Party. While it is natural that at the party congress which meets only once in five years the supreme leader will emphasize on party work to inspire and energise the junior most party worker yet the extent and intensity of Xi Jinping’s continuous stress on the party is almost unparalleled in the history of communism. The speech gives due importance to many other aspects of the social, economic and political life of people in the PRC but his call to the youth, I thought, was, remarkable. Towards the end of the speech, he says: “A nation will prosper only when its young people thrive; a country will be full of hope and have a great tomorrow only when its younger generations have ideals, ability, and a strong sense of responsibility. The Chinese dream is about the past, the present, and the future. It is the dream of our generation, but even more so a dream of the younger generation” (p.75).

A young Indian political scientist, Dr. Bhim Subba, who studies politics in China while summing up the Report has made the following comment, “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’ also called as Xi Jinping Thought has been enshrined into the party doctrine/constitution as a guiding ideology. This is a part of a continuum which indicates that Xi like his predecessors wants his ideological innovation to be added to the party charter but after his name. The Report stressed on the party leadership to guide towards socialist modernization and the national rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Further, the Report also stressed on the Chinese people and the Party not to forget the ‘original mission’ (bu wang chuxin) of the Chinese communists through the alertness of the cadres, continuing by deepening reforms (rule of law) and strict governance (anti-corruption and rectification continues to make waves until this day). However, the most important pronouncement was the mentioning of the Belt and Road Initiative (OBOR) more than five times. This has become the bed-rock of Xi’s grand strategy of economic and foreign relations since 2013 and more vigorously post-19th party congress in 2017.”

Other noticeable points that Xi Jinping makes in his speech include supporting a new generation of entrepreneurs and giving a boost to the private sector (p.315). For readers who may be interested in knowing President Xi’s ideas on diplomacy and foreign policy it is necessary to point out that here also he focusses on strengthening the CPC’s leadership role (pp.489-499). The volume includes Xi’s speeches at all major international events like the SCO, BRICS Business Forum, APEC CEO Summit, G20 as well as the Asian Civilizations Dialogue, (which this reviewer had the opportunity to attend), among others.

In my opinion, however, the most significant, relevant and with far-reaching consequences are the Chinese President’s views and policies on ecology and environment. Speeches  and writings on these issues are in the section called ‘Harmony between Humanity and Nature’.  Speaking at the National Conference on Eco-environmental Protection in May 2018, he states at the beginning of his speech that the major challenge facing Chinese society today “is the gap between the unbalanced and inadequate development and the ever-growing expectation of the people for a better life”. Since people of the country and their support are top priority it is absolutely necessary to promote environmental protection, preserve the ecosystems and provide more quality eco-products (p.417) When it comes to economic development it is important to adhere to the principle of giving priority to “conservation, protection and the restoration of nature. We should not think of taking from nature without giving back, developing without protecting, and consuming without restoring” (p419). One cannot overstress the significance of the above-mentioned statement. Development and progress without adequate precautions to keep the environment healthy is already haunting mankind. At this stage if corrective measures are not taken the future of humanity will be jeopardized. In this speech the President urges and pleads to protect the environment as one protects one’s eyes and life. Insisting that environmental quality cannot be allowed to drop further, it should only improve, he warns that local Party and government functionaries will be held directly accountable if in their areas of work ecosystems are badly damaged and there is deterioration in the quality of the environment (p.420). In this speech he mentions that “each and every individual is a protector, builder and beneficiary and so  should not be a bystander, an outsider or a critic” (p.421). Towards the end he makes a commitment that China will be heavily involved in global environmental governance and actively take part in the transformation to help form global solutions to eco-environmental protection and to sustainable development. (p.423). 

In the same speech President Xi refers to the ever-important issue of air and water pollution. Stating that air pollution is top priority he reminds the audience that China has made a promise to the international community that before hosting the 2022 Beijing winter Olympics air quality will be improved. Specifically targeting the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region and its surrounding area, the Yanztze River Delta, and the Fenhe-Weihe river Plain would be essential for a substantial improvement in air quality which he calls an “unconditional requirement ….to bring back blue skies” To achieve this it will be necessary to eliminate individual coal-fired boilers and suspend operations of outdated coal-fired power plants and then transform and upgrade them. On controlling water pollution Xi Jinping suggests that all urban water bodies need to be cleaned up and in particular the Bohai sea water must be improved and the Yangtze River ecosystem should be protected and restored. In addition, soil pollution control can be done through promulgating and implementing a law to enforce the action plan (pp.427-29).

This section on environment and ecology also consists of the inaugural speech President Xi delivered on April 2019 at the International Horticulture Exhibition in Beijing. Since this event was attended by many foreign heads of governments and other dignitaries he urges all nations to join hands to meet the common challenges, he says “Only together we can effectively address climate change, marine pollution, biological conservation, and other global environmental issues, and achieve the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” (p.436). Towards the end of this speech he mentions that China is prepared to work with other countries “to create a better homeland and a global community of shared future.” (p.437). The last sub-section on this subject is the Chinese president’s speech at the Forum on Eco-conservation and quality Development of the Yellow River Basin. Here he emphasizes on improving water conservation and preventing potential hazards due to too much sediment in the Yellow River.

Overall, the selection of speeches on ecology and environment made by the publishers is rather commendable as it gives the reader a very comprehensive picture of the policies and priorities of the Chinese leadership on a matter which has world-wide consequences.

Yash Johri, Research Assistant, ICS

Biden foreign policy will focus on renewing the American position as the chief consensus builder and underwriter for a rule based international order. While this doesn’t portend a new beginning or a wiping of the slate, it does mean making an attempt to restore the effectiveness and trust enjoyed by world and regional institutions that helped the world prosper in the post World War Two phase as well as recommitting to and developing new methods to deal with multilateral problems such as that of climate change and technology governance. While the primary focus will undoubtedly be on healing the socio-economic divide at home we are likely to see a return of America projecting the values of democracy to the world as it has done in the past. All this will undoubtedly be in the face of the somewhat multipolar environment that has come to develop with an aggressive China and highly unequal and divided societies across the world.

The President-Elect in a conversation earlier this week with Thomas Friedman of the New York Times stated that he would not make any immediate moves to change Trump policy toward China, including on the Tariffs until he had conducted a full review of United States’ China Policy and consulted allies in the United States and Europe.  Biden went on to state that it was required for America to create far greater leverage when it came to dealing with China, such leverage is to emerge from generating domestic and international consensus in their approach to the China challenge. While, only once the full spectrum China policy review concludes will observers be able to gauge the real direction of the administration on China, in the meantime, we can glean further into the thoughts and writings of persons the President-Elect is expected to involve in these consultations as principle stakeholders.

Anthony Blinken has been nominated by the President-Elect to serve as his Secretary of State. In the Obama administration, he served as Deputy National Security Advisor (2013-2015) and Deputy Secretary of State (2015-2017). In a conversation with Walter Mead organized by the Hudson Institute on the 9^th of July, 2020, Blinken echoed his new boss’s aforementioned words that the United States relative to China had to regain a strategically advantageous position. While specifically stating that a lack of reciprocity in the Sino-US relationship was unsustainable, he stated that the United States needed to renew and strengthen its various alliances, re-engage with global institutions and re-commit to holding up its values. Given that the US’s erstwhile leadership position was receding, the situation was not only allowing China to act with impunity but also leading to a general world fragmentation. Blinken went on state that it was when the United States re-established this position of strength, only then would it be conducive to engage with the Chinese upon issues, which both nations share overlapping interests on such as Climate Change.

Jake Sullivan has been nominated by the President-Elect to serve as National Security Advisor. Sullivan in the past served as VP Biden’s National Security Advisor, as well as the Head of Policy Planning under Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, at 43 he will become the youngest person to serve in this capacity since the Eisenhower Administration.

In an October 2019, Foreign Affairs piece titled ‘Competition Without Catastrophe’, Sullivan along with Kurt Campbell (Secretary Clinton’s Assistant for East Asia) while differentiating the Cold War from the US-China situation and arguing against similar containment strategies wrote, “…the goal should be to establish favorable terms of coexistence with Beijing in four key competitive domains – military, economic, political and global governance – thereby securing US interests without triggering the kind of threat perceptions that characterized the US-Soviet rivalry. Washington should heed the lessons of the Cold War while rejecting the idea that its logic still applies.” The piece further critiqued the National Security Strategy of 2018 by stating that the term ‘Strategic Competition’ contained in it reflects uncertainty about what the competition is over and what it means to win and further stated that the “starting point for the right US approach must be humility about the capacity of decisions made in Washington to determine the direction of long-term developments in Beijing. Rather than relying on assumptions about China’s trajectory, American strategy should be durable whatever the future brings for the Chinese system.”

The piece is a preliminary analysis dissecting the relationship from all angles, it urges a middle path between outright competition and a Chamberlain-like Grand Bargain. At the conclusion, Sullivan and Campbell echo Biden and Blinken that the United States can certainly not go it alone and needs to regain the confidence of its allies. More recently in May, 2020 Sullivan and Hal Brands have detailed in Foreign Policy, China’s two paths to power, one, a bottom up regional dominance narrative and the other a top down method by developing global political influence. An interesting and very detailed analysis that helps show the mirror to not only the American strategic community, but to all around the world dealing with the China challenge.

From Blinken and Sullivan’s views as well as President-Elect Biden’s recent statements, we can certainly expect a far more engaged United States. A running trope across the three views has been the need and desire to regain the United States’ strategic leverage across the world in order for it to not only secure its own economic position in the world but also to continue having a major say in setting the rules of post-pandemic world order. While the two aforementioned functionaries have so far been nominated, a recent Financial Times article states that Biden is expected to name China hawk Ely Ratner, Former Deputy NSA to a senior role as well as Kelly Magsamen to a prominent Asia role. Expect the Treasury Secretary nominee, Janet Yellen (erstwhile governor of the Federal Reserve, US Central Bank) to have a prominent say on China policy as well.

Professor Da Wei of Tsinghua University during an ICS Wednesday Seminar on the 29^th of April was asked his preference between Biden and Trump, he replied that it didn’t matter who the principal was, what mattered greatly were the subject area policy makers. About Trump’s advisors he stated, “The team in DC running China policy are not mature enough, I think they are not stable or predictable…”. While 46’s advisors may put forth challenging propositions for Chinese persons like Da Wei to argue with, from their qualifications, past experience and Biden’s track record of trusting experts one can say that the management of the relationship will certainly be more predictable.

Neha Mishra, Research Intern, ICS

The perception of the Persian Gulf countries about Iran has been built across two time frames – Pre and Post-Islamic revolution. The Pre-Islamic revolution Iran was seen as a preserver of regional stability and an agent of the USA in the region. Mohammad Reza Shah (1941-79) played an important role in this context as he tried to dismantle every challenge to the regional stability whether it was Iraq’s regional hegemonic aspirations or any rebellion unrest in the Gulf monarchies, along with sustaining US legitimacy in the Persian Gulf. Ironically, the Islamic or Iranian Revolution (1979) led to a revolutionary wave in the other Gulf monarchies that made Gulf rulers perceive Iran as a threat to the regional solidity and, weaken the US-Iran ties as well. The events including- Islamic Revolution, Iran-Iraq war (1980), Gulf crisis (1990-91), and regional conflicts or disputes over Abu Musa, Tunb Islands, annual Hajj pilgrimage, and so on, contributed further to change the relation between Iran and Gulf states.

The Post-Islamic revolution Iran began to be perceived as a threat to the Gulf security, despite all the efforts made by President Muhammad Khatami and President Hassan Rouhani including the JCPOA agreement, to bring back the pre-revolution status of Iran. Broadly speaking, the securitization of Iran in the region has been the outcome of two developments: – a) the US-Israel Alliance that portrayed Iran’s nuclear program as a threat to the regional security; b) the insecurity of the neighbors about Iran, having a high amount of reserves and overpowering them. The regional security, peace, and cooperation are imperative for the domestic stability and economic recovery of Iran, but the above-mentioned developments had made it difficult for Iran to resolve the issues with its Gulf neighbors.

In this context, it could be argued that being a part of China’s BRI railway network could help Iran not only in establishing itself as a trade hub for the region, but also to boost its bilateral connection with the neighbors, thereby restoring its preserver status.

Iran became an integral part of the Chinese BRI program in 2016 when President Xi Jinping declared his intentions to help Iran in the facilitation of long-term peace and stability in the Middle East, claiming that Chinese planning to build railway network connectivity with the region will certainly improve the regional integration of the region as well.

The interest of China in the Persian Gulf region evolved majorly due to its geostrategic and geopolitical significance. The involvement of China in the Gulf region increased further during the 1970s to counteract the augmented Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean region, since Gulf is connected to the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran with domination over the Strait consequently became geopolitically important for China. Furthermore, Iran’s uneasy relationship with the USA and the strategic interest of India in Iran were the other factors that shaped Sino-Iran interactions.

The opportunity to be a part of BRI came as an advantage for Iran when it declared the plan to expand its railway network and connectivity to the Gulf neighbors as well as the other powerful actors. The Railway Restructuring/ Revolution plan of Iran invited major foreign investors including China, India, Russia, and others to participate in the progress. The Projects like- International North-South-Transport Corridor (INSTC), Eastern corridor, and Ashgabat agreement will connect Iran to India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Gulf country Oman, but might not contribute enough to change the regional equations of Iran. Chinese BRI railway connectivity project, on the other hand, is more likely to facilitate the geo-strategies of Iran in the Persian Gulf. For instance- in 2016, the first freight (Cargo) train was launched to transport goods in bulk between Iran and China and this developed the chances of turning Iran into a central hub of the Eurasian region. The hopes of connectivity continued to develop with launches of second, third, and fourth train services from 2016 to 2018, connecting China to Tehran passing through Central Asian countries and former Soviet Union Republics as well.

Besides these freight trains, Chinese Railway Engineering Corporation has approved loans for two important railway networks- a) The Tehran-Qom-Isfahan railway network- a $1.2 billion loan agreement on 400km double-tracked railway lines, to connect these three cities of Iran to develop Iran’s transporting capacity and speed, b) The Urumqi-Tehran-Mashhad railway network- this route will start from Urumqi (China), passing through Yining and Almaty (Kazakhstan), Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan), Tashkent and Samarkand (Uzbekistan), Ashgabat (Turkmenistan), then crosses Tehran to reach Mashhad (Afghanistan). This project will help China as well as Iran to deal with the incompatibility of the Persian Gulf neighbors since the benefits attached to the networks will certainly magnetize Gulf monarchies towards Iran as well as BRI railway projects. In addition, the Chinese railway networks being a gauge for its Silk route plan have the efficacy to improve the regional solidity and interaction for Iran. For instance:- the proposed Khorramshahr-Basra Railway network between Iraq and Iran is receiving aid from China, considering it as a potential route to connect Silk Road with regional rail system of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, as Basra is only 154 km away from the GCC country, Kuwait that would extend the connectivity further. As the Chinese railway project in Iran will not only make Iran a giant crossroad of the trade routes but also in boosting its economic as well as regional connectivity, thus largely viewed as a win-win collaboration.

However, the outspread of the Covid-19 Pandemic in the Iranian holy city of Qom has halted the work of railway network projects. On the one hand, there has been a considerable increase in the anti-Chinese sentiments in Iran, with a certain section of populace claiming that Iran contracted the virus in lieu of the economic and trade support from China. The spread of the virus has also affected the somewhat improving relations of Iran with the Gulf countries, as reports allege that Iranian travelers had spread the virus to these countries. While on the other hand, the unwillingness of majority Iranian politicians to accept Chinese workers/ travelers as a source of the virus, due to the importance of China to Iran is also noteworthy. Moreover, the latest removal of India from the Chabahar-Zahedian line project citing continuous delay in the funding is going to fuel up the Sino-Iran interactions, as the involvement of India in the Chabahar Project remained a critical concern of China and challenge to its Gwadar port project in Iran.

The BRI railway network has the potential of not only bridging the infrastructure and connectivity gap at the global level, but also at the regional level for Iran. However, Iran should not be excessively dependent on China, as it can lead to a situation reminiscent of pre-revolution era when it shared a skewed power dynamic with the USA. Moreover, China has certain unilateral goals through the BRI railway network and any conflicting stance of Iran can be a major setback to achieving its regional aspirations.

Asma Masood, Associate Member, Chennai Centre for China Studies (C3S)

“Let’s make America great again” or “The Chinese Dream”?

Xi Jinping’s “Asian Civilization” or Donald Trump’s “America First”?

As the spread of coronavirus ebbs and rises, waves of opposing political narratives and ideological clashes continue to flow. Civilizational contrasts are observed as American calls for liberty clash with Chinese assertions on non-interference. As US condemns Chinese treatment of Uyghurs by sanctioning high-ranking Chinese officials, Chinese officials also face visa restrictions over the US insisting on greater autonomy for Tibet. Chinese media did not hold back on coverage and op-eds on the race riots in US after George Floyd’s killing.

While political and strategic analysts ponder on the above, queries also arise on how cultural contours have merged with commercial aspects and the significance of this interlinkage.

Cultural curiosity is no longer a forerunner to new market ventures, as was in centuries gone by. Instead, trade with upcoming markets has been leading to enhancement of cultural linkages since recent decades. Nevertheless, inquisitiveness about lifestyles in Western countries is a major factor in determining consumer behaviour in many developing states. This in turn helps drive international trade ties. However, there are occasions when these linkages fall short of translating into mutual success, as demonstrated by two scenarios. It is important to understand such shortcomings, as they offer a peek into how international relations can be managed in the coming decades.

Take the case of when Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) won the 2015 elections in Myanmar. At the time, there was global interest in the scope for the country’s fledgling industries such as finance, telecom and hospitality. Myanmar subsequently sought to develop cultural realms such as tourism. Fast forwarding to 2020, and the ongoing Covid-19 crisis, pressures from USA due to the Rohingya issue and a shaky outlook for the government have reverted Myanmar to uncertainty, with foreign investors stepping back. The US views that Myanmar’s conceptualization of democracy is not all-inclusive as in the case of the Rohingyas, hence leading to USA’s ‘financial distancing’ from the country.

While Western historians and cultural scholars keenly study ancient Persian culture, they would face challenges in carrying forward this interest into the Iranian ethos today. Geopolitics block not only prospects for commercial forays into Iran, but also shape perceptions and impede communication pathways. Intriguingly, this has not dampened Iranians’ appetite for American goods. This is in spite of strategic tensions with the US, current American sanctions and an influx of Chinese goods.  The US is scoring domestic points in alienating the Iranian leadership, however, Iran’s common citizens continue to complain of narrowed access to American supplies, including medical supplies for treating coronavirus.US sanctions also led to Iranians losing access to electronic goods fromJapan and South Korea.

In either matrix, it is clear that China is gaining an edge. The country is ensuring that its energy needs are met, while it exports not only goods to Iranian and Myanmarese markets but also its own cultural manifestations. One cultural component is coaching in Mandarin, which is also an essential business tool. This will be increasingly sought after, especially as Iran and China cemented their strategic and trade partnership in July 2020. In Myanmar, although the government is looking to balance China’s overwhelming presence by focusing on India among other countries, the military which has high stakes in the country’s commercial sectors, has strong ties with China. This acts as a gateway for increasing popularity of Chinese language and entertainment productions among Myanmar’s population. 

While Iran and Myanmar are within Chinese spheres of commercial and cultural influence, the West proclaims that China is facing challenges from various other fronts. These include tensions with the US over trade, the pandemic crisis, and the status of Hong Kong. Other fissures are visible as seen in the UK’s rejection of Huawei, Japan largely diverting automobile manufacturing from China to Vietnam, and the Indian rethink on Chinese investments before and after the recent border stand-off. The spread of coronavirus is another reason for widespread criticism of China.

However, a parallel narrative is emerging, that of China moving closer to Russia and reiterating relations with Iran, as well as its economic growth after containing the pandemic within its borders. This means that it is attempting to balance its economic losses on one scale with gains on the other. China also continues to maintain relations with other energy exporting states and markets worldwide. It is clear that state economies worldwide are intensely intertwined with China, and these ties cannot transform overnight.

On a parallel note, American nationalism is rising, but not diluting US commercial presence across the globe. Private companies are well aware of the consequence of ignoring American and Chinese realities. Evidence of this is apparent in the New York Times shifting its Hong Kong staff to South Korea in light of the US stand on the HK status. It mirrors an entrenched tendency among private players to adapt to the laws of both the homeland and wherever they hold shop.

Consequently, the demand for key language skills will remain, as will the interest to imbibe cultural etiquette while dealing with American and Chinese businesses. It is easier for the US to draw strength from the international knowledge base of the English language and know-how of American customs. On the other hand, China’s Confucius Institutes (CIs) were shut down in Sweden and in the US. For now, these are isolated incidents, which are not reflected in the rest of the CIs across the world. Similarly, rivalry between leadership in China and other countries has not changed the existing social linkages between them, be it in Japan or ASEAN member states. The Chinese government realizes this, and has long established a ministry dedicated to cultivating relations with the country’s diaspora who are also crucial investment channels for China.

The ‘Chinese takeaway’ from these facets is that Xi Jinping wants to match, if not outrace, the US in global cultural influence. ‘Pepsi culture’ which may sound cliched, is a stark reminder on the success of American brand values. Incidentally, the hit US beverage brand has reinvented itself for Chinese consumers. A slow march lies ahead for China in the quest for equal prominence of its cultural symbols and brands. Meanwhile, Beijing will attempt to employ the umbrella of geographical commonalities as a binder via the ‘Asian Civilization’ dialogue. Calls of global unity are promoted under the banner of ‘community of shared future of mankind’. One cannot help thinking that the key is the packaging. The US markets its services and products in internationally appealing cultural wrappers. Chinese goods have to depend on the lower priced tags to push sales. The ‘Chinese Dream’ is ambitious, but it is a dream for China. The American Dream which inspired millions of immigrants until recently is losing shimmer. But the world still ‘needs’ iPhones as much as Xiaomi mobiles. It is not immediately clear whether the US and China will outmanoeuvre each other in the political realm or find a way for co-existence. Until then, consumerism will stay as the cross-continental culture of our times.