Category: Uncategorized

Parul Trivedi, Research Intern, ICS

The relationship between People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains the most enduring brothers- in arms relationship which was forged during the Korean War in 1950 and solidified with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in 1961. During the heydays of the cold war both Chinese and North Korean leaders described their relationship as ‘lip and teeth’ on the account of shared mutual interests and common ideology.

With the end of the cold war era in 1990s, three differences emerged between the two allies. First, China wanted North Korea to open up its economy but North Korea was reluctant to adopt such measures fearing regime collapse. Second, sticky issue was Beijing’s growing relations with South Korea which made Pyongyang uneasy. The third issue was the Beijing’s concern about North Korean nuclear Programme. Despite numerous differences between the two, it had been observed that Beijing has endeavored to maintain its traditional ties with DPRK as North Korea serves as a buffer state for China as well as PRC is desirous of maintaining stability in the Korean peninsula.

BEIJING’S STRATEGY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA UNDER XI JINGPING

Beijing’s foreign policy towards its North East Asian neighbors includes five no’s: no instability, no collapse, no nukes, no refugees and no conflict escalation. Before Xi Jingping assumed power China had a clear stance over the North Korea’s nuclear issue that it preferred stability over denuclearization and thus Beijing has not been forthcoming in implementation of sanctions. However, under Xi, Beijing supported UNSC resolution against DPRK in 2013 and began implementing international sanctions on North Korea which in North Korea’s views, such Chinese actions was a betrayal to their traditional ties. Xi by choosing to travel to South Korea in July 2014 before visiting North Korea, broke the tradition reflecting a preference for Beijing’s relations with Seoul over Pyongyang.  The relationship between the two countries deteriorated further in 2016 with North Korea which began with its testing missile frequently. China had raised its voice on multiple occasions. For instance: According to U.S. media report: “China can no longer stand the continuous escalation of the North Korean nuclear issue at its doorstep” Another statement made by the official media of the Chinese Communist Party(CCP) cautioned North Korea to ‘avoid making mistakes  and warned’, if North Korea makes another provocative move, the Chinese society will be willing to see the UNSC to adopt severe restrictive measures that have never been seen before, such as restricting oil imports to North Korea. Notwithstanding the fear that excessive pressure on North Korea could lead to regime collapse, in 2017, following Pyongyang’s continued testing ballistic missiles, Beijing not only supported UN backed sanctions but also implemented them earnestly. It is to be noted that:

In response to Chinese actions, North Korea upped the ante both in rhetoric and in action. In a response to commentaries in Chinese state media calling for more sanctions, the Korean Central News Agency warned PRC by reinstating that: ‘China had to better ponder over the grave consequences to be entailed by its reckless act of chopping down the pillar of the DPRK- PRC relations’. It was also added that the ‘DPRK will never beg for the maintenance of friendship with China’ In fact, North Korean act of testing its 6^th nuclear weapon hours before the BRICS Summit hosted by China in September 2017 was an act clearly to embarrass Beijing diplomatically to convey Pyongyang’s displeasure of Chinese support for sanctions.

REPAIRING THE TROUBLED RELATIONSHIP (2018-2022) Beijing’s approach of supporting international sanctions meant to convey the message to Pyongyang that undermining China’s interest would not be tolerated and will have its consequences and push North Korea to choose the path of diplomacy. However, when North Korea shifted its approach from confrontation to diplomacy towards United States in 2018, Beijing was concerned that Pyongyang was drifting away from China as well as its influence on Pyongyang was on decline and it appeared that its interests were threatened.

In an effort to reassert its influence in the changing Korean peninsula dynamics that was fast evolving, Beijing doubled down on its efforts to patch up things with Pyongyang. China hurriedly organized the first Kim- Xi Summit on April 14, 2018, ahead of inter- Korean and the US-DPRK Summit. The two leaders met four times over the span of one year. The last meeting was held in June 2019, during President Xi’s first state visit to North Korea. The last Chinese leader to visit Pyongyang was Hu Jintao in 2005. President Xi’s visit to North Korea was significant as it came following the failure of the second Summit between Kim and Trump in February 2019.

Since, the first Xi-Kim meeting, Chinese narrative of the bilateral relations began emphasizing the value of their traditional alliance relationship and filled with deep appreciation for warm comradeship in championing the socialist cause. President Xi promised to promote a ‘ long term, sound and stable’ relationship with North Korea and Korean leader Kim Jong Un also sent a message to Xi stating that “invincible friendship will be immortal on the road of accomplishing the cause of socialism as two countries marked the 70 years of their diplomatic relations”.

Since, the diplomatic rapprochement in 2018, Beijing once again began assuming the big brother role and started investing further in restoring its alliance with Pyongyang. On the occasion of celebrating the 60^th anniversary of the alliance in July 2021, the two countries renewed the Treaty for another 20 years as they had done before in 1981 and 2001. The growing diplomatic rapprochement between the two countries have also given impetus to restore the traditional party to party ties and furthermore, Beijing promised its support to the Korean Workers Party on its pursuit to a socialist economy. Since, 2018 China has been voicing its support for North Korea in the UN and argued for relaxing sanctions. For instance:  Recently, China stepped up to cover North Korea in the UN by blocking the US bid to impose sanctions for its testing of cruise and hypersonic missiles in January 2022.

In conclusion, it can be inferred that under Xi Jingping China is desirous of enlarging its area of influence in the whole of North East Asian region with an increase in the Sino-US strategic power rivalry. Although China is much wary about North Korea’s nuclearization, but within the given context of growing Sino-US strategic rivalry China might have another calculation towards North Korea’s nuclear program as it would require a nuclear North Korea to restraint the growing US military presence in the Korean peninsula. Therefore, under Xi Jingping’s leadership China has been making efforts to achieve stability in the Korean peninsula by increasing its area of influence over the peninsula as it is geostrategically an outpost for consolidating power in the whole of North East Asian region. However, In near future, it is yet to be observed that whether Beijing’s blossoming relationship with Pyongyang with utmost patience and grudging tolerance for its nuclear programs will still continue if DPRK’S expanding missile programs begins to affect China’s regional and strategic interests in the region.

The Blog was written under the guidance and supervision of Dr. Priyanka Pandit, Ashoka-HYI Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, Department of International Relations and Governance Studies Shiv Nadar University, India. The views expressed here are those of the author(s), and not necessarily of the mentor or the Institute of Chinese Studies.

Upasana Ghosh, Research Intern, ICS

While the world has its gaze fixed on China, it stepped into a pivotal political year that is awaited by several economic challenges exacerbated due to the pandemic. On the last day of 2021, President Xi Jinping extended his best wishes to his fellow citizens and delivered the annual New Year address to the nation. During the televised speech, the Chinese President had sent a clear message to the international community that China is “ready” for the long and arduous journey ahead. The crux of the speech revolved around – glorification of the Communist Party of China’s (CCP) achievements in 2021, the elevation of the regime’s image as the best governing institution and Xi’s political objectives for the year, 2022. Another prime focus of Xi’s address was: urging citizens to maintain their “strategic focus” and mindfulness against “potential risks”, that could disrupt CCP’s mission to lead the way in China’s long march towards the great rejuvenation. Consequently, stressing the importance of resilience, courage and determination for the people of China as they look forward to the future.  

Nevertheless, the profound message behind the address reflects articulated camouflaging of the economic and political fallouts at home and abroad. Looking forward to 2022, Xi’s call for more rigorous efforts to foster an economically robust, politically transparent and socially peaceful environment came at the backdrop of the Party’s forthcoming 20^th Congress scheduled in autumn this year. The preceding year 2021, was a tough one for China, as the world’s second-largest economy came under severe international pressure due to a range of factors, including obfuscating information on Covid-19 data, aggressive posturing on the South China Sea, and the human-right abuses against Uighurs in Xingjian province.

Further, the downturn in China’s real estate market and the intensifying slowdown in the export-driven national economy due to drastic drop in foreign demands of Chinese produce added to the financial distress at home. Investors from the foreign business community are becoming increasingly sceptical about Beijing’s grip over increasing risks in credit markets. Politically it got worse for Xi, as he faced widespread resentment from his own Party members due to the expelling of many party elites and that of unceasing popular discontent resulting from media censorships, regulations and surveillance on citizens in the name of adjustment of excessive incomes, redistribution of wealth and reduction of income inequality. In addition, a crackdown over Hong Kong and an expansionist approach towards Taiwan led to further dispersal of Beijing’s negative image across the globe. All these combined, contributed to Xi’s pledge in this year’s annual address to meet domestic and global expectations from a responsible world power. The implied undertone was reflected in a burnished manner in his message that  “the world is turning its eyes to China,” and it is ready.

President Xi began his speech with his retrospective appreciation of “continual progress” and contributions made by Chinese citizens and the Party in achieving their first centenary goal of building China into a “moderately prosperous” society during the historically axial year 2021. While looking ahead into the future, he highlighted that as China “confidently” strides toward “a new journey” of achieving its second centenary goal of building a great modern socialist country in all respects, 2022 will be another crucial year for the country. By drawing attention towards the centenary celebration of the founding of the CPC, Xi recalled the Party’s extraordinary achievements and contributions throughout the past century in diminishing Chinese people’s “unyielding struggle” against all challenges, be it the elimination of poverty or towards the accomplishment of their extraordinary mission of Chinese rejuvenation. In the televised address, Xi reminded his people to “always remain true to their original aspiration”, thereby emphasizing loyalty as integral to Party’s founding mission and interests. While conveying about the adoption of the Party’s third resolution on historical issues at the sixth plenary session of the 19th CPC Central Committee, Xi praised CPC’s 100-year achievements and experience as a source of motivation and inspiration. In this context, Xi also referred to the importance of Chairman Mao’s thoughts in attaining the historical initiative. Therefore, it becomes evident that the Chinese President’s New Year address is nothing but a commemoration before his people about CCP’s centrality in Chinese polity. Also, the President in his address attempted to bolster the regime’s image as the quintessential modus-operandi for China’s socio-economic advancement. The speech can further be interpreted as Xi’s attempt to elevate his image and stature in the Party’s history in order to fulfil his intention to ensure his position as party chief for a third term. Hence, in Consequence, establishing himself as the uncontested ‘core’ leader of the People’s Republic of China. It is to be noted that Xi has always relied on Party’s performance legitimacy as his preferred tool to strengthen and maintain his monopoly over national power, dismantle domestic dissent of any kind and to consolidate mass support.

While speaking on people’s struggles from living in poverty, Xi’s address entailed a personal touch. He accentuated experiences from his encounter with poverty and mindfulness from his nationwide field trips about Chinese people’s sustained efforts in scoring ‘complete victory’ in fighting poverty. This relatable and engaging acknowledgement of the common man’s problems conveyed a calculated measure to garner widespread support as an empathetic mass leader. Although Xi called for more strenuous efforts on behalf of the Chinese people to ensure stable and highest-quality of economic development and a truly prosperous social environment, this year’s speech appears to have tactfully evaded from setting any specific economic agenda and growth targets. Instead, in desperate measures to win over people’s confidence before the commencement of CCP’s National Congress in autumn 2022, Xi seemed to hint at looming economic pressure in the country, thereby vowing about his and the Party’s commitment to tackle any such challenges. He devoted a substantial section to his profound concern for the environment, with multiple geographic references, evincing his detailed attention to specific situations. Thus, taking a chance to demonstrate the world about China’s sincerity as a responsible leader, towards advancing sustainable development goals and its resolution and effort to promote collaborative development and prosperity for all in the future. By stressing upon the advancements in China’s space program, Xi tried to draw worldwide attention towards its broadened scientific outreach for humanity. In a very veiled fashion, by capitalizing on the Party’s much-hyped campaign on ‘collective effort on common development and prosperity for mankind’, Xi alluded to his vision for China and next-generation political leaders, that the commitment to China’s aerospace would only intensify in the coming period.

The Chinese President also didn’t miss the chance to be in the spotlight while expressing his plaudits for Chinese contribution in vaccine diplomacy and material assistance across the globe at the pandemic outbreak, contrary to the developed democracy’s struggle to meet their respective national demands. Aggrandizement of the Communist regime’s efficiency is handling the Pandemic crisis, reflected Xi’s motive to instil a sense of admiration for the Chinese way of global leadership among the developing countries. Also, the New Year address flagged Xi’s apprehension over a forthcoming complicated geopolitical environment in the commencing year, particularly concerning Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland and stability in the former British colony of Hong Kong and the former Portuguese-run enclave of Macau. Declaration on establishment and implementation of “One Country, Two Systems in the long run” through concerted efforts came amidst a severely deteriorating US-China relation alongside growing international backlashes and pressure from the US and European Union. To decode the subtle message, underlining a delicate tone of inspiring his people to defend, fight for and promote global peace and prosperity, upholds a firm and uncompromising diplomatic posture on behalf of the country’s President in his attempt to manage and resolve issues, perceived by Beijing as encroaching on its core national interests. The regime’s intent to enforce its political will embodying CCP’s contemporary expression of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ within its neighbourhood is clear from its expansionism in the region.

To sum up, Xi, in a very colloquial and relatable fashion, intended to demonstrate to China and the World that the Chinese model of socialism is not just delivering desired results but is also flourishing. On the surface, the enthusiastic address directed towards 1.4 billion national audiences resonated a personal one-to-one conversational appeal towards individual efforts for the overall upliftment of China’s global stature. However, underlying this optimism, is an instructive parameter of the communitarian regime for law-abiding Chinese citizens. The apparent portrayal of self as an archetype of a compassionate, charismatic mass-leader – through the application of simple yet catching phrases like “amicable, respectable” and “dream chasers” to address Chinese people, conveyed about the Chinese President’s attempt to uphold his image and political legitimacy at home and abroad. His description of 2022 as a pivotal year for the country by looking backward at Chinese achievements in the preceding year and looking forward as the Chinese together embarks on a new journey to transform their country into a significant global power sets the prime tone for Xi’s vision for Chinese polity in the coming time. Whereas, if Xi continues to stay in office beyond the anticipated decade, which is a high possibility, the international community, particularly its neighbouring contemporaries, must be prepared to face an even more outward-looking, proactive, and assertive China in the global platform. Beijing’s willingness to flex its muscle regarding what it considers defence and procurement of its core national interest in the contested Indo-Pacific and other territorial disputes is more likely than recognized. Xi’s telling phrase that everyone has seen and experienced a resilient and dynamic China further exemplifies contemporary China’s strategic posture in international affairs. Moreover, the two adjectives, “resilient” and “dynamic”, illustrates China’s preparedness for facing future challenges and the country’s zeal to bounce back against them. Henceforth, the upbeat address driven by political and economic exigencies at home and abroad is a clear indication of a further shift towards aggressive diversionary foreign policy approach to reinforce national sentiments and demonstrate competence against alternative administrations, only to retain political power of the party leaderships and thus, continuance of the Party’s legitimacy and authority across the motherland.

The Blog was written under the guidance and supervision of Dr. Priyanka Pandit, Ashoka-HYI Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, Department of International Relations and Governance Studies Shiv Nadar University, India. The views expressed here are those of the author(s), and not necessarily of the mentor or the Institute of Chinese Studies.

Hemant Adlakha, Honorary Fellow, ICS

Much before Trump-Pompeo combined “assault” on China and its ruling communist party, an article penned by a Singapore-based US researcher in Asia Times five years ago accused the communist party leadership of China of taking “victimhood” card to dizzying heights. Richard A. Bitzinger, the author, further claimed “every nation in the Asia-Pacific can claim, with some justification, to be a victim. Even Japan can declare its victimhood, as it was the first (and so far, only) target of nuclear weapons.” A well-known and globally respected scholar in South Korea wrote a decade ago: “the global community must speak with one voice and send China a clear message that it no longer views China as a victim of modern history.”

To most Chinese, including of course the ruling communist party, the above Western narrative demonstrates “the ignorance and prejudice its creators” have long held towards China. However, what Bitzinger and the South Korean professor Jongsoo Lee have been emphatically pointing out over the past decade or so is something new: it’s time China must shed a “victim” mentality. The Western “irritation”, as well as “impatience” with China playing victimhood or “century of humiliation” card, had started following China’s unprecedented economic rise a couple of decades ago. More recently, the worldwide anti-Chinese victim mentality buzz, which was re-launched half a decade ago with China’s “aggression” and “assertiveness” in the South China Sea, reached a crescendo with the global spread of the Covid19 pandemic.

This explains why according to the Western narrative, in recent years China’s acute sense of “victimhood” has been more pronounced in the international political arena. In June 2016, as the legal verdict was being awaited on China’s sweeping claims to SCS, the WSJ published a story entitled “The Danger of China’s Victim Mentality” and warned the international community of “Beijing lashing out if a ruling on SCS claims goes against it.” Suddenly, the global media was filled with similar “China against the world” op-ed commentaries. While some genuinely advised China to stop its obsession of playing the victim if the country seriously wished to advance as a society. Others were less charitable and warned China must shed a “victim” mentality. 

At another level, as according to Mark Tischler, a researcher at the Department of East Asian Studies, Tel Aviv University, the fundamental flaw in the Western narrative is, it often overlooks the fact that “China is the first power to challenge the United States” that truly rose from its post-colonial past. (Emphasis added) Perhaps oblivious of how much of China’s modern-day policy is driven by the collective trauma of “victimhood,” a former Indian foreign secretary opined recently “to avenge the ‘Century of Humiliation’ that China endured in the hands of western imperial powers from roughly 1839-1840 to 1949,” the Chinese are pursuing unilateralism instead of compromise in SCS. Moreover, their new brand of “wolf warrior” arrogance is replacing diplomacy of humility of the Zhou Enlai-Deng Xiaoping style, observed the veteran Indian diplomat who also served as ambassador in Beijing. In contrast, Tischler argues the major difference between Beijing’s and Western narrative on “century of humiliation” is the following. For China, it (century of humiliation) means “not just a grim lesson of the past, but also a warning about a possible future.” Hence, the (Chinese) narrative has created “a never again mentality.”

Much has been written and published in both Chinese and in English, on China’s victim mentality. Yet the issue has not only not whittled away over the decades since the foundation of New China, instead under Xi Jinping “century of humiliation” has acquired the new meaning of “Chinese rejuvenation” or “Chinese dream,” as it were. Interestingly, in an attempt to twist the “one hundred years of humiliation” narrative into post-Mao or post-Tiananmen Chinese nationalism, some scholars in the West are calling it anti-Western or anti-US Chinese nationalism. Applauding Zheng Wang’s highly acclaimed (Columbia University Press, 2014) Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations, Edward Friedman described the work as “a vivid and well-informed study of post-Mao nationalism and Chinese foreign policy…” 

Furthermore, it is not incorrect to say scholarly claims of “victimhood” being described as the new Chinese fig leaf for anti-West nationalism and to create post-Mao/pre-Mao “victimhood” dichotomy – as the current Western narrative wants us to believe, are fundamentally flawed. A recent article, for example, accuses the Communist Party of China (CPC) of manipulating the so-called victimhood as nothing less than a cynical ploy to exploit Chinese history and the feelings of Chinese people. It is pertinent to mention, though intangible, such a narrative has been receiving a lot of traction in the international media recently. Consider for example some of the following popular writings: “China doesn’t have to keep playing the victim” in Foreign Policy (2018), “China playing victim after attacking Indian soldiers in Galwan” in theprint.in (2020), “The Danger of China’s Victim Mentality” in TWSJ (2016), “China’s dangerous sense of entitled victimhood” in Asia Times (2016), “China’s New Diplomacy: Victim No More” in Foreign Affairs (2003) and so on.

Though perhaps understudied in the West, like most intellectuals in the late Qing and Republican eras, Mao Zedong too was not only deeply disturbed by the Chinese “century of humiliation,” several of his foreign policy decisions in the early to mid-1950s were heavily influenced by the “victim” mentality. In a seminal paper jointly authored by China’s widely respected historian, professor Yang Kuisong, and his young protégé and a Ph.D. candidate in Chinese history at the Pennsylvania University, Sheng Mao, have highlighted how Mao’s victim mentality impacted his decision which led to two Taiwan Strait crises in 1954-1955 and 1958 respectively. From both crises, according to Yang and Sheng, Mao’s gains were remarkably rewarding and psychologically productive. The first Taiwan Strait crisis – the shelling of Jinmen in 1954 – resulted in Mao succeeding in “forcing the United States to begin ambassador-level talks with China.” The outcome of the second Taiwan crisis in 1958 enabled Mao to declare: “The United States has put itself into our noose.” “The other thing Mao claimed to have achieved from the crises was confirmation of America’s nature as ‘paper tiger’,” Yang and Sheng pointed out. 

Finally, as we talk of prejudice and victimhood, and as the scholars in the West have firmed up their resolve to force Beijing to “give up” playing “victim” card, one thing is crystal clear in the minds of the current party leadership, i.e., riding on the past success of Mao’s playing “victim” mentality, the current Chinese leadership is too aware of how well the victimhood narrative has been serving China in its diplomatic strategies to put it aside anytime soon. Analyzing how China’s victimhood strategy was on full display at the Anchorage summit in Alaska two months ago, Drew Thompson, a visiting senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore, views the Chinese “victim” mentality narrative aimed more at the domestic audience than at the world populace at large. 

Well, speaking of prejudices and biases, Michael Barr, author of Who’s Afraid of China (2011) argued a decade ago that “fears of China often say as much about those who hold them as they do about the rising power itself.” The book has been described as holding a mirror to Sino-Western relations in order to better understand ideas about modernity, history, and international relations. It is indeed true the Western bias against China predates the “century of humiliation.” What is also historically undeniable is “on no other major civilization do self-regard, self-congratulation and denigration of the ‘Other’ run as deep, as they have in Western Europe and its overseas extensions,” observed a professor of economic history in a recent article “A Eurocentric Problem.” Not at all a surprise, historian Jeffery Wasserstrom wrote in his review of the book above: “This short book provides a clear-eyed critique of the latest versions of Sinomania and Sinophobia.”

In conclusion, as mentioned above, not only China is not going to stop playing victim and behave like a “normal country” as was recently on display during the first top level bilateral summit between the world’s two largest, hostile economies since President Biden took office. On the contrary, as many in the West fear, and as Beijing perceives the US power as well as dominance continuously declining, China is likely to pursue expansionist policies unchecked. Unlike what many in the West see as the nature of Chinese diplomacy is changing, China knows it is pursuing the same Maoist strategy to trap the US in the Chinese noose. As regards the “wolf warriors,” a seasoned Chinese ambassador Liu Xiaoming, flaunting “victimhood,” recently offered a tongue-in-cheek explanation: where there is a “wolf”, there is a “warrior”.

*This is a slightly edited version of the article published under the title Of Prejudice and Victimhood. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/05/18/of-prejudice-and-victimhood/

Siddhant Hira, China-analyst and incoming MA National Security Studies student at King’s College London

Introduction

Just like Beijing’s 2008 Summer Olympics, the run-up to the 2022 Winter Olympics also has “angry pro-Tibet protests along much of the Olympic Torch relay.” 2008 was a watershed moment in Chinese foreign policy: the Games was a major soft power victory. China proved to the world that it was capable of hosting a green and high-tech event by investing $40 billion in four years.

Chang Ping puts it aptly: pre-2008, ‘connecting the world’ was popular but post the games, China’s new message was “now the world should follow us”. At that time, the Olympics was a sports diplomacy tool for it to consolidate its status as an emerging superpower. A 2009 Congressional Research Service Report stated that after the Beijing Olympics, China’s economy enjoyed a domestic boom while its international trade and investment declined sharply.  By implementing economic measures for short-term benefits, Beijing projected the image that its economy was surging despite the rest of the world combating global recession.

Beijing’s 2022 Winter Olympics will be the first to allow foreign visitors in the post-Covid world. It will certainly be a welcome distraction, both domestically and globally. Domestically, it is perceived as a potential major success: China’s 14^th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) outlines the country becoming a sports power by 2025 as one of its long-term goals. China wishes to use the Games to fabricate a diplomatic victory after Covid-19 by inviting the world to witness first-hand, on-the-ground Chinese economic and soft power.

Today, China faces a credibility crisis ahead of the Olympics that is not just economic but an amalgamation of military, political, human rights and democratic challenges. China is not yet a global superpower but is much stronger than in 2008; however, now it has a different agenda for the 2022 Winter Olympics: a reset in its global perception and a restoration of credibility against the backdrop of Covid-19.

Loss of Face?

For decades, China has maintained an aggressive posture in the South China Sea, with numerous ongoing territorial and/or maritime disputes with nations in the region. Threats to and flight incursions over Taiwan continues to be a major issue. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, the PRC has violated Taiwan’s air defence identification zone (ADIZ) 380 times in 2020, a record figure. It does so in three ways, from most to least common: “circumnavigational flights of Taiwan, ADIZ intrusions, and violations of the cross-strait median line.”

                                              

In recent times, there have been two heavyweights in Tibet’s corner: the United States (US) and Great Britain (GBR). The former passed the Tibetan Policy and Support Act in January 2020 in Congress: Tibetans choose a new China-independent Dalai Lama, strict measures against Chinese officials who interfere in his succession, environmental protection of the Tibetan plateau, potentially no new Chinese consulates in the US until a consulate in Lhasa and recognition of the Central Tibet Administration. Just two months later, GBR’s Foreign Secretary, Domininc Raab, spoke at the United Nations Human Rights Council, stating that human rights abuses against Uighur Muslims were “… taking place on an industrial scale.”

On 30^th June 2020, China circumvented Hong Kong’s legislature by passing a draconian national security law. This Law grants vast and extremely vague powers to the Chinese Government to curb dissent and protest; criminalises secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign/external forces. Even though China has faced heavy backlash from the free world, the law is still in effect and the democratic and humanitarian freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong remain curtailed.

2020 began with the grim news of Covid-19, with most of the world holding China responsible for its origins and development. One theory propounded is that it was intentionally developed in a Wuhan laboratory with links to China’s army – the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The other theory considers it an accidental leak by human negligence.

Cases first emerged early November 2019, but the world only came to know in late December. Before the virus emerged, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had conducted an exercise in August 2019 – Crimson Contagion – to simulate a pandemic originating in China. David Sanger of The New York Times said that the result of the exercise may have been alarming enough to be “marked draft, sensitive, not for distribution”. The numbers projected were extremely sobering: “90% chance that the pandemic will be of very high severity, with 110 million forecasted illnesses, 7.7 million forecasted hospitalizations, and 586,000 deaths in the U.S. alone.” There is no evidence of a published exercise report, nor of any follow-up action. Had necessary steps been taken, Covid-19’s initial impact on the American public health system would have been minimised. The US Government’s apprehension of this becoming public knowledge potentially allowed China to control the narrative by obstructing impartial and independent studies on the origins and development of the virus. But now, the US Intelligence Community is conducting a thorough fact-finding investigation on the direct command of President Biden.

For India from an international relations perspective in 2020, its two greatest challenges which continue to shape its policy are Covid-19 and the clash with Chinese troops in Galwan Valley on 15^th June 2020. Soldiers from both sides came to blows in Eastern Ladakh, using clubs, stones, fists and the like – with India losing 20 men – and the Chinese – four, and possibly more. Typically, China takes decades to admit if and when it has lost soldiers in battle but this time, it took eight months. Forced by its own citizens sharing information publicly and with international sources quoting higher casualties, China had to admit its losses.

Conclusion

China also lost, and continues to lose, face because of the Belt and Road Initiative, its alleged involvement in the Myanmar coup and the Uighur-related controversy surrounding the Disney film Mulan. Its medium of aggression is primarily wolf-warrior diplomacy, a term that has become synonymous with China’s foreign policy.

For any state, hosting the Olympic Games is an opportunity to display the strength of its public diplomacy, status and soft power. There have even been some comparisons between the 1936 Munich Summer Olympics and the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, and the significance for both nations. The Biden administration is yet to take a stand regarding any boycott – with various stakeholders expressing a range of reactions including outright boycott, hosting elsewhere and legally punishing sponsors. Political leaders across North America and Europe have also coordinated legislative action against China hosting the Games.

The greatest challenge for the democratic world order is to ensure that the spirit of the Olympics is upheld, and yet strong action is taken against China’s humanitarian track record. The question facing China is whether it will be able to reset its image to the pre-Covid era, or has it already done irreversible damage in the eyes of the free world.

Hemant Adlakha, Honorary Fellow, ICS

Summary

President Biden’s China policy in his first hundred days is already drawing flak in Beijing. Notwithstanding recently witnessed smart US-China “climate diplomacy” during Washington-sponsored Earth Summit, the US watchers in the People’s Republic are further irked by weird signals Biden is sending in picking Nicholas Burns as the next China envoy.

“The US ambassador to Beijing must be someone who can show to the world the importance of the Unites States’ relationship with the Peoples’ Republic of China,” is how a former US envoy to China under President Obama reacted to the news of the likely Biden pick for the job. “It’s also critical that the person is empowered to negotiate on the president’s behalf and should not just be a person to deliver messages,” the former Montana Democrat Senator was quoted in the US media when Bloomberg first disclosed two months ago that Nicholas Burns might be the next China envoy. 

On March 18, the South China Morning Post’s seasoned China correspondent Shi Jingtao in an exclusive report claimed that Beijing had decided to stay on with Cui Tiankai, as China’s envoy to the US during the Biden presidency. Cui is already well over the usual retirement age for a Chinese official of his rank but “his connections and knowledge” are highly valued, citing sources in Beijing, Jingtao wrote. It is pertinent to point out, given that the Party general secretary, who is also at the same the President of the PRC, is assigned the responsibility by the seven-member politburo standing committee – the CPC’s highest decision making body – to deal with China’s affairs with the United States, which means Cui Tiankai is Xi Jinping’s man in Washington.

Furthermore, if what Shi Jingtao claims is true, then it is clear that 71-year old Cui or Xi Jinping’s “Mr. Indispensable” will be creating a history of sorts in the diplomatic annals by serving as Xi’s ambassador in Washington for long 11 years. It was the newly appointed Chinese president Xi, who picked Cui as the Chinese ambassador to the US in 2013. Cui’s continuation as China’s envoy in Biden era is also indicative of Beijing’s conviction that China-US rivalry is here to stay, at least for the next four years if not beyond. Let us recall, following the Alaska talks failure last month, China’s “independent” English language CX Daily in reaction to Biden administration’s relentless vitriol against China did predict that in Biden era and beyond “we are going to see at least 10 years of frosty ties between Beijing and Washington.”  

Let us return to the early reactions to Burns as the next potential US envoy for China. In the US media, as soon as the news of Nicholas Burns being considered for the most crucial ambassadorial appointment under the new Biden administration was disclosed two months ago, the reactions were positive and welcoming. While the state department and the White House both made it clear the next China envoy must be finalized based on the more “traditional mix of political and career,” the purpose was also to have fewer (key) political appointees than during Trump presidency. On the other hand, most ex-diplomats and foreign affairs experts too underscored the importance of having someone in Beijing who will be “perceived as having influence with the President Joe Biden.”

The influential Bonnie Glaser, a senior advisor for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, emphasized the person (the likely China envoy) to have access to both Biden and Xi. “The most important thing I think for an ambassador is to have a good relationship with the President and have some ability to directly communicate with the President and the key people around him.” she was quoted by the CNN as saying. “It’s important for the person to have access to Xi Jinping as well,” Glaser added.

In Beijing, the first thing commentators have pointed out is the strange “missing” of the US envoy since October last year when Terry Branstad was unceremoniously recalled by President Trump, saying “Branstad would be coming home from China” as he wanted to join the presidential campaign. Branstad, a former long-time Iowa governor was handpicked to the posting in Beijing by Trump in part because of the ambassador’s strong personal relationship with Xi Jinping. Earlier on in February, scholars in China had commented on the new President’s going slow in finalizing ambassadorial nominees to several countries, including China.

Diao Ming, a well-known expert on US-China relations and professor at the Renmin University in Beijing had told the Global Times: “Since Biden’s major officials in the foreign affairs sector attach great importance to China affairs, the ambassador to China needs to be a person with strong experience in politics, top-class professionalism, a well-known reputation and prestige in political circles, as well as trust from the president.” For Branstad, though ambassadorship came as political “reward,” he not only fitted the bill in several ways but he also proved to be a hit with the authorities in Beijing.

“Branstad’s departure would be a loss to China-U.S. diplomacy as it would mean one less political heavyweight with a deep understanding of China based here,” was how Wang Huiyao, an adviser to China’s cabinet and founder of the Centre for China and Globalization, had reacted to the news of the end of Branstad’s tenure. Branstad had arrived in Beijing as the US envoy during the early days of the new Trump administration. Branstad was also one of the first ambassadorial announcements – made as early as in December 2016, within a month of Trump’s victory. 

Just like Branstad, if appointed, Burns too will be among the first diplomatic nominees under President Biden. Burns’ reputation of a “no-nonsense” veteran professional diplomat – he has been a former ambassador, had served in the state department under the Bush administration and enjoyed his role in academic circles as professor with the Harvard Kennedy School – is well-acknowledged by the Global Times which has declared him as the “ideal choice for the position of US ambassador to China.” Interestingly, the GT, known for its strong hawkish views, while ignoring harsh remarks on China made by Burns in 2017 has lavishly praised the career diplomat for not “holding extreme views on China.” “Given his views on China that are not extreme, it is unlikely China will be averse to him. It should be said that Biden’s choice for Burns is very reasonable,” the newspaper opined.

In contrast to the GT commentary, Shanghai-based influential and widely popular Chinese language online news platform guancha.cn, has described Burns as “senior professional diplomat but not a diplomatic veteran.” Echoing what Hans Nichols wrote of Burns for AXIOS two weeks ago, cited above, the guancha.cn observed “choosing Burns would be indicating a preference for a seasoned diplomat instead of a high-wattage politician.” The online news platform did not fail to point out however that the past four US ambassadors in succession were all influential politicians. Guancha.cn also wondered on the choice of Burns as the US envoy for three additional reasons: one, Burns is known to be an expert on “Soviet Union” and Europe and not for handling China’s affairs; two, he would be filling in the challenging diplomatic assignment as “non-China” hand and that too when the coveted position in Beijing has been vacant for the past six months at a time considered as the most difficult period in the last 40-years of the bilateral relationship; and finally, unlike his past predecessors, Burns will have tough time doing liaison between President Biden and Blinken-Sullivan-Campbell trio. Not to forget, Biden’s China envoy will have to maintain a fine balance with the Biden administration’s first high-ranking traveller to China, John Kerry, the former secretary of state and now the president’s special climate envoy.

To sum up, as Lü Xiang, an expert in US studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has observed, Biden will decide on who will represent Washington in Beijing “once the state department announces comprehensively the US foreign affairs plan.” But scholars in Beijing are also saying, though Burns may not be a political heavy weight and “an old friend of Chinese people” like his immediate predecessor was, yet Beijing might be pleased with him. For the simple reason that he not only strongly supports the view that the US-China “decoupling” is impossible and that cooperation between the two largest economies is a must in containing Covid-19 pandemic and in climate change. But also because like his immediate predecessor who actively tried to ease China-US tensions, if experienced and professional diplomat like Burns succeeds as ambassador to China, he will play an even greater role than Branstad. 

                                                                                                   (1397 words)

This is modified version of an earlier article  published by the NIICE, Kathmandu under the title

‘Nicholas Burns for China Envoy: Is Biden Sending Wrong Signals to Beijing?’ on 26 April, 2021

Hemant Adlakha, Honorary Fellow, ICS  

Summary

Last week, Henry Kissinger warned that US-China tensions threaten to engulf the entire world and could lead to Armageddon-like clash between the world’s two military and technology giants. Surprisingly, some Chinese are interpreting the warning as threat to intimidate China in order to “accept and obey” the US-led world hegemonic order.

In January 2015, the peace group CODEPINK dangled a pair of handcuffs in front of 91-year old former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at a Senate hearing. Twelve months later, at the February Democratic Debate Bernie Sanders and Hilary Clinton were seen engaged in a heated duel attacking and defending the acclaimed diplomat. The late writer Christopher Hitchens in his book The Trial of Henry Kissinger warned editors, TV news channel producers and presidential candidates to stop soliciting Kissinger’s “worthless and dangerous” opinions. The never ending outburst of enmity on the part of CODEPINK, Sanders and Hitchens was due to Kissinger’s brutal role in the killing of thousands of civilians, gang rape of hundreds of female detainees, and allegedly slaughtering of over one million people in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos among countless similar crimes against humanity since the early 1970s. 

As documented in “Kissinger and Chile: The Declassified Record,” as some 5,000 people were being detained and tortured in Chile’s National Stadium, Kissinger told the ruthless Augusto Pinochet: “You did a great service to the West in overthrowing Allende.” But Sanders-Clinton “spirited exchange” five years ago, as mentioned above, was not confined in Sanders’ words to Kissinger being “one of the most destructive secretaries of state in the modern history” of the United States. Sanders’ rare outburst also included Clinton defending her foreign policy mentor – Kissinger – on China. “[Kissinger’s] opening up China and his ongoing relationship with the leaders of China is an incredibly useful relationship for the United States of America,” Hilary Clinton emphatically pointed out.

Sanders responded disdainfully and berated Clinton for admiring Kissinger. “Kissinger first scared Americans about communist China and then opened up trade so US corporations could dump American workers and hire exploited and repressed Chinese,” Sanders had retorted. However, no one in Beijing either knows or seems interested in all the so-called negative traits attributed to the veteran diplomat who is generally known as arguably the most “influential figure in the making of American foreign policy since the end of World War II.” Instead, according to Peter Lee, editor of the online China Matters and a veteran Asia Times columnist, the CPC leadership value Kissinger as the “symbol, custodian and advocate” of a US-China relationship that is special.   

Professor Aaron Friedberg, author of A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, described the re-opening of relations with China as Kissinger’s greatest achievement. In a review of Kissinger’s massive book On China, Friedberg wrote: “Kissinger’s six hundred pages on China are an attempt to apply the principles of foreign policy realism to the most pressing strategic challenge of our day.” (Emphasis given) However, the approach, taken alone, was far from inadequate in anticipating the behavior of an increasingly powerful China on the one hand, and for prescribing an appropriate American strategy to deal with a rising China, Friedberg went on to add.

Since Mao, all successive top Chinese leaders have met with Kissinger one-on-one in Beijing, some even more than once. China’s current President Xi Jinping is no exception. In fact, given the deep esteem with which reform era CPC leadership has been embracing Henry Kissinger, the general wisdom in Beijing is President Xi has horned his diplomatic skills by learning well his (Kissinger’s) oft-quoted aphorism “you don’t go into negotiations unless your chances of success are 85 percent.” Kissinger had first met with Xi in 2007, when Xi, as the party secretary in Shanghai, had received the most frequent foreign visitor to China on a visit to the city. When asked for his assessment of the party’s new general secretary within days of the 18th party congress in November 2012 by the Wall Street Journal, Kissinger had said “Xi Jinping is a strong leader capable of rising up to any challenge.”

In the past little over four decades of Kissinger-CPC bonhomie, the first decade thanks to Cold War passed off rather smoothly and uneventfully. The second decade ushered in with perhaps the first most serious test for both Kissinger as well as for the US-China relations since the unfreezing of the bilateral ties by Nixon-Kissinger pair in the early 1970s. In June 1989, the CPC rulers used brutal force to crush peaceful student demonstrators at the Tiananmen Square and launched nationwide crackdown on suspected dissidents. Though criticized by the US political elite for “Kowtowing to Beijing” for defending the CPC authorities by saying “a crackdown was inevitable,” Kissinger did influence the Bush administration in imposing comparatively mild sanctions while deflecting congressional pressure for tougher action.

In third and fourth decades respectively, unlike during the first two stages, ideology gradually regained initiative over geopolitics in influencing the bilateral relationship. There are mainly two factors for this. First, from 1979 to the end of the last century, China was relatively weaker than the United States both economically and in military technology. Following China’s rapid economic growth beginning late 1990s and at the turn of the twenty-first century, a section in the US political elite became apprehensive of China’s assertive and highly competitive stance. These concerns soon gave birth to the “China threat theory” which Beijing unsuccessfully tried to pass off as “China’s peaceful rise.”

The second factor has much to do with the world financial crisis in 2008 which resulted in the beginning of decline of the US economy on the one hand, and the unfolding of the seemingly evident intent of the CPC leadership to “eventually displace the US” and “re-establishing their own country as the pre-eminent power in East Asia.” In other words, with Cold War and the Soviet Union both long gone, and China threatening to soon replace America as the world’s number one economy, the communist rulers in Beijing were under no illusion that the ideologically hostile US was gearing up to plot “color revolution” to replace the CPC with democratically elected leaders in the People’s Republic.

The chilling of US-China bilateral relations during the first year of Obama presidency itself, with China replacing Japan to become the world’s second largest economy in 2010 and further hardening of the US stance towards China, and finally the US “pivot to Asia” strategy introduced by the Secretary of State Hilary Clinton – all these were perceived by Beijing as the US “creating political framework for a confrontation with China in order to maintain the global hegemony of American dominance.” Even Kissinger was very much aware of the changing stance in Beijing, as is reflected from what he wrote in On China: “China would try to push American power as far away from its borders as it could, circumscribe the scope of American naval power, and reduce America’s weight in international diplomacy.”

Interestingly, although the most frequent US visitor to China has continued to visit China ever more frequently during the past decade, given the changing nature of polity in both the US and in China it is not incorrect to say the Kissinger magic has been gradually fading away. Last Friday, when the “old friend of China” warned both Beijing and Washington in a speech at McCain Institute’s Sedona Forum in France that their escalating tensions are leading the world towards Armageddon-like clash, the opinionating Chinese social media reacted with caution. “Kissinger used the so-called end of the world argument to threaten and intimidate China in order to accept and obey the hegemonic order by the United States.

Another commentary in Chinese pointed out, ever since Trump launched “all out political war” against China, Kissinger has been in subtle and cunning way warning China to “cooperate” with Washington. The signed article entitled “Kissinger Continues to Scare the Chinese People” stated: “For the past two, three years, Kissinger has been repeatedly saying, China must continue to compromise and obey the US hegemony and US-led global order. Otherwise, China will face the danger of World War I-like situation.”

To sum up, an angry guancha.cn – one of China’s most widely read online Chinese language news platform – reader posted in the chat room: Kissinger is no longer qualified to advise China or the world. Instead, the world will be a peaceful if America first puts its own house in order!   

This is edited version of an earlier article published under the same title in moderndiplomacy on 5 May, 2021.

Jelvin Jose, Research Intern, ICS

The Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic armed organization (EAO), engaged in armed struggle for ethnic self-determination of the Rakhine Buddhist people has been a significant newcomer to Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts. The fierce tensions  between the AA and the Tatmadaw, following AA’s police station attack on 4 January 2019, led to the displacement of 157,000 people and prompted a global outrage. The public support consequent to the political marginalization of the ethnic Rakhine community, and Chinese material backing, expedited the rise of AA as a lethal outfit within a short period since 2017. In order to safeguard its economic and strategic goals in Myanmar, Beijing needs to balance both the Tatmadaw and AA.

Arakan Army and its Rise

The AA was formed in April 2009 in Laiza, a town in Kachin state. It aims to set up an autonomous territory with substantial autonomy in Myanmar’s Rakhine state, similar to the one run by the United Wa State Army (UWSA). The Rakhine State of Myanmar is one of the poorest regions in the country. AA, seeks to garner public support by upholding Rakhine nationalism, promising to bring prosperity to the region, and preserving the identity and cultural heritage of the ethnic Rakhine community.

Though the AA had been initially trained and operated under the umbrella of Kachin Independence Army (KIA), it later shifted to the fold of the powerful UWSA. After gaining training and battle experience from its operations in the Shan and Kachin states in the initial years, AA started shifting focus to Rakhine state by 2012. However, it was only after 2017 that the AA has risen to prominence in the Rakhine state.

Chinese Material Backing to AA

Although there is little evidence for direct supply of arms to AA by the Chinese government, multiple instances, including the Sittwe naval vessel attack, confirm the flow of Chinese weapons to AA’s hands. In the words of Anders Corr, around 90 percent of AA’s financial resources come from China. Chinese backing to the AA also extends in terms of uniforms, weapons, and ammunition. In the Sittwe vessel strike that AA carried out in June 2019, the AA rebels reportedly fired at least three Chinese-made 107mm surface-to-surface rockets.

The primary source of weaponry for AA is the purchase from other EAOs, mostly from UWSA and members of the Northern Alliance. UWSA- Beijing’s closest ally and most prominent beneficiary of Chinese weapon supply is said to have installed factories producing Chinese weapons in its territory. UWSA, leading the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) – a seven-member coalition of EAOs including AA – is reportedly used by Beijing to influence AA to secure its interests.

The flow of sophisticated Chinese weapons to AA’s arsenal strengthens the claim of Chinese backing of AA. In July 2020, the Thai military seized a massive stock of Chinese armaments worth US$1 million from Mae Tao district, bordering Myanmar and Thailand. The weapons reportedly were destined for the AA and insurgent groups operating in India’s North East. In November 2019, Tatmadaw captured another stock of Chinese-made weapons, including FN6 anti-aircraft guns, RPGs, and around 40,000 rounds of ammunition from the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) – AA’s partner in the Northern Alliance- at Homein village of Northern Shan State.

It is notable that AA rebels, who have obstructed India’s Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP) at different points, have not, similarly, targeted any Chinese projects. The statement by AA spokesperson U Khaing Thukka in March 2020, that “China recognises us, but India doesn’t” further exposes Beijing’s connections with the AA.

Arakan Army and China’s Links with Ethnic Armed Organizations

Unlike several EAOs such as UWSA, Beijing has not directly backed AA. Instead, China pipelines weapons and other resources to AA via other EAOs, to secure its strategic and security interests in Myanmar. In a broader sense, Chinese indirect backing to the AA is part of Beijing’s balancing act between EAOs and the government to retain its influence in Myanmar. Keeping links with AA helps Beijing to shield its infrastructure projects from harm. Swedish Journalist Bertil Linter explains the strategy Beijing adopts in Myanmar as a  “Carrot and Stick Policy.” On the one hand, China assists Myanmar with investments and necessary political cover from global human rights outcries at international bodies such as the UN Security Council. On the other hand, China also keeps links with the armed ethnic outfits, providing them with necessary political cover, funding, and weapons.

In fact, for Beijing, the existence of AA as a cause of turmoil in Rakhine is unwanted business. China critically needs a stable situation, conducive to the smooth implementation of its economic projects in Myanmar. Beijing perceives that the AA claims are implausible to be accepted by the Tatmadaw, thus posing obstacles to stability in the state by instigating prolonged political stir. As a cause of violence, the persistence of AA without striking any workable deal with the government (or at least with Tatmadaw) seriously hampers Chinese interests in Myanmar. First, violence and resultant disruption of stability would impact the rollout of Chinese projects and their functioning. Second, border security is a crucial aspect of Chinese interests in Myanmar. Beijing believes that its porous border with Myanmar is vulnerable to exploitation by external players. Thus, the extreme turmoil AA has been making, pressing for greater international involvement, is not in China’s interest. Third, the presence of AA as a formidable power would necessitate Beijing to balance between the government and AA simultaneously. Otherwise, Beijing could have much more easily secured its interests by striking a deal with the government and Tatmadaw. Fourth, though Tatmadaw and Nyaypidaw have been long suspicious of Beijing’s connections with various EAOs, Beijing’s material backing to AA seems to have further exacerbated this distrust.

Notwithstanding this, given the reality that the Tatmadaw cannot control the whole territory on its own, Beijing requires links with both the EAOs and the government to safeguard its economic and strategic interests in Myanmar. Rakhine state, the focal point of AA, is the hub of both economically and strategically important BRI projects such as Kyaukpyu port and China-Myanmar oil and gas pipeline. These projects are critical for China from the geostrategic perspective to reduce its vulnerability in the crucial Malacca Strait- often described as  “China’s Malacca Dilemma.” Hence, Beijing essentially requires establishing links with the AA to prevent the disruption of these ambitious projects.

Given the factors mentioned above, the Chinese backing to AA is conditional. Beijing does not see any end to Myanmar’s ethnic crises in the foreseeable future. Thus, Beijing can be expected to continue its direct or indirect engagements with EAOs, including the AA, while maintaining strong ties with Nyaypidaw in order to minimize its risks and maximize the profits from Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts.

Chandam Thareima, Research Intern, ICS

In almost 50 years since the People’s Republic of China’s accession into the United Nations on 25 October 1971, there have been a series of shifts in its role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. From a cautious beginning as a newcomer to the game of UN multilateralism (1971-1978), to one of pragmatic engagement and steady integration with the global economy in pursuit of modernization (1979-1989), China has sought, in the post-Tiananmen incident period, to salvage its international image while continuing its modernization drive (1990-2000), before assuming an increasingly pro-active stance at the turn of the new century. Especially since 2008, the Chinese role became increasingly wide-ranging in its strategic scope and reach as well as more assertive and strident.  One important indicator of this is China’s voting pattern in the Council. The period 1971-2000, may be depicted largely as “going with the flow” or “passive” approach except in extraordinary circumstances.  During this entire period, China cast its veto only four times – twice in 1972 and one each in 1997 and 1999. For the most part, its votes were affirmative, non-participative and abstentions, as illustrated below. This was to change decisively in the following two decades.

Time period	Affirmative votes percentage	Non-Participation	Abstentions	Vetoes
1971-1978	54.9 %	47	4	2
1979-1989	93.5%	17	1	0
1990-2000	87.9%	0	43	2

Source: United Nations Security Council Documents: Volumes of Resolutions and Decisions

China’s first veto in 1972 was against a resolution for Bangladesh’s membership in the UN, on behalf of its regional ally Pakistan; and the other 1972-veto was on an amendment to a NAM (Non-Aligned Movement)-sponsored resolution against Israeli use of force in the Middle East. This veto was not very substantial considering it was on an amendment rather than a resolution but could be inferred as showing solidarity to NAM countries and opposition to the US which had vetoed the resolution. The remaining two vetoes were against resolutions on Guatemala (1997) and on Macedonia (1999). Both these vetoes were in protest against the former two countries’ recognition of Taiwan- a threat to China’s core national interests. China’s UN representative Qin Huasun explained the 1997-veto as: “The Guatemalan authorities cannot expect to have the cooperation of China in the Security Council while taking actions to infringe upon China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”. 

Since the turn of the century, China’s enhanced capabilities were translated into activism and confidence in global affairs. As Zhiqun Zhu argued, “China is gradually becoming more responsive to international demands to put diplomatic pressure on authoritarian regimes such as Sudan and North Korea”. Such confidence and cooperativeness were also reflected in its UNSC voting pattern during 2001-2006 in which its abstentions were drastically reduced to eight, increased its affirmative votes to 95.5 per cent, and a total lack of vetoes. However, the timeframe of this analysis, 2007-2017 is marked by a total of eight vetoes, a stark departure from China’s earlier record in which it had cast only four vetoes in a span of 30 years since its UN admission. It is often surmised that China’s frequent use of its vetoes in this period implied assertiveness on its part as a result of its rising power, rendering the Council ineffective in discharging its function of maintaining international peace and security. China’s assertiveness from this period onwards can also be seen in its broader foreign policy behaviour, for instance in the South China Sea.

Moreover, this period also assumes significance because unlike in the past when it traditionally used to veto resolutions on countries that impinged on its territorial integrity, China’s vetoes during 2007-2017 were against resolutions that had nothing to do with its one-China policy. Furthermore, the eight vetoes during this period were on resolutions against countries that had questionable human rights records‒ Myanmar (2007), Zimbabwe (2008) and Syria (2011, 2014, 2016, 2017 and two vetoes in 2012)— an association with which China risked tarnishing its international image which it had been striving to build since the Tiananmen incident. By not only stepping away from its consensus seeking stance on the UNSC resolutions, but also by blocking them from being adopted, China has shown that it is willing to stand against the larger consensus, in pursuance of its interests as also for the principles it upholds, and enforce it through its veto power. This marks a sharp shift from its earlier Security Council diplomacy wherein China has always refrained from using its veto power except in Taiwan-related cases or in cases in which its immediate geo-political interests were involved.

Although China defended its stance in UNSC on grounds of the principles it upholds such as respecting the sovereignty of the nations concerned, its opposition to sanctions, or the lack of consensus in the Council, China’s actions could also be attributed to its desire to protect its economic, political and strategic interests in those countries. For instance, China vetoed the 2007 UNSC Resolution calling for Myanmar to cease military attacks against civilians in ethnic minority regions and to put an end to the associated human rights and humanitarian law violations, on the grounds that “the matter was an internal affair of a sovereign state and did not pose a threat to international or regional peace and security”. However, China’s economic and strategic interests in Myanmar also seem to influence China’s decision to censure the latter from international scrutiny.

Most of China’s vetoes coincided with Russia’s, implying that both these countries support one another when their respective national interests are at stake and to avoid taking an isolationist stance. This could be seen in the cases of Libya and Syria when both these nations concurrently abstained or vetoed. China is also increasingly seen to shadow its vetoes and abstentions behind Russian vetoes or abstentions. During 2013-2017, China’s vetoes (3) and abstentions (14) were all on resolutions against which Russia had vetoed or abstained. This helped China diminish the negative attention of international community’s disapproval as Russia’s concurrent vetoes or abstentions insulated China’s own. 

Furthermore, China’s reduction of vetoes from five to three, and of its affirmative votes from 98.8 per cent to 97.7 per cent, increase of abstentions from five to 15 from the period 2007-2012 to the period 2013-2017; its exercise of vetoes and abstentions largely in support of Russian vetoes and abstentions, and not entirely to protect its own interests, could very well be interpreted as an act of cautiousness in the UN. This cautiousness could be seen as a tactical response to the international community’s apprehensions about China’s assertiveness. Nevertheless, the period 2007-2017 was also marked by an increasing number of UNSC Resolutions having been adopted without any apparent opposition from China. Thus, the argument that it was creating obstacles in the functioning of the Security Council is not entirely true.

From the foregoing account, it could be inferred that China’s UN policy, reflective of its broader foreign policy behaviour, has been undergoing distinct changes, reflecting the changing internal as well as external environment. Overall, it must be noted that in both the phases – 2007 to 2012 and 2013 to 2017- although China exercised its veto power, it nevertheless maintained a high rate of affirmative voting affinity with the rest of the Council members. This is enormously significant, especially in view of the fact that China has, on balance, maintained a posture of collaboration with the other powers in UNSC matters rather than a contentious one. This in turn provides some pointers to understand China’s foreign policy behaviour in the backdrop of its growing power.

Halim Nazar, Research Intern, ICS

Introduction

The South China Sea dispute involves conflicting land and maritime claims of sovereignty between China and several nations in the South China Sea area. Although China’s claims that they historically exercised “exclusive control” over the sea was rejected by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, they haven’t been deterred in their pursuit. Almost a quarter of the global trade passes through these waters, so many non-claimant nations like India require the South China Sea to remain open as international waters. The region is of immense importance to India as India has been increasing trade and economic linkages with several East Asian nations and also with the Pacific region.

The South China Sea is the second-most used sea lane globally, with one-third of the world’s shipping (over $3 trillion) passing through the area. A single country having complete control over this maritime route would have significant economic and military advantages for itself. Thus, enabling this region to be the geopolitical pivot for achieving control over the rest of Asia. Opposing China, The Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan all lay claims to sections of these waters.

China has laid claim to most of the South China Sea via a looped line called the “historic line” or the “nine-dash line”. The “loop”, or the “cow’s tongue” as it is called, surrounds many islands from China to Malaysia and Singapore, including the Spratly and Paracel chain of islands.

It is apparent that as Beijing accumulates more political, military and economic power, it would use it to further their interests, inevitably at the cost of other nations, regardless of the rhetoric of “win-win” situations. By following a delaying strategy, wherein a state maintains its claims over the contested land without offering concessions or using force, China seeks to consolidate its claims while deterring other states from strengthening their claims. Under the course of a delaying strategy, if a state occupies a piece of contested land, the passage of time strengthens its claim in international law; states can go beyond diplomatic statement and utilize civilian and military actors to further assert their claims. In the South China Sea, China would only compromise when improved ties with the other states become more critical than the maritime rights and islands that are contested. A similar compromise has precedence in Chinese statecraft as Mao had ordered the transfer of the disputed Bailongwei (White  Dragon  Tail) Island to  North  Vietnam in 1957, as part of improving the alliance between China and North Vietnam. Such a shift in priorities is improbable but can be orchestrated. For example, China could oppose the formation of any counterbalancing coalition in the region, especially one under the US’s leadership. In this scenario, China could be expected to offer some concessions to improve ties with the affected states.

India’s Interests

India has significant geo-economic and geopolitical stakes in the South China Sea. Although India is not geographically in the South China Sea region, it is extensively involved with several littoral states in the area, mostly through naval exercises, oil exploration, strategic partnerships and diplomatic discussions. India considers the South China Sea as its “extended neighbourhood” and has extended its diplomatic outreach to the various nations there.

The Chinese have estimated that the South China Sea has one of the world’s largest oil reserves, second only to Saudi Arabia and will ultimately yield around 130 billion barrels of oil. India’s state-run explorer, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), had come into agreement with Petro Vietnam for developing long-term cooperation in the oil sector via its overseas investment arm, ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL), and it had accepted Vietnam’s offer of exploration in certain specified blocks in the South China Sea and signed a letter of intent on September 15 2014. OVL had already forayed into Vietnam in 1988 when it obtained the exploration license for Block 06.1. The company also got two exploration blocks, Block 127 and Block 128, in 2006. However, Block 127 was relinquished as it wasn’t profitable, and the other block is currently under exploration and roughly coincides with the current area of Chinese escalation.

India has high stakes attached to the uninterrupted flow of commercial trade in the South China Sea as well as in maintaining the movement of its Navy in these waters. Over 55 per cent of India’s trade passes through the South China Sea. Therefore, ensuring peace and stability in the area is of paramount importance to India.

The South China Sea lies at the intervening stretch of waters between the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific. As Indian maritime cooperation grew with America and Australia, these waters have come to be referred to as “Indo-Pacific”. Indian Navy now operates in the Western Pacific in collaboration with the United States and Japanese navies. Therefore, it becomes all the more important that India gets secure access through the South China Sea. To navigate from the Indian Ocean to Western Pacific, easy, unhindered access through the South China Sea is essential for India.

Conclusion

As China engineers strategic investments and partnerships throughout the South Asian neighbourhood, particularly under the ambit of the ambitious BRI project, it is imperative that India capitalize on the advantages of its geographical position and emerging naval profile as well as its cooperation with the ASEAN and legacy of goodwill to balance its eastern neighbour. India’s response to the South China Sea issue is based on the realist balance of power logic. India plans to deter China’s ambitions in the South China Sea whilst complementing ASEAN’s stance of indirect balancing of China by fostering an alliance based on the principle of cooperative security. The successful execution of the “Look East Policy” (LEP) and strides taken by the “Act East Policy” (AEP), which were premised on the adherence to the principle of ASEAN centrality, complemented India’s strategy of containing Chinese footprints in its “extended neighbourhood” by putting its weight behind countries like Vietnam caught in the dispute over overlapping claims to sovereignty in the South China Sea with Beijing. The LEP and AEP have constituted the bulwark for the development and entrenchment of India-ASEAN ties. Besides, it has also erected the foundation for India’s enhanced participation and assumption of responsibility in Indo-Pacific affairs.

The current policies have served India well. India, along with the US, Australia and Japan, held the first Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) summit, where they pledged to work together to ensure a free and open Indo-pacific and also cooperate on cybersecurity and maritime. A realist approach, tempered by strains of critical, tangible geopolitical imperatives, complemented by the constructivist logic of intangibles, would be most appropriate for India.

Hemant Adlakha, Honorary Fellow, ICS, and Associate Professor, Centre for Chinese and Southeast Asian Studies, JNU

Special series on US-China Climate Diplomacy (2 of 2)

Summary

Earlier on, climate skeptics had wondered if President Biden’s January 27 Executive Order on “climate crisis” was “climate politrick?” Now, scholars in China have likened the US climate envoy’s hurried China visit last week to “a weasel calling on a friendly New Year visit to a chicken” – or a visit with evil intentions. Some overenthusiastic critics of the US in Beijing are even warning President Xi to not login for the online Earth Summit in Washington this week.

People in China believe a snake and a wolf must never be rescued. The belief comes from a popular idiom: the Zhongshan wolf or “The Wise Old Man and the Wolf.” In a few words, the essence of the popular Chinese adage is well-captured in the following sentence: a popular fairy tale about the ingratitude of a creature after being saved. Last year, the idiom entered China’s foreign policy discourse as several IR commentators employed it to describe “ingratitude” of the Trump-led America towards the Peoples’ Republic. Following the ascent of President Biden in the White House, the Chinese commentariat quickly course-corrected itself, i.e. neither Trump nor Biden, it is the US bipartisan anti-China consensus which is the real “wicked wolf.”

Just like the curt and bland statement issued by China’s foreign ministry acknowledging China will host the US climate envoy Kerry for three days in Shanghai, 14-17 April, China released on last Sunday the text of the joint China-US statement following Kerry’s departure on Saturday. The statement said: “The United States and China are committed to cooperating with each other and also with other foreign governments to tackle the climate crisis which must be addressed with seriousness and urgency it demands.” Interestingly, or rather conspicuously, the statement neither indicated nor was followed by another press release regarding whether China will be represented at the upcoming crucial 40-nation Earth Summit being hosted by President Biden.

While it is true a few Chinese scholars and think tanks have welcomed the worlds’ two largest carbon emitting nations to come forward to cooperate with each other upholding the spirit of the Paris climate agreement. What is perhaps unprecedented and more significant is the warning to President Xi by a section of China’s leftist intelligentsia to beware of Biden’s “climate politrick.”

Talking of those who welcomed Xi-Biden climate cooperation initiative – the first sign of bilateral cooperation since the Trump interregnum, Zhang Jianyu, chief representative and vice president of the non-profit Environmental Defense Fund’s China Program, reacted positively and said: “The fact that the joint statement has been signed, means that both Beijing and Washington believe in climate change. We are hoping both China and the US take bold actions.” Li Shuo, senior climate adviser for the environmental group Greenpeace, said China could soon respond to a new U.S. pledge with one of its own, building on the “momentum” of the Shanghai talks. “The statement in my view is as positive as the politics would allow: It sends a very unequivocal message that on this particular issue (China and the United States) will cooperate. Before the meetings in Shanghai this was not a message that we could assume,” Li added. 

 

In contrast, an article in Utopia, one of the influential “anti-US” platforms for ideological debate in China, cautioned China’s top leadership while questioning Biden’s credentials to host the Earth Summit. The pro-Mao, leftist online intellectual discourse forum advocates Maoist and communist ideology. In a signed article on the forum’s website last Saturday – the day John Kerry concluded his 3-day stay in Shanghai and left for Seoul, a commentator using strong words not only “condemned” Joe Biden for his “arrogant” and “hypocritical” foreign policy thinking, but also urged the Chinese leadership to thwart Washington’s attempt to regain the US leadership by holding the Earth Summit beginning Thursday. The article was entitled: “China must resist and fight back hypocrite Biden.”   

In fact, as early as in November last year, within days of the presidential voting, a section of scholars in China were writing “the election of Biden may or may not turn out to be a turning point for easing Sino-US frictions…with Biden in power, the nature of Sino-US relations will not see a fundamental change, but the mode of confrontation will be relatively soft and the direction of negotiations will be more predictable.” However, with each passing day since taking office, President Biden’s China policy has consistently been predictable in only one direction – in enduring the Trump legacy. The most recent manifestation of which was on display at the testy diplomatic summit last month in Anchorage where senior officials from the two countries “traded sharply critical assessment” of each other’s policies.

Another Chinese commentary has highlighted six ideological “attacks” the US has carried out against China in the international arena under Trump and Biden administrations respectively. First is the classic example of the US-Japan nexus in politicizing and turning on its head the Chinese opposition to Japan’s decision to release radioactive contaminated water from Fukushima into the sea; second is the Western governments and media carrying out slanderous campaign of China’s “economic colonialism” in Africa; third, as soon as China succeeded in containing fight against COVID-19 last year in May and started offering humanitarian assistance abroad, the US-led started defaming and discrediting China by launching “mask diplomacy” campaign against Beijing; fourth, just like vicious propaganda maligning China’s economic assistance to Africa and China’s humanitarian aid by free supply of PPE and masks, the US launched “vaccine diplomacy” campaign to vilify China; the fifth is attacking China using the virus trajectory and accusing China of developing COVID-19 virus and exporting it from chemical laboratory in Wuhan; the sixth and the latest anti-China “false” propaganda is the “genocide” in Xinjiang. Unlike the genuine human rights violation by Japan to release the contaminated water into the sea, the false propaganda against China is aimed at creating anti-China world public opinion, creating social unrest and turbulence in China and ultimately achieving their goal of destroying China, the article stated.   

Finally, it is not incorrect to view President Xi’s highly charged remarks made at two most recent international events respectively in the context of strongly-worded articles published in Utopia and other left-leaning online websites in the past few days. Two days prior to the arrival of Kerry in China, President Xi, according to the Xinhua news agency, warned the US in his speech at the China-Germany-France trilateral video conference on climate change: “Climate change could be used as a tool to disparage some countries for not doing enough.” Then two days prior to the Earth Summit, Xi apparently reiterated his stern warning to President Biden: “We must not let the rules set by one or a few countries be imposed on others, or allow unilateralism pursued by certain countries to set the pace for the whole world.” The remarks by Xi were made at China’s annual Boao Asia Forum on Tuesday.    

                                     

China’s semi-official “independent” English language CX Daily interpreted Xi’s above remarks as “veiled swipe at the new US administration under Biden” that has been busy forming alliances challenging China over issues such as Taiwan, Hong Kong and Xinjiang. Of late, mainstream media in China has been accusing Biden of not only carrying on and enduring the Trump legacy in relentlessly “attacking” China, but also that Biden has gone far beyond Trump in insulting and condescending Beijing. In fact, the Utopia commentary uses another Chinese idiom “externally strong, empty inside” to caricature Biden’s personality. It cites two recent incidents to establish how weak and hollow is President Biden, i.e. the US-China talks in Alaska and Putin’s resolve to dare the US in the Black Sea – in both instances, Biden simply caved in after he was challenged, the commentary observed. “On Iran nuclear deal issue too we saw Biden acting in the same surreptitious and crude manner. He [Biden] is typical treacherous man,” the Utopia commentary continued its verbiage.

Some Chinese scholars, therefore, have welcomed Xi’s remarks as clear rebuff to what the mainstream Western media, in particular the Wall Street Journal has been spreading, i.e. “Xi would participate in the US-initiated climate summit later this week.” These scholars are invoking yet another ancient Chinese proverb “Mouth honey belly sword” or Koumifujian in Chinese. The idiom is used as a metaphor for describing someone extremely sweet on the outside but actually shrewd, cunning and sinister. Most Chinese IR commentators are telling us, the idiom is a perfect description of Biden. 

The article was first published as “Is the Washington Initiated Climate Summit a Biden ‘Politrick’” in Modern Diplomacy on 22 April 2021.