Image: President Xi Jinping with eight Pacific island countries’ leaders at the 26th APEC Economic Leaders Meeting Source: Getty Images
The People’s Republic of China (PRC)
is the third-largest aid donor to the Pacific Island Countries (PICs), spending
around US$1.76 billion in aid towards the region. In its aid
programme, the PRC emphasises on equality, mutual benefit and win-win
cooperation. On this note, the following paragraphs examine the benefits that
the PRC gains from its engagement with the PICs.
Scholars have identified the PRC’s
two main interests in the PICs as political and economic. Political or
diplomatic interests include decreasing Taiwan’s diplomatic clout and gaining
the support of the PICs at multilateral forums, mainly the United Nations (UN).
The PRC and Taiwan rigorously engaged in “chequebook diplomacy” in
the 1990s,
competing for diplomatic recognition from the PICs until 2008 when President Ma
Ying-Jeou of the Kuomintang government came to power in Taiwan and led to a
diplomatic truce. Before 2019, Taiwan had six diplomatic allies in the region,
but this was reduced to four when the Solomon Islands, followed by Kiribati,
switched to the PRC in September of 2019. There were several reports that the
PRC had baited both countries with promised aid: US$500 million for the Solomon
Islands
and funds for aeroplanes and commercial
ferries for Kiribati
Although the PICs occupy only 15 per
cent of the world’s surface, with a cumulative population of around 13 million,
they hold about 7 per cent of UN votes. The PRC’s membership in the UN Human
Rights Council (UNHRC) has often been questioned, and the PRC is often targeted
at the UN for its human rights record. The Xinjiang issue has been raised twice
at the UNHRC in the recent past-2019 and 2021. Both were led by countries from
the West. However, both times the PRC responded with greater support from its “Like-Minded Group”- a term used to describe a loose
coalition of developing states often led by the PRC, Russia and Egypt . In
2020, when the issue of China’s new national security law in Hong Kong was
raised at the 44th session of the UNHRC by 27 countries, Papua New
Guinea was amongst the 53 countries that backed the PRC. In 2021, when the human rights
situation in Xinjiang was raised at the 47th UNHRC session by Canada with the support of 44
countries,
a coalition of 69 countries led by Belarus responded in China’s support. The
PICs Kiribati, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands were
included in the 69. Thus, the PRC has been successful at garnering increasing
support from the PICs on issues concerning its interests in international fora.
The
PRC’s economic interests in the region include the promotion of China’s Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI) and the hunt for raw materials. All the ten
diplomatic partners of the PRC in the region have signed up for the BRI. The
PICs’ total exclusive economic zones (EEZs) extend across nearly 7.7 million
square miles of ocean. This can be beneficial to China’s endeavours in
exploring and extracting natural resources. Some of
the PICs are blessed with abundant natural resources and raw materials in terms
of minerals, metals, fossil fuels, fisheries and wood. A global audit of Pacific resource
extraction undertaken by the Guardian’s Pacific Project revealed that China is
the largest importer of the region’s natural resources, importing resources
worth US$3.3 billion in 2019. In the mining industry, the PRC has invested in seven mining
projects across the region, with the largest one being the US$1.4
billion Ramu nickel and cobalt mine in PNG. PNG and Fiji have been the main
focus of investments in this field. Other major operations include the Porgera
gold mine and the Frieda River Copper project in PNG, the Nawailevu Bauxite
mining project and the Vatukoula gold mine in Fiji, and so on. These operations
are partly owned and run by Chinese SOEs such as Zijin Mining Group, Xinfa Aurum
Exploration and Zhongrun International Mining. In 2019, PNG exported US$2.3 billion worth of oil, metals and minerals to China
while Fiji exported US$4.8 million of the
same.
The Pacific region is the world’s most fertile fishing ground.
China imported US$100 million worth of seafood products from the region in
2019. However, Chinese vessels have also been involved in illegal, unreported
and unregulated (IUU) fishing, which has been threatening the region’s revenue
sources and food security. Even though the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) states that China has around 600 licensed vessels
fishing in the area, various estimates of the
Chinese fleet range between 1,600
and 3,400 vessels. The major exporters of tropical logs in the
region are PNG and Solomon Islands, where forestry is a major industry.
According to the US Department of Agriculture report, in 2020, Papua New
Guinea was the largest hardwood log exporter to China, accounting for 21 per
cent of China’s total imports, followed by the Solomon Islands. The
Pacific region’s emerging potential as the ‘blue economy’ has also
caught Chinese interest. China has started looking into Deep Sea Mining by
conducting research projects through the China Ocean Mineral Resources Research
and Development Association (COMRA). They have identified polymetallic and
cobalt nodules, hydrothermal sulfide deposits and have also produced several
deep-sea mining maps in the Pacific. Furthermore, in 2017, China signed a
15-year exploration contract for polymetallic
nodules in the Clarion-Clipperton Fracture Zone in the Pacific Ocean with the
International Seabed Authority.
Although the gains from the Sino-Pacific engagement
may not be equal in quantity, Sino-Pacific engagement
can be considered a qualitative ‘win-win’. Certainly, China’s primary goals in the region are
being met to some degree on both the political and economic fronts.
The new Hong
Kong National Security Law
(香港国家安全法 ) has caused massive controversy in Hong Kong as well as in the
international community. On 21st May the Chinese authorities
introduced a proposal in National People’s Congress (NPC) to enact the National
Security Law. Further, on 28th May, the 13th NPC
(人民代表大会), voted in favour of the National Security Law (NSL) for Hong
Kong. The new law aims at tackling
secession, subversion, terrorism and foreign interference, the details of which
were kept under wraps until it was implemented on 30th June2020. A protest broke out in Hong
Kong city on 1st July and several people were charged under the new
NSL.
The NSL consists of a total of 66 Articles
divided among six chapters. Some Articles are more important to look at, as
they provide an overview of what awaits Hong Kong (香港) and anti-CPC Hong Kong
citizens.
Article 12 of the Law states the establishment
of a Committee for Safeguarding National Security, which will be under the
supervision of and accountable to the Central People’s Government in Beijing.
Although the committee will be headed by the Chief Executive, Article 15 states
that the committee will also have a National Security Advisor, who will be
designated by the Central People’s Government and shall be responsible for
providing advice to the committee relating to its functions and duties. Article
14 states that the committee will work in secrecy and its decisions are not reviewable by the court. While Article 5
states that all persons shall be considered innocent until declared guilty by
the judicial organ, Article 42 contradicts it by stating that no bail shall be
granted to a criminal suspect or defendant unless the judge has sufficient
grounds for believing that the criminal suspect or defendant will not continue
to commit acts endangering the national security. Article 38 states that the law would be even applied
to offences committed against the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(HKSAR) from outside the region by people who are not a permanent resident of
HKSAR. Article 40 provides that the jurisdiction is in the hands of the Hong
Kong authorities by default but it can be taken over by the mainland’s office
for Safeguarding National Security. Further, Article 57 states that once in
mainland, the processing and sentencing will be done according to the Chinese
Criminal Law Procedure.
On the other hand, Article 60 provides complete
impunity to the office and its personnel as they are not subjected to the
jurisdiction of HKSAR while performing any act in the course of duty. The
National Security Law has caused ripple effects not only in Hong Kong but in
the international arena as well.
Hong Kong in Sino-US Relations
Sino-US relations have
seen a massive downgrade since the Trump administration came into power in 2017. Human Rights and Trade have
been a point of contestation between the US and China. Hong Kong has always
acted as a geopolitical buffer state between China and the West especially for
the U.S. Under the Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, the U.S. had decided to
maintain its favourable treatment, especially in the matter of trade, even after
Hong Kong was reverted to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. The underlying condition
for the preferential treatment was the autonomy of HKSAR. The Act also stated
that “whenever the President determines that Hong Kong is not sufficiently
autonomous to justify treatment under a particular law of the United States,”
he is authorized to “suspend the favourable treatment.” In the wake
of anti-extradition bill protests in 2019, the
U.S. Senate and the House respectively passed the Hong
Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (HKHRDA) in November of the same year.
This indicated that the State Department would
annually require to re-certify Hong Kong’s autonomous nature, in order to
continue the so-called “special treatment” the U.S. affords to Hong Kong. It was a
week after the National Security Law was tabled for voting before the NPC on 27th
May, 2020 the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo refused to certify the
autonomy of HKSAR. On 28th
May, the NPC passed the Hong Kong National Security Law. On 29th
June, the U.S. Department of State ended exports of U.S.-origin defence
equipments to Hong Kong. It also mentioned that U.S. will take steps to impose
the same restrictions on U.S. defence and dual-use technologies to Hong Kong as
it does for China. Mike Pompeo in his Tweet mentioned about the waning of ‘One
Country, Two Systems’ （一国两制） and replacement of it with ‘One Country, One System’. As the
Sino-US relations have already been in a tailspin due to the ongoing trade war
and the COVID-19 impact, the recent issues have further exacerbated tensions in
an already fragile relationship.
Sino-British Relations
Hong Kong has been a major component of the
Sino-British relations. The recent move by the Chinese government has led to
deterioration in the relations between two countries. Hong Kong was handed back
to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 under the Sino-British Joint Declaration, 1984.
Since then Hong Kong has been ruled under the framework of ‘One Country, Two
Systems’, which is to continue until 2047. Under this system Hong Kong
maintains a mini-constitution and enjoys autonomy on matters other than defence
and foreign relations. On the National Security Law, the UK criticized China
for breaching the ‘One Country, Two systems’ formula. On 11th June
2020, while presenting the 46th report to Parliament
on Hong Kong, the British Foreign
Secretary mentioned that China must respect Hong Kong’s autonomy and its own
international obligations. Britain also mentioned that the Joint Declaration is
registered with United Nations (UN). Thus, indicating its international
obligations. On the other hand, China has mentioned that the Sino-UK Joint
Declaration is unilateral policy announcement by China and not an international
commitment.
On 1st July, Britain introduced a new
route for those with British National (Overseas) (BNO) status to move to UK.
BNO status holders refer to Hong Kong citizens born before 1997. The recent
announcement by the British Prime Minister Boris Johnson in the House of
Commons, extended the Right of Abode (ROA) to dependents of BNO passport
holders, giving way for millions of Hong Kong citizens to acquire British
citizenship. China’s Foreign Ministry criticized Britain’s decision and
mentioned that the offering of ROA to BNO status holders is a breach of the
terms of a memorandum offered by the UK to China in 1997.
China-Hong Kong Relations
Hong Kong maintains a democratic-capitalist
system under the shadow of Communist China. It also enjoys certain level of
autonomy on various matters and is governed by Hong Kong Basic Law. Article 23 of the law states that the HKSAR “shall enact laws on its
own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the
Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign
political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the
Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from
establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.”
Before the British handover of Hong Kong to
China in 1997, China’s
crackdown on the student-led democracy movement
in 1989 created anxiety in Hong Kong regarding the handover and led to the
political awakening of the population. In 1992, Chris Patten was appointed as
the last colonial governor of Hong Kong. Patten initiated a series of political
reforms designed to give the people of Hong Kong a greater voice in government
via democratic elections to the Legislative Council (LEGCO).
When Hong
Kong’s Democratic Party, led by barrister Martin Lee, routed pro-Beijing
candidates in the 1995 LEGCO elections, Beijing denounced Patten and began a
series of strong measures aimed at re-establishing its influence. On 24th
March, 1996 China’s 150-member Preparatory Committee, which had been created to
oversee the handover, voted to dissolve LEGCO and installed a provisional
legislature after Hong Kong returned to Chinese sovereignty. In December 1996 a
China-backed special election committee selected the 60 members of the
provisional body, just days after it had overwhelmingly elected
59-year-old Tung Chee-hwa as the
first Chief Executive of the HKSAR. Tung soon signalled his intention to roll
back Patten’s reforms, announcing in April 1997 proposals to restrict political
groups and public protests after the handover. After the handover, however, the
situation in Hong Kong remained stable but complete freedom in the exercising
political and civil rights remained doubtful.
In September 2002, Hong
Kong government released a proposal to implement Article 23 of the Basic Law.
In February 2003, the National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill was
introduced in the Legislative Council. This caused a massive upheaval in the
city and the bill was
finally withdrawn by the government following a huge protest by the citizens of
Hong Kong on 1st July, 2003. The city has witnessed many protests
since the British handing over of Hong Kong to China. Each protest has
culminated into a “pro-democracy” protest. In 2012, Protests broke out in Hong Kong as the authorities
tried to change the curriculum of the school system in Hong Kong. The 2014
Umbrella Movementwas
a movement against the decision of China’s National People’s Congress Standing
Committee (NPCSC) regarding the ‘proposed reforms of the Hong Kong electoral
system.’ The reforms suggested a pre-screening of the candidates by the CPC for
the post of Chief Executive of Hong Kong.
The 2016 protestwas the
first pro-independence protest held in Hong Kong as it demanded complete
independence of Hong Kong from Mainland China. In 2017, as Hong Kong celebrated
two decades of handing over of Hong Kong to the Chinese control, the pro-
Democracy protesters marched against China’s refusal to grant ‘genuine
autonomy’ to Hong Kong and the erosion of ‘one country, two systems.’ In 2019,
the city, during the Anti-Extradition Bill movement, witnessed the most violent
protests since its handover, as police used brutal force to supress it. It
garnered the attention of the world and led to massive criticism of China on
the international
stage.
The Bill was eventually shelved indefinitely,
causing major embarrassment for the CPC. Hong Kong was the last remains of the
humiliation faced by China at the hands of a foreign power. Even when return to
Chinese rule, in terms of politics, society and culture, there has been vast
discrepancies between Hong Kong and Mainland. China, time and again has tried
to interfere in the city’s day-to-day affairs in order to create more semblance
between Hong Kong and Mainland. On the economic front, although, Hong Kong is
just 2.7% of China’s but it remains a most favoured destination for FDI due to
its financial and legal system. While
international companies use Hong Kong as a launching pad to expand into
mainland China. The bulk of foreign
direct investment (FDI) in China continues to be channelled through the city.
Although, recently Shenzhen surpassed Hong Kong in terms of GDP, Hong Kong
still provided systems and frameworks which cannot be provided by Mainland
Shanghai or Shenzhen. Most
of China’s biggest firms, from state-owned Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China (1398.HK), to
private firms like Tencent Holdings (0700.HK), have listed in Hong Kong, often as a springboard
to global expansion. Last year, Chinese companies raised $64.2 billion globally
– almost a third of the worldwide total – via initial public offerings (IPOs),
but just $19.7 billion of that came from listings in Shanghai or Shenzhen. Hong
Kong has also been pivotal to China’s longer-term ambition to turn the RMB (Yuan
元) into a widely-used international
currency, competing with the U.S. dollar.
Conclusion
The citizens of Hong Kong have often voiced
their concern over the ‘Mainlandization’ of the city and the waning of ‘One
Country, Two Systems”. The passing of the National Security Law has caused a
great amount of anxiety among the citizens and was termed as a “Death Knell”
for democracy in Hong Kong. Every year, 1st
July commemorates the anniversary of the British handing over of Hong Kong to
China and the citizens take out an annual march on this day. On 1st
July, 2020 the day which commemorated the 23rd anniversary of
British handing over of Hong Kong, the citizens marched into the streets
while National Security Law was already put in place.
The day witnessed the actual implementation of the Law when the protestors were
arrested under the new Law on charges of “inciting sedition and terrorism”.
While China received massive criticism over
subversion of freedom and rights of citizen of Hong Kong from various countries
including the U.S. and UK, HKSAR Chief Executive Carrie Lam stated that “the
National Security Legislation will help restore stability in Hong Kong, and
protect the life and property, basic rights and freedoms of the overwhelming
majority of residents” and will not cause any harm to freedom possessed by the
citizens of Hong Kong. China lashed out at the U.S. and UK, stating that while these
powers have a National Security Law in place, they are against China for doing
something similar. China’s current domestic politics including rising
nationalistic sentiments, of which territory occupies a great portion and Xi
Jinping’s aggressive foreign and domestic policies have a major effect on the
implementation of the law. Besides, the 2019 protests and fading CCP’s patience
to deal with Hong Kong together has also played a great role in panning out of
the new Law. The Chief Executive elections which was due in September was
very crucial to the Law. The Hong Kong government on 31st Aug 2020
announced the postponement of elections by 1 year. While the reason cited by
the government was the pandemic, the pro-democracy opposition remarked that
this was an attempt to prevent their winning which, according to them, is
inevitable in the face of massive dissatisfaction among the Hong Kong
citizens.
Finally, the Law has also affected
China’s relation’s with other countries, including the U.S and UK. While
Sino-US relations have already been on a crossroad due to trade war and the
outbreak of COVID-19, the implementation of National Security Law by China and
retaliation by the State Department of the U.S., further deteriorated the
relations. U.S. has massive
investment in Hong Kong which
includes over 1,300 companies and $82.5 million dollars as direct investment
and the new Law have put into risk U.S. business interest as it will no longer
be protected under British-style
common law jurisdiction. Moreover, as American elections remain due in November
2020, Trump has hardened its stand on China. On the other hand, the
Sino-British relations have been in its ‘golden era’ post- ‘Brexit’. As Hong
Kong constitutes an important part of Sino-British relationship, the National
Security Law, means much more for the UK than
what it stands for the U.S. Thus, UK’s has been the most direct international
response against the implementation of the law.
As it were, other countries’
reactions make it easy for China to blame foreign interference and play the
nationalist card to go through with the plan of completely integrating
territories under the roof of ‘One China’.
Hemant Adlakha, Honorary Fellow, ICS and Associate Professor, JNU
Speaking of foreign affairs, in the early days
of reform and opening door policy, Deng Xiaoping once said, China must continue
to ensure good relations with the US. All other outstanding issues, including
Taiwan and the dispute with Japan and ASEAN nations about the Diaoyu Island and
South China Sea, Deng was confident that future Chinese leaders “with cleverer
minds” would be capable of settling.
Daily Express Photo
Recently, the South China Sea has become a flashpoint again. Why? To people who refuse to be labeled as pro-China or pro-US (though there really aren’t many such people around), the reason for waters heating up in the 3.5 million km2 sea is the showdown of strength between China, a continental rising power and the US, the world’s only dominant maritime power ruling the oceans for over a century now. While the mainstream media (MSM) – also the dominant view in the region, blames growing Chinese muscularity in the SCS, the non-MSM perspectives in the region and beyond, attribute further intensifying of the many-fronted aggression against China by the American Empire, especially during the ongoing Covid19 pandemic period, as the main source of the SCS again becoming a potential flashpoint.
As the battle of perceptions weighs heavily against the People’s
Republic of China, it is intriguingly puzzling why three important aspects –
crucial in the understanding of the prevailing venomous atmosphere in the SCS –
remain hidden in the mainstream discourse. They are, namely: Asian nations
since at least WWII have territorial disputes in the SCS but long kept them
manageable, until America began targeting China as a primary foe and
implemented its “Pivot to Asia” policy to contain China in 2011; the current,
incendiary sovereignty battle in SCS is the result of four centuries of Western
– American and European – colonialism which began with Spain and Portugal
dividing the Philippines and Indonesia in 1529 and ended with the US and UK
drawing borders separating the Philippines and Malaysia in 1930; finally and
more importantly, the US maritime hegemony – an unchallenged Anglo-American sea
power for over 200-years ensuring that 90 percent of global trade continues to
use oceanic routes – cannot allow any country, especially a continental power
like China, to change the international political order designed by the
maritime world.
The Brazilian journalist Pepe Escobar, a regular columnist for Asia Times Online and Sputnik News, has been following
developments in the SCS since Hilary Clinton started navigating the US return
to “Asian waters” as the 67th US Secretary of State under the Obama
Administrationin 2009. In July 2016,
when the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague decreed in favor of
the Philippines and rejected China’s claim of “nine dash line” regarding the
disputed Spratlys, Escobar wrote “the SCS is and will continue to be the
ultimate geopolitical flashpoint of the young 21st century.” Needless to point
out, Escobar’s pronouncement had much to do with China’s instant, disdainful
dismissal of The Hague judgment as “null and void.” But in fact, Escobar was
reminding us of the future retaliation by the US against the Chinese “saber-
rattling.”
Another pertinent argument which generally is missing from the
mainstream discourse is that stakes are very high in tension-ridden SCS not
only for the future of Asia, but also for the East-West balance of power, as
compared with the Middle East or even in Eurasian borderlands. To understand
this, one must read Alfred Mahan’s seminal The
Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, written over a century and
quarter ago. Mahan essentially wrote the roadmap of US ascendancy to become the
world’s most powerful maritime power, and therefore the dominant power. His
core thesis is, the US should go global in search of new markets, and protect
these new trade routes through a network of naval bases. “That is the embryo of
the US Empire of Bases – which de facto started after the Spanish-American war,
over a century ago, when the US graduated to Pacific power status by annexing
the Philippines, Hawaii and Guam,” Mahan had envisioned.
Echoing the above, a recent article in Wn.com/Defensepost on the ongoing eyeball-to-eyeball contestation
between the armies of China and India along the Line of Actual Control in
India’s eastern Ladakh, draws interesting connection between escalating
tensions simultaneously in the SCS and on China’s western border with India,
respectively. According to the article’s two authors, current India-China
border skirmishes should not be viewed in isolation from Anglo-American
geopolitical plans to halt the Chinese from reaching the Arabian Sea through a
much shorter route via Pakistan. “US maritime power is asserting its reach and
range to let its allies know that the ‘maximum pressure’ game on China is
underway. Offensive realism, consisting of assertive containment and
deterrence, is America’s new theoretical and military mantra against China,” it
said.
When speaking of allies, a former Indian ambassador believes the
ASEAN countries – almost all former or current allies of the US, may appear to
be bandwagoning with China. In an op ed piece in The Hindu a couple of weeks ago, Ambassador Jayant Prasad opined:
“But in spite of their deepening economic ties with China, they (ASEAN
countries) are seeking political insurance, strengthening their navies, and
deepening their military relationships with the United States.” On the other
hand, while sympathizing with Beijing’s “self-defensive” actions, Thomas Hon
Wing Polin, Hong Kong-based veteran journalist recently observed, “The SCS is
home to the world’s busiest and most important trade lifelines. Some 80% of
China’s overall trade including vital oil imports, all pass through its waters.
Keeping SCS shipping lanes open is a core interest of China – simply because it
is matter of national survival.” Polin also cautioned that the ASEAN nations
are fully aware the island disputes is not with China alone, but also between
and among several ASEAN members. To the huge discomfiture of the US, not only
China knows this, China has been successful in rallying most ASEAN countries
round two initiatives Beijing can take credit for: to settle disputes
bilaterally and to have a Code of Conduct between China and the ASEAN.
Emerging from the just concluded virtual meeting of the ASEAN+3
Senior Officials Meet (APT SOM) last Monday, the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister
Mr. Luo Zhaohui exuded confidence in the solid economic and trade ties between
China and ASEAN. In the backdrop of the ongoing pandemic and in the face of
escalating tensions in the SCS, the value of China’s exports and imports to
ASEAN increased by 5.6 percent in the first half of this year, he said. Luo
displayed the same confidence in East Asia to lead the world to recover
economy. A statement released by the Foreign Ministry of the P R China (FMPRC)
next day claimed: “As epidemic prevention and control becomes a new normal,
regional cooperation East Asia has been reinforced. All parties are looking
forward to signing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)
within this year. East Asia economic integration has bright prospects.”
Now, let us turn to China to see how scholars and experts have
been evaluating both the heightened presence of the US marine power in the SCS,
especially since early June; and whether the PLA Navy (PLAN) is actually
planning to take on the US might, which is literally knocking at China’s doors.
The overall consensus in Beijing regarding the presence of USS Ronald Reagan
and USS Nimitz in SCS seems to dismiss any real or potential threat of war
associated with the US move. Song Zhongping, a well-known military affairs
commentator said in a recent interview with the Global Times, “The US move aimed at enhancing its military presence
in the West Pacific, is designed to show off that its hegemony in the region is
unshakable.” The US is also attempting to deter PLA movements in the SCS and on
the Taiwan question, Song said.
Perhaps encouraged by Deng’s confidence in the ability of future
Chinese “cleverer” leaders, or an indication that Beijing is moving towards a
more hardened stance – in line with its so-called “aggressive” external
posturing during the pandemic period, a recent article in the Party-run online
current affairs news platform Utopia
is worth paying attention. On the one hand, the article disdainfully calls for
“reset” in Beijing’s long-held position of defining the SCS as “peaceful sea”;
and on the other it makes an appeal to China’s policy makers to have “no more
serious engaging with countries in the region with which China has territorial
disputes.” Both propositions sound too extreme to seem tenable. Yet the fact
that a major “official” media outlet has carried the signed article is enough
to raise eyebrows among China watchers and security analysts alike, especially
in the Philippines and Indonesia, or even in Malaysia, and raise the question,
what is China up to?
Well, many would agree with the title of the op ed piece by the
former Indian ambassador: “More saber-rattling, more isolation.” However, the moot question still remains, the
SCS for Beijing will continue to be
China’s South Sea or become “trouble sea” (nanhai).
For nan in Mandarin means both
“south” and “trouble.”
