Author: ICS

Post Shangri La Dialogue: Powerplay in the South China Sea

ICSLeave a comment

Mr. Saurav Sarkar, Research Intern, Institute of Chinese Studies

Just a day before the commencement of the 2018 Shangri La Dialogue (SLD) (1-3 June), the United States military’s Pacific Command changed its name to the Indo-Pacific Command. This name change came after the US had disinvited China from the 2018 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise as a consequence of its continued militarization of the South China Sea (SCS). The US-China relations have hit a new low in recent months as China perceives American activities in the SCS to be aimed at countering its growing presence in what it considers to be its sovereign waters.

Lieutenant General He Lei, head of China’s military delegation to the 2018 SLD, reportedly drew a parallel between China’s militarization of the SCS to the deployment of troops to Hong Kong in 1997 to project its sovereignty. The US, however, expects China to adhere to international law in the SCS before engaging with it in any military exercise hence the reason for disinviting China from RIMPAC. US Secretary of Defense James Mattis has defiantly insisted that the US would continue its freedom of navigation operations to enforce the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. China, however, does not view cessation of its military activities in disputed areas of the SCS (which it perceives to be completely legal) as a pre-requisite for participating in war games like RIMPAC. Hence, it has developed significant military capabilities in the SCS in an attempt to enhance its power projection capabilities in the region and beyond.

Implications of militarization in SCS islands

In the backdrop of this strained period in China-US relations, the military activities of both countries in the SCS are significant. Woody Island occupied by China in the disputed Paracels is now capable of conducting takeoff and landing of the H6-K strategic bomber which can even carry nuclear weapons. However, its nuclear capability is secondary to its primary role of conducting aerial attacks on approaching enemy ships using air-to-ground cruise missiles and anti-ship missiles. Woody Island is in close proximity to the Yulin naval base in Hainan province which is home to the People Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) fleet. About 1028 km south from Yulin is Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands. This makes the defences at Fiery Cross Reef important as it sits in the middle of the southern access zone to the SCS and will, therefore, be vital to disrupting enemy movements into the SCS. In addition to Fiery Cross, there are air and naval defence platforms on Mischief and Subi Reefs as well. This arc of military installations from the Paracels to the Spratlys is designed to protect the Yulin submarine base using anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) weapons as Yulin is critical for the PLAN’s ability to break through US defences around the First Island Chain. This is because the SCS has favourable conditions for submarines and makes it easier to disguise their movements.

Woody Island is also capable of landing J-11 and FC-1 fighter jets which could be used to gain air superiority and in conducting aerial bombings in the SCS. The same warplanes and even strategic bombers like the H6-K can also be stationed at Fiery Cross Reef which has a 3 km long airstrip and multiple hangers as observed via satellite images. This would allow the PLA to use the island as a force multiplier and an offshore power projection platform, something it had earlier lacked in the SCS. On 5 June the US Air Force conducted a flyby of the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal from Guam using B-52 bombers as part of a routine ‘Continuous Bomber Presence’ mission in a deliberate attempt to project American power. The flyby not only raised tensions but also elicited a response from China who accused the US of sabre-rattling. This is understandable due to the fact that B-52s are nuclear capable and form part of the US strategic bomber fleet at Guam.

A day after the B-52 fly-by, according to ImageSat International, HQ-9B surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries had been removed from Woody Island which reappeared in the same positions on 8 June. This shows that the PLA is capable of quickly moving and deploying sophisticated military hardware on its offshore facilities. HQ-9Bs have been deployed in the Spratlys as well along with YJ-12B anti-ship cruise missiles. HQ-9Bs are medium to long range SAMs and would be effective in engaging with the US Navy’s fighter jets like F/A-18s but their effectiveness in dealing with stealth aircraft like F-22s and F-35s and cruise missiles remain doubtful. The YJ-12B anti-ship missiles, however, would be dangerous to US aircraft carriers especially if launched in large numbers to overwhelm their short-range defences.

In the current scenario, the PLA could conduct operations in the SCS unilaterally and get an upper hand against all regional actors but not without escalating the stakes involved and risking a direct confrontation with the US. A direct contest with the US, however, would be an uphill task for the PLA due to the experience and superior capability of the US Navy in amphibious warfare and support from its allies. This is one reason why China has still not engaged in a direct show of strength as it knows it still has a long way to go to counter the US fully. For the moment China seems to be abiding by Deng Xiaoping’s ‘bide our time, hide our capabilities’ dictum in its strategic designs. How it all plays out in the long term remains to be seen as neither country seems willing to compromise on their respective stances regarding the dispute.

Book Review: Redefining Empress Dowager Cixi

ICSLeave a comment

Ms. Sharanya Menon, Research Intern, Institute of Chinese Studies

JUNG CHANG, Empress Dowager Cixi: The Concubine who Launched Modern China. (London, Random House Group, 2013), pp. 436, ₹ 360/ £ 7.48, ISBN: 9780224087438

Through the Empress Dowager Cixi’s biography, Jung Chang has attempted a reappraisal of a controversial figure in Chinese history – Empress Dowager Cixi (Qing dynasty) –who ruled for over four decades, during some of the most turbulent years in Chinese history (1861-1908). Commonly perceived as ‘tyrannical’, ‘vicious’ and ‘incompetent’ (pp. 373), Empress Dowager Cixi was known as a traditionalist and unfalteringly opposed to modernisation and any engagements with the West. Her adopted son, Emperor Guangxu was known to be a reformer, moderniser and heralded for shaping modern China during its nascent stages. Commonly perceived to be anti-Western and deeply traditional, Cixi is often accused of being the primary reason for China’s humiliating defeat in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895.

Using newly available Chinese records and historical documents, Jung Chang, through this detailed biography of Empress Dowager, constructs a compelling counter narrative. The author throws new light on Cixi’s reign by describing her as an ‘astute’ ruler (pp. 298), and most importantly, a strong woman who stood her ground among the misogynistic male bureaucracy and society. The book narrates the story of a concubine who, with the desire to protect her empire, transforms into an ‘amazing stateswoman’ (pp. 373).

The book is divided into six sections with each section devoted to the various stages and the important events that shaped her life. The first section takes the reader through the initial years of Empress Dowager’s life in the Summer Palace as an imperial concubine of Emperor Xianfeng (1835-56). Initially left as a low-ranking concubine, Cixi was hardly taken notice of by the Emperor. This changed with the birth of her son, Tongzhi (1856), the heir to the throne. She was consequently promoted to a higher position and gained prominence.

Emperor Xianfeng’s lack of foreign policy understanding and deep-seated loathing for the Westerners was seen by Cixi as the primary cause for the empire’s defeat in the hands of the foreign powers during the Second Opium War (1856-1860). Cixi understood that it was in the interests of the empire to engage with the West instead of following a contractionary trade and foreign policy. State-affairs were assigned to a Board of Regents chosen by her husband till her son came of age. Known to share the late Emperor’s views on the West, Cixi was afraid that with themn power the empire would plunge deeper into crisis. Hence, Cixi launched a coup that transferred all authority and powers to her till her son, Tongzhi, came of age.

Section two takes off with Cixi assuming power and ruling from behind the ‘yellow screen’; being a woman, she could not appear in front of the men who served her. Her initial attempts at modernisation and engagement with the West are described along with the resistance that she endured. With the support of her trusted aides, Cixi embarked on the journey of transforming medieval China by introducing foreign policy, diplomacy and engaging in foreign trade at a level that was unprecedented. She introduced reforms to modernise the army and navy; trade and diplomacy boomed during her reign and the empirerom a slump (1861-1873).

Cixi retired as soon as her son came of age and willingly stayed away from state-affairs. Emperor Tongzhi had a short reign (1861-75) and died at a very young age, forcing a heartbroken Cixi to assume power yet again, this time through her adopted son, Emperor Guangxu. Section three and four explore Cixi’s modernisation efforts and her engagement with the West until he came of age. Unlike with her own son, Cixi did not share a warm and close relationship with her adopted son. Often alienated, Emperor Guangxu grew up rooted in Confucian principles and espoused deeply traditional values. Cixi had to retire once again as Emperor Guangxu came of age and was forced to remain silent when he undid all her modernising efforts and reverted to an isolationist foreign policy.

The final two sections highlight the consequences of Emperor Guangxu’s decisions and efforts. China suffered a humiliating defeat in the Sino-Japanese war of 1895 due to Guangxu’s conservative approach. Cixi, unable to hold off any longer, launched yet another coup and assumed the mantle of power. However, at this stage, faced with the combined forces of the imperial powers (British, French, Russian, German, United States, Italy and Austria-Hungary) and Japan. Cixi committed the fatal mistake of aligning with the anti-West and anti-Christian rebel group, the Boxers. The foreign powers overpowered the forces and the empire suffered a setback once again. The period from 1906ere spent in rebuilding her empire and she devoted her time towards transforming China into a constitutional monarchy. Her wish was to allow her subjects to participate in the affairs of the state and hence become citizens.

The nationalists that came to power after the fall of the Qing dynasty (1911-12) were not kind to her legacy though. They yoked together a narrative that presented Cixi in a manner that was highly unfavourable, while all her achievements and successes were credited to Emperor Guangxu or to the men who served her.

The author has attempted to undo the great disservice that has been done to an important historical figure in China. While some may allege that the author is rather explicit in her bias towards the Empress, and the biography at times takes on characteristics of a hagiography, Jung Chang presents the Empress in a manner that disrupts her otherwise demonic characterisation. The book is successful in attempting to produce a fresh and alternative narrative to the dominant one, by successfully presenting Cixi as the astute political ruler and stateswoman, despite all her flaws and handicaps.

QESS What? China’s Advancement in Quantum Communications

ICSLeave a comment

Ms. Prarthana Basu, Research Assistant, Institute of Chinese Studies

Next month, that is, August 2018 marks the completion of China’s 600kg ‘Micius’ satellite into the low earth orbit. ‘Micius’, the quantum satellite nicknamed after a famous fifth century BC Chinese philosopher and scientist (墨子 Mozi in Chinese), is a remarkable feat in space deployment achieved by China in the field of quantum communications. The prospects of quantum communications are immense and can be applied to both civilian domains like e-commerce and military aspects by providing a hundred per cent secure link for the transfer of confidential data.

Notably, it is the world’s first “hackproof” satellite and its deployment has opened up an entire new arena in outer space technologies, giving China quite a leeway, ahead of major space powers such as US and Russia. China has further plans to develop technologies that provide for impenetrable communication links, which is why they intend to conduct more tests related to quantum communications. Quantum communication links are clearly an upgrade of the existent communication links where communication works on the principle of quantum key distribution in which cryptographic keys are transmitted in the form of light pulses. The transmission of data remains intact due to a phenomenon known as quantum entanglement where the particles mimic the same quantum state, irrespective of the spatial difference between them. A slight manipulation or disturbance (in the form of a hacking attempt or eavesdropping) would disrupt the quantum state resulting in the loss of the data link.

A landmark quantum encrypted video-conference, which lasted for about 75 minutes, was held in September last year between China and Austria, covering a distance of roughly 1200 kilometres. Anton Zeilinger, a pioneer in the field of quantum communications has termed the video-conference as ‘very important and impressive’. European researcher Ronald Henson from the Technical University of Delft, Netherlands has also applauded China’s successes and commented that ‘This is the first demonstration of intercontinental quantum key distribution of any kind, and it will stand as a milestone towards future quantum networks’. This indeed has been proven to be an important milestone for China as a country and its scientific community who have been working on it, including various other projects, in order to be at par with other global powers such as the US and Europe. For Pan Jianwei, the lead scientist of QESS said, ‘The satellite marks a transition in China’s role from a follower in classic information technology (IT) development to one of the leaders guiding future IT achievements’.

Quantum Experiment at Space Scale (QESS) is an international research project, which China has been working on, since 2011. The White Paper released by China titled ‘China’s Space Activities’ in 2016 discusses China’s breakthrough in Space Science and highlights ‘quantum experiments in space’ as one of the major thrust areas. It also mentions about ‘quantum communications and computing’ under the science and technology programme that were to be carried out as a part the programme for Sci-Tech Innovation 2030. The Sci-Tech Innovation 2030 is an integral part of the science and technology programme and has been one of the major areas of focus for China as it continues its aspirations to become a space faring nation; this has also been repeatedly emphasized by China’s President Xi Jinping. QESS largely works under the ambit of Quantum Physics and aims to test the principles of quantum entanglement and quantum key distribution. Albert Einstein, one of the prominent scientists who produced works on quantum physics quoted the quantum entanglement phenomenon as a “spooky action at a distance”. However unwelcome in the earlier part of the 20th century, the idea has now gained currency in the 21st century in the experiments conducted by countries such as China and Austria.

There were certain scientific objectives enumerated by the National Space Science Centre of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) guiding the QESS plan: implementation of long-distance quantum communication network to provide transmission of data in a secure manner, based on the application of quantum cryptography, which has established a high-speed quantum key distribution between the satellite and the ground stations. The second objective that has been enumerated is to test quantum entanglement distribution and quantum teleportation on space scale. It is too soon to comment on the full proven successes of the QESS as it is still in its engineering qualification model phase.

In order to further advance the development in quantum experiments, Antonia Zeilinger emphasized the importance of constructing more ground stations in Europe and also creating a ground network of optic fibres (something which China is already progressing in). Xinhua commented that the country hopes to ‘achieve Asia-Europe intercontinental quantum key distribution in 2020 and build a global communication network in 2030’. Reportedly, China intends to create more quantum satellites in order to facilitate long distance quantum communications with a larger area coverage. Tests are also scheduled to take place between China and Canary Islands (West Coast of Africa), thereby expanding the area coverage over half of Asia and some parts of the African continent. China has also established a 2000 km long quantum fibre link connecting Beijing to Shanghai in the month of September 2017. Sources suggest that the successful tests on quantum communications would provide a secure communication backbone network, which would aid in the creation of strategic spaces in Beijing-Tianjin-Heibei and the Yangtze River economic zone. According to the National Interest, China’s scientists have plans to conduct a follow-up experiment with a quantum satellite placed at a higher orbit (probably GEO) within the next five years, which would provide larger geographical coverage. The future plans also include upgradation of the Chang’e Programme (China’s Moon Programme) by sending a quantum satellite to one of the gravitationally stable points between the Earth-Moon system, which would provide more scope to research on the structure and gravity of the spacetime.

 

Trump Administration’s Decision to Quit UNHRC: An Opportunity for China?

ICSLeave a comment

Ms. Fatima German, Research Intern, Institute of Chinese Studies

On 18 June 2018, the United States Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley along with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced the administration’s decision to pull out from the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). In the press briefing, Haley gave two main reasons for the pullout: first, the poor framework of the Council and its inefficiency in meeting its objectives. Second, she cited the Council’s bias against Israel and attempts to isolate it via agenda item 7. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo who joined Haley during the withdrawal announcement took issue with the Council’s image – that it has come across as a poor defender of human rights.

The United States questioned the UN Human Rights Council’s competence by approving countries like China, Venezuela, Iran, and the Republic of Congo for membership, who are believed to be the worst human rights violators. She further alleged that countries like Russia, China, Cuba, and Egypt came out as ‘woodwork to oppose the council reform’.

Earlier, on 6 June 2017, Haley in her speech in Geneva suggested two required reforms to the Council. First, she suggested a change in its election procedure in order to make it more competitive and transparent. Second, she called for the elimination of agenda item 7. In her view, singling out of a country such as Israel with a good human rights record is a mockery of the Council. She mentioned that many other Council member countries agreed with the United States regarding the poor framework and need for reform; however, it was all behind closed doors.

Asia Advocacy Director at Human Rights Watch John Sifton criticized Nikki Haley for the decision to pull out from the council and suggested that she ‘could have worked with missions in Geneva on agenda consolidations and member pledges, as we and others repeatedly advised’. He expressed concern about how such a decision would work in the interest of countries like Russia and China. Radio Free Asia also mentioned in its report that this decision has let down the Chinese rights activists and dissidents who on had their hopes pinned on the United States. Human Rights Watch in a statement said ‘The United States withdrawal risks emboldening countries like China, and other actors that regularly seek to undermine UN human rights mechanisms’.

The notion that China will benefit from the absence of the United States in the Council is largely driven by the understanding that the US withdrawal creates a void that is opportune for China. As the US moves towards isolation by pulling out of multilateral forums, it creates space for China to gradually increase its presence. For example, Chinese personnel are filling senior posts in the World Bank, Interpol, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, UNESCO, and so on. Also, China is deploying a majority of troops to UN peacekeeping missions. In October 2017 the president of the Better World Campaign, a UN advocacy group, Peter Yeo noted that China is the second biggest funder of the UN. In the same year Human Rights Watch’s UN director, Louis Charbonneau mentioned that ‘With China’s international influence growing and growing, there is a worry that what it’s doing could undermine the UN Human Rights system overall’.

Two days after the American withdrawal from UNHRC, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang expressed regret regarding the United States decision to quit. However, as discussed earlier, it is widely perceived that China will benefit the most from it. Amnesty International researcher in Hong Kong, William Nee, pointed out that without the United States in the Council it will become easier for China to promote its views, as ‘The United States had been one of the few countries willing to stand up to China’.

China’s influence in the Council is increasing gradually and in 2017 China successfully passed a resolution which prioritized development over human rights. This resolution basically considers the right to economic development at par with the right to freedom of speech. In March 2018, China proposed a resolution suggesting ‘mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of human rights’. The US was the only country to cast a negative vote with Britain, Australia, Japan, and Switzerland abstaining. The US spokesperson Jason Mack reasoned that ‘the “feel good” language about “mutually beneficial” cooperation is intended to benefit autocratic states at the expense of people whose human rights and fundamental freedoms we are all obligated, as states, to respect’. The US also argued that this resolution glorifies Xi Jinping and is an attempt to forward his thoughts in the international human rights glossary.

China has often criticised the United States for imposing their notion of human rights and experts have observed that now China is aiming to ‘smash the West’s monopoly on human rights’ and promote human rights with Chinese characteristics. Amidst this, the decision of US to pull out from the Council is no less than an opportunity for China. Frances Eve, the researcher at the Chinese Human Rights Defenders, noted that ‘withdrawing will not make the UNHRC disappear, rather provides open space for China to dominate the council unchallenged’.

Nevertheless, Israeli Prime Minister’s office released a statement appreciating the Trump administration for voicing against the hypocrisy of the Council, ‘Instead of dealing with the regimes that systematically violate human rights, the UNHRC obsessively focuses on Israel, the genuine democracy in the Middle East’. While the debate on US withdrawal from the Council continues, Ambassador Haley has assured that the US would continue to work on human rights from outside the Council and rejoin it when desired reforms are undertaken. Until then, how human rights with Chinese characteristics play out at the Council would be an important issue to watch out for.

National Carbon Market: China’s Response to Climate change

ICS3 Comments

Ms. Shristi Singh, Research Intern, Institute of Chinese Studies

For a very long time, China believed that climate change is a myth propagated by western countries to contain the growth of developing countries, especially of China. With time, China has realised that climate change is a reality and has decided to stop adhering to the concept of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’. In the past few decades, the economic growth of China had been impressive. It is the world’s second largest economy and most likely to supersede the United States (US) in coming years. The pace of China’s economic growth has put its environment under increasing stresses. Historically, it has been reluctant in cutting its emissions off, fearing that it could hinder its economic growth. At present, China is the world’s largest energy consumer and carbon emitter, but there are positive signs that it is shifting its position.

China launched its much awaited ‘National Carbon Market’ on 19 December 2017 as its biggest initiative to combat climate change. The foundation of carbon market was laid down in 2013 when local markets were launched in five cities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Chongqing) and two provinces (Hubei and Guangdong) to reduce carbon emission. It included sectors like power, cement, metals, textiles and others. These markets were also included in 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-15) and current 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-20). The motive was to experiment the pilot projects in these polluting cities and provinces before commencing the mechanism nationwide. The countdown began when President Xi Jinping visited his US counterpart President Barack Obama in 2015 and promised to launch national carbon market in 2017. This commitment was then included in China’s pledge to Paris Climate Agreement and is also known as ‘Nationally Determined Contribution’ or NDC to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions.

Carbon Market in China

Carbon market can be defined as a marketplace where carbon emissions can be traded. The government sets limit on carbon emissions to ensure that industries cannot pass the environmental costs to the public. There are many ways of implementing the carbon market and the most popular approach is ‘cap-and-trade’ system where the government sets the cap on the emissions based on factors like ‘type’ of the industry and the ‘ease’ with which companies could feasibly reduce their emissions. If the company successfully beats the government’s target it can sell additional ‘saved’ carbon emissions in the market and earn profit whereas other companies that fails, will buy those saved emissions to reach their target.

Carbon market can be seen as China’s response to pressure at home and abroad to clean up its act and achieve target of clean environment. The domestic public is highly concerned about China’s increasingly deteriorating environmental conditions like rising sea level, soil pollution, deteriorating water quality, urban smog and poor air quality and others. The government has responded to these challenges by introducing ‘green technologies’ such as electric cars, solar panels, wind turbines and other eco-friendly technologies.

It was expected that China will upgrade existing local markets into national emission trading system covering eight high-energy intensive sectors such as power generation, iron and steel, paper-making, chemicals, non-ferrous metals, construction materials, aviation and petrochemicals. Instead, the government chose to cover the emission from power sector only, which emits one-third of China’s total greenhouse gases and makes China’s carbon market – the world’s largest carbon market or Emission Trading System (ETS). China has been the world’s leading investor in renewable energy sources for years but its power sector still depends upon high-carbon sources such as coal. Thus, carbon market starting with the power sector will be helpful in reducing coal burning and thereby boost the growth of clean energy industry.

Under the mechanism, the government will set a limit on total carbon emission and within that limit, polluting power generating industries that fails to reach the target will have to buy ‘carbon credits’ from less-polluting industries. This will impose financial burden on the polluters and will grant rewards to the cleaner entities. This way the renewable energy sector would be able to earn extra revenue from selling carbon credits to those that emit more than their allowed quota. For the first time power plants will undergo a rigorous verification process and there will be a continuous check by the government on accurate measure of emissions coming from them.

Environmental or Political Strategy?

China has vied for the role of a global leader on climate action after the withdrawal of the United States from Paris Climate Agreement in June 2017 under the Trump administration. However, carbon market as an idea is not new to the world, but coming from the world’s largest emitter is startling. China has promised that its carbon dioxide emission will peak by 2030 and the market may not produce a reduction in emissions immediately but in a way has been successful in sending signal to the world about China’s seriousness in dealing with the catastrophic climate change.

China has respected the timeline for announcing its carbon market but is being criticised for drifting from its original plan of covering all the eight broad industries to confining it to the power generation sector. At present, there is no hard cap emission on power sector, which can be pointed as China’s conservative approach to cushion the power sector and economy from sudden carbon shock. It can also be seen as ‘image-building’ process initiated by China to improve its image internationally from biggest emitter to one championing the carbon markets and also among its own people to restore their faith in new project as government’s action in dealing with broad environmental issue.

China’s carbon market would dwarf all the existing markets in the world. No official date has been announced for the actual start of the ETS but if successful, it could incentivize other nations to adopt emission-trading system and take a firmer stand on climate change and if it fails, it will dent China’s image and might impact many climate policies in different parts of the world.

ZTE sanctions withdrawal: Possible channel to address US stance on Iran Nuclear Deal?

ICSLeave a comment

Ms. Sunaina Bose, Research Intern, Institute of Chinese Studies

The United States Department of Commerce announced in the early hours of 7th June, that a deal had been stuck between the Trump administration and ZTE (Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment) withdrawing the sanctions previously imposed on it. ZTE, a Chinese telecom manufacturing company, was sanctioned in April for violating US laws and exporting telecom equipment which contained American parts to Iran and North Korea. The sanctions were announced amidst the already hardening US stance on the Iran nuclear deal.

Within a few weeks, President Donald Trump pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal, otherwise known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), leaving his allies across the Atlantic scrambling to save their ongoing investments in Iran. One of the implications of US withdrawing from the deal involve re-impositions of their unilateral sanctions which were withdrawn in 2015 as a result of signing the deal. These include secondary sanctions that prevent non-US entities, conducting commercial transaction with Iran, from accessing US markets and financial systems.

In an attempt to salvage the nuclear deal, the European Union has invoked the ‘blocking statute’, a 1996 regulation that prevents EU companies from following unilateral sanctions and laws of any other nation. The EU has also offered to create alternative financial streams to support the Iranian economy. India, one of Iran’s significant oil partners, has also declared that it will only follow the sanctions imposed on Iran by the United Nations, and not unilateral sanctions imposed by other nations.

The remaining signatories of the deal maintain that JCPOA is still the best way to keep Iran’s nuclear activities in control while respecting its right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes and have hence extended diplomatic and economic support to the nation. Iranian officials have in turn issued statements deciding to remain committed to deal as long as their economic activities are intact.

However the Iranian economy, especially the oil market, is expected to take a considerable hit, with major companies withdrawing from the Iranian market. Total (France), which is currently engaged in an attempt to secure a sanctions waiver from the US, is expected to hand over its shares of the South Pars oil field to the Chinese state-owned company CNPC. According to reports, Reliance Industries Limited (RIL) plans to stop imports from Iran before the 180 day ‘winding down’ period, due to significant exposure to US financial systems. Lukoil, a Russian enterprise, has also put its plans of investing in Iran on hold soon after US announced its withdrawal. Danish shipping group A P Moller Maersk, the world’s largest oil shipping container firm, ceased operations in Iran.

Under such circumstances experts have expressed concern over the deal entirely falling apart and Iran resuming its nuclear program. However, the recent revocation of sanctions imposed on ZTE has been cited as an example of possible negotiations with the Trump administration with respect to secondary sanctions on Iran.

The punitive measures imposed on ZTE by the United States prevented it from accessing US market for finance or supplies as a result of which it soon announced a shut down of its international operations. Simultaneously, national security concerns were also raised in the US regarding remote surveillance through ZTE equipment.

Nevertheless, the Trump administration decided to take back the injunctions imposed on ZTE in exchange of a $1 billion fine, $400 million in escrows as insurance against future fines and a promise to replace the executive board members within 30 days of the deal being signed. As a show of disapproval, the Senate Banking committee in the US had earlier voted in an overwhelming majority to put in place measures that would prevent Trump from unilaterally revoking the sanctions imposed on ZTE. The president also faced overwhelming bipartisan criticism in the Congress regarding the alleged threat to national security and the precedence it would set with respect to America’s larger policy towards Iran.

One of the many discourses around the ZTE sanctions drop has been regarding the creation of a model that can possibly be used by other signatory states to receive waivers and accommodations and continue their businesses in Iran, thereby weakening the sanctions regime, often referred to as ‘maximum pressure’, that the Trump administration is trying to create. Notably, Total, has begun lobbying the White House for a sanctions waiver over their South Pars oil field development project.

However the Trump administration put speculations to rest by continuing to maintain a harsh rhetoric over the Iran nuclear issue, putting forth its plans for an alternative ‘better’ deal as elucidated by the Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo. The latest sanctions slapped on Iranian entities and individuals for alleged human rights violations and export of terrorism at the end of last month only reiterated the hardliner stance that the US government is presently taking with respect to the West Asian nation.

Although the ZTE deal could potentially be interpreted as a break in the unrelenting sanction regime adopted by the Trump administration, the aforementioned recent development indicates that it is far-fetched to assume that it marks a change in US policies towards Iran and JCPOA.  It is not an inflection in the Trump administration’s narrative towards Iran and may not prove to be a channel to renegotiate the nuclear deal with US. It should perhaps rather be seen in the ambit of the ongoing trade negotiations between US and China and the momentous Kim-Trump nuclear summit in Singapore. However the interesting takeaway from the ZTE episode is that the Trump administration has clearly demonstrated that it does not hold the same commitments to its sanctions when it comes to the Chinese as it does for Iran.

China’s Social Credit System: Descent into an Orwellian era?

ICSLeave a comment

Ms. Sharanya Menon, Research Intern, Institute of Chinese Studies

In 2016, lawyer Li Xiaolin was unable to book plane tickets for his impending journey. An enquiry revealed the cause to be the insincere apology submitted by him to the court. The apology, which had been ordered by the court, had been deemed insincere because it had been submitted on April Fool’s day. The result: Li Xiaolin was placed on a government blacklist that barred him from accessing services as per the bold, ambitious new governance system of China, the Social Credit System.

This incident has drawn comparisons to a recent episode from the British science fiction show, Black Mirror which depicted a society that rated people based on their social interactions with others. The Social Credit System is a Chinese Government initiative which aims to assign a score to all its citizens based on a myriad of factors. The Planning Outline of the system, which was released in 2014 by the State Council, threw light on this upcoming system which aims to “establish the idea of sincerity culture [using] encouragement to keep trust and constraints against breaking trust”. To achieve this, the system will monitor the individuals based on their internet activities, personal shopping habits and rather innocuous behavioural tendencies of its people. The system, by seeding all available data and information across databases, will create a comprehensive record on all citizens and it will showcase all the activities that the individual engages in. Thus, the record will be the basis for the assigned score and will determine citizens’ employment opportunities, their access to loans and even potential romantic partners. The system will not be restricted to citizens but will also include business enterprises and industries.

Eight private companies have been provided with licenses to start pilots and experimental phases in regions. The most notable of them is Sesame Credit which is a subsidiary of Chinese retail giant, Alibaba. The final system that will be instituted might draw on the pilots designed by the private companies or might be entirely different.

The Social Credit System has been presented as the panacea to the widespread issue of mistrust in society and the lack of “sincerity” among the Chinese. The promise of a good score and subsequent benefits would incentivise the citizens to work to attain and maintain a good score. The threat of a bad score will act as a check on undesirable behaviour. Thus, incentivised good behaviour and actions will ensure that the underlying issue of mistrust and insincerity will be tackled tactfully.

While the Social Credit System is soon becoming a reality in China, in India, the Aadhar system is attempting to achieve something similar and parallels between the two systems can be drawn. The Aadhar, a 12-digit unique number, functions as an identity proof for residents of the country and is being modelled by the government to be the solution for all issues related to identity fraud plaguing the country. This system acts as a platform for the government to access all records and information available on all its residents. Therefore, the implementation of Aadhar has incited debates on privacy and data security across the country.

The dominant narrative that is being woven by the governments in both countries revolves around national interest and security. The narrative builds on these themes by asserting that the entry into the digital era and digitization is what is required for the countries to finally assert themselves and reclaim their rightful positions in the world order.

The government in India, by introducing welfare schemes that include Aadhar, is creating a system that necessitates Aadhar be the foundation of welfare and governance. Further, like the Social Credit System in China, the Aadhar integrates all available information on the individuals and as a result the individual loses complete control over any form of information or data that is available on them. The Social Credit System in China has been designed as a surveillance apparatus designed to exert control over the citizens and to construct the “ideal citizen”.

Therefore, the Chinese government is very subtly weaving together the notion of an ‘ideal citizen’ and in the process also reworking the conception of what it is to be a citizen and the relationship they enjoy with the state. China has always maintained administrative control over her population through the Hukou system which has been used to actively determine and limit where a person can live. Therefore, the Hukou system predicted an individual’s opportunities and prospects and therefore could be seen as a precursor to the Social Credit System.

The Social Credit System might be straight out of an Orwellian nightmare, but it shows how a country like China, always known to assert control over her citizens is devising new mechanisms to continue doing so. The Social Credit System warrants several questions to be raised; does the implementation of the system signal a shift towards a Big Data driven governance backed by the state? How does this model aim to accommodate the rights of the citizens and negotiate with the state’s need to survey its citizens? At this point, only time will tell.

India and North Korea: time for a reset?

ICSLeave a comment

Amb. Anil Wadhwa, Senior Fellow & Cluster Leader, VIF

General VK Singh, the Indian Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs was in North Korea from 15- 16 May 2018. Many have raised eyebrows on the timing of this visit, especially since the last ministerial visit from India to North Korea was in 1998. High-level contact between the two countries, however, have been maintained sporadically, and North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong was in New Delhi in 2015. Despite the history of Pakistan and North Korea collaboration in the nuclear and missile fields in the past, Indian and North Korean delegations have been meeting regularly on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit and related meetings. A major thread binding the two together has been India’s food aid to North Korea, which has been reeling under international sanctions and pressure due to its pariah status.

The last few years have seen unprecedented rhetoric from North Korea, matched by equally strong words from the United States, followed by increased sanctions, as the North embarked on an acceleration in the development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.  India had to follow the sanctions route of the United Nations and USA, and its bilateral trade with North Korea fell from US$ 209 million in 2015-16 to US$ 130 in 2016-17. In line with UN sanctions, India banned all trade with North Korea except food and medicine. Following a gazette notification which incorporated the sanctions imposed since 2006, all trade of exports of defence, space and technology, training etc. was banned, and a ban imposed on officials suspected to be involved in nuclear proliferation. Bank account of North Korean diplomats in India were restricted, and there were curbs on the procurement of coal, minerals and other materials from North Korea. The Indian embassy in Pyongyang, however, has continued to function.

The winds are changing on the Korean peninsula. There has been a rapprochement between North and South, and expectations have been raised for a meeting of Kim Jong Un with Trump. The proposed meeting on 12 June in Singapore has slipped into the realm of doubt and the proposed official level meeting between North and South Korean officials have also not happened, with North Korea blaming US officials of proposing a “Libya style” denuclearization proposal on the North, without going into substantive discussions. While the North Koreans have signalled a desire for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the North Korean view will be that it must be done on a reciprocal, phased manner with guarantees that there will be no regime change in North Korea.

India has trained North Korean scientists under the UN COPUS programme at its Dehradun facility, has collaborated with the North in the agricultural field, and its cultural troupes have paid continuous visits to North Korea. Besides food aid, Indian pharmaceuticals are popular in North Korea due to their generic nature and consequently, cheaper prices. The fact that India was one of the top three trading partners of North Korea before the sanctions is testimony to the fact that the commodities traded are complementary.

A major achievement of General VK Singh’s visit was the assurance he received on the possible collaboration and technology transfer between North Korea and Pakistan which the North Koreans said was not in the realm of possibility, given the close relationship between India and North Korea. But the purpose of the visit at this stage also seems to be India’s desire to play a role in the opening of the North Korean economy, and participation in the reform of its dismal economy once there is a thaw with the outside world which now looks likely. India can quickly ramp up its exports of agriculture, steel products and pharmaceuticals and , and restart imports of North Korea iron and other metals. General Singh met with Vice president of the Presidium of the Supreme Peoples Assembly Kim Yong Dae, Culture Minister Pak Chung Nam and Foreign Minister Choe Hui Chol. They agreed to strengthen people to people contacts through culture, cooperate in vocational training, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, promotion of yoga and traditional medicine. India can quickly ramp up its exports, and look at possible investments in the metallurgical sector which it has been offered in the past. Above all, India must be engaged in the process of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and ensure that there is no proliferation of nuclear or missile technologies from North Korea in our neighbourhood.

From Hurling Abuses to Summit Diplomacy: What Factors are Driving Kim Jong-un?

ICSLeave a comment

Divya Tyagi, Research Intern, Institute of Chinese Studies

Kim Jong-un’s new year speech (saehae yeonseol) kick-started an accelerated pace of political shifts in the Korean Peninsula. With the emphasis on creating a ‘peaceful environment’ on the Peninsula, Kim surprised the world with his turnabout from hurling abuses to proposing peace talks. But the question arises, why has he changed his stance and what could be the possible reason behind this sudden shift in Kim’s approach.

If we take lessons from history then, the Panmunjom declaration might just be yet another disappointment. The summit of 27 April 2018 was the third Inter-Korean summit after the Korean war. During the summit of 2000, images of Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il (father of Kim Jong-un) shaking hands and clinking champagne glasses covered the news, as the two leaders signed a “broad agreement to work toward peace and reunification.”[1] The second summit came in 2007 after North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006. Similarly, in hopes of finding a negotiated solution regarding North Korea’s pulling out of Non-Proliferation Treaty (2003), six-party negotiations were initiated which again came to a stalemate after Pyongyang pulled out in 2009. So, there is a sense of deja-vu as North-Korea once again shows the willingness to come to the negotiating table with the concerned parties. The script of the present scenario can be seen as a repetition of the past but, the motive behind the benevolent approach of Kim can be speculated to have manifold reasons.

Breathing Space from the Strangulating Sanctions

Economic sanctions are not a rarity for North Korea after it conducted its first nuclear test in 2006. These sanctions were tightened in 2017 and with it’s all weather ally, China, actively supporting this time, compelled Kim Jong-un to embark on his 2018 ‘charm offensive’. There have been glimpses in the new year’s speech of Kim and the 2018 Parliamentary budget report indicating the damage the sanctions have made on the country’s economy. The North Korean supreme leader in his new year’s speech alluded that sanctions had affected the country’s economy. Likewise, the Premier of North Korea, Pak Pong Ju’s speech during the 6th session of the 13th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) on 11 April 2018 mentioned ‘externally imposed obstacles’ twice, referring to “unprecedented massive challenges” and “vicious sanctions and pressure manoeuvres.” Both leaders acknowledged that economic sanctions were strangulating the North Korean economy, and that might have compelled Kim to rethink his approach, towards its southern neighbour in particular.

Victory on the Nuclear Front

Five years after announcing his Byungjin Policy in 2013, Kim Jong-un has declared North Korea as a nuclear state. Byungjin policy is his signature national strategy and, the successor to his father’s Songun policy (1994). Under Byungjin, Kim pledged to the success of North Korea’s parallel pursuit of a nuclear deterrence and economic development. Now that he claims the successful completion of making North Korea a nuclear state, shifting his focus to economic development seems the only logical choice. The transition of North Korea into a de facto nuclear state has also increased the confidence of Kim in global power standing. The idea of negotiating on an equal footing because of the nuclear weapons can also be considered as a valid motivating factor for Kim to shift to diplomatic negotiations, and aim to pressurize the opposing party agree to his favourable terms.

Laying the Groundwork for Reforms?

Kim Jong-un has in the past tried the ‘stick’ version of diplomacy by hurling abuses and threatening the US and maybe now, equipped with a sense of security because of the nuclear arsenal, he is shifting to ‘carrot’ version of diplomacy, desiring the end result to be, the acceptance of North Korean regime. In his six years of rule, if anything, Kim Jong-un has proved that he has ‘plans’. Starting from Byungjin Policy, aggressive pursuance of nuclear weapons and eradicating any possible competition, Kim is strategically bringing reforms in the regime beneath the guise of continuity. The survival of the regime is of paramount importance to the leader and Kim knows it can be achieved only when the regime’s legitimacy is not under external threat.

One thing that can be said with certainty is that the Panmunjom summit was definitely a historic and impressive day in the history of the Peninsula. From smiling faces of both the leaders, to the promises of a “new era of peace” (pyeonghwaui saeloun sidae) the summit was a success in terms of public diplomacy. However, with big powers like China and United States involved, shaping a new era of peace will not be easy, especially when the objectives of the involved parties are not in tandem with each other’s. The difference of “complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation” stated by South Korea in accordance with US, and Kim Jong-un’s “phased and synchronised denuclearisation” can and probably will be the cause of friction in the momentum of this positive development.

This budding North-South bonhomie will be further put to test in the upcoming Kim-Trump meeting, to be held in Singapore next month. With both Kim and Trump having a flair for unpredictability and aggressive approach, it would be interesting to observe how the two leaders work towards ‘solving’ decades-long conflict.

Note

[1] The two leaders adopted a joint peace declaration after the three-day meeting, agreeing to work towards independent unification and humanitarian and economic cooperation. For more, see:  https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/n_skorea06152000.pdf

China in Africa: An Image Makeover is Underway

ICSLeave a comment

Dr. Veda Vaidyanathan, Research Associate, Institute of Chinese Studies

It was late afternoon in Ethiopia, I scrambled onto a bus filled with University students and found a seat at the back, near the window. As the bus meandered through traffic in Addis Ababa, the noises of the city was drowned out by the loud Amharic music playing on the radio. A young girl wanted to know why Indian women wore bindi’s – when I handed her a few packets from my reserve gift collection – she asked me if I could give her Bollywood DVD’s instead. An hour or two into our drive, the bus slowed down, trudged uphill and finally stopped. Without a groan or complaint, people picked up their bags and began to alight. “We need to get off the bus and walk to the top of the hill”, someone explained as he walked past.

There we were- in the stunning Ethiopian countryside, a horde of people, some quiet others singing, making our way to the top of the hill. “Does this happen every time?” I asked the student accompanying me for the trip. “Oh yes, it’s a Chinese bus.” He replied matter-of-factly. “What’s that supposed to mean?” I prodded. “Oh its terrible quality, it has a weak engine, the chairs and the cushions will come off soon too” he replied grinning. I asked him why we did not take another bus, one which had a stronger engine perhaps, “but there aren’t any other buses” he responded.

As we reached the last hairpin bend, there were large Chinese characters painted on a granite wall. As I stopped to take a picture, they explained that the well-laid tar road was new and built by a Chinese company. It used to be a narrow, uneven dirt road, dangerous during the rains and it took a lot of time to reach the villages on the top.  As we spoke, a woman in a beautiful white habesha kemi walked beside us carrying a pot of water. That journey, I assume, from the water source at the bottom of the hill to the top, was made easier by the broad winding new road.

Many instances like these provided a glimpse into the layered and complicated perception of China in Africa today. As Chinese migrants and companies make their presence felt across the cityscapes and country sides, the African attitude about them is quietly evolving. While acknowledging that Chinese exports to Africa are of inferior quality or that working conditions in Chinese companies are harsh or frustration with Chinese bosses who don’t take into account local sensibilities- conversations with young Africans in Kenya, Ethiopia and beyond highlight a palpable unease. However despite a range of criticism levelled against Chinese firms and violence targeting Chinese managers, most often than not- China is viewed as a provider of options. Sure, the Chinese bus was sub-standard, but at least there was a road and a bus!

Afrobarometer- a pan African, nonpartisan research network conducted a survey in 2016 of 36 African countries about China in Africa and concluded that “Africans rank the United States and China No. 1 and 2, respectively, as development models for their own countries.” Interestingly, in three of five African regions, “China either matches or surpasses the United States in popularity as a development model.” Additionally, “In terms of their current influence, the two countries are outpaced only by Africa’s former colonial powers.”

This shift in perception is by no means abrupt; Africa has been on China’s foreign policy radar with a twenty eight year old tradition of the Chinese foreign minister visiting Africa, in addition to a range of senior officials regularly travelling to the continent. Development Reimagined, the first Kenyan wholly foreign owned enterprise in China, recently published their first infographic on Chinese leaders traveling to Africa. According to their study, the Chinese leadership has made 79 visits to 43 different African countries over the past 10 years and no other country can match this degree of diplomatic exchange with countries in the continent.

Beyond the Chinese ‘Charm Offensive’, data from the AidData dataset – curated by a research lab at the College of William & Mary – point out that seven of the top 10 recipients of Chinese Aid are in Africa. They also drew attention to the fact that contrary to popular perception, Chinese ODA generally goes to poorer countries and it does not appear to go disproportionately to authoritarian or corrupt regimes in the continent.

In addition to Aid, since 2009 China has been Africa’s largest trading partner and in 2016, bilateral trade between China and Africa was valued at USD149.1 billion, Chinese non-financial direct investment in the continent amounted to USD3 billion and the contractual value of newly signed contracted projects reached USD65.2 billion.

The language utilized by China while crafting its policies for Africa have strong moralistic undertones indicating selflessness and altruism. While some Chinese scholars agree with this premise, others insist that it is a mutually beneficial ‘win-win partnership’. African scholars remain divided with some viewing China as having increased their options, while others remain wary of their increasing influence.

Regardless of the motivations, fact remains that a new generation of Africans are becoming increasingly comfortable with a powerful China and the ‘China model’ of growth and development. Not only has China has become the most popular destination for Anglophone African students studying abroad, there are over 40 Confucius Institutes (CI) in Africa. A recent Quartz report mentioned that at a Mandarin speaking proficiency test conducted in Lusaka, a Zambian student was asked what her dream was, and she claimed “Wode mengxiang shi Zhongguo” (“My dream is China”). This acceptance of China and aspiration to be like China, the result of years of Beijing’s proactive engagement in the continent, could perhaps be one of the biggest successes for China in its contemporary foreign policy.