Month: March 2022

Xi’s Spirited New-Year Address to a “Dynamic” and “Resilient” China

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Upasana Ghosh, Research Intern, ICS

While the world has its gaze fixed on China, it stepped into a pivotal political year that is awaited by several economic challenges exacerbated due to the pandemic. On the last day of 2021, President Xi Jinping extended his best wishes to his fellow citizens and delivered the annual New Year address to the nation. During the televised speech, the Chinese President had sent a clear message to the international community that China is “ready” for the long and arduous journey ahead. The crux of the speech revolved around – glorification of the Communist Party of China’s (CCP) achievements in 2021, the elevation of the regime’s image as the best governing institution and Xi’s political objectives for the year, 2022. Another prime focus of Xi’s address was: urging citizens to maintain their “strategic focus” and mindfulness against “potential risks”, that could disrupt CCP’s mission to lead the way in China’s long march towards the great rejuvenation. Consequently, stressing the importance of resilience, courage and determination for the people of China as they look forward to the future.  

Nevertheless, the profound message behind the address reflects articulated camouflaging of the economic and political fallouts at home and abroad. Looking forward to 2022, Xi’s call for more rigorous efforts to foster an economically robust, politically transparent and socially peaceful environment came at the backdrop of the Party’s forthcoming 20th Congress scheduled in autumn this year. The preceding year 2021, was a tough one for China, as the world’s second-largest economy came under severe international pressure due to a range of factors, including obfuscating information on Covid-19 data, aggressive posturing on the South China Sea, and the human-right abuses against Uighurs in Xingjian province.

Further, the downturn in China’s real estate market and the intensifying slowdown in the export-driven national economy due to drastic drop in foreign demands of Chinese produce added to the financial distress at home. Investors from the foreign business community are becoming increasingly sceptical about Beijing’s grip over increasing risks in credit markets. Politically it got worse for Xi, as he faced widespread resentment from his own Party members due to the expelling of many party elites and that of unceasing popular discontent resulting from media censorships, regulations and surveillance on citizens in the name of adjustment of excessive incomes, redistribution of wealth and reduction of income inequality. In addition, a crackdown over Hong Kong and an expansionist approach towards Taiwan led to further dispersal of Beijing’s negative image across the globe. All these combined, contributed to Xi’s pledge in this year’s annual address to meet domestic and global expectations from a responsible world power. The implied undertone was reflected in a burnished manner in his message that  “the world is turning its eyes to China,” and it is ready.

President Xi began his speech with his retrospective appreciation of “continual progress” and contributions made by Chinese citizens and the Party in achieving their first centenary goal of building China into a “moderately prosperous” society during the historically axial year 2021. While looking ahead into the future, he highlighted that as China “confidently” strides toward “a new journey” of achieving its second centenary goal of building a great modern socialist country in all respects, 2022 will be another crucial year for the country. By drawing attention towards the centenary celebration of the founding of the CPC, Xi recalled the Party’s extraordinary achievements and contributions throughout the past century in diminishing Chinese people’s “unyielding struggle” against all challenges, be it the elimination of poverty or towards the accomplishment of their extraordinary mission of Chinese rejuvenation. In the televised address, Xi reminded his people to “always remain true to their original aspiration”, thereby emphasizing loyalty as integral to Party’s founding mission and interests. While conveying about the adoption of the Party’s third resolution on historical issues at the sixth plenary session of the 19th CPC Central Committee, Xi praised CPC’s 100-year achievements and experience as a source of motivation and inspiration. In this context, Xi also referred to the importance of Chairman Mao’s thoughts in attaining the historical initiative. Therefore, it becomes evident that the Chinese President’s New Year address is nothing but a commemoration before his people about CCP’s centrality in Chinese polity. Also, the President in his address attempted to bolster the regime’s image as the quintessential modus-operandi for China’s socio-economic advancement. The speech can further be interpreted as Xi’s attempt to elevate his image and stature in the Party’s history in order to fulfil his intention to ensure his position as party chief for a third term. Hence, in Consequence, establishing himself as the uncontested ‘core’ leader of the People’s Republic of China. It is to be noted that Xi has always relied on Party’s performance legitimacy as his preferred tool to strengthen and maintain his monopoly over national power, dismantle domestic dissent of any kind and to consolidate mass support.

While speaking on people’s struggles from living in poverty, Xi’s address entailed a personal touch. He accentuated experiences from his encounter with poverty and mindfulness from his nationwide field trips about Chinese people’s sustained efforts in scoring ‘complete victory’ in fighting poverty. This relatable and engaging acknowledgement of the common man’s problems conveyed a calculated measure to garner widespread support as an empathetic mass leader. Although Xi called for more strenuous efforts on behalf of the Chinese people to ensure stable and highest-quality of economic development and a truly prosperous social environment, this year’s speech appears to have tactfully evaded from setting any specific economic agenda and growth targets. Instead, in desperate measures to win over people’s confidence before the commencement of CCP’s National Congress in autumn 2022, Xi seemed to hint at looming economic pressure in the country, thereby vowing about his and the Party’s commitment to tackle any such challenges. He devoted a substantial section to his profound concern for the environment, with multiple geographic references, evincing his detailed attention to specific situations. Thus, taking a chance to demonstrate the world about China’s sincerity as a responsible leader, towards advancing sustainable development goals and its resolution and effort to promote collaborative development and prosperity for all in the future. By stressing upon the advancements in China’s space program, Xi tried to draw worldwide attention towards its broadened scientific outreach for humanity. In a very veiled fashion, by capitalizing on the Party’s much-hyped campaign on ‘collective effort on common development and prosperity for mankind’, Xi alluded to his vision for China and next-generation political leaders, that the commitment to China’s aerospace would only intensify in the coming period.

The Chinese President also didn’t miss the chance to be in the spotlight while expressing his plaudits for Chinese contribution in vaccine diplomacy and material assistance across the globe at the pandemic outbreak, contrary to the developed democracy’s struggle to meet their respective national demands. Aggrandizement of the Communist regime’s efficiency is handling the Pandemic crisis, reflected Xi’s motive to instil a sense of admiration for the Chinese way of global leadership among the developing countries. Also, the New Year address flagged Xi’s apprehension over a forthcoming complicated geopolitical environment in the commencing year, particularly concerning Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland and stability in the former British colony of Hong Kong and the former Portuguese-run enclave of Macau. Declaration on establishment and implementation of “One Country, Two Systems in the long run” through concerted efforts came amidst a severely deteriorating US-China relation alongside growing international backlashes and pressure from the US and European Union. To decode the subtle message, underlining a delicate tone of inspiring his people to defend, fight for and promote global peace and prosperity, upholds a firm and uncompromising diplomatic posture on behalf of the country’s President in his attempt to manage and resolve issues, perceived by Beijing as encroaching on its core national interests. The regime’s intent to enforce its political will embodying CCP’s contemporary expression of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ within its neighbourhood is clear from its expansionism in the region.

To sum up, Xi, in a very colloquial and relatable fashion, intended to demonstrate to China and the World that the Chinese model of socialism is not just delivering desired results but is also flourishing. On the surface, the enthusiastic address directed towards 1.4 billion national audiences resonated a personal one-to-one conversational appeal towards individual efforts for the overall upliftment of China’s global stature. However, underlying this optimism, is an instructive parameter of the communitarian regime for law-abiding Chinese citizens. The apparent portrayal of self as an archetype of a compassionate, charismatic mass-leader – through the application of simple yet catching phrases like “amicable, respectable” and “dream chasers” to address Chinese people, conveyed about the Chinese President’s attempt to uphold his image and political legitimacy at home and abroad. His description of 2022 as a pivotal year for the country by looking backward at Chinese achievements in the preceding year and looking forward as the Chinese together embarks on a new journey to transform their country into a significant global power sets the prime tone for Xi’s vision for Chinese polity in the coming time. Whereas, if Xi continues to stay in office beyond the anticipated decade, which is a high possibility, the international community, particularly its neighbouring contemporaries, must be prepared to face an even more outward-looking, proactive, and assertive China in the global platform. Beijing’s willingness to flex its muscle regarding what it considers defence and procurement of its core national interest in the contested Indo-Pacific and other territorial disputes is more likely than recognized. Xi’s telling phrase that everyone has seen and experienced a resilient and dynamic China further exemplifies contemporary China’s strategic posture in international affairs. Moreover, the two adjectives, “resilient” and “dynamic”, illustrates China’s preparedness for facing future challenges and the country’s zeal to bounce back against them. Henceforth, the upbeat address driven by political and economic exigencies at home and abroad is a clear indication of a further shift towards aggressive diversionary foreign policy approach to reinforce national sentiments and demonstrate competence against alternative administrations, only to retain political power of the party leaderships and thus, continuance of the Party’s legitimacy and authority across the motherland.

The Blog was written under the guidance and supervision of Dr. Priyanka Pandit, Ashoka-HYI Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, Department of International Relations and Governance Studies Shiv Nadar University, India. The views expressed here are those of the author(s), and not necessarily of the mentor or the Institute of Chinese Studies.

Why is the Ukraine War becoming a debating battleground in China?

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Hemant Adlakha, Vice Chairperson, ICS and Associate Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

Very few Beijingers are aware that most Western embassies in the capital’s “Embassy Alley” have put up Ukrainian solidarity signs near their entrances. No, not because the area is “no entry zone” for everyday strollers, but because as they say, the area is “far from the madding crowd.” Yet the Ukraine war has attracted the country’s netizens and citizens’ so much attention that a Beijing-based foreign commentator says “a rupture has taken place.” Furthermore, a leading Chinese newspaper has even equated the unprecedented “rupture” with as if China is participating in the war.


To believe what most foreign affairs experts in China tell us, Chinese people usually do not pay attention to international news, or for that matter to world events unless of course China is directly involved. However, the degree and the passion with which a large number of Chinese have come out to express their views and opinion, even take sides, has surprised one and all. Part of the reason why the Russia-Ukraine war has opened up “a new battlefield” of public opinion in China is Beijing’s pro-Ukraine and pro-Russia friendly image in the Chinese media in recent years. Thanks largely to wide media coverage as recently as January this year when Xi-Zelensky pictures were flashed in various media in China as the two presidents exchanged congratulatory messages celebrating thirty years of diplomatic ties between Beijing and Kyiv.


A more significant factor why most Chinese do not see Ukraine as a country far away is, Ukraine is the hub of the Belt and Road Initiative, or “One Belt, One Road” strategy – interestingly, in the Chinese media the BRI is generally referred to as Yidai yilu, or OBOR. Many Chinese see OBOR, President Xi’s favourite and China’s important infrastructure and overseas investment project, as a major casualty of the Ukrainian war. According to Professor Wang Yiliang of Shanghai’s prestigious Fudan University, “Europe is a crucial market for China’s ‘Belt and Road’ land projects. China’s “Belt and Road” land projects may either face “blockade” or “OBOR” connectivity in the region may become increasingly dependent on Russian “protection. Therefore, the war between Russia and Ukraine has made Beijing’s decisions to be cautious.”

A far more important or perhaps equally controversial reason which is creating near vertical split between China’s pro-Ukraine/pro-Russia public opinion is the absence of a clear “party line” on the situation from above. As Tom Clifford, a seasoned foreign affairs analyst who has been living and writing from Beijing for long, has observed recently: “China’s wait-and-see-inaction seems sclerotic. Chinese officials have sent out confusing and frankly incoherent statements. They stress, parrot like, the importance of territorial integrity but blame the US for the crisis.” As a result of the Chinese leaderships’ sclerosis, the country’s all powerful censorship agencies too seemed clueless and floundered on the issue.

At another level, a huge controversy was created when a blogger on China’s largest social media platform, Weibo – China’s equivalent to Twitter etc., labelled those pro-Ukraine as “rightists” with a similar view as the position taken by the Western media and most liberal democracies; while calling all those who support Russia in the ongoing war as “leftists” with no independent thinking of their own. Reacting angrily to the blogger’s “bogus” claim, Zhang Zhikun, a veteran and widely influential current affairs analyst wrote thus: “The debate caused by the ongoing war in Ukraine refuses to stop. Unlike at the beginning of the war, the debate is now no more about the war itself but has been extended into investigating the ideological roots of those taking part in it. This also explains why the debate is acquiring a high degree of polarization.”

A no less pertinent dimension of the growing sharp divide in China over the Russian invasion in Ukraine is the shocking degree of cynical hype as manifested among China’s hardened “left” (aka orthodox leftists). In a signed commentary, a Mao-faction ultra-left scholar, Wen Anjun, has named and accused several leading intellectuals from China’s topmost universities of parroting “western speak.” Anjun blames them for condemning Russia but not speaking a word of criticism against the US and Nato. To Wen Anjun and others of his ilk, what is most worrying about the people mentioned above is their worldview, their view of the US, and above all their perception of the CPC-led China. “Once China’s re-unification war [with Taiwan] is launched in the future, all these people may endanger China by siding with the US and Taiwan independence,” wrote Wen Anjun.

It is indeed true that the Ukraine war has shocked the world, aroused strong reactions in all corners of the world, and led to fierce debates. But it is also true that the degree of polarization in public opinion in China has not been witnessed in most countries. In addition to what is highlighted above, other bizarre public reactions to the ongoing war include a section of Chinese netizens unashamedly displaying misogynist attitudes by writing blogs with a flurry of tone-deaf jokes. What outraged many within China and abroad was surfacing of ham-handed humour such as calls for “willing to shelter 18- to 24-year-old Ukrainian beauties.” On the other hand, some Chinese observers sounded alarm bells, warning that China’s “filthy wealthy” rich – such as “comprador capitalists” Jack Ma, Pony Ma and others – along with all those who are backing Ukraine are all anti-China, anti-Chinese motherland, and anti-CPC.

Finally, no one in China denies, just like no one in the world is in doubt, as far as China is concerned the Russia-Ukraine war is not a good war. It is understandable the Chinese leadership must have been regretting now what it said during Xi-Putin summit on February 4 in Beijing: “China’s Russia friendship has no limits.” But given the country’s political system and the political culture, not at all surprising that no one in the leadership will openly admit “of being caught wrong-footed by a world that is rapidly changing.”

The views expressed here are those of the author(s), and not necessarily of the Institute of Chinese Studies.