Month: June 2021

Siddhant Hira, China-analyst and incoming MA National Security Studies student at King’s College London

Introduction

Just like Beijing’s 2008 Summer Olympics, the run-up to the 2022 Winter Olympics also has “angry pro-Tibet protests along much of the Olympic Torch relay.” 2008 was a watershed moment in Chinese foreign policy: the Games was a major soft power victory. China proved to the world that it was capable of hosting a green and high-tech event by investing $40 billion in four years.

Chang Ping puts it aptly: pre-2008, ‘connecting the world’ was popular but post the games, China’s new message was “now the world should follow us”. At that time, the Olympics was a sports diplomacy tool for it to consolidate its status as an emerging superpower. A 2009 Congressional Research Service Report stated that after the Beijing Olympics, China’s economy enjoyed a domestic boom while its international trade and investment declined sharply.  By implementing economic measures for short-term benefits, Beijing projected the image that its economy was surging despite the rest of the world combating global recession.

Beijing’s 2022 Winter Olympics will be the first to allow foreign visitors in the post-Covid world. It will certainly be a welcome distraction, both domestically and globally. Domestically, it is perceived as a potential major success: China’s 14^th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) outlines the country becoming a sports power by 2025 as one of its long-term goals. China wishes to use the Games to fabricate a diplomatic victory after Covid-19 by inviting the world to witness first-hand, on-the-ground Chinese economic and soft power.

Today, China faces a credibility crisis ahead of the Olympics that is not just economic but an amalgamation of military, political, human rights and democratic challenges. China is not yet a global superpower but is much stronger than in 2008; however, now it has a different agenda for the 2022 Winter Olympics: a reset in its global perception and a restoration of credibility against the backdrop of Covid-19.

Loss of Face?

For decades, China has maintained an aggressive posture in the South China Sea, with numerous ongoing territorial and/or maritime disputes with nations in the region. Threats to and flight incursions over Taiwan continues to be a major issue. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, the PRC has violated Taiwan’s air defence identification zone (ADIZ) 380 times in 2020, a record figure. It does so in three ways, from most to least common: “circumnavigational flights of Taiwan, ADIZ intrusions, and violations of the cross-strait median line.”

                                              

In recent times, there have been two heavyweights in Tibet’s corner: the United States (US) and Great Britain (GBR). The former passed the Tibetan Policy and Support Act in January 2020 in Congress: Tibetans choose a new China-independent Dalai Lama, strict measures against Chinese officials who interfere in his succession, environmental protection of the Tibetan plateau, potentially no new Chinese consulates in the US until a consulate in Lhasa and recognition of the Central Tibet Administration. Just two months later, GBR’s Foreign Secretary, Domininc Raab, spoke at the United Nations Human Rights Council, stating that human rights abuses against Uighur Muslims were “… taking place on an industrial scale.”

On 30^th June 2020, China circumvented Hong Kong’s legislature by passing a draconian national security law. This Law grants vast and extremely vague powers to the Chinese Government to curb dissent and protest; criminalises secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign/external forces. Even though China has faced heavy backlash from the free world, the law is still in effect and the democratic and humanitarian freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong remain curtailed.

2020 began with the grim news of Covid-19, with most of the world holding China responsible for its origins and development. One theory propounded is that it was intentionally developed in a Wuhan laboratory with links to China’s army – the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The other theory considers it an accidental leak by human negligence.

Cases first emerged early November 2019, but the world only came to know in late December. Before the virus emerged, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had conducted an exercise in August 2019 – Crimson Contagion – to simulate a pandemic originating in China. David Sanger of The New York Times said that the result of the exercise may have been alarming enough to be “marked draft, sensitive, not for distribution”. The numbers projected were extremely sobering: “90% chance that the pandemic will be of very high severity, with 110 million forecasted illnesses, 7.7 million forecasted hospitalizations, and 586,000 deaths in the U.S. alone.” There is no evidence of a published exercise report, nor of any follow-up action. Had necessary steps been taken, Covid-19’s initial impact on the American public health system would have been minimised. The US Government’s apprehension of this becoming public knowledge potentially allowed China to control the narrative by obstructing impartial and independent studies on the origins and development of the virus. But now, the US Intelligence Community is conducting a thorough fact-finding investigation on the direct command of President Biden.

For India from an international relations perspective in 2020, its two greatest challenges which continue to shape its policy are Covid-19 and the clash with Chinese troops in Galwan Valley on 15^th June 2020. Soldiers from both sides came to blows in Eastern Ladakh, using clubs, stones, fists and the like – with India losing 20 men – and the Chinese – four, and possibly more. Typically, China takes decades to admit if and when it has lost soldiers in battle but this time, it took eight months. Forced by its own citizens sharing information publicly and with international sources quoting higher casualties, China had to admit its losses.

Conclusion

China also lost, and continues to lose, face because of the Belt and Road Initiative, its alleged involvement in the Myanmar coup and the Uighur-related controversy surrounding the Disney film Mulan. Its medium of aggression is primarily wolf-warrior diplomacy, a term that has become synonymous with China’s foreign policy.

For any state, hosting the Olympic Games is an opportunity to display the strength of its public diplomacy, status and soft power. There have even been some comparisons between the 1936 Munich Summer Olympics and the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, and the significance for both nations. The Biden administration is yet to take a stand regarding any boycott – with various stakeholders expressing a range of reactions including outright boycott, hosting elsewhere and legally punishing sponsors. Political leaders across North America and Europe have also coordinated legislative action against China hosting the Games.

The greatest challenge for the democratic world order is to ensure that the spirit of the Olympics is upheld, and yet strong action is taken against China’s humanitarian track record. The question facing China is whether it will be able to reset its image to the pre-Covid era, or has it already done irreversible damage in the eyes of the free world.

Hemant Adlakha, Honorary Fellow, ICS

Summary

President Biden’s China policy in his first hundred days is already drawing flak in Beijing. Notwithstanding recently witnessed smart US-China “climate diplomacy” during Washington-sponsored Earth Summit, the US watchers in the People’s Republic are further irked by weird signals Biden is sending in picking Nicholas Burns as the next China envoy.

“The US ambassador to Beijing must be someone who can show to the world the importance of the Unites States’ relationship with the Peoples’ Republic of China,” is how a former US envoy to China under President Obama reacted to the news of the likely Biden pick for the job. “It’s also critical that the person is empowered to negotiate on the president’s behalf and should not just be a person to deliver messages,” the former Montana Democrat Senator was quoted in the US media when Bloomberg first disclosed two months ago that Nicholas Burns might be the next China envoy. 

On March 18, the South China Morning Post’s seasoned China correspondent Shi Jingtao in an exclusive report claimed that Beijing had decided to stay on with Cui Tiankai, as China’s envoy to the US during the Biden presidency. Cui is already well over the usual retirement age for a Chinese official of his rank but “his connections and knowledge” are highly valued, citing sources in Beijing, Jingtao wrote. It is pertinent to point out, given that the Party general secretary, who is also at the same the President of the PRC, is assigned the responsibility by the seven-member politburo standing committee – the CPC’s highest decision making body – to deal with China’s affairs with the United States, which means Cui Tiankai is Xi Jinping’s man in Washington.

Furthermore, if what Shi Jingtao claims is true, then it is clear that 71-year old Cui or Xi Jinping’s “Mr. Indispensable” will be creating a history of sorts in the diplomatic annals by serving as Xi’s ambassador in Washington for long 11 years. It was the newly appointed Chinese president Xi, who picked Cui as the Chinese ambassador to the US in 2013. Cui’s continuation as China’s envoy in Biden era is also indicative of Beijing’s conviction that China-US rivalry is here to stay, at least for the next four years if not beyond. Let us recall, following the Alaska talks failure last month, China’s “independent” English language CX Daily in reaction to Biden administration’s relentless vitriol against China did predict that in Biden era and beyond “we are going to see at least 10 years of frosty ties between Beijing and Washington.”  

Let us return to the early reactions to Burns as the next potential US envoy for China. In the US media, as soon as the news of Nicholas Burns being considered for the most crucial ambassadorial appointment under the new Biden administration was disclosed two months ago, the reactions were positive and welcoming. While the state department and the White House both made it clear the next China envoy must be finalized based on the more “traditional mix of political and career,” the purpose was also to have fewer (key) political appointees than during Trump presidency. On the other hand, most ex-diplomats and foreign affairs experts too underscored the importance of having someone in Beijing who will be “perceived as having influence with the President Joe Biden.”

The influential Bonnie Glaser, a senior advisor for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, emphasized the person (the likely China envoy) to have access to both Biden and Xi. “The most important thing I think for an ambassador is to have a good relationship with the President and have some ability to directly communicate with the President and the key people around him.” she was quoted by the CNN as saying. “It’s important for the person to have access to Xi Jinping as well,” Glaser added.

In Beijing, the first thing commentators have pointed out is the strange “missing” of the US envoy since October last year when Terry Branstad was unceremoniously recalled by President Trump, saying “Branstad would be coming home from China” as he wanted to join the presidential campaign. Branstad, a former long-time Iowa governor was handpicked to the posting in Beijing by Trump in part because of the ambassador’s strong personal relationship with Xi Jinping. Earlier on in February, scholars in China had commented on the new President’s going slow in finalizing ambassadorial nominees to several countries, including China.

Diao Ming, a well-known expert on US-China relations and professor at the Renmin University in Beijing had told the Global Times: “Since Biden’s major officials in the foreign affairs sector attach great importance to China affairs, the ambassador to China needs to be a person with strong experience in politics, top-class professionalism, a well-known reputation and prestige in political circles, as well as trust from the president.” For Branstad, though ambassadorship came as political “reward,” he not only fitted the bill in several ways but he also proved to be a hit with the authorities in Beijing.

“Branstad’s departure would be a loss to China-U.S. diplomacy as it would mean one less political heavyweight with a deep understanding of China based here,” was how Wang Huiyao, an adviser to China’s cabinet and founder of the Centre for China and Globalization, had reacted to the news of the end of Branstad’s tenure. Branstad had arrived in Beijing as the US envoy during the early days of the new Trump administration. Branstad was also one of the first ambassadorial announcements – made as early as in December 2016, within a month of Trump’s victory. 

Just like Branstad, if appointed, Burns too will be among the first diplomatic nominees under President Biden. Burns’ reputation of a “no-nonsense” veteran professional diplomat – he has been a former ambassador, had served in the state department under the Bush administration and enjoyed his role in academic circles as professor with the Harvard Kennedy School – is well-acknowledged by the Global Times which has declared him as the “ideal choice for the position of US ambassador to China.” Interestingly, the GT, known for its strong hawkish views, while ignoring harsh remarks on China made by Burns in 2017 has lavishly praised the career diplomat for not “holding extreme views on China.” “Given his views on China that are not extreme, it is unlikely China will be averse to him. It should be said that Biden’s choice for Burns is very reasonable,” the newspaper opined.

In contrast to the GT commentary, Shanghai-based influential and widely popular Chinese language online news platform guancha.cn, has described Burns as “senior professional diplomat but not a diplomatic veteran.” Echoing what Hans Nichols wrote of Burns for AXIOS two weeks ago, cited above, the guancha.cn observed “choosing Burns would be indicating a preference for a seasoned diplomat instead of a high-wattage politician.” The online news platform did not fail to point out however that the past four US ambassadors in succession were all influential politicians. Guancha.cn also wondered on the choice of Burns as the US envoy for three additional reasons: one, Burns is known to be an expert on “Soviet Union” and Europe and not for handling China’s affairs; two, he would be filling in the challenging diplomatic assignment as “non-China” hand and that too when the coveted position in Beijing has been vacant for the past six months at a time considered as the most difficult period in the last 40-years of the bilateral relationship; and finally, unlike his past predecessors, Burns will have tough time doing liaison between President Biden and Blinken-Sullivan-Campbell trio. Not to forget, Biden’s China envoy will have to maintain a fine balance with the Biden administration’s first high-ranking traveller to China, John Kerry, the former secretary of state and now the president’s special climate envoy.

To sum up, as Lü Xiang, an expert in US studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has observed, Biden will decide on who will represent Washington in Beijing “once the state department announces comprehensively the US foreign affairs plan.” But scholars in Beijing are also saying, though Burns may not be a political heavy weight and “an old friend of Chinese people” like his immediate predecessor was, yet Beijing might be pleased with him. For the simple reason that he not only strongly supports the view that the US-China “decoupling” is impossible and that cooperation between the two largest economies is a must in containing Covid-19 pandemic and in climate change. But also because like his immediate predecessor who actively tried to ease China-US tensions, if experienced and professional diplomat like Burns succeeds as ambassador to China, he will play an even greater role than Branstad. 

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This is modified version of an earlier article  published by the NIICE, Kathmandu under the title

‘Nicholas Burns for China Envoy: Is Biden Sending Wrong Signals to Beijing?’ on 26 April, 2021

Hemant Adlakha, Honorary Fellow, ICS  

Summary

Last week, Henry Kissinger warned that US-China tensions threaten to engulf the entire world and could lead to Armageddon-like clash between the world’s two military and technology giants. Surprisingly, some Chinese are interpreting the warning as threat to intimidate China in order to “accept and obey” the US-led world hegemonic order.

In January 2015, the peace group CODEPINK dangled a pair of handcuffs in front of 91-year old former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at a Senate hearing. Twelve months later, at the February Democratic Debate Bernie Sanders and Hilary Clinton were seen engaged in a heated duel attacking and defending the acclaimed diplomat. The late writer Christopher Hitchens in his book The Trial of Henry Kissinger warned editors, TV news channel producers and presidential candidates to stop soliciting Kissinger’s “worthless and dangerous” opinions. The never ending outburst of enmity on the part of CODEPINK, Sanders and Hitchens was due to Kissinger’s brutal role in the killing of thousands of civilians, gang rape of hundreds of female detainees, and allegedly slaughtering of over one million people in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos among countless similar crimes against humanity since the early 1970s. 

As documented in “Kissinger and Chile: The Declassified Record,” as some 5,000 people were being detained and tortured in Chile’s National Stadium, Kissinger told the ruthless Augusto Pinochet: “You did a great service to the West in overthrowing Allende.” But Sanders-Clinton “spirited exchange” five years ago, as mentioned above, was not confined in Sanders’ words to Kissinger being “one of the most destructive secretaries of state in the modern history” of the United States. Sanders’ rare outburst also included Clinton defending her foreign policy mentor – Kissinger – on China. “[Kissinger’s] opening up China and his ongoing relationship with the leaders of China is an incredibly useful relationship for the United States of America,” Hilary Clinton emphatically pointed out.

Sanders responded disdainfully and berated Clinton for admiring Kissinger. “Kissinger first scared Americans about communist China and then opened up trade so US corporations could dump American workers and hire exploited and repressed Chinese,” Sanders had retorted. However, no one in Beijing either knows or seems interested in all the so-called negative traits attributed to the veteran diplomat who is generally known as arguably the most “influential figure in the making of American foreign policy since the end of World War II.” Instead, according to Peter Lee, editor of the online China Matters and a veteran Asia Times columnist, the CPC leadership value Kissinger as the “symbol, custodian and advocate” of a US-China relationship that is special.   

Professor Aaron Friedberg, author of A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, described the re-opening of relations with China as Kissinger’s greatest achievement. In a review of Kissinger’s massive book On China, Friedberg wrote: “Kissinger’s six hundred pages on China are an attempt to apply the principles of foreign policy realism to the most pressing strategic challenge of our day.” (Emphasis given) However, the approach, taken alone, was far from inadequate in anticipating the behavior of an increasingly powerful China on the one hand, and for prescribing an appropriate American strategy to deal with a rising China, Friedberg went on to add.

Since Mao, all successive top Chinese leaders have met with Kissinger one-on-one in Beijing, some even more than once. China’s current President Xi Jinping is no exception. In fact, given the deep esteem with which reform era CPC leadership has been embracing Henry Kissinger, the general wisdom in Beijing is President Xi has horned his diplomatic skills by learning well his (Kissinger’s) oft-quoted aphorism “you don’t go into negotiations unless your chances of success are 85 percent.” Kissinger had first met with Xi in 2007, when Xi, as the party secretary in Shanghai, had received the most frequent foreign visitor to China on a visit to the city. When asked for his assessment of the party’s new general secretary within days of the 18th party congress in November 2012 by the Wall Street Journal, Kissinger had said “Xi Jinping is a strong leader capable of rising up to any challenge.”

In the past little over four decades of Kissinger-CPC bonhomie, the first decade thanks to Cold War passed off rather smoothly and uneventfully. The second decade ushered in with perhaps the first most serious test for both Kissinger as well as for the US-China relations since the unfreezing of the bilateral ties by Nixon-Kissinger pair in the early 1970s. In June 1989, the CPC rulers used brutal force to crush peaceful student demonstrators at the Tiananmen Square and launched nationwide crackdown on suspected dissidents. Though criticized by the US political elite for “Kowtowing to Beijing” for defending the CPC authorities by saying “a crackdown was inevitable,” Kissinger did influence the Bush administration in imposing comparatively mild sanctions while deflecting congressional pressure for tougher action.

In third and fourth decades respectively, unlike during the first two stages, ideology gradually regained initiative over geopolitics in influencing the bilateral relationship. There are mainly two factors for this. First, from 1979 to the end of the last century, China was relatively weaker than the United States both economically and in military technology. Following China’s rapid economic growth beginning late 1990s and at the turn of the twenty-first century, a section in the US political elite became apprehensive of China’s assertive and highly competitive stance. These concerns soon gave birth to the “China threat theory” which Beijing unsuccessfully tried to pass off as “China’s peaceful rise.”

The second factor has much to do with the world financial crisis in 2008 which resulted in the beginning of decline of the US economy on the one hand, and the unfolding of the seemingly evident intent of the CPC leadership to “eventually displace the US” and “re-establishing their own country as the pre-eminent power in East Asia.” In other words, with Cold War and the Soviet Union both long gone, and China threatening to soon replace America as the world’s number one economy, the communist rulers in Beijing were under no illusion that the ideologically hostile US was gearing up to plot “color revolution” to replace the CPC with democratically elected leaders in the People’s Republic.

The chilling of US-China bilateral relations during the first year of Obama presidency itself, with China replacing Japan to become the world’s second largest economy in 2010 and further hardening of the US stance towards China, and finally the US “pivot to Asia” strategy introduced by the Secretary of State Hilary Clinton – all these were perceived by Beijing as the US “creating political framework for a confrontation with China in order to maintain the global hegemony of American dominance.” Even Kissinger was very much aware of the changing stance in Beijing, as is reflected from what he wrote in On China: “China would try to push American power as far away from its borders as it could, circumscribe the scope of American naval power, and reduce America’s weight in international diplomacy.”

Interestingly, although the most frequent US visitor to China has continued to visit China ever more frequently during the past decade, given the changing nature of polity in both the US and in China it is not incorrect to say the Kissinger magic has been gradually fading away. Last Friday, when the “old friend of China” warned both Beijing and Washington in a speech at McCain Institute’s Sedona Forum in France that their escalating tensions are leading the world towards Armageddon-like clash, the opinionating Chinese social media reacted with caution. “Kissinger used the so-called end of the world argument to threaten and intimidate China in order to accept and obey the hegemonic order by the United States.

Another commentary in Chinese pointed out, ever since Trump launched “all out political war” against China, Kissinger has been in subtle and cunning way warning China to “cooperate” with Washington. The signed article entitled “Kissinger Continues to Scare the Chinese People” stated: “For the past two, three years, Kissinger has been repeatedly saying, China must continue to compromise and obey the US hegemony and US-led global order. Otherwise, China will face the danger of World War I-like situation.”

To sum up, an angry guancha.cn – one of China’s most widely read online Chinese language news platform – reader posted in the chat room: Kissinger is no longer qualified to advise China or the world. Instead, the world will be a peaceful if America first puts its own house in order!   

This is edited version of an earlier article published under the same title in moderndiplomacy on 5 May, 2021.

Jelvin Jose, Research Intern, ICS

The Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic armed organization (EAO), engaged in armed struggle for ethnic self-determination of the Rakhine Buddhist people has been a significant newcomer to Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts. The fierce tensions  between the AA and the Tatmadaw, following AA’s police station attack on 4 January 2019, led to the displacement of 157,000 people and prompted a global outrage. The public support consequent to the political marginalization of the ethnic Rakhine community, and Chinese material backing, expedited the rise of AA as a lethal outfit within a short period since 2017. In order to safeguard its economic and strategic goals in Myanmar, Beijing needs to balance both the Tatmadaw and AA.

Arakan Army and its Rise

The AA was formed in April 2009 in Laiza, a town in Kachin state. It aims to set up an autonomous territory with substantial autonomy in Myanmar’s Rakhine state, similar to the one run by the United Wa State Army (UWSA). The Rakhine State of Myanmar is one of the poorest regions in the country. AA, seeks to garner public support by upholding Rakhine nationalism, promising to bring prosperity to the region, and preserving the identity and cultural heritage of the ethnic Rakhine community.

Though the AA had been initially trained and operated under the umbrella of Kachin Independence Army (KIA), it later shifted to the fold of the powerful UWSA. After gaining training and battle experience from its operations in the Shan and Kachin states in the initial years, AA started shifting focus to Rakhine state by 2012. However, it was only after 2017 that the AA has risen to prominence in the Rakhine state.

Chinese Material Backing to AA

Although there is little evidence for direct supply of arms to AA by the Chinese government, multiple instances, including the Sittwe naval vessel attack, confirm the flow of Chinese weapons to AA’s hands. In the words of Anders Corr, around 90 percent of AA’s financial resources come from China. Chinese backing to the AA also extends in terms of uniforms, weapons, and ammunition. In the Sittwe vessel strike that AA carried out in June 2019, the AA rebels reportedly fired at least three Chinese-made 107mm surface-to-surface rockets.

The primary source of weaponry for AA is the purchase from other EAOs, mostly from UWSA and members of the Northern Alliance. UWSA- Beijing’s closest ally and most prominent beneficiary of Chinese weapon supply is said to have installed factories producing Chinese weapons in its territory. UWSA, leading the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) – a seven-member coalition of EAOs including AA – is reportedly used by Beijing to influence AA to secure its interests.

The flow of sophisticated Chinese weapons to AA’s arsenal strengthens the claim of Chinese backing of AA. In July 2020, the Thai military seized a massive stock of Chinese armaments worth US$1 million from Mae Tao district, bordering Myanmar and Thailand. The weapons reportedly were destined for the AA and insurgent groups operating in India’s North East. In November 2019, Tatmadaw captured another stock of Chinese-made weapons, including FN6 anti-aircraft guns, RPGs, and around 40,000 rounds of ammunition from the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) – AA’s partner in the Northern Alliance- at Homein village of Northern Shan State.

It is notable that AA rebels, who have obstructed India’s Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP) at different points, have not, similarly, targeted any Chinese projects. The statement by AA spokesperson U Khaing Thukka in March 2020, that “China recognises us, but India doesn’t” further exposes Beijing’s connections with the AA.

Arakan Army and China’s Links with Ethnic Armed Organizations

Unlike several EAOs such as UWSA, Beijing has not directly backed AA. Instead, China pipelines weapons and other resources to AA via other EAOs, to secure its strategic and security interests in Myanmar. In a broader sense, Chinese indirect backing to the AA is part of Beijing’s balancing act between EAOs and the government to retain its influence in Myanmar. Keeping links with AA helps Beijing to shield its infrastructure projects from harm. Swedish Journalist Bertil Linter explains the strategy Beijing adopts in Myanmar as a  “Carrot and Stick Policy.” On the one hand, China assists Myanmar with investments and necessary political cover from global human rights outcries at international bodies such as the UN Security Council. On the other hand, China also keeps links with the armed ethnic outfits, providing them with necessary political cover, funding, and weapons.

In fact, for Beijing, the existence of AA as a cause of turmoil in Rakhine is unwanted business. China critically needs a stable situation, conducive to the smooth implementation of its economic projects in Myanmar. Beijing perceives that the AA claims are implausible to be accepted by the Tatmadaw, thus posing obstacles to stability in the state by instigating prolonged political stir. As a cause of violence, the persistence of AA without striking any workable deal with the government (or at least with Tatmadaw) seriously hampers Chinese interests in Myanmar. First, violence and resultant disruption of stability would impact the rollout of Chinese projects and their functioning. Second, border security is a crucial aspect of Chinese interests in Myanmar. Beijing believes that its porous border with Myanmar is vulnerable to exploitation by external players. Thus, the extreme turmoil AA has been making, pressing for greater international involvement, is not in China’s interest. Third, the presence of AA as a formidable power would necessitate Beijing to balance between the government and AA simultaneously. Otherwise, Beijing could have much more easily secured its interests by striking a deal with the government and Tatmadaw. Fourth, though Tatmadaw and Nyaypidaw have been long suspicious of Beijing’s connections with various EAOs, Beijing’s material backing to AA seems to have further exacerbated this distrust.

Notwithstanding this, given the reality that the Tatmadaw cannot control the whole territory on its own, Beijing requires links with both the EAOs and the government to safeguard its economic and strategic interests in Myanmar. Rakhine state, the focal point of AA, is the hub of both economically and strategically important BRI projects such as Kyaukpyu port and China-Myanmar oil and gas pipeline. These projects are critical for China from the geostrategic perspective to reduce its vulnerability in the crucial Malacca Strait- often described as  “China’s Malacca Dilemma.” Hence, Beijing essentially requires establishing links with the AA to prevent the disruption of these ambitious projects.

Given the factors mentioned above, the Chinese backing to AA is conditional. Beijing does not see any end to Myanmar’s ethnic crises in the foreseeable future. Thus, Beijing can be expected to continue its direct or indirect engagements with EAOs, including the AA, while maintaining strong ties with Nyaypidaw in order to minimize its risks and maximize the profits from Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts.