Debashis Chakraborty, PhD, Assistant Professor, Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT), Kolkata*
A version of this article was originally published in Chinese as ‘印度谨慎推进RCEP的理由’ [Yindu jinshen tuijin RCEP de liyou], Diyi Caijing, 27 August 2017. This is part of a series by Indian scholars in China’s top business affairs news portal facilitated by the ICS. The English version follows the Chinese text.
从1991年开始采取外向型发展模式以来，印度始终稳健地推行着自由化进程，以此促进外商直接投资 (FDI)的流入和出口。直到2003年，印度还主要依赖由世贸组织(WTO)主导的旨在促进出口的多边贸易改革，此后的一段时间，印度开始参与一系列的区域贸易协定(Regional Trade Agreements ,RTAs)。
印度最早在2005年和新加坡达成了双边综合经济合作协定(CECA)，此后又陆续在2006年达成了南亚自由贸易协定(South Asian Free Trade Area , SAFTA)，在2010年在商品贸易方面和东盟达成了自由贸易协定(FTA)，与韩国达成了双边综合经济伙伴协定(CEPA)，并在2011年分别与日本和马来西亚达成了双边综合经济伙伴协定(CEPA)以及双边综合经济合作协定(CECA)。印度还参与了多项区域贸易协定谈判，例如，与欧盟的双边贸易投资协定(BTIA)、印度加拿大经济伙伴协定。然而，现如今，印度正处在关于亚洲泛区域性协定——区域全面经济伙伴关系协定(Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership ,RCEP)的十字路口上。
上世纪70年代，“雁行模式”促成了东亚以及东南亚的贸易一体化。该理论指出，投资和相应的技术会向享有更低劳动力成本以及其他地区性优势的国家转移。手握技术的跨国公司的流入，以及伴随而来的商品、服务贸易增长，使得东盟国家以及中国、近年来的印度，均能在一些产品线上做到专精尖，而这是加入涵盖整个亚太地区的国际生产网络的关键一步。随着东盟国家同时采取双边形式和集团形式加入了一系列战略区域贸易协定，过去十年，国际生产网络不但得到了深化，还在地域上得到了扩展。而如若正在进行中的泛阵营协定RCEP最终能够生效，那么(亚洲的)这一区域融合进程将达到顶点。RCEP谈判始于2013年，包括了六个与东盟有着双边区域贸易协定的伙伴国家，即澳大利亚、中国、印度、日本、新西兰和韩国。
对于印度而言，RCEP意味着通过实现与澳大利亚、中国和新西兰的更深层次的区域融合，使印度出口方面的市场准入得到实质性提升。然而，一些特定成员采取了谨慎态度，包括印度。印度倾向于谨慎推进RCEP谈判的背后，是否存在正当的理由呢?
审视一下印度逐渐演进中的与RCEP伙伴国的贸易-投资联动，其背后是经济逻辑。2016年，RCEP(包括中国香港和中国澳门)在印度出口和进口篮子中的占比分别为22.5%和38.2%，而在2005年时，相应的数字分别为26.6%和25.3%。显然，虽然RCEP经济体正成为印度越来越重要的进口源，但它们作为印度出口目的地的吸引力下降了。此外，在此期间，印度与RCEP伙伴国之间的贸易平衡也在恶化。比如，中国在印度出口和进口篮子中的占比分别为3.4%和17%，加深了贸易不平衡的程度。而中国目前尚未与印度通过已运行的区域贸易协定达成深度融合。这一观察结果很好地表明，通过对于印度的贸易参与者尤其是那些中小型企业(SMEs)推行关税以及其他程序性改革，RCEP很可能给印度带来负面影响。这可能是印度政策制定者的一个重要考虑事项。
另一方面，从RCEP伙伴国流入印度的外商直接投资额在2000~2012年和2013~2016年分别占印度总投资现金流的20%和36.63%。然而，只有来自新加坡和日本的外来投资对印度而言比较重要，两者在2013~2016年期间分别占印度总投资流入的25.06%和8.33%。在后RCEP时代，根据“雁行”现象，紧接着，技术将从澳大利亚、中国、韩国等其他RCEP国家向印度转移。
印度特意在2014年发起了“印度制造”运动，重点关注汽车和汽车零部件、航空、生物技术、化工、食品加工、纺织和服装、工程产品、制药、皮革制品、IT硬件等第二产业。而这些产业在亚洲均存在着国际生产网络，即在日本、新加坡和韩国技术转移的协助下，这些产业的生产阶段被分割并分布于东盟成员国、中国和其他亚洲国家和地区。印度已经深化了它与东盟伙伴国之间的生产融合，但还未达到中国-东盟、日本-东盟网络的相应融合程度。在RCEP的规范下，印度将取消进口关税、被迫接受贸易便利化措施，而这将带领印度向更理想的方向发展。印度参与RCEP将进一步促进知识和技术转移，其在区域内的出口潜力也会得到显著增长，长期来看还能纠正贸易逆差。此外，印度的东北部地区将成为其东南亚贸易的门户，并从中获益极大。
但印度主要还是期待通过参与RCEP，从服务贸易自由化尤其是商业服务及专业服务类(例如医生、IT专业人员)的贸易自由化中获益。伴随美国工作签证的收紧以及保护主义情绪在全欧洲范围内抬头，印度急需一个新的市场来吸收其服务出口。鉴于东亚和东南亚的增长活力，它们能成为很好的替代市场。印度尤其希望通过扩大服务贸易领域的贸易顺差来弥合扩大中的商品贸易逆差。然而，想从RCEP伙伴国处获得慷慨的服务改革承诺，印度谈判技巧的成熟度将受到考验，尤其是RCEP国家要求其很多品类的产品得以零关税准入印度市场。在此背景下，2014年时，印度决定在成立孟加拉湾多部门技术经济合作计划(BIMSTEC)自由贸易区协议(协议包括RCEP中的缅甸和泰国)的谈判中扮演关键角色。这凸显出印度将风险多元化的倾向。
在特朗普总统宣布美国退出受到热议的跨太平洋伙伴关系协定(TPP)后，从2017年1月起，RCEP对于促进亚太地区贸易-投资流动的重要性变得越来越多样化。澳大利亚、文莱、日本、马来西亚、新西兰、新加坡、越南这些RCEP国家也参与了TPP谈判。现如今，TPP的实际消亡使得这些国家萌发了在RCEP中投入谈判资源和精力的极大动力。也因此，推动这些经济体做出更深层次的服务业改革承诺，将成为印度谈判策略的一个要素。
鉴于保护主义浪潮抬头以及WTO多哈回合谈判陷入僵局，区域贸易协定正在迅速崛起为促进贸易的载体。RCEP对于所有参与方而言，都是互利的制度安排——印度旨在通过RCEP获得技术，与亚洲的国际生产网络融合，并出口专业服务，而其他伙伴国则期待深化其在印度商品市场的份额，这一市场在过去十年始终以超过6%的增速增长着。
鉴于其能够使亚太地区间的货物、资本、技术和服务无缝对接，虽然RCEP将使得一些短期性的调整问题浮现出来，但从长期来看，RCEP很可能会发展成为一种增进福祉的安排。
Since adopting the outward-oriented growth model in 1991, India has steadily liberalized to facilitate FDI inflows and exports. While up to 2003, the country broadly relied on WTO-led multilateral trade reforms for export promotion, in the subsequent period it started participating in a series of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), starting with Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) with Singapore (2005), followed by South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) in 2006, Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in merchandise trade with ASEAN (2010), Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with South Korea (2010), CEPA and CECA with Japan and Malaysia respectively in 2011 and so on. India is also engaged in several ongoing RTA negotiations, e.g., the Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) with the EU, India-Canada Economic Partnership Agreement. However, today India stands at the crossroad with respect to the mega-regional agreement in Asia, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
During seventies trade integration in East and Southeast Asia was facilitated by ‘flying geese’ investment and associated technology transfer towards countries enjoying labour cost and other locational advantages. The inward movement of multinational corporations (MNCs) with technologies, and the consequent rise in merchandise and services trade enabled ASEAN countries and China, initially, and India, in a more recent period, to specialize in narrower product lines, a core step towards joining international production networks (IPN) spread across the Asia-Pacific. The IPNs have both deepened and geographically broadened over the last decade, with ASEAN countries entering into a number of strategic RTAs, both bilaterally and collectively as a bloc. This ongoing regional integration process will reach culmination when ongoing negotiations on the mega-bloc RCEP since 2013, involving six bilateral RTA partners of ASEAN, namely – Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea, will come into effect.
For India, RCEP would mean a substantial enhancement of market access for its exports, with realization of deeper regional integration with Australia, China and New Zealand. However, RCEP negotiations have only witnessed a limited progress so far, with certain members adopting a cautious approach. Are there any valid reasons behind India’s inclination to move cautiously during RCEP negotiations?
A look into India’s evolving trade-investment linkage with the RCEP partners underlines the economic rationale. In 2016 RCEP’s (including Hong Kong and Macao) shares in India’s export and import baskets stood at 22.5 and 38.2 per cent respectively, as compared to the corresponding figures of 26.6 and 25.3 per cent in 2005 in that order. This clearly underlines that while RCEP countries are becoming more important as an import source for India, as export destination their attractiveness have come down. In addition, India’s trade balance with RCEP partners is worsening over the period. For instance, China, a country presently not deeply integrated with India through an operational RTA, is explaining 3.4 and 17 per cent of India’s export and import baskets respectively, underlining the extent of trade imbalance. The observation indicates that the possible adverse effect of RCEP through tariff and other procedural reforms on Indian players, especially on the small and medium enterprises (SMEs), might be an important consideration for Indian policymakers.
On the other hand, FDI inflows in India from RCEP partners over 2000-12 and 2013-16 accounted for 20 and 36.63 per cent of the gross investment flows in India respectively. Inward investment flows were however important only from Singapore (25.06 percent of gross inflow) and Japan (8.33 percent) during 2013-16. It is expected that in the post-RCEP period, in line with the ‘flying geese’ phenomenon, technology transfer to India from other RCEP countries, e.g., Australia, China, South Korea, will follow.
In particular, India in 2014 has launched the ‘Make-in-India’ campaign focusing on secondary sectors like automobile and auto-components, aviation, biotechnology, chemicals, food processing, textiles and garments, engineering products, pharmaceuticals, leather products, IT hardware and so on. Asian IPNs exist in all these sectors, with fragmented production stages spread across ASEAN, China and other countries, aided by technology transfer from Japan, Singapore and South Korea. India has already deepened its production integration with ASEAN partners, but the level of integration is yet to match the corresponding Sino-ASEAN and Japanese-ASEAN networks. Removal of import duty and imposition of trade facilitation measures under RCEP norms would take India towards the desired direction. India’s participation in RCEP would further facilitate knowledge and technology transfer, with intra-bloc export potential considerably growing and correcting the negative trade balance in long run. In addition, the North-East region of India can immensely benefit as a gateway for trade with RCEP through Southeast Asia.
The major expectation of India through the RCEP forum is, however, to benefit from liberalized trade in services, particularly in business and professional service categories (e.g., doctors, IT professionals). With tightening of H1B visa regime in the US and rising protectionism across Europe, India needs newer markets for absorbing its service exports. East and Southeast Asia, given the growth dynamics, can provide such an alternate market. India particularly expects to widen the trade surplus on this front as against the widening trade deficit in merchandise products. However, extracting a generous service reform commitment from RCEP partners would test the maturity of India’s negotiating skill, especially given the fact that RCEP countries (particularly China) are asking for zero tariff entry to the Indian market in a wide range of product categories. In this background, India’s decision to play a key role in the launch of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) Free Trade Area negotiation in 2014 (includes Myanmar and Thailand from RCEP) underlines its inclination to diversify risks.
The importance of RCEP in promoting trade-investment flows in Asia and the Pacific has grown manifold since January 2017, after the announcement of President Trump on US pull-out from the much-discussed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). A number of RCEP countries, namely, Australia, Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Vietnam, were also part of the TPP discussions. Now the practical death of the TPP provides these countries enormous incentive to invest their negotiating capital and energy in RCEP. Hence, pushing for deeper service sector reform commitments from these economies would form a crucial component of India’s negotiating strategy.
Given the growing waves of protectionism and the stalemate of the ongoing Doha Round negotiations of WTO, RTAs are fast emerging as the vehicle for trade promotion. RCEP is a mutually beneficial arrangement for all involved – while India intends to receive technology, integrate with Asian IPNs and export professional services, its partners look forward to deepening their presence in India’s merchandise products market, a segment which is consistently growing in excess of 6 per cent over the last decade.
While short-run adjustment problems may surface, in the long run, RCEP is likely to emerge as a welfare-augmenting arrangement, provided it enables seamless movement of goods, capital, technology and services throughout the Asia-Pacific.
* The views expressed are personal and in no way corresponds to the view of the author’s organization; e-mail: debchakra@gmail.com