Amb. Kishan Rana has an MA in Economics from St. Stephens College, Delhi. He joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1960 and served in Indian Embassy in China (1963-65, 1970-72). He was the Indian Ambassador/ High Commissioner to Algeria, Czechoslovakia, Kenya, Mauritius and Germany and served on PM Indira Gandhi’s staff (1981-82). A polyglot, he speaks Chinese and French in addition to English and Hindi. He is Professor Emeritus, DiploFoundation, Malta and Geneva; Emeritus Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi; Archives By-Fellow, Churchill College, Cambridge and Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Centre, Washington DC. Earlier, he was guest faculty, Diplomatic Academy, Vienna (2011-18) and Commonwealth Adviser, Namibia Foreign Ministry, 2000 -01. He has authored and edited 11 books, including: Inside Diplomacy (2000); Asian Diplomacy (2007); Diplomacy of the 21st Century (2011); The Contemporary Embassy (2013); Diplomacy at the Cutting Edge (2015); two translated into Chinese.
In the unique conjoined system of Party-State that China operates (with the Party the dominant player), Leading Small Groups, LSGs, are a governance device dating to the Ya’anan days of the 1930s.
Indian states engage with foreign countries on the rigorous logic of our constitutional provision that foreign affairs is exclusively a “union” subject.
This essay is based on P K Banerjee’s (1917–2003) book, My Peking Memoirs of the Chinese Invasion of India (Banerjee 1990), published 14 years after he retired from the Indian Foreign Service (IFS).1 I have my own connection to the story as I reached Beijing in August 1963, spending five months
P K Banerjee’s China Days
Does India have a strategic culture?
This account of India’s foreign policy under Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi is an accomplished body of research into a period, usually studied primarily for India’s Non-Aligned Movement.
The Belt and Road Initiative, China’s foreign policy hallmark, faces problems over magnitude, mismanagement, and excessive indebtedness for the recipient countries.
As a rising power, India needs a foreign policy that projects its interests and its future possibilities...
The essay examines BRI in terms of China’s direct economic, political and domestic interests, the funding arrangements for its projects, including aid and loans, and the potential gains for the countries and the regions that are to participate in the connectivity and infrastructure oriented projects, including the maritime projects. It looks closely at the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and the possible connectivity gains that participating countries may obtain among themselves, suggesting that what is being created are ‘international public goods’, even if China has not yet engaged in participatory, comprehensive and equal dialogue among all that are current and potential beneficiaries of BRI actions.
Comprehensive diplomatic goals, broken down into action plans for embassies, needed
As a significant global player, India has to play a more nuanced, multilayered diplomatic game
China is an arrived major power, the world's second largest. India is an emerging power aspiring to major status.
Is the idea of cooperative governance, in which governing coalitions and opposing parties actually join in tackling real issues, truly beyond our ken?
Last week in Shanghai, Indian and Chinese firms signed joint work plans. That is the way to go - compete, but also cohabit if feasible
Four major political takeaways from Narendra Modi's much-anticipated trip to China
India cannot resent neighbours moving ahead with infrastructure projects that serve their interests, funded by Chinese munificence
What are the key characteristics of the diplomacy of India and China? To what extent is diplomatic capacity an issue in the management of a country’s foreign policy?
Diplomacy process, and foreign affairs
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