@ HYDERABAD

16th AICCS

ALL INDIA CONFERENCE OF CHINA STUDIES

印度全国中国研究会议

16 - 18 November 2023

MIRA SINHA-BHATTACHARJEA
Best Paper Award

SOCIAL DYNAMICS & POLITICAL RESPONSES IN CHINA



Institute of Chinese Studies ICS 中国研究所 DELHI

COUNCIL FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

SHIV NADAR INSTITUTION OF EMINENCE DEEMED TO BE UNIVERSITY DELHI NCR

CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE FOR HIMALAYAN STUDIES

Indian Council of Social Science Research

16th All India Conference of China Studies

CONFERENCE REPORT

Submitted to

Institution of Eminence Directorate, UoH

Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi

Council for Social Development, Hyderabad

Institute of Chinese Studies, New Delhi

Department of Political Science, UoH

CONTENTS

1. **AICCS & Theme: Social Dynamics and Political Responses in China** **4**
2. **Programme@ Exact Titles & Presenters** **6**
3. **Session Reports (Thematic & Special)** **17**
4. **Note @Contribution of the Seminar** **71**
5. **Image Gallery** **72**
6. **Organisers and Funders** **76**
7. **Draft Abstracts & Papers** **80**
8. **List of Participants in the Seminar** **272**

ABOUT THE ALL INDIA CONFERENCE OF CHINA STUDIES

All India Conference of China Studies (AICCS) is a flagship event started in 2006 by the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi. Convened annually, its principal objective is to generate interest in and strengthen research on China Studies in India. The conference is usually held in November in one of the institutions where research and teaching on social sciences and humanities with a focus on China/East Asia is being carried out.

The AICCS has been steadily gaining in popularity and is an eagerly awaited annual event for the young China scholars of the country. Fifteen conferences have been held so far - Delhi (2006 and 2009), Jadavpur University (2010), University of Hyderabad (2011), Shanti Niketan-Visva-Bharati University (2012), Indian Institute of Management-Kozhikode (2013), Banaras Hindu University (BHU)-Varanasi (2014), Sikkim University (2015), University of Mumbai (2016), Goa University (2017), CHRIST University (Deemed to be University) (2018), O.P. Jindal Global University (2019), Indian Institute of Technology Madras (2020), Cheena Bhavana-Visva-Bharati University (2021). In November 2022, the fifteenth edition was held in collaboration with the Indian Institute of Technology Guwahati, Gauhati University, and Omeo Kumar Das Institute of Social Change and Development.

The 16th AICCS was held at the Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad from 16-18 November 2023. It had the following three components:

Part I: ***China Studies: State of the Field***

- Global Trends in China Studies
- New Scholarship in China

This part covered the areas of foreign policy and strategy, focusing on China and South Asia and India-China relations, with a special focus on the diplomatic genre of writings.

Part II: ***New Research on China in India***

With a steady and significant increase in enthusiastic young scholars, especially M.Phil./Ph.D. students, wishing to share their research, this section witnessed intense interactions amongst emerging scholars with the senior scholars of China Studies who have set the benchmark for academic research.

In this section, new horizons of Indian scholarship on China were displayed in all its diversity and originality.

Part III: Special Theme: *Social Dynamics and Political Responses in China*

Many countries across the globe are witnessing rapid transformation. Across the international and domestic spheres, this transformation has led to new socio-economic, cultural and political conditions. China too, is not untouched by these new forces. With rapid economic growth and development and dramatic technological changes, the aspirations of the Chinese people have changed from subsistence to affluence, which has altered the social, cultural and political interactions in the society. The uneven development and regional disparities have led to further divisions and chasms in Chinese society, generating diverse political and social responses from the people and the state alike. These contradictions were more profoundly felt during the COVID-19 pandemic — particularly the Zero-COVID policy, resulting in severe logistical and policy challenges. The economic fallout, with rising graduate unemployment, youth disenchantment and ineffective pandemic management policies, especially in COVID hotspots, resulted in widespread protests in urban spaces and elite universities across China. China's international image was affected when its one-party governance model, often touted as efficient and responsive, failed to come up with effective responses to the pandemic.

Interestingly, amidst the pandemic, the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) marked a new political development. It indicated a departure from the old norms to a new era of politics under Xi Jinping, legalising continuation into the third term and beyond. This was no routine political event, and it was seen in terms of a prelude to how China will be steering its course and dealing with the outside world in the changing regional and global political landscape. The domestic challenges, particularly the demographic concerns and the economic slowdown, pose challenges to the new leadership under Xi Jinping and the CPC in the coming years.

The Conference witnessed Special Lectures by prominent scholars/practitioners; Thematic Panels, comprising papers by individual scholars, and Special Panels, comprising selected proposals and special invitees.

Prof. Sabaree Mitra
Professor, CCSEAS
SLLCS, JNU, New Delhi-110067

Dr. Bhim Subba
Assistant Professor, Political Science
SSS, University of Hyderabad-500046

PROGRAMME @Titles & Presenters

WEDNESDAY, 15 NOVEMBER 2023

Arrival of Participants

DAY 1: THURSDAY, 16 NOVEMBER 2023

0900–0930 Hours: Registration for Conference Attendees

INAUGURAL SESSION
0930 – 1100 Hours

Chair: Jyotirmaya Sharma, Dean, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad.

Welcome Remarks: **Alka Acharya,** Professor, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; Honorary Director, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi.

Opening Address: **Basuthkar Jagadeeshwar Rao,** Vice-Chancellor, University of Hyderabad.

Special Remarks:

M. Ghanashyam Krishna, Director, Institution of Eminence Directorate, IoE-UoH.

Sujit Kumar Mishra, Regional Director (In-charge), Southern Regional Centre, CSD-Hyderabad.

Rajat Kathuria, Dean, School of Humanities and Social Sciences; Professor,Department of Economics, Shiv Nadar University, Delhi NCR.

K.K. Kailash, Head of Department & Professor, Department of Political Science,School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad.

Convener's Remarks: **Sabaree Mitra,** Convener, 16th AICCS; Professor, Centre for Chinese and South East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; Honorary Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi.

Keynote Address: **Elizabeth Perry,** Henry Rosovsky Professor of Government, Harvard University and Director, Harvard-Yenching Institute, Cambridge,Massachusetts, USA.

Campaign Governance in the People's Republic of China

Vote of Thanks: Bhim Subba, Co-Convener, 16th AICCS; Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad.

1100 – 1130 Hours: TEA/COFFEE BREAK

SPECIAL PANEL I: Rural-Urban Linkages: Emerging Trends in India and China
1130 – 1300 Hours

Chair: D. N. Reddy, Professor in Economics (Retd.) and former Dean, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad.

Speakers:

Manoranjan Mohanty, Distinguished Professor at the Council for Social Development, New Delhi; Emeritus Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi; Professor (Retd.), Department of Political Science, University of Delhi.

Reconceptualizing Rural-Urban Linkages: Some Critical Issues

Jajati Keshari Parida, Associate Professor, School of Economics, University of Hyderabad.

Rural-Urban Migration and Changing Livelihood Uncertainties in India

Ritu Agarwal, Associate Professor, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; Honorary Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi.

Administrative Restructuring, Land Conversion and 'Flexible Livelihood' inYunnan

Amrita Datta, Assistant Professor, Development Studies, Department of Liberal Arts, Indian Institute of Technology Hyderabad. ***(DROPPED OUT)***

Economic Development and Rural-Urban Linkages in India: Talking acrossTheory, Empirics and Policy

1300 – 1400 Hours: LUNCH BREAK

THEMATIC PANEL I: Chinese Economy and its Socio-Political Ramifications
1400 – 1515 Hours

Chair: Rajat Kathuria, Dean, School of Humanities and Social Sciences; Professor, Department of Economics, Shiv Nadar University, Delhi NCR.

Speakers:

Megha Shrivastava, Dr. TMA Pai Fellow and Doctoral Candidate, Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE), Manipal.

Examining the Political Economy of China's Private Sector Development Duringthe Xi Jinping Era: Theoretical Discourse and Challenges

Alka Verma, Doctoral Candidate, Centre for East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

The Paradox of Poverty Alleviation in China: A Case Study of Migrant Workersin Shanghai during the Covid-19 Pandemic

Discussants: Vijay Gudavarthy, Department of Political Economics, University of Hyderabad, and **Reeja Nair,** Assistant Professor, Department of History, Deshbandhu College, University of Delhi.

THEMATIC PANEL II: Chinese State: Political Representation and Social Responses
1530 – 1700 Hours

Chair: Manjari Katju, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad.

Speakers:

Ahana Roy, Research Associate, Organisation for Research on China and Asia (ORCA), and **Omkar Bhole**, Research Associate, Organisation for Research on China and Asia (ORCA), New Delhi.

Women's Political Representation in China: Do They Hold Up Half the Sky Yet?

Monika Kumari, Doctoral Candidate, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Social Organizations and State Control: The Case Study of Domestic ViolenceNetwork (DVN) in China

Rakshit Kweera, Doctoral Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad.

Deepening of Surveillance in China and India: A Comparative Study of ContactTracing Applications During the Pandemic

Discussants: Sneha Banerjee, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad, and **Ritu Agarwal,** Associate Professor, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; Honorary Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi.

1700 – 1730 Hours: TEA/COFFEE BREAK

ICS-HYI PANEL DISCUSSION:
Expanding the Horizons of China Research in India
1730 – 1830 Hours

Chair: Alka Acharya, Professor, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; Honorary Director, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi.

Remarks: Elizabeth Perry, Henry Rosovsky Professor of Government, Harvard University and Director, Harvard-Yenching Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.

Speakers:

Tiasangla Longkumer, PhD, Centre for Social Medicine and Community Health,School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; ICS-HYI Fellow (2017 Cohort).

Nishit Kumar, Research Fellow, Centre for Contemporary China Studies (CCCS), Ministry of External Affairs, ICS-HYI Fellow (2018 Cohort).

Saloni Sharma, Doctoral Candidate, Centre for Chinese & South East Asian Studies, School of Language, Literature & Cultural Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; ICS-HYI Fellow (2019 Cohort).

Bhim Subba, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad; ICS-HYI Fellow (2015 Cohort).

Concluding Remarks: Ruohong Li, Associate Director, Harvard-Yenching Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.

DAY 2: FRIDAY, 17 NOVEMBER 2023

SPECIAL PANEL II: Surveillance and Control: How the Chinese Party-State Deploys Science & Technology in Tibet and Xinjiang
0930 – 1100 Hours

Chair: Jabin T. Jacob, Associate Professor, the Department of International Relations and Governance Studies (IRGS) & Director, Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence, Delhi NCR.

Speakers:

Apa Lhamo, Fellow, Centre for China Analysis and Strategy, New Delhi.

China's Social Stability and Security Dilemma in Tibet: State Securitization through Surveillance and Technology

Devendra Kumar, Associate Fellow, Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence, Delhi NCR.

Chinese State's Deployment of Technology for Security Responses in Tibet: A Study of Prefecture Level Budgets for Internal Security since 2008

Ayjaz Ahmad Wani, Research Fellow, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Mumbai.

Family Planning Policies and Uyghur Women in Xinjiang in the 'New Era'

Anand Parappadi Krishnan, Fellow, Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence, Delhi NCR.

Another Layer in a Securitized Ecosystem: Mapping the Zero-Covid Policy in Xinjiang

1100 – 1130 Hours: TEA/COFFEE BREAK

THEMATIC PANEL III: Chinese State: Political Control and Popular Responses
1130 – 1300 Hours

Chair: Kham Khan Suan Hausing, Professor, Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad.

Speakers:

Wriju Banerjee, Master's Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad.

Tracing the Evolution of Rural and Labour Protests in Contemporary China

Rituja Ghosh, Academic Associate, Kautilya School of Public Policy, Hyderabad.

Sinicization in the People's Republic of China: An Analysis of Language Policies

Kriti Chopra, Doctoral Candidate, CHRIST University, Bengaluru.

Zhonghua Minzu and Chinese Nationalism: A Case Study of Inner Mongolia

Discussants: Anand Parappadi Krishnan, Fellow, Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence, Delhi NCR; Visiting Associate Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi, and **Reeja Nair,** Assistant Professor, Department of History, Deshbandhu College, University of Delhi.

1300 – 1400 Hours: LUNCH BREAK

THEMATIC PANEL IV: China and the World: Cultural Interactions through History
1430 – 1600 Hours

Chair: Madhavi Thampi, Honorary Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi; Associate Professor in China Studies (Retd.), Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi.

Speakers:

Archan Saha, Postgraduate Scholar, Department of Chinese Language & Culture, Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan.

Indian Music: A New Tool in Reshaping the Dream of "Dragon and Elephant Dancing Together"

Sugandha Tandon, Doctoral Candidate, Visual Studies, School of Arts and Aesthetics, Jawaharlal Nehru University, and **Yamini Meena**, MA, Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi.

Sino-Japanese Art Exchanges in the 20th Century and their Implications on Chinese Avant-Garde

Chhavi Raj, Doctoral Candidate, Centre for Chinese & South East Asian Studies, School of Language, Literature & Cultural Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, NewDelhi.

Cultural, Historical Trajectories of US-China Relations and the Role of Anson Burlingame

Discussants: Sujith Kumar Parayil, Professor, Department of History, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad, and **Anagha Ingole,** Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad.

1600 – 1630 Hours: TEA/COFFEE BREAK

SPECIAL LECTURE
1630 – 1730 Hours

Chair: Patricia Uberoi, Emeritus Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi; Professor (Retd.) and former Head, Social Change and Social Structure, Institute of Economic Growth (IEG), Delhi.

Speaker: Govind Kelkar, Executive Director, GenDev Centre for Research and Innovation, Gurgaon; Adjunct Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi.

The Dilemma of Gender and Culture in China's So Power in the Global South

ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION:
Future of India-China Economic Engagement
1800 – 1900 Hours

Moderator: Ashok K. Kantha, Honorary Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi; former Ambassador of India to China.

Panelists:

Sanjay Chadha, former Joint Secretary/Additional Secretary, Ministry of Commerce& Industry (2015–22); Director, Public Policy for India and South Asia, Uber.

Santosh Pai, Honorary Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi; Partner,Link Legal.

Manoj Kewalramani, Senior Fellow and Head, China Studies, Takshashila Institution, Bengaluru.

DAY 3: SATURDAY, 18 NOVEMBER 2023

SPECIAL PANEL III: As the World Ages: Learnings from the East AsianEconomies for Care of Older Persons 0930 – 1100 Hours

Chair: Madhurima Nundy, Fellow, Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP), New Delhi; Honorary Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi.

Speakers:

Kavita Sivaramakrishnan, Associate Professor, Sociomedical Sciences, Columbia University.

Ageing, Care and Cognition in South Asia and South-East Asia in times of Crisis:Networks of Coping and Resilience before and During Covid Crises

Alex Jingwei He, Associate Professor, Division of Public Policy, Hong Kong Science and Technology University.

De-fragmentizing Elderly Care Services in East Asian Super-Ageing Societies: AComparison of Hong Kong and Singapore

Rama V. Baru, Professor, Centre of Social Medicine and Community Health, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; Honorary Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi.

Public-Private Mix in Health Services for Older People in a Comparative Perspective

1100 – 1130 Hours: TEA/COFFEE BREAK

THEMATIC PANEL V: Party, State and Party Politics
1130 – 1300 Hours

Chair: Sreemati Chakrabarti, Chairperson and Honorary Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi; Professor in China studies (Retd.), Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi and former Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Delhi.

Speakers:

Ekta Singh, Assistant Professor, Public Policy & Governance, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar University, Delhi.

Grid Management and the Chinese Surveillance State

Raj Gupta, Doctoral Candidate, Centre for Chinese & South East Asian Studies, School of Language, Literature & Cultural Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, NewDelhi.

Historical Resolutions as an Institution in the CPC: Understanding the Third Historical Resolution

Shaan Kashyap, Doctoral Candidate, Department of History, Ravenshaw University, Cuttack.

Mao's China and the First School Textbook Controversy in Contemporary India, circa 1949-1959

Discussants: Bhim Subba, Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad, and **Anand Parappadi Krishnan,** Fellow, Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence, Delhi NCR; Visiting Associate Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi.

1300 – 1400 Hours: LUNCH BREAK

THEMATIC PANEL VI: China's Strategic Policy and Internal Discourse
1400 – 1500 Hours

Chair: S. Shaji, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad.

Speakers:

Aastha Binzani, Doctoral Candidate, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

China's Approach to the Global Commons: A Critical Analysis of China's Outer Space Policy

Akshat Mayne, Doctoral Scholar, Japanese Studies, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

A Resurgent Rising Sun? Japan in Chinese Socio-Political Discourse

Discussants: V. Anand, Assistant Professor, Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE), and **Amrita Jash,** Assistant Professor, Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE).

SPECIAL PANEL IV: State of China Studies in India: Scholarship on India-China Relations
1500 – 1615 Hours

Chair: Rityusha Mani Tiwary, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Shaheed Bhagat Singh College, University of Delhi; Honorary Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi.

Speakers:

Rajiv Ranjan, Assistant Professor, Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi; Adjunct Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi.

China, South Asia, and Regional Dynamics

Prashant Singh, Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar-Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi.

Chinese Foreign Policy and International Relations

Madhura Balasubramanium, Doctoral Candidate, Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai.

Recent Writings on India-China Relations: Writings by Policy Practitioners

1615 – 1645 Hours: TEA/COFFEE BREAK

VALEDICTORY SESSION
1645 – 1800 Hours

Chair: Syed Akbaruddin, former Permanent Representative of India to the UN; Dean, Kautilya School of Public Policy, Hyderabad.

Valedictory Address: **Gautam Bambawale**, former Ambassador of India to China, Pakistan and Bhutan; Adjunct Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi & Distinguished Professor, Symbiosis International University, Pune.

Rising to the China Challenge

Report of the Conference: Sabaree Mitra, Convener, 16th AICCS; Professor, Centre for Chinese and South East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; Honorary Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi.

Vote of Thanks: Anudeep Gujjeti, Research Associate, Council for Social Development-Hyderabad; Doctoral Candidate, Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad; Young Leader, Pacific Forum, Honolulu.

Welcoming Delegates to the 17th AICCS: Amrita Jash, Assistant Professor, Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE).

Appreciation & Looking Ahead: Rityusha Mani Tiwary, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Shaheed Bhagat Singh College, University of Delhi; Honorary Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi.

CONFERENCE REPORT

The All India Conference of China Studies (AICCS) – an annual flagship event of the Institute of China Studies, Delhi (ICS). The 2023 edition was organized by the Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad, with the Institute of China Studies, New Delhi and UoH Institution of Eminence in association with Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi, the Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar University, Delhi-NCR, and the Council for Social Development, New Delhi, and was held on 16-18 November 2023, at the University of Hyderabad. The principal objective of the AICCS is to spread interest in and strengthen research on China in India; it promotes active networking among scholars and raises awareness about research and study of China in India. Each conference has a special theme. The special theme of the 16th AICCS was ***Social Dynamics and Political Responses in China***. Another notable feature of the AICCS is the Mira Sinha-Bhattacharjea Award – instituted in the memory of one of the finest China scholars of India, a founding member of the ICS and its former Director – for the best original paper at the AICCS. The selection is made by a group of senior scholars, based on methodology, argument and presentation.

DAY 1: THURSDAY, 16 NOVEMBER 2023

Inaugural Session

The Inaugural Session of the 16th All India Conference of China Studies (AICCS) was chaired by **Prof. Jyotirmaya Sharma**, Dean, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad. **Prof. Alka Acharya**, Professor, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; Honorary Director, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi, delivered the **Welcome Remarks**. The **Opening Address** was presented by **Prof. Basuthkar Jagadeeshwar Rao**, Vice-Chancellor, University of Hyderabad. Prof. Sharma read out Prof Rao's message in his absence. Followed by this, the **Special Remarks** were presented by **Prof. M. Ghanashyam Krishna**, Director, Institution of Eminence Directorate, IoE-UoH, **Prof. Sujit Kumar Mishra**, Regional Director (In-charge), Southern Regional Centre, CSD-Hyderabad, **Prof. Rajat Kathuria**, Dean, School of Humanities and Social Sciences; Professor, Department of Economics, Shiv Nadar University, Delhi NCR, and **Prof. K.K. Kailash**, Head

of Department & Professor, Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad. **Prof. Sabaree Mitra**, Convener, 16th AICCS; Professor, Centre for Chinese and Southeast Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; Honorary Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi, delivered the **Convener's Remarks**. The **Keynote Address** titled, *Campaign Governance in the People's Republic of China* was delivered by **Prof. Elizabeth Perry**, Henry Rosovsky Professor of Government, Harvard University and Director, Harvard-Yenching Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. Finally, the **Vote of Thanks** was presented by **Dr. Bhim Subba**, Co-Convener, 16th AICCS; Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad.

In an auspicious start to the 16th All India Conference of China Studies (AICCS) at the University of Hyderabad, **Prof. Jyotirmaya Sharma**, the chair, extended a warm welcome to all attendees and acknowledged the exceptional efforts of the organisers in arranging this significant event. Delivering the welcome remarks, **Prof. Alka Acharya** highlighted the event as a milestone in the conference's decade-and-a-half of existence. She recounted the humble beginnings of the conference when only three universities and two institutes offered China studies in India. Over time, this landscape has burgeoned to encompass 30 universities and 22 institutes, signifying a substantial growth in opportunities for China studies. She emphasised that in this pursuit, the journey itself has been the destination, reflecting on the transformative evolution of China studies in India. She underscored the pivotal role played by *China Report*, the esteemed flagship journal of the Institute of China Studies (ICS), providing a platform for young scholars to publish their research and contribute significantly toward understanding India's most important neighbour, China. Prof. Acharya also spoke about the ICS-Harvard-Yenching Institute Joint Scholarship for Doctoral Research, which was inaugurated in 2014. This collaboration kickstarted a robust relationship with the Harvard-Yenching Institute, and integrated scholarly endeavours from India, the US, and China.

Prof. B. J. Rao's **Opening Address** expressed gratitude to the organizers for selecting a theme pertinent to contemporary times. His message highlighted the inherent opacity of China's political landscape which has hindered comprehensive analyses of its political evolution and its substantial growth in various domains. He underscored the contrast between the depth of scholarly exploration in India's political development and the relative lack thereof in understanding China's trajectory. Emphasizing the significance of the Conference, he described it as a gateway to unravel previously unrecognized or poorly understood facets of China's polity.

Following Prof. Rao's address, **Prof. M. Ghanashyam Krishna** delivered **Special Remarks**, shedding light on the University of Hyderabad's recognition as an Institution of Eminence (IoE) by the Government of India in 2019, alongside two other universities. He elaborated on the Institution of Eminence (IoE) status, emphasizing its objective of elevating the institution to world-class status and globalising positive perceptions about Indian scholarship and universities. He detailed the university's efforts in augmenting teaching infrastructure and academic stature by operating under substantial accountability. Additionally, Prof. Krishna made two recommendations to the conference organisers. Firstly, he urged for an evaluation of China's ascent as a dominant force in the scientific realm. Secondly, he proposed the creation of a policy white paper intended for submission to the Government of India, aiming to offer strategic insights derived from the deliberations of the Conference.

Representing the Council for Social Development (CSD), **Prof. Sujit Kumar Mishra** highlighted the organization's role as a co-organizer of the 16th AICCS and emphasised the contribution of CSD in curating the Special Panel I titled, "Rural-Urban Linkages: Emerging Trends in India and China." He noted the convergence between urban and rural areas in both countries, acknowledging their contribution to employment and income growth but admitted that these connections have not led to holistic development. Prof. Mishra outlined the panel's focus on exploring conceptual paradigms and complex issues concerning rural-urban linkages. **Prof. Rajat Kathuria**, representing Shiv Nadar University, highlighted the University's unique status as the youngest institution to receive the prestigious Institution of Eminence (IoE) designation. He outlined the university's initiatives, including the establishment of Centers of Excellence within various schools, aimed at promoting research in priority areas such as environment, energy, cognition and behaviour, and data and computation. Prof. Kathuria also acknowledged the support rendered by the IoE-recognised Centre for Himalayan Studies in facilitating the current Conference. He addressed the substantial disparity in knowledge about China in India compared to China's investment in Indian scholarship. He stressed the necessity for increased collaboration between different universities and institutes to fortify Indian scholarship on China. Prof. Kathuria expressed optimism that the Conference would contribute significantly to this collaborative endeavour.

Prof. K.K. Kailash, representing the Department of Political Science at the University of Hyderabad (UoH), expressed immense pleasure in hosting the conference for the second time since 2011. He highlighted the historical significance of the Conference as the first fully in-

person gathering in the last four years of the AICCS series. Prof. Kailash lauded the efforts of the organizers, extending gratitude to the Institution of Eminence (IoE) and the Dean of Social Science at the University for their support in facilitating this scholarly event. **Prof. Sabaree Mitra**, delivering the **Convener's Remarks**, traced the journey of the AICCS, highlighting its evolution since the inaugural review of Chinese scholarship in India in 2006. She emphasised the Conference's stature as a flagship event of the Institute of China Studies (ICS), having traversed various universities and institutions across the country. Prof. Mitra underscored the relevance of the 16th AICCS, supported by the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR), with a special focus on the theme **"Social Dynamics and Political Responses in China"**. She praised the resilience of the organizers in steering the Conference amidst challenging times. Prof. Mitra lauded the diverse array of abstracts received for the conference as the products of extensive scholarly work dealing with emerging issues in the field. She expressed hope that the 16th edition of AICCS would yield interdisciplinary scholarship and shed light on areas previously untouched by academic inquiry.

Prof. Elizabeth J. Perry, delivering the **Keynote Address**, elucidated upon the nuanced landscape of ***Campaign Governance in the People's Republic of China***, placing a particular focus on the historical significance and contemporary implications of the Patriotic Health Campaigns. Prof. Perry highlighted the resurgence of mass campaigns, prevalent during the Mao era, despite Deng Xiaoping's proclamation of the end of the mass-line approach. Drawing parallels with Xi Jinping's recent Anti-Corruption campaigns as a modern-day exemplar of its re-emergence. Central to her speech was the Patriotic Health Campaign, started in 1952, and standing as the longest-lasting campaign in Chinese history. She emphasised its role in illuminating continuities between the Mao and post-Mao periods, including the continuing tradition of carrying out Patriotic Health Month since 1989. Beyond medical motives, Prof. Perry underscored the political utility of Patriotic Health Campaigns by Chinese regimes, by citing Mao Zedong's first publication on Physical Education that stressed the importance of health for revolutionary combat.

While globally acclaimed for their cost-effectiveness and accomplishments within resource limitations, she detailed the criticism this programme received from some Chinese officials who favoured a more institutionalized cleanup and perceived campaign governance as a threat to bureaucracy. Successful in routine hygiene, the Patriotic Health Campaigns struggled during *ad hoc* emergency campaigns against epidemics. Contrary to claims of uniqueness by the Chinese

state, Prof. Perry highlighted the prevalence of employing patriotic symbols in health crises and using Patriotic Health Campaigns for nation-building purposes across Western countries. She threw light on pre-revolutionary influences, citing how Western missionaries in China influenced by American tuberculosis campaigns emphasised the Asian population's unhygienic status compared to the West and its effect on national strength. She drew parallels to Mao's strategies while emphasizing they were not identical.

Distinguishing state-led Chinese initiatives from Western experiments run by civil societies, Prof. Perry noted the use of low-cost methods, emphasis on traditional Chinese medicine, and grassroots mobilization during and after the revolutionary period. Additionally, she highlighted the evolution of the Patriotic Health Campaigns, which were initially framed as a response to alleged American bacteriological warfare during the Korean War. They have maintained their patriotic and political hues even after shifting focus to the eradication of pests. Furthermore, she acknowledged the adoption of Patriotic Health Campaigns by modern Chinese leaders like Xi Jinping as reflected in their patriotic wars against SARS and COVID respectively. However, recent anti-lockdown protests have tested the limitations of such examples of resilient patriotism.

In the contemporary landscape, Prof. Perry emphasised that the legitimacy of the Chinese state rests on its claim as the rightful bearer of Chinese tradition, revolution, and orthodox Marxism. To this end, the cultural legitimacy aimed through the Patriotic Education Campaigns under Deng Xiaoping aligned with the goals of the Patriotic Health Campaigns. However, she cautioned against the risks of linking regime legitimacy solely to public health campaigns while recognizing their short-term appeal. While health campaigns recognized as successful could contribute to the regime's legitimacy, she underscored the pitfalls if such campaigns are construed as a shameful defeat. China's recent wave of fatalities during the COVID outbreak prompted questions about the efficacy of campaign governance in combating pandemics while maintaining regime legitimacy. Prof. Perry cautioned against the mere reinforcement of traditional campaigns without systemic reforms, indicating it has only produced diminishing returns in recent years. Xi Jinping's projection of national strength in the contemporary period will require more than recycling the campaign traditions.

Dr. Bhim Subba, delivering the **Vote of Thanks** as the Co-Convener, extended gratitude to the volunteering students, guests, and co-organizers for their pivotal roles in making the Conference

a reality. He expressed optimism that the discussions and insights shared during the event would catalyze further research and deliberation on Chinese scholarship in India.

Special Panel I

Rural-Urban Linkages: Emerging Trends in India and China

The panel was chaired by **Prof. D. N. Reddy**, Professor in Economics (Retd.) and former Dean, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad. The panellists included **Prof. Manoranjan Mohanty**, Distinguished Professor at the Council for Social Development, New Delhi; Emeritus Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi; Professor (Retd.), Department of Political Science, University of Delhi, who spoke on ***Reconceptualizing Rural-Urban Linkages: Some Critical Issues***, **Dr. Jajati Keshari Parida**, Associate Professor, School of Economics, University of Hyderabad, who presented on ***Rural-Urban Migration and Changing Livelihood Uncertainties in India***, and **Dr. Ritu Agarwal**, Associate Professor, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; Honorary Fellow, Institute of China studies, New Delhi, who spoke on ***Administrative Restructuring, Land Conversion and 'Flexible Livelihood' in Yunnan***.

In the context of rapid economic development in India and China, the panellists dealt with its impact on rural-urban linkages while focusing particularly on the approaches to economic development adopted by the state and their implications. Further, they deliberated on the challenges posed to sustainable linkages in both countries.

Prof. Manoranjan Mohanty emphasised the need to question the existing conceptual framework for rural-urban linkages in his paper titled, ***Reconceptualizing Rural-Urban Linkages: Some Critical Issues***. He argued that the parameters set by colonial modernisation whereby progress is defined by urbanisation, industrialisation, and technological progress, have resulted in serious problems like climate change, inequalities, and environmental degradation. While these premises are being challenged by people's movements in India, China and, the world over, this conception of (colonial) modernisation has been adopted in post-colonial India and China despite differences in their regime types. In this context, he gave the example of policies for the rural sector like the Smart City Programme in India and the New Urbanization Program in China, which, in his opinion creates unequal exchange systems by way of professionalisation of the rural economy. He is therefore primarily concerned with the question of how to establish self-dependent, self-regulated, and equal exchange systems to supplant them.

He suggested that this calls for the creation of equal exchanges, connections, and relationships through a re-conceptualisation of knowledge to guide this process. He proposed three alternative premises for the purpose, first, the organisation of production systems compatible with the community and local environment; second, all sectors of the economy to be equally respected and; third, the gradation and degradation of labour needs to be challenged. Upon being asked for his views on the "de-growth discourse", **Prof. Mohanty** suggested that his approach should not be taken as being anti-growth/development and that he recognises the necessity of a certain level of economic growth but that should not be the only preoccupation.

Dr. Jajati Keshari Parida, speaking on ***Rural-Urban Migration and Changing Livelihood Uncertainties in India***, stated that India is in a phase of demographic advantage. However, job creation in non-agricultural sectors was required to transform this demographic advantage into a demographic dividend. He suggested that for structural transformation to occur and result in sustained economic growth, the percentage of the population engaged in the agricultural sector must decline. He pointed out various trends in rural-urban migration and employability in India. Based on NSS data from 1983 onwards, firstly, rural-urban migration rose despite the pandemic; second, the percentage of female migrants has been increasing while that of male migrants showed declining trends; third, women migrants were found to be less employable and were mostly self-employed while greater percentage of males were employed in regular salaried jobs; fourth, increasing share of skilled job but unskilled migrants getting stuck in low paid, vulnerable jobs facing extreme poverty and poor living conditions. He suggested that the most important trend in the post-Covid scenario remained a reversal of structural transformation, i.e. increase in the number of workers engaged in the agricultural sector. He noted that this trend was particularly concerning as this would have adverse consequences for sustained economic growth. On being asked about the reliability of data, he responded by pointing out that despite being inadequate on various crucial counts, the NSS surveys remained the only source of migration data in India.

Dr. Ritu Agarwal presented a case study of the administrative restructuring of Chenggong County, Yunnan into an urban district based on extensive fieldwork conducted by her, in her paper titled, ***Administrative Restructuring, Land Conversion and 'Flexible Livelihood' in Yunnan***. She pointed out that this policy made a vast amount of land available to the local leadership for urban infrastructure projects. Her study primarily dealt with the question of the impact of such a policy on the social actors, especially the farmers. She suggested that the policy

brought the 'city' to the peasants rather than the other way round, created newer employment opportunities, and newer models of agricultural production and marketing in the form of Agro-based industries. She argued that while the farmers readily gave away land to the state, they continued to remain attached to their traditional occupation of farming, making their transition from 'rural dwellers' to 'urban settlers' difficult. Therefore, in her opinion, the policy has not been very successful. On an enquiry about the existence of any peasant protests, she suggested that their resistance has come in the form of their unwillingness to be wage workers and their attachment to their traditional occupation of farming and continued return to their family land.

Thematic Panel I

Chinese Economy and its Socio-Political Ramifications

The panel was chaired by **Prof. Rajat Kathuria**, Dean, School of Humanities and Social Sciences; Professor, Department of Economics, Shiv Nadar University, Delhi NCR, who commenced the session by introducing both the speakers and discussants in the panel to the audience. Prof. Kathuria reflected on the prospects of a market economy in China and briefed on the linkages between economic growth and poverty alleviation by referring to the Sen-Bhagawati debate. The panel featured **Ms. Megha Shrivastava**, Dr. TMA Pai Fellow and Doctoral Candidate, Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE), Manipal, who presented on ***Examining the Political Economy of China's Private Sector Development During the Xi Jinping Era: Theoretical Discourse and Challenges***, and **Ms. Alka Verma**, Doctoral Candidate, Centre for East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, who spoke on ***The Paradox of Poverty Alleviation in China: A Case-Study of Migrant Workers in Shanghai during the Covid-19 Pandemic***, as the speakers. **Dr. Vijay Gudavarthy**, Department of Political Economics, University of Hyderabad, and **Dr. Reeja Nair**, Assistant Professor, Department of History, Deshbandhu College, University of Delhi, were the discussants.

The first presentation, by **Ms. Megha Srivasatava**, provided a review of the innovative development of the private sector within the Marxist realm, Xi Jinping's thoughts, challenging policies and his influence on the private sector in China through her paper, ***Examining the***

Political Economy of China's Private Sector Development During the Xi Jinping Era: Theoretical Discourse and Challenges. She elaborated on the three main phases in the development of the private sector before Xi assumed power namely, the preliminary stage of socialism; the private sector as a supplementary force; and as a complementary pillar in the socialist market economy. Further, she discussed the theoretical discourses, policies and challenges under Xi followed by insights into the declining trends of private investment in China. She delineated mixed-ownership reforms, attempts to shift from the market economy, spiritual civilization and rising traction for techno-nationalism among other approaches of Xi. Speaking of Xi's influence on the private sector development, the policies of Xi's predecessors were compared with those of Xi and the prevailing global and domestic challenges were examined. This was followed by her analysis of Xi's approach to private companies. **Ms. Srivastava** concluded her presentation by noting that though there hasn't been a fundamental paradigm shift in theory and policies adopted by Xi from his predecessors, rather a deepening of ideological emphasis has been observed in recent times, which could be seen in the light of 'new contradiction'. The cusp of her presentation was the management of the private sector, the ideological shift within the change in regimes and the role of the state in the backdrop of an emerging market economy.

The second speaker, **Ms. Alka Verma**, threw light on faults in the poverty alleviation program in China and how the government furthers economic development under the garb of poverty alleviation through her paper, ***The Paradox of Poverty Alleviation in China: A Case-Study of Migrant Workers in Shanghai during the Covid-19 Pandemic***. She speculated on how rural poverty caters to the urbanization of poverty in China while discussing the inter-relation between poverty, migration, and, economic development by referring to the *hukou* system and labour contract law. Through a case study, she shed light on the dilemma of migrant workers in Shanghai during the COVID-19 pandemic and portrayed the economic vulnerability and other challenges faced by migrant workers. **Ms. Verma** concluded that there has been a neglect of migrant workers despite their contribution to the unprecedented economic growth in China and that there is a need for more safety nets, unemployment insurance schemes, and relocation measures to address this issue. The presentation emphasised the correlation between migration, poverty alleviation and economic growth in China.

Dr. Vijay Gudavarthy offered his observations on Ms. Srivastava's presentation, wherein he reflected on the social, political and economic setting in China and pointed out growing social tensions owing to uneven development, unemployment and urban poverty among a myriad of

other challenges. **Dr. Reeja Nair** gave her remarks on the presentation by Ms. Verma by highlighting urban inequalities and the impact of the pandemic on the cross-sections in society. She also posed her questions and gave her suggestions. Following this, the floor was open for questions from the audience to both the speakers and discussants. **Prof. Rajat Kathuria** brought the session to a close by emphasising how globalisation has aggravated the existing inequalities within and across countries and projected his perspectives.

Thematic Panel II

Chinese State: Political Representation and Social Responses

The second Thematic Panel of the 16th AICCS was chaired by **Prof. Manjari Katju**, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad, and featured three paper presentations. **Ms. Ahana Roy**, Research Associate, Organisation for Research on China and Asia (ORCA), and **Mr. Omkar Bhole**, Research Associate, Organisation for Research on China and Asia (ORCA), New Delhi, jointly presented the first paper titled, ***Women's Political Representation in China: Do They Hold Up Half the Sky Yet?***. Following this, **Ms. Monika Kumari**, Doctoral Candidate, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, spoke on ***Social Organization and State Control: The Case Study of Domestic Violence Network (DVN) In China***. **Mr. Rakshit Kweera**, Doctoral Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad, presented on ***Deepening of Surveillance in China and India: A Comparative Study of Contact Tracing Applications During the Pandemic***. The panel featured **Dr. Sneha Banerjee**, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad, and **Dr. Ritu Agarwal**, Associate Professor, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; Honorary Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi, as the discussants.

The first presentation by **Ms. Ahana Roy** and **Mr. Omkar Bhole** discussed the political representation of women in China reflecting upon the causes and challenges of the same through their paper, ***Women's Political Representation in China: Do They Hold Up Half the Sky Yet?***. The paper dwelled on the nature of women's representation in Chinese politics particularly within the Chinese Communist Party (CPC). The authors explained the trajectory of women's political representation and how far they have come in upholding Mao's dictum that "women hold up half the sky". Mr. Omkar Bhole pointed out that women are underrepresented in all

spheres of Chinese society including politics. It was much more evident after the two-decade long tradition of women being part of Politburo was left unfulfilled during the 20th Party Congress. Mr. Bhole goes on by explaining through statistical data that no women had ever been part of the Politburo Standing Committee and only 6 women made into Politburo till now. Most of them were the wives of the top male leaders of China. Those leaders were even made to depend on their male relatives for the decision-making process.

Mr. Bhole went further to detail the statistics regarding the representation of women in the legislature. The National People's Congress (NPC) has more women members than the CPC Central Committee, however, this status would be misleading as the NPC acts as a rubber stamp and it does not have actual decision-making powers. He also talked about the peculiarities of the women who already are a part of Chinese politics. 15% of them belong to ethnic minorities and 50% of total women leaders are qualified technocrats. Even though women's representation shows signs of improvement, it is not sufficient and the policies were not much of a success. He made an interesting point that women's representation in the central administration is much lower than that at the provincial level. The rule of 'at least one women representative at the provincial level' helped this achievement, but it also led to a situation where the whole idea was reduced to 'only one woman'. Mr. Bhole concluded by opining that women's role in policy implementation had a positive rise, but that in policy formation have a lot more to go.

Ms. Roy talked about the need to ensure women's political participation in China. The gap in political representation is still prevalent as gender stereotypes and traditional roles are deeply rooted in the patriarchal society. She elaborated that women leaders had experienced many difficulties in climbing up the ladder of progress as they were not accepted as policymakers and decision-takers in many sections of society and it shows the need for diversity and inclusivity. Women are also denied many opportunities due to their lack of political networking chances. Ms. Roy's examination of recent policies of CPC and Xi Jinping including the 'Three Child Policy,' illustrated that China is trying to reaffirm the role of women as caregivers and restricting women to their homes. She also talked about the stagnancy during Xi's period and the dichotomy between symbolic and substantial representation. The authors tried to bring out the argument that despite the economic advancement of the country, China has yet to achieve gender parity and fill the gap between the gender quota and its implementation. The presentation ended with a discussion on remedies for China to move in a positive direction and break the socio-cultural barriers to the representation of women.

The next speaker, **Ms. Monika Kumari,** reflected on Domestic Violence cases in China and the different mechanisms to control it through a discussion of her paper titled, ***Social Organization and State Control: The Case Study of Domestic Violence Network (DVN) In China***. She illustrated it as a significant health hazard and a serious threat to social mobility. Her paper focused more on the qualitative research on various socio-cultural factors that resulted in the existence and sustenance of a large number of DV cases in China, the impact of social organizations in regulating it and how they affected the mechanisms of the state. According to Ms. Kumari, increased DV cases in China are a product of the traditional gender roles and the historical acceptance of women as inferior to men and as caregivers of the family. It is a product of such imbalances within the family that the female identity itself is centred on the male members of the family. She pointed out that, after the reforms of the 1970s, even though the economic opportunities of women showed a substantial improvement, the DV cases remained high. The discussions on such cases were confined only to the private/family sphere and it was not even considered as a grave concern. The Fourth United Nations World Conference on Women, hosted by China in Beijing in 1995, marked a landmark event in China's engagement with the global women's movement. The discussions on DV cases were brought to the public sphere as women in China got a chance to interact with Western women. She also focused on the development of social organizations in China. The establishment of the 'Network for Combating Domestic Violence in China' (DVN) in 2000 was another pivotal turn that impacted the whole discussions on DV cases. This women's NGO worked as an autonomous, free and democratic institution and it was affiliated with the Chinese Law Society for legitimisation. Later they were forced to work in the restricted environment of the state and were subjected to compulsory registrations. Ms. Kumari thus gave an idea about how such women's social organizations in China declined in their work and authority. According to her, such Chinese organizations have their working styles and conditions which are quite different from the Western NGOs.

Ms. Kumari also talked about the 'Domestic Violence Law' that was brought into effect in China in 2016. This law gave a trajectory to the recognition of DV and provided the victims with legal tools to utilize. Even though the law was further pushed forward after the 'Li Yang Case', it still had several practical inadequacies. She argued that when it comes to police actions and protection orders, the law remained dormant and restricted. She presented DV as a result of the strong traditions and customs of Chinese society. Rural women are more vulnerable as they have inadequate access to resources and awareness. Migration also makes women more prone to DV and it was interesting to note that the higher earning women are as much as vulnerable

as those having lower income. The pandemic had made the situation much worse as women were trapped inside the house with their abusers. The DV law was promising but insufficient. The speaker also explained that social organizations in China played a crucial role along with civil society in legitimizing state authority. The speaker ended the discussion by pointing out such inadequacies in the system and the suggestions to move forward.

The next speaker, **Mr. Rakshit Kweera**, made a comparative study of the digital surveillance apps used by China and India during the pandemic through his paper, ***Deepening of Surveillance in China and India: A Comparative Study of Contact Tracing Applications During the Pandemic***. 'Quick Response Health Code' (QRHC) and 'Aarogya Setu' are two applications developed by China and India respectively as a non-pharmaceutical method to control the spread of Covid-19. **Mr. Kweera** compared the functioning of these two apps and the citizens' response to them. QRHC was developed by Alipay and WeChat, it was developed based on the 'DingTalk Employee Health Code' which was used earlier by these companies. He described the functioning of the app which works on a colour coding system. People are assigned various colour codes in lieu of their potential risk to the pandemic. The 'Red' colour indicates the person who was infected with the virus and should be isolated from the public spaces. The 'Yellow' colour was given to those who had contact with infected persons. 'Green' colour indicated fully secured ones and later 'Gold' colour was added to those who are vaccinated. On the other hand, the Aarogya Setu app was developed by the NITI Aayog, the National Informatics Centre, and a few private companies. This app works through the GPS and the Bluetooth. It was used to trace the movements of the people and the data collected was classified into demographic data, contact data, self-assessment data and location data. Mr. Kweera compared these two apps using three parameters, administrative authority and accountability, physical and digital surveillance infrastructure, civil society and citizens' response to it during the pandemic.

He also explained the administrative responses of China and India towards the pandemic. The party-state-society triangle in China quickly responded and they formed the "grid management system" at the local administrative level to manage COVID-19. The speaker elaborated on this system in detail. Around 200 households were classified into separate grids and there was a Grid chief and 2 Grid controllers for each grid. He went on to compare the system of India in which the central government took up the primary responsibility and the regulations were made according to the 'Disaster Management Act of 2016'. The pandemic management was coordinated by the local-self-government institutions. He also compared the physical and digital

surveillance systems of the two countries. The technological advancement of China was well evident at this juncture. China used the facial recognition system and video surveillance extensively throughout the pandemic. Another important initiative was the 'Internet plus road map' developed by China.

The "social credit system", which was employed on the model of the "financial credit system" was another successful initiative. Citizens were given credit scores according to their trustworthiness. The speaker then talked about the situation in India where Aadhar and the use of its biometric feature. It was India's first step towards digital surveillance. The growth of the drone and CCTV sectors in India showed how physical surveillance in India had made a substantial improvement. He pointed out that the 'Digital India' project also played a vital role. According to him, the third parameter shows the exact difference between the two countries in the usage of this surveillance system. Chinese citizens extensively supported QRHC and it was widely accessible. The criticisms of this system are mostly the creation of the Western media. On the other hand, Aarogya Setu was criticized a lot by the Indian civil society. The strong digital divide in India made this app inaccessible for the majority of the Indian population and it was downloaded by only 14% of the citizens. As the app was made mandatory for many purposes, the daily wage workers and the migrant workers were hit hard as they were not able to access it.

Mr. Kweera presented many engrossing findings and conclusions. The digital surveillance apps which were introduced to manage the spread of the pandemic have been criticized for their usage as a control mechanism of the state over its citizens even after the pandemic. He claimed that the citizens are being monitored and their data have been extracted using such apps. In conclusion, he argued that digital surveillance was successfully centralised and legitimised in China while India could not achieve that. The technological backwardness put the country behind and more socially accepted surveillance systems are yet to be introduced in India.

Dr. Ritu Agarwal posed questions to Ms. Kumari regarding the difference in the nature of domestic violence before and after the period of Mao. She concluded her remarks by asking for clarification regarding the terms in which civil society is classified in China, whether it's a Western imposition or not. Further, she posed questions to Mr. Kweera that, if China is already a surveillance state or is it a new phenomenon after the pandemic. Dr. Agarwal winded up her remarks by encouraging the author to reflect on the context within which such apps are introduced and their usage after the original aim ceases to exist. **Dr. Sneha Banerjee**

appreciated the efforts of the authors on compiling such vast data and comprehensively presenting the paper. She also commented that along with including the statistics, deeper attempts should be made to come up with a critical analysis of the data and figures. She also suggested including the intersectionality of both the women and men who are already a part of Chinese politics. Dr. Banerjee concluded her remarks by encouraging the authors to contextualize the concepts they had presented.

In the interactive session, the panellists received a slew of questions from the audience. Concerning the first presentation, questions were asked on the reasons for the disparity in women's participation at the local and central levels and also about the dichotomy between what the party said and what is implemented due to the deep-rooted patriarchal and social norms. The authors explained the lack of opportunities for women to rise to a higher level of political leadership and the drawbacks of the "one-child policy" and the recent "three-child policy".

The questions in the second presentation focused on the impact of education and economic reforms on domestic violence cases. The author also agreed on the point that the economic reforms and the increase in educational opportunities had led to an increase in women's consciousness and thereby reduced the domestic violence cases but it was not up to the desired levels. She also explained further the nature of the new NGOs that emerged in China and their role in society. Regarding the third presentation, questions were posed for clarification of certain concepts like the Social Credit System and the author took the time to explain it in detail. Questions were also asked on the inclusivity of QRHC of China and the impact of the political economy development of both countries on their respective surveillance systems. The author clarified the fact that the technological advancement of China is way ahead of India and around 80% of Chinese citizens got access to QRHC while in India only 14% of Indians could access Aarogya Setu. Finally, the session was wrapped up with the closing remarks from the Chair.

ICS-HYI Panel Discussion

Expanding the Horizons of China Research in India

The Institute of China Studies – Harvard-Yenching Institute Panel was chaired by **Prof. Alka Acharya**, Professor, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; Honorary Director, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi, and included **Prof. Elizabeth Perry**, Henry Rosovsky Professor of Government, Harvard University and Director, Harvard-Yenching Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. The

panel featured four speakers, including **Dr. Tiasangla Longkumer**, PhD, Centre for Social Medicine and Community Health, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; ICS-HYI Fellow (2017 Cohort), **Dr. Nishit Kumar**, Research Fellow, Centre for Contemporary China Studies (CCCS), Ministry of External Affairs, ICS-HYI Fellow (2018 Cohort), **Ms. Saloni Sharma**, Doctoral Candidate, Centre for Chinese & South East Asian Studies, School of Language, Literature & Cultural Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; ICS-HYI Fellow (2019 Cohort), and **Dr. Bhim Subba**, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad; ICS-HYI Fellow (2015 Cohort). The **Concluding Remarks** were delivered by **Dr. Ruohong Li**, Associate Director, Harvard-Yenching Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.

Prof. Elizabeth Perry reflected on the distinct characteristics of the ICS-HYI Fellowship and her journey with Prof. Acharya in grooming young scholars in Asia. The HYI is independent both financially and legally. For the present young scholars, ICS-HYI is a platform that caters to excellent access and wider opportunities and scope for scholarship in China. They offer a five-year Fellowship where the 1st year is carried out in partner universities in China, and the second year is dedicated at the HYI. For the last three years, the fellows would return to their home country and conduct the research. However, in all these, language is a significant factor. To accommodate this, the Fellowship is flexible in giving a year for language training; this enriches the young scholar's ability to read and understand Chinese texts, interact and conduct interviews. Overall, this Fellowship equips young scholars and helps expand the scope of Chinese research. While taking fellows, the institute looks for people with candidates who have already done secondary literature and a literature review of their concerned area, and they should be able to justify how their proposal is different from others. Following Prof. Perry’s remarks, the panel featured four recipients of the ICS-HYI Fellowship, who shared their experiences with the audience.

Mr. Nishit Kumar was selected for the ICS-HYI Fellowship in 2018, and he shed light on how this Fellowship helped him as well as the preparation process. He brought to the forefront how this granted better access to resources, museums, people, primary sources, and mentors in China and at the HYI. He was exposed to different workshops, paper presentations, and writing workshops that added to his Fellowship work. He highlighted that there is a lot to learn as there is a diversity of candidates. He also spoke about the importance of writing a sound statement of purpose.

Ms. Saloni Sharma received the Fellowship in 2018 but started in 2022 due to Covid-19. Her experiences enriched her thought process as she was exposed to ideas, Chinese society, and culture. Through fieldwork, she could check the practicality of theory and how scholarly reading on China and real-life experiences converge and diverge. She noted the need to acknowledge complexities and have conversations in an integrated and holistic approach rather than in isolation. This Fellowship, in her view, offers better access to resources and networking with various eminent institutes and scholars, and it fosters long-lasting intellectual friendships.

Dr. Tiasangla Longkumer stated that her interest drew from a comparative study of health systems in India and China. For her, the Fellowship started with learning the Chinese language. She mentioned that the Fellowship is a unique and flexible way to work on one's research interest and it provides space and support along with access to resources of different varieties.

Dr. Bhim Subba shed light on the resources accessible at the HYI and his interactions with eminent professors and mentors. Furthermore, based on his experience as a scholar of China, he stated his aim to make Hyderabad a centre for China studies in India. He highlighted that the Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad, encourages a comparative approach, wherein one can analyse Chinese and Indian systems in terms of society, and culture, among other aspects, moving beyond international relations.

Dr. Ruohong Li emphasised the distinctive features of the Fellowship and explained how the program starts with learning the Chinese language. The HYI partners with 19 universities and 900 foreign visiting scholars. Commitment and passion are necessary while learning the language. She highlighted the importance of mentorship and networking. The first year for learning the language, the second year also continues improving the language with interactions, and the third year is spent at the HYI. She also pointed out the necessity of academic career prospects for post-doctoral Fellowships. She gave a brief timeline of the application process, interviews, proposals, and placements.

DAY 2: FRIDAY, 17 NOVEMBER 2023

Special Panel II

Surveillance and Control: How the Chinese Party-State Deploys Science & Technology in Tibet and Xinjiang

The panel, chaired by **Dr. Jabin T. Jacob**, Associate Professor, the Department of International Relations and Governance Studies (IRGS) & Director, Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence, Delhi NCR, delved into critical aspects of surveillance and control methods deployed by the state in Tibet and Xinjiang since 2008-2009. The panel featured four speakers. **Dr. Apa Lhamo**, Fellow, Centre for China Analysis and Strategy, New Delhi, presented on ***China's Social Stability and Security Dilemma in Tibet: State Securitization through Surveillance and Technology***. **Dr. Devendra Kumar**, Associate Fellow, Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence, Delhi NCR, spoke on ***Chinese State's Deployment of Technology for Security Responses in Tibet: A Study of Prefecture Level Budgets for Internal Security since 2008***. Followed by Dr. Kumar, **Dr. Ayjaz Ahmad Wani**, Research Fellow, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Mumbai, presented on ***Family Planning Policies and Uyghur Women in Xinjiang in the 'New Era'***. Finally, **Dr. Anand Parappadi Krishnan**, Fellow, Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence, Delhi NCR, spoke on ***Another Layer in a Securitized Ecosystem: Mapping the Zero-Covid Policy in Xinjiang***.

Dr. Jacob emphasised that while surveillance is not exclusive to China, the focus on scientific and technological surveillance has recently gained prominence in India as well which has now begun adopting similar strategies. He highlighted the relevance of understanding surveillance in regions like the Tibetan Autonomous Regions, which share a border with India. Dr. Jacob stressed the importance of a nuanced understanding of China, recognizing the diversity within its polity, and the historical interconnections between Xinjiang and India. He articulated three frameworks capturing China's deployment of science and technology in Tibet, first, acknowledging the significance of science as a discourse within China; second, emphasizing the operational role of science and technology in surveillance infrastructure; and third, highlighting the deployment of science as a rationale for policy implementation, exemplified by its Zero-Covid Policy.

The panel, featuring four speakers chosen for their expertise on pertinent themes, provided critical insights into the intricate dynamics of surveillance and control mechanisms utilized by the state in Tibet and Xinjiang. The speakers covered the use of science and technology as a tool for governance and control in Tibet post-2008 internal security budget at prefecture levels in Tibet; response to the Covid-19 pandemic in Xinjiang; and family planning in Xinjiang.

The first speaker of the panel, **Dr. Apa Lhamo**, spoke on ***China's Social Stability and Security Dilemma in Tibet: State Securitization through Surveillance and Technology***, and highlighted the urgent need for an increased focus on Tibetan studies as equivalent to understanding mainland China. Dr. Lhamo emphasised the deployment of science and technology in the securitization measures undertaken by the state in Tibet. The discourse elucidated upon the theory of securitization and its core idea of identification of issues as existential threats to state security necessitating immediate and hierarchical political responses. She claims that China's securitization discourse in Tibet revolves around social stability, Tibetan resistance to Chinese legitimacy, and allegations of Tibetan separatism. Dr. Lhamo identified three insecurities of the state regarding Tibet, first, the political insecurity regarding CCP legitimacy, second, the military concerns in border regions, and third, the sociocultural anxieties arising from the failure to undermine Tibetan community cohesion.

Dr. Lhamo highlighted a considerable surge in government investments in internal security in Tibet, with the region having the highest government budget per capita among all provinces. Detailed explanations followed on the implementation of the grid social management system which categorizes individuals into geographical blocs, which utilizes intricate household and recognition systems, and employs biometric strategies like mass DNA collection to monitor not just dissidents but their relatives as well. Moreover, she expounded upon how the Chinese state reinforces digital control to restrict Tibetan access to language and religious sites while also explaining the increase in central officials deployed to augment surveillance infrastructure and the enlistment of local unemployed and criminals into surveillance-oriented militias. Despite China's extensive surveillance measures, Dr. Lhamo noted instances of Tibetan resistance, including protests, self-immolation, and literary forms of dissent witnessed since 2008. She concluded by cautioning that the Chinese state might intensify Orwellian techniques using advanced infrastructures like AI, hinting at a potentially bleak future for Tibet under heightened surveillance.

The second speaker, **Dr. Devendra Kumar**, in his paper titled, ***Chinese State's Deployment of Technology for Security Responses in Tibet: A Study of Prefecture Level Budgets for Internal Security since 2008***, dissected the spending trends of prefectures in China, shedding light on the deployment of surveillance technology by the Chinese state in Tibet. Dr. Kumar's research focused on the allocation of budgets by prefectures in China, aiming to unveil insights into the threat perception of the Chinese government in Tibet. He emphasised the significance of studying budgets at the prefecture or province levels due to the limited access to data concerning

central and Tibetan government budgets on internal public security. He delved into various strategies, notably the Comprehensive Public Security Management (CPSM), to highlight the involvement of numerous public and private institutions in security surveillance efforts. Dr. Kumar meticulously analyzed departmental and subject-specific spending trends, emphasizing the importance of scrutinizing both project heads and general budgets. He used diverse sources, including tender notices, to compile a comprehensive overview of spending.

Dr. Kumar also underscored the considerable escalation in surveillance spending, contributing to a substantial increase in budget sizes. However, he cautiously emphasised that while spending had surged, it could only be conclusively asserted that the state had made substantial investments in developing surveillance infrastructure. The analysis by Dr. Kumar highlighted that the Chinese state's increased utilization of technology for surveillance in Tibet resulted from both immediate responses following the Tibetan uprising and the long-term evolution of surveillance infrastructure since the 1990s. Moreover, Dr. Kumar drew attention to the variations in spending among different prefectures, attributing these differences to factors such as urban-rural population ratios, the number of religious sites, and population size, among others.

The third speaker, **Dr. Ayjaz Ahmad Wani**, shed light on the precarious situation of Uyghur women in Xinjiang under the Chinese surveillance regime, in his paper titled, ***Family Planning Policies and Uyghur Women in Xinjiang in the 'New Era'***, and emphasised the targeted securitisation of this demographic. Dr. Wani explained how Uyghur women have become focal points of the Chinese surveillance regime, citing political and social reasons behind the state's meticulous monitoring, particularly under the leadership of Xi Jinping. He stressed Xinjiang's distinction as a region which has more in common with Central Asia rather than China, emphasizing that its rich cultural heritage developed independently from mainland China. He noted the resistance displayed by Uyghur women against the state's attempts at demographic alteration in Xinjiang by embracing elements of Uyghur culture, such as veiling, to preserve their cultural identity amidst forced assimilation attempts. Dr. Wani also highlighted the troubling demographic shifts evidenced by an increase in the Han population and concentrated development efforts in Han-dominated areas.

Further, Dr. Wani drew attention to the unjust policing of Uyghur women regarding childbirth, leading to forced abortions, fines, and coercive birth control measures that extended beyond legal limits. He mentioned the disproportionate usage of intrauterine devices in Xinjiang compared to the region's contribution to China's overall population. Xinjiang which contributed

just 1.8% of the Chinese population accounted for 80% of intrauterine devices used across China. Highlighting another distressing aspect, Dr. Wani noted the state-sponsored intermarriages, coercing Uyghur women into marrying Han males, a trend that has surged significantly since 2017. He underscored how these oppressive measures not only functioned as demographic tools but also served political agendas. The intensified use of technology on Uyghur women for family planning highlights the intertwining nature of technology as a tool for both surveillance and political enrichment which resonates with Xi Jinping's ascent as a populist and authoritarian leader.

The final speaker for the session, **Dr. Anand Parappadi Krishnan** delved into the lesser-explored facets of the Zero-Covid policy in his paper titled, ***Another Layer in a Securitized Ecosystem: Mapping the Zero-Covid Policy in Xinjiang***. He elucidated the multi-layered complexities within the implementation of the Zero-Covid Policy in Xinjiang. Dr. Krishnan emphasised the disparities in scholarly attention, noting that while the Zero-COVID Policy in larger Chinese cities receives extensive coverage, the more repressive policies enforced in frontier areas like Xinjiang have been significantly neglected. Dr. Krishnan claimed that several scientific technologies utilized for the Zero-Covid Policy in major cities were first perfected and implemented in Xinjiang as part of the state's surveillance system. Differentiating China's Covid-19 policies from national lockdowns in India, Krishnan highlighted the territorial aspect of China's policies, notably the grid system, while also revealing, that in Xinjiang, these policies were layered atop an already extensive surveillance infrastructure.

Dr. Krishnan underscored the state's justifications for these stringent measures, blending both biosecurity and terrorism narratives into a comprehensive system. While presenting science as a means for a well-ordered and healthy society, he claims that the technology employed also served to construct what the Chinese state termed "walls of copper and iron against terrorism". Dr. Krishnan further illuminated how these technological solutions often allowed for human discretion, classifying citizens based on their compliance with COVID-19 data collection, contributing to the categorization of individuals as loyal or undesirable in the eyes of the state. Finally, he highlighted the commercial aspect of technology usage within the Zero-Covid Policy framework where the growing demand for technological sophistication in surveillance and pandemic control has spurred the expansion of companies manufacturing surveillance technologies.

During the interactive session, various questions were raised, which led to insightful discussions and revelations. One pertinent question raised during the session focused on public awareness in India regarding maps and narratives surrounding China-occupied regions. The panellists highlighted the media sensationalism prevalent in India, which often drives sensationalist narratives. Dr. Apa Lhamo emphasised the imperative for greater education among Indians concerning the nuances of Tibetan society and governance. Additionally, she lamented how certain Indian media outlets employ Chinese names for Tibetan regions instead of their indigenous Tibetan names. Another significant inquiry delved into the autonomous political and social space of Uygur women, examining the influence of patriarchy on their decisions regarding childbirth. Dr. Wani elucidated the lack of independent political space for Uygur women due to state surveillance and prevalent joint family traditions, predominantly in Southern Xinjiang. The discussion extended to the responses of Han and Uygur men to forced marriages and intermarriages, where Panelist **Dr. Wani** indicated various incentives offered, such as land, to encourage inter-community marriages as a means to propel demographic change.

Addressing a query regarding spending on internal surveillance in Tibet, **Dr. Devendra Kumar** highlighted the focus on enhancing local and basic infrastructure, yet expressed doubts about the effectiveness of the state's cohesive capacity. He mentioned the challenge of illegal migration which prompted the state to establish foreign offices at county and prefecture levels. Dr. Krishnan, responding to a question about states' responsiveness to public needs, opined that states like India and China have intensified disciplinary techniques and surveillance while retracting from adequate welfare and service provision for citizens. Another query centred on the role of literary forms in Tibetan resistance and the unique aspects of diaspora literature. The panellists emphasised the usage of propaganda materials by the United Front Work Department (UFWD), particularly targeting monks and nuns at the forefront of resistance.

Thematic Panel III

Chinese State: Political Control and Popular Responses

The third Thematic Panel was chaired by **Prof. Kham Khan Suan Hausing**, Professor, Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad. The first speaker for the session, **Mr. Wriju Banerjee**, delved into the intricacies of rural and labour protests in China through his paper, ***Tracing the Evolution of Rural and Labour Protests in Contemporary China***. The second speaker, **Ms. Rituja Ghosh**, Academic Associate, Kautilya

School of Public Policy, Hyderabad, presented ***Sinicization in the People's Republic of China: An Analysis of Language Policies***. Followed by **Ms. Ghosh** and **Ms. Kriti Chopra**, Doctoral Candidates, CHRIST University, Bengaluru, presented on ***Zhonghua Minzu and Chinese Nationalism: A Case Study of Inner Mongolia***. **Dr**. **Anand Parappadi Krishnan,** Fellow, Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence, Delhi NCR; Visiting Associate Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi and **Dr. Reeja Nair**, Assistant Professor, Department of History, Deshbandhu College, University of Delhi, were the discussants.

Mr. Wriju Banerjee, in his paper titled, ***Tracing the Evolution of Rural and Labour Protests in Contemporary China***, examined the similarities and differences between protests in urban and rural China. Mr. Banerjee delved into how labour movements and protests have affected China over time. Highlighting the evolution of protest dynamics, he discussed the changing landscape of protests in the country while emphasizing the need to distinguish between urban and rural protests, shedding light on the distinct nature of each. Mr. Banarjee went on to elucidate the methodology employed in his study, providing a foundation for the subsequent discussion. The analysis encompassed the sectarian protests in rural China, attributing the mobilization of rural peasants to state policies. The "post-decollectivisation era" witnessed the decentralisation of administrative positions, creating legal ambiguity that allowed the state to redistribute land. He emphasised the nexus between real estate owners and the obstacles faced by farmers in retaining their land while also drawing attention to the informal and loophole-ridden nature of the work undertaken by rural workers. Low wages, lack of insurance schemes, and the detrimental impact of legal ambiguity on the rural job market were highlighted as significant challenges.

Mr. Banarjee also provided the historical context by referring to the Hundred Flowers Movement and the Iron Rice Bowl system. The latter, symbolic of socialist ideals, significantly impacted people's lives. The subsequent baby boom in the 1950s and 60s increased job demand, leading to rising migration despite the *hukou* system. Addressing state responses to protests, Mr. Banerjee discussed demobilisation as a strategy employed by the Chinese government. This tactic involves the classic divide and rule by categorizing protests into red and black categories, catering to different needs and dividing various sections of the population. He underscored the state's repression of protests, particularly the prevention of any alliance between workers and public intellectuals. In conclusion, Mr. Banerjee emphasised the necessity of viewing rural and urban protests in China through distinct lenses. His presentation shed light on the multifaceted

challenges faced by rural workers, the historical underpinnings of labour movements, and the intricate strategies employed by the Chinese state in response to dissent. The audience was enriched with a deeper understanding of the complexities surrounding rural and labour protests in contemporary China.

The second speaker, **Ms. Rituja Ghosh**, delved into the often-overlooked ethnic diversity of China and the implications of the Sinicization process on language politics through her paper titled, ***Sinicization in the People's Republic of China: An Analysis of Language Politics***. Ms. Ghosh questioned China's portrayal of itself as a homogenised nation which obscures its rich ethnic and cultural diversity. The quest for stability through Sinicization, a process of assimilating non-Han people into the Chinese fold, was identified as the central theme. Sinicization, as Ms. Ghosh explained, is a two-way process with a particular focus on the national language, standard Mandarin. Ms. Ghosh explored the Chinese Communist Party's perspective on diversity, and briefly examined protests in Inner Mongolia as a case study. Relying on secondary literature, she discussed government guidelines and laws on regional ethnic autonomy within the context of ethnic governance.

Ms. Ghosh underscored language as a key tool for maintaining distinctions among different ethnic groups in China by discussing the prevalence of Mandarin-dominated entrance exams and the hierarchical nature of languages which contribute to the preservation of the Sinicization agenda. She referred to the 2004 bilingual learning document which advocated for Mandarin as the sole source which led to the discontinuation of books with a history of Inner Mongolia. She detailed Inner Mongolia's efforts to resist the Sinicization reforms, particularly in preserving its traditional script and resisting the CCP's Latinization reforms. Inner Mongolia's traditional script faced silent extinction as the directive required Mandarin instruction which led to large-scale de-enrolment of students prompting a response from the community emphasizing the importance of their Mongolian mother tongue.

Ms. Ghosh highlighted *Bainu* as a social media platform for the Mongolian community, emphasizing its role in cultural preservation. She also discussed the responses of Chinese authorities, citing Xi Jinping's call for the standardization of Mandarin, portraying it as 'scientific and progressive.' The impact of these language policies on the second generation in Inner Mongolia was also briefly touched upon. The discussion by Ms. Ghosh provided a comprehensive analysis of Sinicization's impact on language politics in the People's Republic of China, using Inner Mongolia as a lens to examine the complexities of ethnic governance and

resistance. The audience gained valuable insights into the multifaceted nature of China's approach to language standardization and its implications on cultural diversity**.**

The third speaker, **Ms. Kriti Chopra** provided valuable insights into the complex dynamics of *Zhonghua minzu* (ZM) and its impact on Chinese nationalism through her paper titled, ***Zhonghua Minzu and Chinese Nationalism: A Case Study of Inner Mongolia***. She commenced her presentation by examining *Zhonghua minzu* from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. She highlighted the historical objective of instilling a common identity among the Chinese people by referring to Liang Qichao's usage of the term in 1902. The Quin Dynasty's portrayal of *Zhonghua minzu* as a multi-ethnic state has evolved, with contemporary China using it to shape a hyper-nationalistic narrative to enhance its global image.

Ms. Chopra delved into the specific case of Inner Mongolia, exploring the reasons behind China's implementation of *Zhonghua minzu* in the region. The empirical analysis included the rapid economic growth of Inner Mongolia, the standardization of Mandarin, and the steady erasure of local history. Xi Jinping's Order Number 19, which mandated Mandarin instruction in most Inner Mongolian schools, was noted as a significant policy shift. She highlighted the challenges faced by Inner Mongolia, including the migration of Han Chinese, which led to the gradual displacement of the native population. Despite the economic growth, the improved standard of living has resulted in increased social discrepancies. The presentation noted the peaceful protests in Inner Mongolia, with parents facing threats to send their children to Mandarin schools.

Ms. Chopra discussed the research methodology employed, combining qualitative and quantitative approaches. The instrumentalist, primordial, and constructivist perspectives were considered in analyzing identity politics in Inner Mongolia. The theoretical framework of Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* was applied to understand the complex interplay between identity and language. Ms. Chopra presented her research findings as suggesting that *Zhonghua minzu* aligns most closely with the instrumentalist approach among the considered theories. The presentation emphasised the imagined community aspect of identity and language, revealing the dynamics of Inner Mongolia's relations with China and Mongolia. The knowledge of the Chinese language was identified as a valuable asset in the job market, contributing to parents' willingness to enrol their children in Mandarin schools. Finally, she underscored Inner Mongolia's role as a crucial middleman between China and Russia, acting as a window and maintaining a healthy relationship between the two countries. The presentation concluded by

shedding light on the intricate balance Inner Mongolia must ensure to preserve its cultural identity amid China's hyper-nationalistic policies. Ms. Chopra's presentation offered a nuanced examination of *Zhonghua minzu* and its implications for Chinese nationalism, using Inner Mongolia as a compelling case study. The audience gained valuable insights into the challenges faced by Inner Mongolia and the intricate interplay between identity, language, and geopolitical dynamics.

Dr. Anand P. Krishnan suggested improvements, particularly in clarifying the concept of the Maoist era. He highlighted the outdated nature of some data used in the paper and recommended incorporating more recent and relevant information. Dr. Krishnan emphasised the need for a more comprehensive discussion on labour protests, noting a significant era of labour reforms in 2010 and 2012 that was not sufficiently addressed. He encouraged Mr. Banerjee to explore the individualisation of protests as well. **Dr. Reeja Nair** expressed that certain aspects in Ms. Chopra's paper lacked clarity. She also questioned whether the author was aware of similar attempts at language standardization during the USSR era, particularly referencing the Cyrillic script's standardization and the brief use of Latin in Mongolia. She recommended establishing a connection between these historical events for a more comprehensive analysis.

Prof. Kham Khan Suan Hausing thanked all the participants and then pointed that a notable aspect that emerged from the discussions is the imperative to delve into the rise of the capitalist state, not only within the borders of China but also within the broader global context. The phenomenon of "accumulation by dispossession" demands our attention as we seek to comprehend the intricate dynamics of contemporary governance. The prevailing socio-political landscape compels us to question the motives behind the ascendancy of the capitalist state. What forces drive this phenomenon not just in China but across borders? The exploration of this question becomes vital in understanding the underlying currents shaping the trajectory of nations and their people.

Thematic Panel IV

China and the World: Cultural Interactions through History

This session conducted in hybrid mode was chaired by **Prof. Madhavi Thampi**, Honorary Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi; Associate Professor in China Studies (Retd.), Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi. She remarked that the theme "China

and the World: Cultural Interactions through History" was a breath of fresh air, as usually the panels are dominated by geopolitical and strategic dialogues. The first speaker, **Mr. Archan Saha**, Postgraduate Scholar, Department of Chinese Language & Culture, Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan, presented on ***Indian Music: A New Tool in Reshaping the Dream of "Dragon and Elephant Dancing Together"***. The second presentation featured **Ms. Sugandha Tandon**, Doctoral Candidate, Visual Studies, School of Arts and Aesthetics, Jawaharlal Nehru University, and **Ms. Yamini Meena**, MA, Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi, who spoke on *Sino-Japanese Art Exchanges in the 20th Century and their Implications on Chinese Avant-Garde*. The final speaker, **Mr. Chhavi Raj**, Doctoral Candidate, Centre for Chinese & South East Asian Studies, School of Language, Literature & Cultural Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, presented on ***Cultural, Historical Trajectories of US-China Relations and the Role of Anson Burlingame***. **Prof. Sujith Kumar Parayil**, Professor, Department of History, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad, and **Dr. Anagha Ingole**, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad were the discussants.

Mr. Archan Saha began by stating that India and China are often symbolised as the "elephant" and the "dragon" respectively in the popular imagination. He explored the emergence of Indian music as a soft power tool in reshaping India-China relations, through his paper titled, ***Indian Music: A New Tool in Reshaping the Dream of "Dragon and Elephant Dancing Together***. He traced the history of cultural exchanges between India and China, especially through the Silk Route. The Buddhist monks brought hymns and chants to China, along with their spiritual traditions. The Tang dynasty also facilitated musical exchanges. All these exchanges led to a 'musical alchemy' where Indian and Chinese musical styles were combined.

The interlinkages between Chinese and Indian music were explored. They have parallel philosophies, melodies conveying profound emotions, similar rhythmic complexity, use similar instruments, and both emphasise the necessity of improvisation. In the modern era, there have been many musical collaborations between India and China. Bollywood music and movies are popular in China, and act as cultural bridges. Popular Bollywood songs such as *"Jimmy Jimmy Aaja Aaja"* were used on apps like *Douyin* to let out frustration with the COVID policies of the Chinese government.

There are, however, Mr. Saha claims, challenges in using music as a soft power tool. These include language and cultural barriers, political regulatory barriers such as censorship,

geopolitics etc., huge competition from the international and Chinese domestic entertainment history, and concerns about the sustainability of music as a soft power tool. It is essential to be culturally sensitive and preserve the cultural essence while adapting to appeal to the Chinese audience. All these could be overcome by proper communication between the countries, cultural sensitivity and preserving the authenticity and nuances of the art while localizing it. Mr. Saha further argues that cultural diplomacy and mutual understanding could be strengthened through musical exchange. Music as a soft power tool can transcend political boundaries, dispelling stereotypes, enhancing people-to-people connectivity and bridging gaps. There are also economic and collaborative opportunities which India can make use of. Following the K-pop model, Bollywood could improve India's positive perception among the public. Cultural exchanges could also address historical misunderstandings and celebrate cultural links. Indian music can thus contribute to the dream of the elephant and the dragon dancing together.

The speakers for the next presentation, **Ms. Sugandha Tandon** and **Ms. Yamini Meena**, began by drawing attention towards the research gap in Sino-Japanese art history, especially on the Japanese influence on Chinese modern art, which their paper titled, ***Sino-Japanese Art Exchanges in the 20th Century and their Implications on Chinese Avant-Garde*** attempted to address. Ms. Tandon began by stating that there needs to be collaboration among art historians in East Asia and that the cultural narratives are underdeveloped. The paper analysed three case studies, and used the framework of Edward Said's "travelling theory" and John Clark's methodology of how the endogenous mixes with the exogenous. The first case study covered the 1929 National Fine Arts Exhibition, the first one in China to officially exhibit Japanese oil paintings. Ms. Meena explained that Japanese art offered an alternative to Western modernity by combining Western techniques while being an exemplar of 'oriental art'. The second case study of woodcut print traces its emergence as a tool to express people's frustration against the socio-political conditions in China in the 1930s. The two phases of the woodcut movement before and after the Japanese invasion of China were also discussed, with the first phase being multifaceted and focused on modernity, whereas the post-1937 phase woodcuts focused on realism, and emphasised unity.

The third case study dealt with the circulation of art and ideas beyond geographical borders, with students and instructors moving across borders to learn and teach, influencing the Chinese Avant-Garde. This was due to three main factors: proximity, similarity in script, and modernisation in Japan. Japan was heavily influenced by western modern art and there was a

general dissatisfaction with the existing artistic norms in China. This paper illustrates how Chinese art shifted from traditional to modern to Avant Garde, and how art transcends boundaries. The case studies also highlighted the intricate historical context of cultural and aesthetic interactions of China and Japan, despite their political animosity. The paper concluded that the cultural exchange between Japan and China was thematically rich with cultural transmission, artistic innovation and attempts at reconciliation between nationalism and modernity.

The third speaker, **Mr. Chhavi Raj**, threw light upon the strained relations between the US and China by recalling their cordial relationship in the mid to late 19th centuries through his paper, ***Cultural, Historical Trajectories of US-China Relations and the Role of Anson Burlingame***. Unlike previous scholarship which largely focused on the US, and saw China as a passive receiver, Mr. Raj focused on the shared experiences between the US and China, and the role of individuals who shaped these experiences, such as Anson Burlingame.

Anson Burlingame represented both the US and China and led China's first mission to the West. He played a pivotal role in the US signing a fair and equal treaty with China. His dedication and commitment to China was commendable, and is exemplified in his creation of a Chinese national flag when he led the delegation to London on behalf of the Qing emperor. Burlingame's approach was based on cooperation and conciliation rather than conflict. He helped China join the “Family of Nations”. He kept the spirit of freedom high in the US, which he carried to China. In his paper, Mr. Raj discussed the four reasons behind Burlingame mission in detail, including the socio-economic and political reasons. The Burlingame Treaty was explored in detail, especially articles 5 and 6, which enabled free immigration to US from China and condemned laws discriminating against the Chinese diaspora in the US. Article 8 upheld non-intervention and Chinese sovereignty. The apparent distinction between the US and Britain in their relations with countries like China was also mentioned. However, the interest of the mission is debated and the treaty fell short of expectations. Mr. Raj concluded by saying that a 'new Burlingame' is needed in US-China diplomacy. He also expressed his optimism that the theme of shared history could reboot cordial relations between the two countries.

Prof. Sujith Kumar Parayil appreciated the paper for being detailed. He pointed out a possible methodological lapse in Mr. Saha's paper as 'Indian music' as a category is diverse and extensive. He also pondered over the Indianness of Bollywood music and enquired whether there were any tangible diplomatic outcomes of using music as a soft power tool. For the second paper, he

proposed the use of imaginative geography as a more appropriate framework rather than travelling theory. He also suggested to further explore the concepts of narrative building and visual modernity in the paper. **Dr. Anagha Ingole** pointed out a central contradiction in Chhavi Raj's paper, as the Burlingame treaty falling short of expectation is contrary to the central argument of the paper which is focused more on a shared history. She also urged him to look into the current reception of Burlingame in the U.S. and zero in on the language of the Burlingame treaty. She also drew attention towards how the zeitgeist defines diplomatic relationships.

The critiques and suggestions were graciously accepted by the presenters and the chair opened the discussion to the audience. There was a suggestion from the floor to make **Mr. Archan Saha's** paper two separate studies, as well as to incorporate Tagore's influence in China to make it more comprehensive. There were questions about the status of elite artists in Japan, especially with China's adversarial relationship in the early 20th century. The evolution of attitudes and artistic themes in Chinese modern art with regard to its changing relationship with Japan was explained in response. These elite artists were isolated, and anti-Japanese sentiments were expressed by them through woodblock and woodblock printing. There was a critique that the papers were lacking in the literature survey, which was defended by the speakers individually in the context of their research works. **Prof. Sujith** further stated that the papers indeed incorporated literature wherever relevant and appreciated the presenters for their novelty and uniqueness. The chair, **Prof. Thampi** remarked that the three papers made a plea for cultural cooperation to mitigate geopolitical tensions. She explained how all three posed the question of whether soft power can trump harsh geopolitical realities. The conclusion was that cultural cooperation has historically coexisted with conflicts and tensions and will continue to do so.

Special Lecture

The Dilemma of Gender and Culture in China's Soft Power in the Global South

The Special Lecture was chaired by **Prof. Alka Acharya**, Professor, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; Honorary Director, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi, and featured **Prof. Govind Kelkar**, Executive

Director, GenDev Centre for Research and Innovation, Gurgaon; Adjunct Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi, as the speaker. Prof. Kelkar spoke on ***The Dilemma of Gender and Culture in China's Soft Power in the Global South***.

Prof. Govind Kelkar analysed Chinese soft power and the role of women in it. Prof. Kelkar observed a great distinction between soft power as defined by Joseph Nye and soft power as understood or practised by China. She says that the Chinese soft power and hard power, unlike Joseph Nye's definition, are fluid and exhibit a symbiotic relationship. She mentioned the Chinese government's emphasis on the use of soft instead of hard power and President Xi Jinping's underscoring the use of China's soft power in persuading the world to respect diversity, their form of democracy and their ideas of modernisation. Further, delving into the specifics of China's soft power, she defined it as a mix of Confucian historical values with a pursuit towards modernisation, prosperity and harmony in the world.

China's soft power has external as well as internal functions. The external functions are to spread the Chinese culture, establish China's image as a powerful country, and expand the circle of Chinese friends. The internal functions are legitimizing the authority of the CCP, building a socialist spiritual civilization, and expanding the attractiveness of a socialist society. President Xi has given immense importance to the China story being told properly through media, films etc. She further talks about the various decisions taken by the Communist Party of China in favour of women like the decree of equal land rights for men and women in 1948 and the marriage laws in 1949 which gave women equal rights in choosing partners while also acknowledging their failure due to excessive resistance from the society. In the Great Leap Forward in 1958 women were encouraged to join the labour forces but they also had to cook food and manage household chores which hindered their participation. Men kept being used as a yardstick and the main feminist question became "why do women need to do what men do". She further mentioned the 18th and 20th National Congress of CPC in which motherhood and duties for constructing a good family were emphasised. On the status of protests and demands, Prof. Kelkar mentions that in 2023 even the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF), which is a government mouthpiece, acknowledged the inadequate development of women in China and the discrimination faced by them. Further, delving into the instruments of China's soft power she argues that China has two main instruments, first is the internationalization of education and cultural exchange, and second, the Fellowship offered to foreign students to study Chinese culture.

According to Prof. Kelkar the main barrier to gender equality is the revival of Confucian ideology, the core tenet of which for women is *Three Obedience and Four Virtues.* The three obedience are to the father then the husband and then to the son following the "respect the head of the house" tradition. The four virtues include Sexual Morality, Proper speech, Modest manner, and Diligence in work which includes work as a labour and household chores as well. This rigid template for a woman, according to Prof. Kelkar, is one of the main reasons for the continued subordination of women in China. Also, the other obvious reasons are the marginal representation of women in political decision-making and the inadequacy of land rights for women. On the positive side, Prof. Kelkar mentions that the Confucian culture is now being redefined by women from a feminist perspective which includes women's rights in its ambit and also the developing feminist vision for a systemic change.

The interactive session featured various questions from the audience. Answering one such question, Prof. Kelkar noted that at present the universities in China have a great number of female professors and the movement for women's rights is gaining momentum. Another important question was regarding the possibility of gender equality without property relations. Prof. Kelkar replied that women cannot be liberated without property rights and that it holds more importance than the presence of women in political decision-making because their participation itself does not ensure gender equality although with land and property rights domestic violence will surely reduce.

Roundtable Discussion

Future of India-China Economic Arrangement

The Roundtable Discussion was moderated by **Mr. Ashok K. Kantha**, Honorary Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi; former Ambassador of India to China. The panellists included **Mr. Sanjay Chadha**, former Joint Secretary/Additional Secretary, Ministry of Commerce & Industry (2015–22); Director, Public Policy for India and South Asia, Uber; **Mr. Santosh Pai**, Honorary Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi; Partner, Link Legal; and, **Mr. Manoj Kewalramani**, Senior Fellow and Head, China Studies, Takshashila Institution, Bengaluru.

Amb. Ashok Kantha opened the discussion by highlighting the complex nature of India-China bilateral relations while emphasizing the challenge of addressing the unsustainable trade deficit. He noted that factors such as trade imbalances, investment patterns, and security considerations

will play a crucial role in shaping the future of economic engagement. He raised a pivotal question about whether India, by excluding Chinese investments, could benefit from the West's China plus strategy in restructuring Global Value Chains, and how China could selectively invest in India while addressing its security concerns.

Amb. Kantha initiated the conversation by posing a question to **Mr. Sanjay Chadha** about how India should address the challenge of an unsustainable trade balance and dependencies, and what the roadmap for the future might entail. Mr. Chadha delved into the dynamics of the trade deficit between India and China, highlighting that India exports low-value goods while importing intermediaries, capital goods, and manufactured items from China. While acknowledging that intermediaries contribute to job creation, Mr. Chadha expressed concerns about the potential risks associated with over-reliance on a single source which poses a significant threat to the resilience of the supply chain.

Mr. Chadha further outlined the need for a comprehensive strategy to tackle these challenges, emphasizing the importance of a more competitive domestic position, targeted investments in critical sectors, and the reconfiguration of global value chains. As a step in this direction, he mentioned the signing of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework Agreement (IPEF) among 12 like-minded countries, including Australia, Brunei, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, and the United States. However, he acknowledged that while the IPEF serves as a positive starting point, it lacks a concrete plan for implementation at present.

Mr. Chadha also emphasised the critical need to diversify the supply chain across vital economic sectors, including electronics, pharmaceuticals, solar power, machinery, and chemicals. He pointed to the success of Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes, particularly in the mobile phone sector, as a successful model that can be replicated in other industries. In this context, he underscored the importance of both short and long-term planning. Highlighting the competitive landscape, Mr. Chadha stressed the necessity for diplomatic initiatives to negotiate Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). He noted that, despite India's substantial market size, increased competition from countries like Vietnam, benefiting from both their sizeable market and FTA advantages, requires a nuanced and comprehensive strategy rather than a sudden disengagement from China.

Mr. Kantha directed a question to **Mr. Santosh Pai** regarding Chinese investments and India's role in a revamped supply chain. Mr. Pai delved into the efficacy of Press Note 3, released by

India for managing investments, citing a success rate of 15-20% concentrated in specific sectors. While supply chain connections and manufacturing projects have typically gained approvals, Mr. Pai highlighted the challenges faced by projects related to the digital economy and start-ups. He further elucidated that the impact of Press Note 3 extends beyond influencing fresh investment flows into China. Notably, companies that have received investments from China and Hong Kong now require Press Note 3 approval to secure additional capital, introducing an additional layer of scrutiny to funding processes.

Mr. Manoj Kewalramani provided insights into the intricate process of 'derisking,' recognizing the inherent contradictions involved in unravelling economic interdependence. He argued that, although security considerations are crucial, they should not be the sole foundation for assessing trade and investment relations with China. Mr. Kewalramani underscored the importance of domestic capacity-building, targeted industrial policies, and strategic investments in sectors such as semiconductors. Moreover, he advocated for identifying alternative partners, fostering supply chain cooperation at the Quad level, incentivizing businesses, and nurturing resilience as essential components of a forward-looking strategy. In doing so, he emphasised the need for a comprehensive approach that balances security concerns with pragmatic economic considerations.

Expressing reservations, Mr. Sanjay Chadha voiced concerns regarding the Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme, highlighting its initial conception for five years and suggesting that it might not have been thoroughly planned for all sectors. According to him, there are apprehensions about the success of the PLI across various fields, prompting the need for mid-course corrections. Additionally, he commented that, based on the lessons learned thus far, it is acknowledged that the PLI cannot function as a long-term industrial policy.

Mr. Santosh Pai offered insights into the status of Indian companies in China post-Press Note 3, the Galwan Valley clash, and the Covid-19 pandemic. He argued that the business climate for foreign companies in China has deteriorated due to Party policies and mandates, coupled with national security implications reflected in stringent legislation. This deterioration has resulted in many companies opting to leave China. Mr. Pai further asserted that Indian companies in China, especially in the IT sector, have not faced targeted scrutiny. However, their presence is limited and predominantly multinational rather than distinctly Indian. He pointed out that the pharmaceutical companies, linked to China's decreasing healthcare costs, have found protection for their operations. Nevertheless, a conspicuous absence of new Indian companies entering the

Chinese market signals a stagnant development. While existing Indian companies in China have not faced significant tangible risks thus far, the trend of Indian companies expanding into China has experienced a notable halt.

The final phase of the panel discussion commenced with Mr. Kantha summarising the discourse, followed by audience comments and questions. The ensuing conversation delved into multiple facets, such as bilateral trade, the imbalances in India-China trade dynamics, strategies for capacity building, and the crucial matter of reducing India's trade deficit with China. Highlighting the obstacles presented by China's expansive and complex market, marked by opacity and challenges in access, the unanimous viewpoint emphasised the need for careful navigation in engagements with China.

DAY 3: SATURDAY, 18 NOVEMBER 2023

Special Panel III

As the World Ages: Learnings from the East Asian Economies for Care of Older Persons

The Special Panel was chaired by **Dr. Madhurima Nundy**, Fellow, Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP), New Delhi; Honorary Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi. The panel featured three speakers. **Dr. Kavita Sivaramakrishnan**, Associate Professor, Sociomedical Sciences, Columbia University, presented on ***Ageing, Care and Cognition in South Asia and South-East Asia in times of Crisis: Networks of Coping and Resilience before and During Covid Crises***. **Dr. Alex Jingwei He**, Associate Professor, Division of Public Policy, Hong Kong Science and Technology University spoke on ***De-fragmentizing Elderly Care Services in East Asian Super-Ageing Societies: A Comparison of Hong Kong and Singapore***. The final speaker, **Prof. Rama V. Baru**, Professor, Centre of Social Medicine and Community Health, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; Honorary Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi, spoke on ***Public-Private Mix in Health Services for Older People in a Comparative Perspective***.

The chair, **Dr. Madhurima Nundy**, began the discussion by highlighting the importance of the economic ramifications of the demographic dividend, especially the decrease in the working population, while also emphasizing the lack of focus on care for the ageing population. She also

reflected on the fact that many countries in Asia now face a demographic transition while not being prosperous enough to support an ageing population. Informal and unpaid assistance that caregivers provide for family members with chronic diseases also calls for greater concern. Among elderly couples, chances of women outliving men are higher and as lone survivors, elderly women, often with chronic diseases, are particularly vulnerable. WHO has also declared loneliness as a public health concern. Fragmentation also occurs along the levels of care in the provision of services. She concluded by noting that the integration of preventive, promotive, and curative health services was also missing in the Asian context.

The first speaker for the session, **Dr. Kavita Sivaramakrishnan** attempted to conceptually trace the element of "crisis" in notions of social support, as well as how these crises can be resolved through her paper titled, ***Ageing, Care and Cognition in South Asia and South-East Asia in times of Crisis: Networks of Coping and Resilience before and During Covid Crises***. With COVID-19 as the backdrop, she mentioned how moments of crisis can highlight the kind of social and family support that elderly people have. Some aspects of the demography are considered to be in flux like household structure, while some continuities like ideas, ideology, customs, and structure are visibly demarcated. She argued that even these continuities, like the architecture of social support etc., are also changing. She also questioned the role of the state in the Asian context with regard to care because it tends to identify the family as the upholder of long-term care. The state assumes an assisting role, but the risk-taking is left to the family. Urbanization and migration have resulted in old and vulnerable being left behind in rural areas which has led to changes in the family structure. The second demographic dividend is criticized for its focus on the future of the working-age population and the way it prioritizes training young human capital while neglecting the needs of the ageing population.

Through this paper, Dr. Sivaramakrishnan cautioned against harmful narratives, like elder care 'taking away resources' from the young, that have gained currency in Western countries. She also argued for conceptualising a third demographic dividend focusing on health longevity and the creation of a geriatric-focused and integrated public health system. It conceptualizes an active ageing population with older people contributing to the social structure. It also recasts the labour of elderly people not as "productive" in the old sense but in terms of the emotional and social labour they put into the community. The strong sense of civic citizenship in elderly people is also emphasised. She also highlighted how family as the core institution of care is being challenged by women joining the labour force.

The second speaker, **Dr. Alex Jingwei** dealt with the ageing population of Hong Kong through the lens of policy design in his paper, ***De-fragmentizing Elderly Care Services in East Asian Super-Ageing Societies: A Comparison of Hong Kong and Singapore***. The paper undertook a study of public policy as a "science" with policy design at its forefront. Policy design is used both as a verb to refer to the policy formulation process, as well as a noun to denote the actual product that can be compared to others. Policy is evaluated through the criteria of coherence, consistency, as well as the capacity to deploy appropriate tools for policy goals. The paper examined Hong Kong's elderly care system concerning health services and social care systems suffering from high demand and long waiting times. Dr. Jingwei also highlighted key policy problems faced by small governments and fragmentation in the provision of care services. The key policy goals involve meeting the increasing needs of the elderly population by leveraging both public and private resources. One of the primary objectives also involves strengthening primary and preventive care in the medical sector as well as communicative care services in social care. He suggested integrating elderly care services to improve service efficiency and quality. The health policy design of a small governments includes a small toolkit with a consistent and coherent design. However, there is a heavy reliance on subvention, purchasing, and demand-side interventions underpinned by fiscal capacity. Positive outcomes also tend to be offset by faster ageing, rising multi-morbidities and brain drain. Dr. Jingwei also identified "stickiness" for the public healthcare system as a hurdle.

Prof. Rama V. Baru brought forth the scope of comparison between Indian and Chinese healthcare systems due to the size of their population as well as regional variations in care systems through her paper, ***Public-Private Mix in Health Services for Older People in a Comparative Perspective***. She argued that ageing should not be seen as a crisis and that such a narrative has been nurtured and propagated by academic and policy circles. She emphasised that care work done by old people needs to be studied while highlighting how family continues to be an important factor in providing care. State policies tend to dump care responsibilities onto the family. The paper flags the problem of fragmented healthcare as a result of targeted insurance policies. She referred to South Korea to illustrate how highly centralised systems de-emphasise developing local care institutions. Concerning China, Prof. Baru discussed the financial problems associated with universal healthcare. As people age with chronic diseases, hospitals become the sole source of care provisioning which is deemed to be economically unsustainable. Prof. Baru noted that course correction involves strengthening primary care as well as involving the community in developing sustainable care systems.

The paper also highlighted how several competing schemes lead to confusion. Emphasis was also laid on the need to readapt ideas to the Indian context with states which can afford to experiment and innovate. Large engagement of the private sector in health services was also flagged as a problem. The need for social protection leads many to pay out of pocket or not seek care at all which leads to prioritisation of care within the family. The paper also highlighted how caregiving has developed as an economy in itself. The upper middle class tends to "buy" care as they age. In the context of India, lack of development in human resources and skill-building curricula particularly aimed at elderly care are identified as shortcomings.

Answering a question about India's inability to devise economic innovations to rescue its failing healthcare systems, **Prof. Baru** highlighted the aggressive nature of the unregulated private sector, as well as the fact that public-private partnerships in other contexts are possible because of strong control exerted by the state on the private sector. Comments from the audience also pointed out the inability of the poorest of the poor to avail health services which was attributed to the highly restrictive nature of eligibility criteria for targeted programs.

Thematic Panel V

Party, State and Party Politics

The Thematic Panel was chaired by **Prof. Sreemati Chakrabarti**, Chairperson and Honorary Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi; Professor in China Studies (Retd.), Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi and former Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Delhi. The first speaker, **Dr. Ekta Singh**, Assistant Professor, Public Policy & Governance, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar University, Delhi, presented on ***Grid Management and the Chinese Surveillance State***. The second speaker, **Mr. Raj Gupta**, Doctoral Candidate, Centre for Chinese & Southeast Asian Studies, School of Language, Literature & Cultural Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, spoke on ***Historical Resolutions as an Institution in the CPC: Understanding the Third Historical Resolution***. The final speaker, **Mr. Shaan Kashyap**, Doctoral Candidate, Department of History, Ravenshaw University, Cuttack, presented on ***Mao's China and the First School Textbook Controversy in Contemporary India, circa 1949-1959***. The discussants included **Dr. Bhim Subba**, Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad, and **Dr. Anand Parappadi Krishnan**, Fellow, Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence, Delhi NCR, Visiting Associate Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi.

The first speaker, **Dr. Ekta Singh**, shed light on the intricate dynamics of China's response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the role of its grid management system within a single-party authoritarian structure through her paper, ***Grid Management, and the Chinese Surveillance State***. She emphasised the significance of regime type as a pivotal factor influencing state capacity, and the role of political leadership. The examination of China's handling of the pandemic served as a lens through which the interaction between state capacity and regime type was scrutinized. She contended that understanding this interplay is crucial for comprehending the nuanced strategies employed by the Chinese government. A focal point of Dr. Singh's discourse was China's grid management which was portrayed as a vital tool wielded by the Chinese Communist Party to erect a technologically sophisticated surveillance state. Moving beyond conventional methods, the grid management system encompassed information control, grid governance, and the utilization of digital infrastructure. She underscored that China's adeptness in navigating these dimensions was facilitated by its high state capacity operating seamlessly within a single-party authoritarian framework.

She delved into the multifaceted approach adopted by the Chinese government in combating the COVID-19 pandemic while highlighting the mobilization of state capacity in 'Mission' mode, encompassing measures such as information control, quantification, and propaganda. The integration of grid management with digital governance emerged as a distinctive feature in micromanaging the social life of the Chinese populace during the crisis. A noteworthy aspect of Dr. Singh's discussion was China's departure from the Weberian model in its adoption of a cadre-based bureaucracy within the grid management system. This departure reflected the adaptability of the Chinese government to tailor its administrative structures to suit the imperatives of its political system. Her analysis illuminated how this departure contributed to the effectiveness of China's response to the pandemic, providing insights into the dynamics of governance within the country.

The talk concluded with Dr. Singh addressing the principal-agent issue within China's party-state system in the context of grid management. Through her assessment, she underscored the ongoing challenges and threats faced by China in maintaining a cohesive and effective governance structure. The nuanced exploration of these challenges offered a comprehensive understanding of the complexities inherent in the Chinese political landscape.

During the session, the chair, **Prof. Sreemati Chakrabarti** offered a thoughtful comment regarding the presentation where she emphasised the need to further highlight the views of the

scholars. This suggestion aimed to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the scholarly discourse and the specific points of contention that emerged during the presentation. She acknowledged and agreed with the chair's comment, indicating a willingness to delve deeper into the contested perspectives.

The second speaker, Mr. Raj Gupta, provided a comprehensive exploration of the Communist Party of China's (CPC) historical resolutions through his paper**, *Historical Resolutions as an Institution in the CPC: Understanding the Third Historical Resolution*.** Since its inception in 1921, the CPC has undergone three Historical Resolutions, marking critical junctures in the party's history. Mr. Gupta emphasised the historical continuity and significance of these resolutions as a reflective institutional mechanism within the CPC. The first Historical Resolution closely followed the Yan ‘an Rectification, a pivotal event led by Mao Zedong. This resolution addressed "erroneous ideas," "left errors," and "right errors," across politics, military, organization, and ideology. The rectification process brought about a consistent understanding of fundamental issues within the party and contributed to the shaping of the Chinese revolution. The second Resolution focused on the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. It critically assessed the "grave blunder" of that period, distinguishing between erroneous "leftist" and "rightist" viewpoints. This resolution played a crucial role in navigating the ideological landscape of the party, providing clarity on the mistakes made during the Cultural Revolution.

The third Historical Resolution, situated at a historical moment of the CPC completing its first centennial goal, signifies a critical juncture in the party's trajectory. Mr. Gupta highlighted the achievements of the first centennial goal and the ongoing pursuit of the second centennial goal amidst a complex international environment. This resolution, unlike its predecessors, places a strong emphasis on acknowledging achievements and drawing lessons from historical experiences. He underscored the thematic core of the Third Historical Resolution as emphasizing the "New Era" which can be interpreted as China's response to external complexities, aligning the party with contemporary challenges. The resolution positions the party within the framework of the "New Era," reflecting an adaptive response to the evolving international landscape.

In his concluding remarks, Mr. Gupta highlighted the temporal and thematic nuances of the Third Historical Resolution. He emphasised the critical timing of the resolution, coinciding with the completion of the party's first centenary and the commencement of the pursuit of the second centennial goal. The discourse of the "New Era" emerged as a focal point, aiming to unite the

party amidst anticipated challenges, including a prolonged confrontation with the United States. His analysis suggested that the resolution strategically focused on unifying the party behind the ideology of the "New Era" to navigate challenges and contribute to China's development and national rejuvenation.

The third speaker, **Mr. Shaan Kashyap,** threw light on a unique historical episode on the intertwining narratives of Maoism, school textbooks, and political dynamics in post-independence India through his paper titled, ***Mao's China and the First School Textbook Controversy in Contemporary India, circa 1949-1959***. Mr. Kashyap highlighted a notable gap in textbook and curriculum Studies, emphasizing that, apart from a few instances like Timothy Cheek's work, there is a dearth of studies capturing and contextualizing Maoism within the framework of world history or political ideology in school textbooks. This observation underscores the novelty and significance of his research. He discussed the traditional focus on Mao Zedong's significant campaigns, such as the Anti-rightist campaign, The Great Leap Forward, and The Cultural Revolution. He emphasised that investigations into Mao Zedong and Maoism often overlook their role in shaping school textbooks, positioning the figure of Mao and diverse representations of Maoism at the heart of the first school textbook controversy in contemporary India. A critical insight provided by Mr. Kashyap was the historical neglect of this controversy within the larger political history of India. The dismissal of the Communist Party of India (CPI) government by the Government of India within a year of its election further contributed to the historical neglect of this significant event.

He employed the tools of Micro-history and delved into the rich archives of the Ministry of Education, CPI, and contemporary sources, including English and Malayalam newspapers which allowed him to investigate the nuanced trajectory of Maoism in school textbooks, unravelling the intricacies that led to the emergence and subsequent resolution of the first textbook controversy in post-independence India. Beyond the political sphere, Mr. Kashyap unveiled the broad societal interest in the controversy. Local Catholic Churches and various institutions in Kerala exhibited substantial interest, elevating the scale of the textbook controversy from a local to a national context.

An intriguing aspect of Mr. Kashyap's findings was the Chinese government's comfort with the textbook controversy in India. Additionally, the Chinese government expressed a positive stance on Jawaharlal Nehru's thinking regarding the Indian state, providing a nuanced perspective on diplomatic relations during that period. The presentation concluded with Mr. Kashyap asserting

that, during that time, the CPI government in Kerala incorporated anti-religious doctrines into school textbooks while simultaneously labelling other essential subjects as “unsuitable” contents. This juxtaposition highlighted the complex ideological landscape prevalent in the educational policies of the CPI-led government.

In the ensuing interactive session, a member of the audience posed a pertinent question to Dr. Singh, inquiring about the role of other autonomous organizations during the COVID-19 pandemic. In response, Ekta Singh affirmed that these organizations indeed played a crucial role in addressing the challenges posed by the pandemic. She specifically highlighted their contribution in terms of collaboration and co-production, elucidating that the grid managers demonstrated a strong commitment to stretching their capacity. **Dr. Bhim Subba** lauded the richness of the literature survey undertaken, acknowledging the depth of research evident in the presentation. He offered constructive suggestions, urging her to delve deeper into distinguishing the concepts of Party and State within the context of the discussed historical and political framework. Dr. Subba’s commendation for the extensive literature survey underscores the paper's foundation on a robust scholarly framework. However, Dr. Subba’s call for a more distinct elaboration on the concepts of Party and State reveals an opportunity for refinement.

A member of the audience offered a unique perspective on Historical Resolutions in China, suggesting that these resolutions should be viewed as symbols further consolidating the power of China's top leadership, given that they are already in power which was endorsed by Mr. Gupta. A pertinent question was raised regarding the absence of historical resolutions during the tenures of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Mr. Gupta responded by attributing the emergence of Historical Resolutions to historical changes. He posited that perhaps, during Jiang and Hu's leadership, there was no perceived need for such resolutions as no significant historical changes demanded them. Additionally, he highlighted that both Jiang and Hu, while in power, exhibited a comparatively lower level of ambition in comparison to their counterparts. Another insightful question sought to understand the primary contradictions between the first two Historical Resolutions and the third one. Mr. Gupta elucidated that the main contradictions lay in the uneven development of resources and the ever-growing materialistic needs of the Chinese people. This suggests a shift in focus from the earlier resolutions to address disparities in resource distribution to meeting the rising expectations of the populace for an improved materialistic life.

Dr. Anand P. Krishnan, in providing feedback on Mr. Kashyap's engaging paper, noted a relative scarcity of information regarding the broader context of China within the paper. While the paper adeptly explored the connections between Mao's China and the Indian textbook controversy, Krishnan suggested a more comprehensive exploration of the Chinese context. A deeper analysis of the political, social, and economic dynamics in Mao's China during the specified period could offer a more nuanced understanding of the forces influencing the development of Maoist ideologies and their subsequent impact on Indian school textbooks.

Another noteworthy observation made by Dr. Krishnan pertained to the scarcity of Malayalam resources in the paper. He highlighted the importance of diversifying sources, especially considering the localized nature of the controversy. Encouraging Mr. Kashyap to tap into a more extensive range of Malayalam resources could unveil additional perspectives and nuances that might be pivotal in comprehending the regional dynamics at play during the controversy. Krishnan also made a valuable addition to the research methodology by suggesting the incorporation of oral history. While the use of archival materials and written sources is foundational, oral history can provide a unique dimension by capturing lived experiences and personal narratives. The inclusion of interviews with individuals who experienced or witnessed the events surrounding the textbook controversy could offer a more humanistic and vivid portrayal of the socio-political landscape during that period.

Thematic Panel VI

China's Strategic Policy and Internal Discourse

The Thematic Panel was chaired by **Dr. S. Shaji**, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad. The panel included two speakers, **Ms. Aastha Binzani**, Doctoral Candidate, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, who presented on ***China's Approach to the Global Commons: A Critical Analysis of China's Outer Space Policy***, and **Mr. Akshat Mayne**, Doctoral Scholar, Japanese Studies, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, who spoke on ***A Resurgent Rising Sun? Japan in Chinese Socio-Political Discourse***. The discussants included **Dr. V. Anand**, Assistant Professor, Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE), and **Dr. Amrita Jash**, Assistant Professor, Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE).

The chair, **Dr. S. Shaji** began the session, by introducing the panel and providing a brief introduction and comment on the papers to be presented. He stated that both papers are important with respect to the international relations of China in contemporary times.

The first speaker, **Ms. Aastha Binzani** looked into the outer space policies of China, with regard to their approach to the Global Commons through her paper, ***China's Approach to the Global Commons: A Critical Analysis of China's Outer Space Policy***. She traced China's evolution in outer space through different periods. To begin with, she mentioned three requisites for China's outer space policy: political support, economic resources, and technical capacity. She began with Mao's period during the Cold War when China successfully launched its first satellite, Dong Fang Hong 1, and it became a bedrock in the establishment of China's space program. Second is the Dong era, where the Chinese outer space policy goes through a fundamental change, with more focus on economic development. The inspirations from the US Strategic Defense Initiative, and European Eureka, had led China to come up with the 863 Plan.

In the third era, under Jiang Zemin, the space policy undergoes an expansion. During this period, China initiated the Manned Space World Program in 1992, which is the Chinese human flight program. Later in the Hu Jintao period, which is the fourth period in the evolution, China's policy continued the pace of expansion. In 2007, China conducted its first A-SAT Test and later in 2010 and 2013 conducted missile tests. The final and fifth period in the evolution is the current Xi Jinping period, where she claimed that the space dream has become China's dream. 2016 Space White Paper can be seen as aiming at building China into a space power in the global arena. Innovation and independent capacity development are factors that are looked into specifically in this period. China's SSF of 2015 and their 14th Five Year Plans are good indications of the significant importance of space policies in China. The aspect of space also plays a major role in its foreign policy as well. She went on to discuss aspects such as the legitimacy of the Communist Party, global views on China's space policies and the contractions with the US. She also mentions China's Outer Space Treaty of 1983, the working paper with Russia in 2002 and the draft PPWT with Russia in 2008. Ms. Binzani further takes up the issue of space debris, and the ways China is addressing it, verbally, and in action. She concluded her presentation by remarking that the rise in China's outer space policy is a consolidation of the approach to rule-making in outer space, and China's space policy in general which ultimately aims to attain the great power status.

The second speaker, **Mr. Akshat Mayne** shed light upon another dimension of Sino-Japanese relations characterised by memory politics, in his paper titled, ***A Resurgent Rising Sun? Japan in Chinese Socio-Political Discourse***. He began by recounting the interconnected nature of history between the two countries and went on to explain the role played by memory in this relationship. The shared history of Japan and China was marked by cultural exchanges, disputes, and economic exchanges, among others. A major part of Mr. Mayne's presentation was based on the Chinese perspective, their response to Japanese revisionism, and their interpretation of the past. He claimed that Japan's role as an aggressor did not end in 1945 and employing Pierre Nora's framework of *lieux de memoire*, he noted how "sites of memory" can be identified in China. According to Nora, he explained, history and memory are intertwined and the framework of *lieux de memoire* allows for a comprehensive understanding of how historical memory comes into play, and how it has shaped this bilateral relationship. Japanese revisionism, for example, the revision of Japanese school textbooks, and the perception of perpetually trying to avoid accountability for their actions has negatively affected the bilateral relationship. Mr. Mayne further explains that this has emboldened China to aggressively reinforce its version of the historical relationship among the Chinese population. In China, state-sponsored efforts influence public memory at large, and various memorials and monuments have been utilised toward this end.

Dr. V. Anand, in his feedback, suggested three aspects to be considered in the paper. One, to mention the initial context of the Chinese understanding of Global Commons. He requested her to look into the Chinese perception and approach to each of the Global Commons, which will give an overall idea and thereby also help understand, specifically, how it is different with respect to outer space. Second, he asked her to explain more validly, the link between China's view of global Commons during various eras mentioned by her in the paper. Third, he noted the aspect of China's selfish motives, i.e. to explain how China deviates from how or what they speak about Global Commons.

Dr. Amrita Jash suggested having a look into Japanese state responses as well to get a more holistic idea of the topic. Questions came from the audience regarding memory studies, the reliability of memory, the presence of contesting memories, and hegemonic memories as well as marginalised memories.

Special Panel IV

State of China Studies in India: Scholarship on India-China Relations

The fourth Special Panel was chaired by **Dr. Rityusha Mani Tiwary**, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Shaheed Bhagat Singh College, University of Delhi; Honorary Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi. The panel included three speakers. The first speaker, **Dr. Rajiv Ranjan**, Assistant Professor, Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi; Adjunct Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi, presented on ***China, South Asia and Regional Dynamics***. The second speaker, **Dr. Prashant Singh**, Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar-Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, spoke on ***Chinese Foreign Policy and International Relations***. The final speaker, **Ms. Madhura Balasubramanium**, Doctoral Candidate, Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai, presented on ***Recent Writings on India-China Relations: Writings by Policy Practitioners***.

Dr. Rityusha Mani Tiwary, the chair of the panel, provided insight into the rationale behind the annual organization of this special panel by the AICCS. She emphasised that the purpose of the panel is to facilitate critical reflection among China scholars on their scholarly practices and to contextualise these practices about the perspectives of policy practitioners. Over 15 years, she noted, the AICCS has used this Special Panel as a platform to delve into the professionalization of China Studies. This exploration encompasses research methodologies, the institutionalization of research practices, and the interconnection of research with diverse fields such as policy-making that transcends disciplinary boundaries.

Dr. Tiwary then outlined the specific focus of this edition's panel, highlighting its purpose in exploring the emergence of various studies within the foreign policy practices arena concerning the bilateral relations between India and China. This thematic emphasis aims to shed light on the intricate dynamics at play in the realm of foreign policy studies. In conclusion, she introduced the panellists to the audience, setting the stage for a comprehensive discussion and critical examination of the diverse perspectives on India-China relations within the broader context of scholarly and policy-oriented practices.

Dr. Rajiv Ranjan, the first speaker, provided insights into nuanced perspectives within the existing literature, presenting his paper titled, ***China, South Asia and Regional Dynamics***. He discussed three key points in his presentation. Firstly, he examined the theoretical dimensions shaping the evolving scholarship on India-China bilateral relations. He emphasized the absence of a structured South Asia policy for China, noting that the foundations for "peripheral

diplomacy" were laid after Deng Xiaoping's visit to Japan in 1978. Dr. Ranjan underscored the theoretical perspectives of both Indian and Chinese scholars to illustrate his points.

In terms of Indian perspectives, Dr. Ranjan referenced scholars like Mohan Mallik, who view China's South Asia policy as an effort to prevent competition from India and diminish its power. On the contrary, he highlighted Chinese scholars' notion of "cooperating with small and fighting with big." Specifically, scholars like Pu Ling theorize China's South Asia policy as characterized by "informal multilateralism," wherein China cooperates and shares knowledge with other states, sidelining India in the process. This framework suggests that China engages in strategic partnerships with smaller South Asian nations while maintaining a confrontational stance with India, aligning with the "cooperation with small and fighting with big" concept.

In the second part of his presentation, Dr. Rajiv Ranjan focused on the perspectives of Chinese, Indian, and international scholars regarding the responses of South Asian states to China's South Asia policy. He outlined Chinese scholar Liang Changhui's categorization of these responses into four types: two-way cooperation, two-way checks and balances, biased cooperation, and biased checks and balances. Dr. Ranjan then delved into the viewpoints of Indian scholars, citing T.V. Paul, who highlighted the power asymmetries between India and China leading to economic interdependence. Paul termed this phenomenon as "soft balancing", while Chinese scholars referred to it as "dynamic balancing." Another perspective, presented by scholars Darren J. Lim and Rohan Mukherjee through a case study on Maldives and Sri Lanka, introduced the concept of "hedging." They argued that while smaller countries seek benefits from both major powers, they risk losing autonomy in the process.

Dr. Ranjan also discussed the viewpoint of scholars from smaller countries, emphasizing how they perceive the relationship in terms of autonomy and identity. For instance, Lailufur Yasmin from Bangladesh, taking a constructivist lens, advocated for an independent foreign policy rather than aligning with either power. Other scholars from smaller states adopted a "structural realist" perspective, wherein their interactions with India and China were seen as guided by power asymmetries and power politics between the two giants. However, Dr. Ranjan offered a nuanced perspective, introducing the concept of "The Multiplex System of Interdependence" proposed by Amitav Acharya and Francis Fukuyama. He argued that the interactions of smaller states with China and India are shaped not only by economic and security considerations but also by their assertion of identity and autonomy. This multiplex system adds complexity to the dynamics, acknowledging the multifaceted nature of the relationships among these nations.

In the third part of his presentation, Dr. Rajiv Ranjan turned his attention to perspectives presented in policy papers. He highlighted one by Dr. Jabin Jacob, published by the Centre for Social and Economic Policy, and another guest-edited by G.V.C. Naidu and Mumin Chen, published by Issues and Studies, Taiwan. Dr. Ranjan noted that Dr. Jacob's paper focused on China's impact in South Asia, emphasising evidence to support its arguments. In contrast, Naidu and Chen explored the responses of South Asian countries to China's influence.

Dr. Ranjan concluded by emphasising that scholars across China, India, and South Asian countries hold different perspectives on India-China bilateral relations and highlighting the responses of smaller South Asian countries to these dynamics. The varied viewpoints presented in these policy papers contribute to a nuanced understanding of the complex dynamics in the region.

Dr. Prashant Singh, the second speaker, conducted a thorough assessment of recent writings on China's foreign policy, in his paper titled, ***China's Foreign Policy and International Relations***, drawing on various books to highlight key debates within this field. He began by addressing the longstanding debate about China's grand strategy to displace the US, examining books such as *The Hundred-Year Marathon* by Michael Pillsbury and *The Long Game* by Rush Doshi. While Pillsbury's work sparked debate on whether China has a conscious strategic foreign policy or merely a motivational slogan, Doshi argued that China does possess a comprehensive strategy to replace the U.S., delineating three phases from 1989 to the present.

Dr. Singh then delved into the discussion on the potential dangers of a catastrophic war between the U.S. and China, analysing Kevin Rudd's book *The Avoidable War*. He asserted that the view of war inevitability is irresponsible, emphasizing the importance of economic interdependence between the two countries to prevent such a conflict. Regarding the completion of China's "long march," Dr. Singh examined Kishore Mahbubani's perspective, which acknowledges China's successful ascent due to a meritocratic government and hard work, with the U.S. failing to accommodate China's rise. Additional works by Vijay Gokhale were also considered, with Dr. Singh noting the rational foreign policy pursued by Hu Jintao and the centrality of policy flexibility in China's formulations.

The evaluation extended to literature on China's bilateral relations with select countries, including insights from the book *The New Cold War: Henry Kissinger and The Rise of China*.

Dr. Singh emphasised the abandonment of Kissinger's realistic pragmatism, challenges to India's unipolar world notion, and Mao's focus on China's wealth and power rather than democracy.

Assessing literature on Chinese perspectives on India through Shyam Saran's *How China Sees India and the World*, Dr. Singh highlighted China's growing acknowledgement of India as a significant player. In conclusion, Dr. Singh drew two overarching conclusions. Firstly, he emphasised China as a pivotal role in global discussions on international relations, advocating for the push towards multi-polarity by middle powers like India. Secondly, he underscored the ongoing debates and uncertainties surrounding China's policies, creating ripples in academic circles and beyond.

The third speaker, **Ms. Madhura Balasubramanium**, provided a policy practitioner's perspective on recent writings concerning India-China relations in her paper titled, ***Recent Writings on India-China Relations: Writings by Policy Practitioners***. Her primary inquiries delved into understanding how members of the Indian state, particularly those in the armed forces and foreign services, comprehend bilateral relations. She sought to unravel the driving forces behind their analytical writings, critically appraising the institutions they operate within, and emphasized the importance of academics taking these perspectives into account.

Ms. Balasubramanium contextualised this practitioner’s perspective within the broader framework of international relations, highlighting the understudied concept of diplomacy as a necessary tool to comprehend foreign policy. Drawing on the writings of diplomats, former ambassadors to China, members of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and the armed forces, she explored the insights gained from their engagement with policy practices. The central theme in these writings was the impact of diplomatic self-understanding on a state's knowledge and foreign policy.

Analysing these writings within colonial and post-colonial categories, Ms. Balasubramanium illuminated colonial practices that justified British interventions in border issues, such as Tibet. She identified post-colonial writings as responses to "cartographic anxiety," particularly regarding the events of 1962. Categorizing post-colonial practitioner perspectives into three groups, she highlighted efforts to transform fuzzy frontiers into concrete territorial borders, struggles to break away from colonial continuities, and critiques of the Prime Minister's alleged lack of informed decision-making.

Ms. Balasubramanium emphasised that domestic context informs foreign policy, influencing strategic manoeuvres and public opinion. She identified two forms of practitioner perspectives: granular, which focuses on missed negotiation opportunities and operational limitations leading to the 1962 events, and contextual, which considers bilateral, domestic, and international contexts in foreign policy decisions.

The overarching goal of these writings, according to Ms. Balasubramanium, is to prevent another border conflagration and shape public opinion through open understanding, dispelling stereotypes and preventing ill-informed judgments. She concluded by highlighting the evolution of practitioner perspectives with changing bilateral ties between India and China, citing the work of Gautam Bambawale, former ambassador of India to the People's Republic of China, in "The China Challenge."

Ms. Balasubramanium highlighted several advantages for academia when engaging with practitioners' writings. Firstly, it centres the complexity of foreign policy by delving into the various contexts within which it is framed. This nuanced approach goes beyond simplistic analyses and provides a more comprehensive understanding of the intricacies involved. Secondly, the engagement with practitioner perspectives aids in achieving a more profound comprehension of foreign policy within its proper context. By doing so, it moves beyond the binary assessments of successes and failures, offering a more nuanced and realistic perspective on the challenges and achievements within the realm of international relations. Finally, Ms. Balasubramanium argued that an informed understanding of foreign policy, enriched by both theoretical and practical insights from practitioners, equips academia to make informed policy decisions. This, in turn, has the potential to contribute to the resolution of conflicts in the future. By bridging the gap between theory and practice, academia can play a crucial role in shaping effective and informed policies that address the complexities of international relations and contribute to conflict resolution.

In her closing remarks, Dr. Tiwary emphasised that the discussion had been fruitful within the context of bilateral and regional analyses. She underscored the significance of understanding China, posing questions regarding the necessity and underlying motivations for such an endeavour. Dr. Tiwary asserted that the need to read China goes beyond mere temporal events; rather, it delves into the deeper pursuit of unravelling the truth. She elaborated on the various dimensions through which this truth can be deciphered—historical, political, or event-based. However, she acknowledged the challenge of comprehensively grasping the truth, as both

philosophy and social sciences assert their elusive nature. Dr. Tiwary attributed this difficulty to a lack of resources. Addressing this obstacle, she informed the audience that the AICCS is actively working toward overcoming it. She highlighted the organization's commitment to expanding both the scope and tools available to capture the multifaceted truth. Concluding her remarks, Dr. Tiwary expressed gratitude to the panellists and the audience for their participation in the session.

Valedictory Session

The Valedictory Session was chaired by **Amb. Syed Akbaruddin**, former Permanent Representative of India to UN; Dean, Kautilya School of Public Policy, Hyderabad. The **Valedictory Address** titled, ***Rising to the China Challenge***, was delivered by **Amb. Gautam Bambawale**, former Ambassador of India to China, Pakistan and Bhutan; Adjunct Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi & Distinguished Professor, Symbiosis International University, Pune. **Prof. Sabaree Mitra**, Convener, 16th AICCS; Professor, Centre for Chinese and South East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; Honorary Fellow, Institute of China Studies, New Delhi, presented the **Conference Report**. The **Vote of Thanks** was delivered by **Mr. Anudeep Gujjeti**, Research Associate, Council for Social Development-Hyderabad; Doctoral Candidate, Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad; Young Leader, Pacific Forum, Honolulu. **Dr. Amrita Jash**, Assistant Professor, Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE), formally invited all delegates to the 17th AICCS, to be held at MAHE, Karnataka, in 2024.

The chair, **Amb. Syed Akbaruddin** addressed the panel and audience with poise and candidness. He thanked the organisers and the Convenor, **Prof. Sabaree Mitra**, for inviting him back to his alma mater. Echoing Winston Churchill’s remarks on Russia, the former Permanent Representative to the UN noted that, for the average Indian, China was “a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma". The speaker expressed his concern over the way Indian media reports on China, noting the conflicting narratives that contribute to confusion among the public. Various perspectives within the media argue about China's societal and economic future, ranging from predictions of an ageing society before prosperity to a continuation of its economic rise. The media also presents contradictory views on China's political system, portraying it as meritocratic while reporting on Xi Jinping's extended rule. This cacophony, he lamented, leaves ordinary Indians in a state of perplexity, as the media struggles to provide clarity on China.

Despite the challenging nature of India's recent relations with China, the speaker emphasized that understanding China is crucial, considering it an unavoidable 'significant other' for India. He argued that China scholars play a vital role in providing clarity by unravelling the complexities of China's societal, economic, and political landscape. Highlighting China's increasing global influence, he pointed out its significant rise in contributions to the UN General Budget, underscoring the need for India to comprehend China's worldview and its implications.

Turning to the technological realm, the speaker referenced Mustafa Suleyman's book, "The Coming Wave," which contends that China's technology sector is evolving beyond imitation and becoming a modern-day Leviathan. China leads in numerous cutting-edge technologies globally, using both fair and unfair means. The speaker warned that Chinese technology is poised to be a flagbearer in the new era, competing with high-income countries. He urged China scholars to undertake multidisciplinary research to grasp the technological aspect of the Chinese challenge, emphasising the importance of understanding China's evolving role in the global technological landscape.

Amb. Gautam Bambawale delivered the **Valedictory Address** titled, ***Rising to the China Challenge***, based on a book he had co-authored with several other scholars. He emphasised that the book was a set of policy prescriptions for the Indian Government on checkmating China's strategies against India. Mr. Bambawale walked the audience through the process of writing the book. The idea for the book was developed in March 2020, when India was under a hard Covid-19 lockdown. News began to trickle that China had moved large numbers of troops, roughly two divisions, which amounts to roughly 50,000-60,000 soldiers, into Eastern Ladakh. In doing so, China violated several border agreements signed with India on maintaining border tranquillity. He emphasised that **Amb. Akbaruddin** and himself had been members of high-level delegations that signed some of these agreements. The introductory paragraphs of most of these agreements stated explicitly that neither country would move large troops into each other's border areas. India reacted to China's build-up by doing a counter-build-up of over two divisions. Matters escalated to a fever pitch on the night of the 15th and 16th of June, 2020. Indian and Chinese troops engaged in aggressive melee scuffles at Galwan. The moonlight clash in Galwan produced the first Indian casualties from China in 25 years.

The speaker discussed the estimates of Chinese casualties in the Galwan clash, suggesting that approximately 40-50 Chinese soldiers lost their lives, a figure supported by Indian combatants, independent researchers, Australian sources, and U.S. intelligence. The speaker then addressed

the question of why China would violate past agreements with India. He dismissed explanations related to India's proximity to the U.S., actions around Article 370, or road construction near the Karakoram Pass as inadequate and inaccurate.

Amb. Bambawale proposed two main reasons for China's actions: tactical and strategic. Tactically, China sought to align territories it claimed along the Indian border with those it controlled. Strategically, the speaker argued that China aimed to establish hegemony in its backyard to effectively compete with the U.S., signalling to India that it should accept Chinese dominance. However, India resisted both militarily and economically, imposing restrictions on Chinese investments, blocking companies like Huawei, and banning various Chinese applications. Amb. Bambawale highlighted China's economic asymmetry with India as a key factor that emboldened its military actions. He stressed that India's long-term response to the China challenge should focus on improving its economy, advocating for strategic patience in the short term and sustained economic growth of 8-9% per annum in the long term. To counter Chinese pressure, India should deepen cooperation with balancing coalitions worldwide, including major democracies, neighbouring states, and regional partners like QUAD.

Concluding his address, Ambassador Bambawale outlined key steps for India to meet the long-term economic challenge posed by China. These included reducing government micromanagement, cutting down the expanding administrative state, ensuring the rule of law and equality for companies, and emphasizing that the China challenge extends beyond the military domain, requiring concerted efforts across various sectors.

Amb. Bambawale addressed questions about India aligning US-led efforts against China, emphasising that such action was unnecessary. He expressed confidence in India's military capabilities, stating that the country is more than capable of defending itself at the border. Regarding approaches to studying China and discerning truths from Communist Party of China (CPC) propaganda, Amb. Bambawale suggested that the most effective way forward was to learn the Chinese language. This approach would provide a direct understanding of Chinese perspectives and aid in distinguishing between factual information and propaganda disseminated by the CPC.

Prof. Sabaree Mitra, as the Convener of the 16th AICCS, delivered an insightful presentation on the **Conference Report**. In recognising the success of the event, she expressed her gratitude for the tireless efforts put forth by all the organisers. Prof. Mitra also extended appreciation for the collaborative support received from the various members of the organising team, whose

dedication contributed significantly to the smooth execution of the conference. With enthusiasm, she highlighted the overwhelming response to the call for paper presentations, indicating the robust growth of China studies in India. Prof. Mitra shared valuable reflections on how the 16th AICCS has become an integral part of fostering a rich pool of knowledge on China within the Indian academic landscape. She emphasised the need for sustained efforts and continued initiatives to propel the field of China studies forward.

Mr. Anudeep Gujjeti expressed sincere thanks during the **Vote of Thanks**, acknowledging the collective contributions that made the 16th AICCS a tremendous success. Grateful for the active participation of organizers and attendees alike, he underscored the collaborative spirit that defined the conference. Mr. Gujjeti recognised the diversity of perspectives shared and the insightful discussions that unfolded, creating a vibrant intellectual atmosphere. **Dr. Amrita Jash**, in an important announcement, revealed the venue for the 17th All India Conference of China Studies. Scheduled to take place at the Manipal Academy of Higher Education in Karnataka in 2024, this announcement symbolized a forward-looking commitment to the continued exploration and scholarly engagement with the multifaceted dynamics of China. The upcoming conference at Manipal Academy of Higher Education is poised to be another significant milestone in advancing China studies in India.

NOTE

Contribution of the Seminar to the Existing Body of Research.

The All India Conference of China Studies (AICCS) dwells on understanding. China from a nuanced perspective in the present and historical context. Given the context of contemporary times, China has become a new global actor vis-.-vis other existing ones-including India. So how these achievements shaped China's growth today has many dimensions. From a range of vantage points, the conference attempted to show various facets of China's transformation. Spread into three days, the conference witnessed participation from 28 institutions both within India and abroad representing different organisations, and research institutes, even government institutions in various capacities. In fact, one of the first events to have so many participants studying China.

Although the special theme was ***Social Dynamics and Political Responses in China***, the seminar participants, however also deliberated and discussed on the state of China studies in India, its divergences and convergences. Given the diverse set of presentations and deliberations, the conference's primary contribution to research on the following thematic areas:

1. *Chinese Party State's Political Responses to Social Issues in Tibet and Xinjiang*
2. *Comparative Studies on Public Health Systems in India and China*
3. *Comparative Rural-Urban Issues in India and China*
4. *Future of India-China Economic Engagement*
5. *Studies on India-China Relations*
6. *State-Society Relations in Comparative Perspectives*
7. *Language and Culture*
8. *Politics of Governance in China*

In addition to the above, the event showcased the interaction between different generations of scholars—a grooming and training session for young scholars and audiences who active members of society. At the same time, it also familiarized non-China watchers with the current developments inside China beyond Western influences to have an independent Indian perspective. Besides, as a part of outreach activities, the conference was a step towards capacity building and honing research skills on China studies in India. The event was graced by international scholars and India's top diplomats as keynote speakers, through special lectures and valedictorians.

The organisers, are looking forward to publish the proceedings of the conference with international publisher or national publisher of repute. This edited publication will be an essential contribution to knowledge and intellectual discussion and debates on China studies by Indian scholars. It will be indispensable for students, policy-makers and academics of political science, sociology, economics, history, cultural studies, environment, health issues and international affairs.

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IMAGE GALLERY














16th AICCS
ALL INDIA CONFERENCE OF CHINA STUDIES
SOCIAL DYNAMICS & POLITICAL RESPONSES IN CHINA
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ORGANISERS & FUNDING PARTNERS

The **University of Hyderabad (UoH)**, a premier institution of postgraduate teaching and research in the country, was established by an Act of Parliament (Act No. 39 of 1974) on 2nd October 1974 as a Central University, wholly funded by the University Grants Commission, is a Unitary University situated at Gachibowli, Hyderabad. The "objects of the University" as envisaged in the Act are: "to disseminate and advance knowledge by providing instructional and research facilities in such branches of learning as it may deem fit and by the example of its corporate life, and, in particular, to make special provisions for integrated courses in humanities and science in the educational programs of the University and to take appropriate measures for promoting interdisciplinary studies and research in the University." Established in 1979, the Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, is one of the leading departments in the country with its distinguished faculty and contribution to academic research, and social and public policy in India and abroad**.**

The **Institution of Eminence (IoE)** status, accorded to the University of Hyderabad (UoH) in September 2019, is a recognition of UoH's standing, ability and potential to move into the league of the world's best institutions. The university views IoE as a good opportunity in its history to leverage its existing reputation, practices and services to catapult itself into the best and highest leagues globally. The IoE tagline 'national needs, global standards' is to be geared towards academic, financial and administrative support for all its stakeholders, faculty, students and non-teaching staff. The University, through IoE, seeks to enable and facilitate improved services, facilities, quality of research opportunities, visibility, collaborations, innovative programmes and courses, nationally and internationally. It's mission is to enable capacity-building in the marginalised sections of the society by offering skill development, academic and research programmes aimed at social equity and justice; to use the IoE status as a vehicle to enhance international visibility by offering opportunities to students, academics and researchers across the globe to become a part of the University fraternity and

encourage collaborative participation in the academic and research activities of the University; create an ecosystem of innovation, entrepreneurship and translational research among the students and faculty members through start-ups and public-private partnerships; to fund research projects, outreach activities, capacity-building measures in order to emerge as a truly world-class multi-disciplinary University that figures in the World's 500 Best Universities in the next few years.

The **Institute of China studies (ICS)**, New Delhi is an institution engaged in and committed to interdisciplinary research on China. Apart from the annual All India Conference of China Studies (AICCS), the Institute undertakes various collaborative research programs and multilateral initiatives with prominent institutions in India and abroad, and brings together leading and upcoming scholars through multiple fora. Among its many legacies, it has been conducting the iconic Wednesday Seminar for over 50 years and publishes the *China Report*, a peer-reviewed quarterly journal on China and East Asia, currently in its 59th year of publication.

The **Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR)** was established in 1969 by the Government of India with the primary objective of fostering research in the field of social sciences within the country. It actively sponsors research programmes and projects, administering grants to institutions and individuals engaged in social science research. Additionally, the ICSSR institutes and administers scholarships and fellowships to support research in the realm of the social sciences. The Council identifies areas that require promotion of social science research and implements special measures for the development of research in neglected or emerging areas. Financial support is extended to institutions, associations, and journals involved in social science research. The ICSSR plays a pivotal role in organising seminars, workshops, and study groups, as well as co-coordinating research activities to encourage interdisciplinary collaboration. The Council also undertakes the publication and assistance of journals and books in social sciences. As an advisory body, the ICSSR offers guidance to the Government of India on matters related to social science research and takes necessary measures to promote research and its utilisation.

The **Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies (CHS)** under the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence (SNIoE) is a research centre focussed on the economy, borders and identities, the environment and regional geopolitics of the wider Himalayan region including the Hindu Kush and the Karakoram. While there are scholars of the Himalayas and small centres and research groups focused on the region, there is a need for institutionalised efforts at the national level that brings together a wide variety of disciplinary and sectoral approaches to the study of what is one of the world's most environmentally sensitive and politically fraught regions and one that simultaneously has a significant influence on the economic livelihoods of hundreds of millions of people. At the same time, it is difficult to ignore the role of geopolitics in this region.

Therefore, even as the Centre pushes for an approach to studying the Himalayas that crosses both national and disciplinary boundaries as well as engenders a three-way conversation betweencentral and local governments, academia and the people who live in the region, it also remains sharply aware of and is attuned to geopolitics and the policy imperatives that surround it.

The Centre reflects SNIoE's global outlook and ambitions, focusing on engaging researchers with niche or specialised interest in the wider Himalayas, and identifying and creating a network of scholars in the field, both in India and externally, to support its work. This critical mass of scholars of and from the region will redress the longstanding neglect or asymmetrical representation of the Himalayas and beyond, in knowledge, discourse and policy interventions. It also aims to develop and utilise strong links with the policy community and government agencies in a mutually supportive exercise.

The Centre also signifies a leadership role for the SNIoE, as it attempts to fill gaps in both academic and policy spaces. This leadership role is in keeping with the University's identity and goals of promoting innovation, creativity and interdisciplinary engagement in the field of Indian education. The Centre also offers the SNIoE's own faculty and students opportunities to collaborate with counterparts from across the wider Himalayan region as well as those working on the region from elsewhere in the world.

Council for Social Development (CSD) was founded by Dr. Durgabai Deshmukh in Delhi in 1962. She was a well-known social worker with strong acumen for institution building. CSD was setup as a think tank to keep a focus on the social aspects of development planning and to initiate policy-oriented research during the early years of Independence. The Southern Regional Centre in Hyderabad was established in 1967. CSD engages in policy-oriented research with special focus on social aspects of development planning and concern for social justice and equity that continues to guide the work of CSD Hyderabad. The current President of CSD is the distinguished former diplomat Prof. Muchkund Dubey. Prof. Shanta Sinha is the Chairperson of the Managing Committee, a Retired Professor of Political Science, University of Hyderabad and Raman Magsaysay Awardee for her distinguished work on elimination of Child Labour. The other members of the Committee include eminentacademicians and social scientists and representatives of our main sponsors ICSSR and Government of Telangana. Prof. Sujit Kumar Mishra is currently the head of the institute as Regional Director (In-charge). The major thrust of research at CSD is to encourage comparative studies of different cultures, examination of diverse impacts of policy, and appreciation of diversityin understanding the relationship between the state and people.

ABSTRACTS AND PAPERS

Examining the Political Economy of China's Private Sector Development duringthe Xi Jinping Era: Theoretical Discourse and Challenges

Megha Shrivastava

Abstract

Since the implementation of the "Reform and Opening-up" policy in the late 1970s, China has developed its private sector through theoretical and practice-based innovations. In Chinese understanding, the developmental process of the private sector is essentially a response to the requirement of the path towards socialism. And thus, the theories of private sector development have been created in response to the inherent requirements of the initial stage of socialism. However, the trajectory of privatization also depends on changes in political and ideological developments. Various studies focusing on China's private sector provide evidence that the government of China is rethinking its policies toward the private sector. Xi Jinping's leadership has brought nuanced approaches to shift the forward trajectory of growth of China's private sector development. This opens the opportunity to review the development of China's private sector within the realm of Marxist political economy. This paper attempts to locate the recent developments in China's private sector within the theoretical application of Marxism in the Chinese context. It attempts to do so by interrogating the stance of the party-state on the development of the private sector during the Xi Jinping era. The paper analyses the theory of private sector development in China. It outlines the Chinese understanding of the evolution of China's private sector during previous leaderships as a successful application of Marxism in the Chinese context. It also understands how ideological and political changes during Xi's leadership made a characteristic shift in the relations between the state and private sector in China. The paper contributes to understanding the Chinese discourse on political economy and the innovative development of private sector theory.

Keywords: *Private sector, Xi Jinping, technology enterprises, Marxism, Socialism, Common Prosperity.*

Introduction

China announced the "Reform and Opening-up" policies in 1978. In the following years, the reintroduction of the private sector and the embrace of foreign enterprises made the political-economic model look like several democratic countries. The advocates of modernization theories started anticipating how China's changing landscape which is getting closer to 'Capitalism' would run into regime change and eventually turn into a democratic polity.[1] Henry Rowen, a Harvard economist, in1996, predicted that if China maintains a GDP growth of five per cent per year, by 2015 it will turn into a democracy (Rowen, 1996). Another theorist, Arthur Waldron in 1998, proclaimed that in another 10 years, there will be no 'People's Republic of China' (Waldron, 1998). Much later in 2004, Bruce Gilley, in his book China's Democratic Future, in anticipation writes that "The laws of social science grind away in China as elsewhere, whether we like it or not" (Gilley, 2004). He (2004) further states he would be surprised if the process of democratization is delayed beyond the year 2020. Today the private sector of China

[1] Several other myths and predictions on China's democratization can be found in Chapter 1 of Tsai, Kelle S. (2007). *Capitalism without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China*. London: Cornell University Press.

accounts for approximately 60 per cent of China's GDP, 70 per cent of its innovative capacity, 80 per cent of urban employment, and 90 per cent of new jobs (Cunningham, 2022). Yet, the Communist Party of China (CPC) consolidates and monopolises power as it is. That means the market has sustained its existence without calling the socialist system into question. What could explain Chinese exceptionalism? Several scholars (Tsai 2006, 2007) have discussed varied nuances on the legitimisation of power, as well as the complicated development of the private sector. This paper proposes that the theoretical and practical achievements of the CPC's creative adaptation of Marxism in the Chinese context can be attributed to the innovative journey of China's private sector without falling into the prophecies of modernization theorists.

Ideology in China is the driving force behind the existence of the CPC that enables the party-state to legitimize and operationalize various practices, institutions, and organizations. Ideology is a set of assertions that reflects the reality of the world from China's view and helps the party to find solutions to hard questions, build a master narrative and deliver consensus (Wu, 2015). The class struggle was the dominant ideological influence during the Mao era. In the post-Mao era, the permissible traction given to the non-private sector, foreign capital, foreign markets, etc. changed the direction of the core ideology of Marxism-Leninism. While the top leaders in the Post-Deng era, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao focused on extending and reverberating Deng Xiaoping Thought, Xi Jinping with his expression "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in a New Era" has sought to stimulate new debates regarding the innovation in the theoretical evolution of the Marxist political economy. This paper seeks to review the evolution and current state of China's private sector in the light of evolving theoretical dimensions of Marxist Political economy.

Literature Review, Research Gap and Methodology

Literature on the evolution of party ideology reveals different functions of the ideology. According to Zeng Jinghan, the main purpose behind propagating party ideology is to profess a community belief system and convince people to accept the system (Zeng, 2016). He (2016) further asserts that ideology is a tool to assert the power of political elites and enforce a leader's authority over people. According to Holbig, the ideology of the party is channelised to set the rules of the language game (Holbig, 2013). Some scholars believe that ideology is aimed at entrenching an impact on people's daily life and way of thinking (Schull, 1992; Huang, 2015). Huang (2015) also believes that ideology instead of altering people's thoughts ends up empowering the party to assert social control. Shan, Gu, and Chen (2023) while studying the evolution of China's ideological system proposes an "ideological layering approach". They advocate that successive ideologies in China are framed in a "gradual, piecemeal, and accumulative manner" (2023, p.30). He defines layering as a method that adds newer elements to the next ideology without shedding the entire belief system of the previous ideology. Layering. thus, acts as a method to maintain continuity while adapting to the changing requirements of the time. Due to the change in leadership, there are two key changes that occur in the ideological beliefs. One, an adaptation of the previous ideology to suit the changing policy lines; and two, imposition of a personal ideological contribution that indicates the consolidation of power by the new leader. Also, there are two components principally shaping the change in an ideology, a core ideology (Communism-Marxism), and the practical application of the core ideology (Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in a new era). According to Schurmann, without reflecting the core ideology as a foundation, the subsequent ideology loses its legitimation (Schurmann, 1966, p.23). Successive leaders tend to modify some part of the core ideology to reflect personality discourses on top of the ideology of their predecessors rather than changing the ideological foundation. This further affirms the view of Shan, Gu, and Chen (2023), that the core ideological foundation in China is Marxism-Lenninism, and the theoretical

developments (Maoism, Dengism, etc.) by subsequent leaders are layers added to project the changing realities and changing ideological discourses.

The private sector, in China, exists as a result of the continuous deepening of reforms aided by the theoretical development of the Marxist political economy. According to Zhang and Liu (2022), "Every major private sector development is inseparable from innovative private sector theories and the policies to which they gave rise". While understanding the dilemmas of private businesses and their vulnerabilities to political change, McNally and Wring (2010), said that private entrepreneurs in China are thickly embedded in the state party that produced the feeling of a "we-group". According to Kelle Tsai (2007), Chinese entrepreneurs lack "class consciousness". Tsai (2007) referred to them as "Capitalists without a class" as a high level of diversity among the private players hinders the formation of class consciousness thus lowering the chances of them contesting against the party's ever-growing political power.

In recent years, the scholarship on Contemporary Chinese studies has focused increasingly on strengthening the ideological legitimacy of the CPC, having Xi Jinping at the centre of ideological re-orientation. One commonly discussed belief is that Marxism-Leninism is gaining importance and credibility in recent years. Scholars (Livingston, 2020; Leutert, 2018) also believe that the private sector is losing its traction with China's economic landscape, and the resurrection of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) is attributed to the growing influence of Xi Jinping Thought. Among the existing studies, most of the pressing enquires tend to find solutions on the 'how' part of the evolution. This article contributes to the literature by understanding the evolution of the private in response to China's ideological evolution, and leadership discourses. Xi Jinping is increasingly perceived as a game changer for China's private sector development. This paper concerns itself with the aspect that whether the perceptions are valid through a cautious reading of ideological changes vis-à-vis their impact on the private sector. This paper enquires how the interactive links between the state and the private sector have been reshaping in both theoretical and practical contexts.

The paper proceeds as follows. The first section reviews the innovative theoretical development in the theory of private sector development. The second section understands the influences of the new leadership of President Xi Jinping, and how that affects the theoretical development in the application of Marxism in the Chinese context. It understands the challenges undergone and the changing features of state-business relations in China during the Xi Jinping leadership. The paper concludes by throwing light on the scope of expanding the realms of Marxist political economy. The paper adopts an evolutionary and descriptive-analytical approach to understand the 'theory and practice' in China's private sector development and uses ideological discourses, contexts, and institutional policies employed by the government.

The Innovative Development of Private Sector Theories in China

The development and trajectory of the private sector are a direct outcome of the CPC's ideological shifts since 1949. China decided to follow the path of Marxism-Leninism toward achieving the goals of socialism. It is first important to interpret how Marx explained the path of achieving socialism. In his "The Reply to Vera Zasulich" Marx clearly states that his analysis of the transformation of capitalists out of the feudal class, as explained in the chapter on "primitive accumulation" is specific to European society. One can gain insight from his replies that the theory of historical materialism cannot be understood as a principal and a general theory or a destined path to achieve socialism. In short, before reaching the highest stage of communism, there are no theoretical or practical precedents set for the transitional stage on the subject of the allocation of resources. Thus, Marxism was supposed to be applied according to the specific histories, circumstances, and requirements of the time. In China, the prevailing

circumstances, Chinese conditions, and ongoing waves of economic globalisation became the driving forces of theoretical innovation to achieve a socialist society. Based on the teachings of Marx, historical development can be defined as some stages of development that lead it to the final form, i.e., communism.

Mao's ideology and policies set the foundations of China's core ideology i.e., Marxism in the Chinese context. Mao Zedong (1949-1976) understood the simplest meaning of communism, i.e., the abolition of private property. In 1952, Mao declared the contradiction between the working class and the capitalist class as the principal contradiction in China. In 1953, Mao stated, "The transformation of capitalism into socialism is to be accomplished through state capitalism". A gradual process of ownership reforms turned the then-existing private enterprises into SOEs. He also said that the process of transfer of ownership should be a voluntary contribution of capitalists to build socialism. The Great Leap Forward movement and the Cultural Revolution further eroded the spirit of private enterprise in China and by the time of Mao's death, the private sector became practically non-existent in China. The legacy of Mao's period left the basic understanding of the private sector as opposed to the public sector, and a capitalist force that distorts the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

The Reform and Opening-up and the preliminary stage of Socialism

The first stage toward re-orienting the private sector economy occurred during the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. At the start of such ideological transformation, the primary problem was how to adapt Marxism and Socialism in response to the changing conditions. Deng stated, "We shall adhere to Marxism and keep to the socialist road. But by Marxism we mean Marxism that is integrated with Chinese conditions, and by socialism we mean a socialism that is tailored to Chinese conditions and has a specifically Chinese character" (Deng Xiaoping, p.63). He combined the practical application of Marxist political economy with his 'reform and opening-up' policy and advocated a Chinese style of modernisation. In one of his speeches, Deng said that "Poverty is not Socialism", and that the reforms should allow some people to get rich first. He urged the opposition to understand the change in ideological guards as the first stage of building China's socialism. He further said that to achieve socialism, China will have to go through hundreds of years of inequality.

China, in the 1980s, embraced one of the biggest problems of economics, to regulate the influence of 'market', and 'government'. The main features of the reforms that contributed to theoretical innovation and practical application are: breaking the shackles of traditional concepts of ownership, and structures of proprietorship; changing proportion of public and privately owned economy; modifications in income distribution systems; etc. While promoting the "Reform and Opening-up" policy, Deng repeatedly emphasized the 'scientific application of Marxism'. To develop socialism in Chinese conditions, Deng emphasized the development of productive forces and encouraged the promotion of private entrepreneurs. The Chinese government adopted a gradual approach in the first half 1980s towards private sector development that reflects a wait-and-see attitude of the government.

Responding to critics and anticipations that China might fall in the capitalist traps, Deng Xiaoping stated that "commune members' private plots, family sideline businesses and trading at markets are necessary supplements to the socialist economy, and no one can interfere with them". However, he urged that China's modernization can be achieved only when "rigid thinking is broken down and the minds of officials and the people are completely emancipated." He further warned that "Once people's thinking becomes rigid, book worship, divorced from reality, becomes a grave malady" and there was a risk that "the Party or nation will perish" (Deng Xiaoping, Vol I, p.8).

In 1979, Ye Jianying in a speech on behalf of the CPC Central Committee stated that "The self-employed businesses of urban and rural workers, which continue to exist to a limited extent, are a subsidiary of and supplement to the socialist public sector" (Party Literature… vol. I, pp. 211-212). This speech shifts the role of the private sector from being opposed to Marxism to supplementary and subsidiary to the public sector. Moving further, in 1988, the Chinese government passed the Provisional Regulations of the PRC on Private Enterprises that provided legal status to the private sector. In 1992 during his 'southern tour', Deng Xiaoping exposited that "The essence of socialism is liberation and development of the productive forces, elimination of exploitation and polarization, and the ultimate achievement of prosperity for all" (Deng, 1992). To stop the criticism arising amidst the Tiananmen Square protests, Deng stated that "Don't debate that……rather try bold experiments and blaze new trails". Deng Xiaoping's various speeches insisted that the stand towards private sector development should be kept stable for some time. Deng's slogan "Development is the iron law" re-energised and re-affirmed the party on paving the way for private sector development. The broader stand of the government was to continue to deepen the reforms and promote the private sector and raise the productive forces of the country. Instead of using the terms like 'privatization' in official documents, terms like 'China's modernization', and 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' were used. During this phase, continuous emphasis was laid on advocating that reforms that are typical to a capitalist economic model have been introduced by pursue the end goal i.e., socialism, and not the abandonment of Mao Zedong Thought.

The private sector as a supplementary force

The second stage commences with the end of Deng Xiaoping's southern tour and further deepening of reforms that elevated the status of private sector. The 14th CPC National Congress declared that the goal of reforms is to establish a "Socialist Market Economy", and private sector was recognised a partner in the journey toward China's socialist road. The government encouraged the development of diverse economic actors while recognising the foreign-invested enterprises as supplementary to China's economy. In the 15th CPC National Congress held in 1997, the CPC declared that public ownership remains dominant and the diverse set of ownership in other sectors should be developed side by side. The collaborative role of the private sector was thus recognised as an important component of the Socialist Market Economy. The party further stated that any kind of ownership that supports the 'three favourables" given by Deng Xiaoping can be utilised to serve socialism. At the 80th ceremony of the foundation of the CPC in 2001, Jiang Zemin lauded the role of all kinds of private players including foreign-invested enterprises as the "builders of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" (Jiang Zemin, Vol. III, 152).

In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident when party's policies towards the private sector were diverted towards Marxists orthodoxy, the private entrepreneurs were effectively barred from joining the party. With Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour and re-energized spirit towards the promotion of private sector, the leaders in various private enterprises were invited to join the party. Through this, the party disposed of the notions included in its own previous agenda that there exists an exploitative relationship between private entrepreneurs and workers. Jiang Zemin, in 2002, codified the significant role of private players in his "Three Represents", as the first represent i.e., the CPC must support the most advanced productive forces. From "not being one of us", the private entrepreneurs were upgraded to the status of 'builders of socialism with Chinese characteristics". Jiang explicitly embraced "the advanced productive force," a euphemism for China's emerging private entrepreneurs. This step allowed the private players to become party members as well as facilitated the spread of party organisations in the private corporates.

One of the major features of this stage is that the party largely expanded Dengism, and took favourable decisions to deepen reforms. After Deng's death, President Jiang Zemin reaffirmed that "We must hold high the great banner of Deng Xiaoping". He added that "From now, "Deng Xiaoping Theory" would be "the guiding ideology"—joining Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought as the party's "guide to action." By using Deng's pragmatism, the party made Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping's theory compatible with each other. During this stage, the relationship between the party and the private sector was regarded as 'subordinate closeness'.

Private Sector as a Complementary pillar in the Socialist Market Economy

The third stage of private sector development coincides with Hu Jintao's Zeal on technological development and export-oriented growth model. During Hu's phase, the basic formulae of the party was: the principle of unwaveringly consolidating and developing the public sector on the one hand and unwaveringly encouraging, supporting, and guiding the development of the non-public sector on the other. The party at the third plenum of the 16th NPC meeting stated its policy as "relaxing market access and allowing non-public capital to enter infrastructure, public utilities and other industries and sectors not prohibited by laws and regulations" (Party Literature… Vol. I, p. 446). This step brought parity in the treatment and priority to both public and private sectors. In 2005, the Hu government came up with famous Thirty-Six articles on the non-public sector which officially provided a national treatment to all kinds of private enterprises. This led to the recognition of both public and private sectors as "important pillars" of socialism with Chinese Characteristics" and a foundation for China's socialist market economy.

China's Private Economy During Xi Jinping

The scenario changed considerably in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. China's high-speed economy was run by influential private entrepreneurs, and the public sector was suffering from mismanagement and lower economic output. Due to the knocking effect of the 2008 global financial crisis, the private sector was seen as an avenue to revamp the economy and generate growth. It is unquestionable that the CPC has always controlled its private sector companies. However, during the century's first decade, the uninterrupted growth of China's private sector puts the private sector in a position wherein they could be seen as a potential rival to the state power. In 2015, at the sidelines of the Davos Forum, Jack Ma's business partner jokingly said, that if there is a presidential election in China tomorrow, Ma might win. At the summit, Ma pointed out that "In the past 20 years the government was so strong…. But now they are getting weak. It's our opportunity, it's our showtime to see how the market and entrepreneurship can develop real consumption. Following the events, Jack Ma decided to step down from Alibaba, even disappeared from the public for months, and spinoff companies were restructured at the behest of national interests by the state regulators. For this reason, Nicolas Lardy puts that "it is the private sector that paved the way for the resurgence of the state in China" (Lardy, 2019). With this many commentators argued that Xi's policies are marking a reversal of Deng's economic reforms and a resurgence of a Mao-like harsher stand towards the private sector with the stake is reinstating itself in the front seat of the economy. Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard (2018) argues that the reform trend led by Deng Xiaoping is going under a reversal and neo-socialism, a new political order under Xi Jinping is under construction with a renewed focus on strengthening the party over the private sector. To examine this, it is first imperative to understand the ideological and practical transformations during Xi Jinping that highlights the changing stance towards private sector development.

Transformation in Theory and the end of the preliminary stage of Socialism

Xi Jinping, in several of his speeches, has exhibited that his political and ideological control is much more influential in Chinese policies than his predecessors. In 2015, he introduced the concept of "Four Comprehensives". These are: (a) Comprehensively build a moderately prosperous society; (b) Comprehensively deepen reform; (c) Comprehensively govern the nation according to law, and (d) Comprehensively strictly govern the Party. In a 2015 speech, Xi gave the concept of "The two that cannot be denied" (liangge bu neng fouding). It means that the post-reform developments cannot be used to deny the pre-reform phase, and vice-versa (Xi, 2015). By this, Xi indicated that adopting any means for China's modernization cannot divert China's path that their ancestors chose in 1949. In 2016, Xi gave the concept of "Four Confidences" (Singe Zixin) which means keeping confidence in the path (i.e. the path leading to communism), theory (Marxism-Leninism), system, and culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics (Feng, 2016). In 2017, CPC's 19th National Party Congress declared that the greatest challenge in front of the Party is the contradiction between "unbalanced and inadequate development, and the people's ever-growing needs for a better life". It also reaffirmed that to resolve this contradiction, the party needs to overhaul the modes of economic growth (Miller, 2018). According to Zhenjie Yang, while the authoritarian, but fragmented rule must have promoted economic growth numbers, in the opinion of Chinese leaders, such fragmented nature of the party's hold hinders systemic reforms (Zhenjie, 2013).

The keywords popularized under Xi Jinping Thought that factors in the development of the private sector are (a) Harmonious (Hexie); (b) Struggle; and (c) Equality (Pindeng). The term 'Harmonious society' was extensively used during Hu Jintao to highlight the classical concepts advocated in the philosophies of Confucius and Mencius. However, during Xi Jinping, the term 'Harmonious' is used to employ scrutiny, regulation, and strict adherence to the party. It is often used against those who are supposed to be silenced when their ideas are not aligned with the Xi Jinping Thought. During the second term of Xi Jinping, Chinese regulators have imposed hefty fees to crack down on the unbridled growth of Chinese big-tech firms. Alibaba's disappearance from the public and subsequent restructuring of Ant Group in 2022 highlights CPC's approach to building a 'harmonious' relationship with the private sector, wherein the party's position lies above the profit motive of the private sector.

Second, the Marxist concept of class struggle, which is most widely used and practiced by Mao is being re-popularized by Xi Jinping. According to Shan, et.al (2023), the prevalence of the term "struggle" in Marxist school textbooks has gone up in recent years. During his predecessors, terms like 'resistance', 'opposition', and 'guarding against' were used. Xi has urged his party members to embrace struggle (Gill, 2022). The word 'struggle' indicates the ambition to clear the obstacles that hinder the construction of Socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era.

The term 'equality, fundamentally refers to recognizing the widened disparities including social and economic inequalities as a result of Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening-up policies. A popular narrative propagated under Xi Jinping's leadership is the term "Common Prosperity". It is aimed at correcting the excesses of capitalism and restoring the CCP's original mission of serving the masses. Xi declared, "means that all the people will prosper together, both materially and spiritually, not just a small minority." It is not, he stresses, a call for "egalitarianism [with] everyone being the same." Nor will the CCP fall into "a trap of welfarism" that rewards the lazy. Instead, he pledges, the party will continue to "encourage wealth creation through diligence and innovation" (Yuen, 2021).

However, at the same time, Xi defends his policies towards accelerating the process of reform and opening up, saying that "China must continue to activate and leverage entrepreneurial incentives. Refuting the anticipation of his critics, Xi espoused that China's policy of

encouraging, supporting, and guiding the POEs had not changed, and China's policies of creating a good environment and providing more opportunities for the development of the POEs had not changed (Xinhua News, 2018). This presents a dichotomy between the official stands and the implementation of policies. In other words, Xi's ideological position towards taming capitalism as well as keeping it vibrant has produced a challenging situation for the development of the private sector in China.

Creating a New Brand of State-capitalism

In 2012, when Xi came to power, many anticipated a more conducive environment for private sector growth as during Xi's ruling positions in Fujian and Zhejiang, the two provinces emerged as the bastions of private entrepreneurs. However, deeper insights into Xi's ideological positions reveal that Xi had been a supporter of ideological orthodoxy on economic policies, and did he believe in ideological experimentation in the economic field. During his terms in the provinces and under his vice-presidency, he supported the mixing of private and public property ownership as he believed it would improve the socialist market economic structure. During his term as the paramount leader of the CPC, taking corrective actions to strengthen the party's control over both the economy and polity became the top priority of Xi's policies.

At the 19th National Congress of the CPC in 2017, Xi announced that China has entered a new era which is characterised by the end of the preliminary stage of socialism, and China has risen up from getting rich to getting strong (CCDI, 2017).

In 2020, the general office of the Central Committee of the CPC released a document *Opinion on Strengthening the United Front Work of the Private Economy in the New Era,* wherein the party urged China's United Front Works Department (UFWD) to increase its ideological work and political influence in the private sector. The document highlighted Xi's policies toward improving the corporate governance structure to establish a "modern enterprise system with Chinese characteristics". It means integrating the leadership of the party in the corporate governance of private companies in all respects and "clarifying" their legal status within the corporate governance structure. The Party's overall aim appears to be to ensure that a wide range of businesses are under the influence of the CCP and willing to work with it to achieve national strategic objectives.

Launching a 'Third Revolution' after Mao and Deng Xiaoping, during the 6th plenary session of the 19th Party Congress in 2021, Xi, declared that a new era of socialism has dawned in China by highlighting the term "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in a New Era". The 6th plenum report summarized that "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era is the Marxism of contemporary China and of the 21st century (NPC, 2021). It embodies the best of the Chinese culture and ethos in our times and represents a new breakthrough in adapting Marxism to the Chinese context" (Xinhua Net, 2021). This marked a significant change in approach towards the development of the private sector economy in the Marxist realm of political economy.

There are three ways in which Xi Jinping's policies have fiercely indicated the change in the relationship between the party and the private sector. First, in 2013, the party introduced mixed-ownership reforms, wherein private companies were allowed to invest in SOEs (People's Daily, 2013). This policy was seen as a major u-turn from accelerating private ownership numbers and something similar to the ownership reforms of the 1950s under Mao that resulted in the consolidation of ownership in the hands of SOEs. Second, Xi's policies toward the private sector are characterised by dramatically strengthening the party's role in both government and private businesses. In March 2012, in a speech, Xi stressed the need to increase party bodies in private

businesses. The expansive role of the party was first manifested in 2107 by issuing a directive that every company needs to include provisions on the role of the party in their articles of association. In fact, party secretaries were asked to attend important high-level meetings of private corporates. By encroaching on spaces of private businesses, the party advocated that it wants to be a part of their successes, not failures, and sit alongside them and share their wealth. During his second term, the party's influential role in private businesses tends to increase with directives that give decision-making power to the party. According to a new requirement, the company's management must seek the party's advice and approval before making all its major decisions. Third, the policies towards strengthening the SOEs are seen as a method to weaken the influence of private businesses. The private companies were forbidden to invest in the securities market, and the SOEs were allowed to grasp small POEs. According to a 2018 report, 24 POEs have been acquired by SOEs in Chinese stock markets (Xinhua News, 2018). Liu (2021) found that more POEs have been nationalized in 2019 than in any year during 2014-19. During the second term of Xi, private enterprises, especially in the technology sector faced a regulatory clampdown, hefty fines, and restructuring with co-ownership with the government to bring about what the government calls "the orderly expansion of capital".

Conclusion

The chapter began with some highlights of modernisation theorists claiming that China's process of "Reform and Opening-up" will end up becoming a "Western" capitalist system. Perhaps the confusion lay in interpreting the relationship between the CPC, as the power-holder political organisation, and its ideology Communism. The theories failed to understand that loosening the control on the latter did not necessarily mean a decline in the legitimacy of the former. China's constructive adaption of private sector development theory and recent trends in China's private sector economy indicates a rather complicated synergy between the Chinese state-party, and the private sector characterised by a strengthening grip on the ideology and legitimacy of the regime, as opposed to the anticipation about China's modernization. The embrace of Marxism-Leninism and subsequent reinvention in the theory and practice consolidated the power of the party in China, unlike Soviet Russia.

The private sector from being non-existent in the Mao era came to play a supplementary role along with SOEs in China's economy in the 1980s. This policy was further developed into the theory of the primary stage of socialism, arguing that various forms of co-ownership can co-exist before achieving the dream of Chinese socialism. This position of the private sector having supplementary and complementary roles was reiterated by both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao during their terms. Xi Jinping's declaration of the end of the first stage of socialism and the launch of a new era sparks a debate on the changing theoretical position on the role of the private sector. Xi Jinping's remarks on embracing Marxist Thought in the new era resurface the debates on the policies towards the private sector. There lies a question mark when the level of productivity is high, whether the various forms of ownership are still needed. The 2019-2020 crackdown and subsequent restructuring of private firms demonstrated the state's harsher attitude towards tech companies.

However, the reality, in theory, and practice, remains more complex. With respect to the position on evolving theory and practice towards the private sector, this paper concludes that the downtrend demonstrated by Xi's policies is merely a continuation of the policies set by his predecessors. Deng, while formulating the theory of the 'primary stage of socialism', gave his 'two-hands' approach that involves the continuation of reform and opening-up on one hand and 'adherence to Marxism-Leninism' on the other hand. Rather than being a fundamental shift in the theory, Xi's evolving policies towards the private sector indicate an accelerated stage of oscillation between the two hands. This can be seen in Deng's adherence to Marxism, Jiang and Hu's emphasis on control, and Xi's policy of 'Dual circulation' and Common Prosperity'. Thus,

in both theory and practice, the official stance and policies toward the private sector had never deviated from the ideological core of Marxism-Leninism. It can be said that instead of reversing the direction of "reform and opening-up" policies, Xi's policies emphasize creating "modern enterprises with Chinese characteristics" that definitely involves a defined and considerable role of the party with internal regulations and guidance. The accelerated means to fulfill the vision of 'common prosperity' and providing a dominant role to the SOEs indicates another stage in the theory of private sector development within the Marxist realm. However, there is no fundamental shift in theory and rather a careful effort toward re-calibrating theory in practice.

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The Paradox of Poverty Alleviation in China: A Case Study of Migrant Workers in Shanghai during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Alka Verma

Abstract

In 2020, while the world struggled with the COVID-19 pandemic, China declared a 'complete victory' over poverty. China released a white paper claiming that over the past 40 years, it has lifted nearly 800 million people out of poverty, accounting for more than 75 percent of the global poverty reduction. In November 2011, the Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China issued a white paper titled "New Progress in Development-Orientation Poverty Reduction Program for Rural China" delineating the plan to eradicate poverty in China. However, as understood from the white paper's title, the program's focus was on rural areas. The state encourages urban migration as one of the means to reduce poverty. This results in increased rural income from remittances, but the overall condition of migrants sending these remittances remains poor. As such, rural poverty has shifted to urban centres. The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed this deep-rooted paradox of the poverty alleviation program in China. Urban poverty, not considered in the poverty alleviation discourse, becomes more apparent. It has brought the plight of migrant workers in urban centres to the fore. This paper will try to understand migration as a state instrument for poverty alleviation and economic growth in China. Further, it will explore the effects of COVID-19 in exacerbating the precarity of migrants, pushing them back into poverty. This will be demonstrated through the case study of Shanghai,

China's most significant economic centre and migrant destination, which went through a very strict lockdown during the COVID-19 pandemic.

After the end of the Mao era, widespread poverty became a concern for the Communist Party. Poverty was primarily concentrated in rural areas; 90% of the population resided in rural areas, of which three-fourths lived below the poverty level in 1978 (Yao, 2000). Conversely, the urban population enjoyed strong government protection. During the Mao period, full urban employment came with social security and welfare schemes. As a result, in the post-Mao period, the government's primary focus was to reduce and ultimately eradicate rural poverty. Consequently, agricultural reforms were given top priority.

In the mid-80s, the Chinese government initiated a development-oriented poverty reduction program in rural areas. From 1994 to 2000, a seven-year priority poverty reduction program was implemented. Subsequently, an outline for poverty reduction and rural development in China's rural areas was introduced for 2001-2010. The government recognized the need to adjust previous policies as China experienced increasing urban-rural disparities and rising living standards during its rapid growth. The previous system was believed to underestimate poverty. This led the Chinese government to revise the poverty line from CNY 196 to CNY 300 in 2011 (World Bank). Additionally, the State Council released an outline for development-oriented poverty reduction in China's rural areas from 2011 to 2020.
Over the past four decades, China has significantly reduced poverty, as highlighted in a Chinese government report and a World Bank report titled 'Four Decades of Poverty Reduction in China.' According to these reports, China has lifted around 800 million people out of poverty based on the $1.9 per day global poverty line. The poverty rate in rural areas dropped dramatically from 97.5% to 0.6% between 1978 and 2019. This remarkable achievement resulted in the reduction of the poverty headcount from 770 million to 5.5 million, reflecting a substantial decrease of 764.5 million individuals living in poverty over four decades. This success is attributed to various factors, including the expansion of non-agricultural sectors in rural areas and the migration of rural workers to urban centres for employment, which increased family incomes and lifted them out of poverty.

Migration as State Policy for Poverty Reduction
China's efforts to eliminate rural poverty have strongly emphasised incorporating migration into its economic development strategies. In 1986, China established national rural poverty criteria, identifying poor counties as national poverty counties. Instead of relying solely on traditional social relief, these countries implemented development-led poverty reduction strategies. This approach increased rural income in these areas, lifting 45 million people out of poverty by 1993 (Fang & Zhang, 2021).

In 1994, the Chinese government introduced the '8-7' poverty reduction program, aiming to lift 80 million citizens above the poverty line within seven years. This program involved the relocation of one labourer per household to township and village businesses and developed areas. The plan recognized migration as a crucial avenue for achieving poverty reduction goals. Labour-intensive industries and Township and Village Enterprises were promoted in impoverished regions, and the government facilitated the inter-regional transfer of rural labourers. The poverty alleviation program for the period 2001-2010 focused on marginalised populations in remote and mountainous regions, with labour transfer and relocation being critical components of poverty reduction and regional development. The government increased its focus on training migrant labourers to enhance their employability in the non-agricultural sector. This approach was reinforced in the New Progress in Development-oriented Poverty Reduction Program of 2011-2020.

Urbanisation of Poverty

Most of the poor population in other developing countries lives in rural areas, hence, various studies have focused on eradication of rural poverty (Niu & Xu, 2023). China followed the same strategy to focus on rural poverty eradication. In China, the poverty line is defined only for the rural areas, which makes it difficult to draw a comparative analysis of relative poverty. The massive labour migration from rural to urban areas in the last 40 years suggests that one could expect to see urbanisation of poverty. As Martin et al. (2007) demonstrated, the cost of living and the estimation of non-food products in calculating minimum income varies in rural and urban areas. Wang and Cai(2007) write that it is seen that the investment in farm assets is more for returned migrants than others. Migration, therefore, helps in reducing poverty. However, they accept that this does not eradicate poverty. They categorise poverty into chronic and transitory poverty. Chronic poverty is persistent for an extended period due to living in remote areas with harmful natural environments, poor production conditions and low agricultural productivity, family members with serious illness, low participation in market activities, and non-agricultural employment. Whereas, transitory poverty is caused when families experience temporary shocks of natural disasters, agricultural price fluctuation, variations in the economic business cycle, short-term illness, temporary unemployment, and so on. Transitory poverty can be reduced after the temporary shocks are overcome. This can be achieved through a well-funded social security net that takes into account unforeseen disturbances.

However, migration as a poverty alleviation strategy has only limited success. The Chinese government's plan to eradicate rural poverty leaves out urban areas where 60% of the population resides. There is an increasing income gap. Initially, poverty decreased with an increase in the economy, but it could not follow the trend after a point. Large works show that the poor have gained far less from economic growth than the rich (Chen & Wang, 2001; Jalan & Ravallion, 1998; Khan, 2000). Accumulation and investment cause the difference between economic growth and income growth which worked in favour of the rich and deepened the income gap (Khan, 2000). It also played an important role in decreasing the speed of poverty reduction and increasing the number of urban poor (Lin & Li, 2005).

The government policies, which could help reduce transitory poverty, are biassed against migrant workers. In China, the responsibility to frame welfare schemes and social security facilities is with the provincial government. They decide based on the market forces, and the market conditions are heavily skewed against the migrant workers in the cities. The hukou system and social status of migrants are important factors affecting market forces.

The hukou system is a household registration system required to access a wide range of social benefits and services such as healthcare facilities, pensions, loans, and accessibility to public schools for children of migrants. Although the hukou system has become more relaxed since the 1980s, it still poses a major challenge to China's economic and social reform. This relaxation entails wealthy and skilled migrants primarily. In 2020, the Shanghai government announced they would allow the Shanghai Hukou permits to graduates holding bachelor's degrees from four top universities ("Shanghai Relaxes Hukou Rules to Attract More Talent," 2022). Later, in 2021, it was extended to postgraduates' of local universities. It is difficult for unskilled migrant workers to get local hukou in the city. Therefore, they can not access the minimum of government facilities such as local public health services, medical insurance schemes, and education. As most migrant workers work in industries facing high occupational hazards and living in poor conditions, they face high health risks. Non-availability of health insurance and public health services add to the precarity (Liu & Griffiths, 2011). In the long term, low

productivity without good healthcare facilities prevents individuals from moving up the socioeconomic ladder and reinforces the virtuous cycles of the poverty trap.

Additionally, the social status of workers contributes to their misery. In the late 80s, the "flood of migrants" (mingchao) raised concern for the stability of cities. The term "blind migrant" (mangliu) was used repeatedly by the media. "This term is a homophobic inversion of the term liumang which roughly translates as hooligan" (Florence, 2006). As such, the legitimacy of migrant workers' presence in cities was always in question, they were described as "inferior others" as opposed to legitimate city dwellers. Shanghai City Council, in the mid-1990s, released a quota for all migrants. Simultaneously in 1993, the skilled labourers were invited and given blue hukou cards, which were later converted into full residence permits in 2002 (Florence, 2006). Therefore, it created dual inequality between migrants and residents and skilled and unskilled migrants. Unskilled labourers were seen as a menace to social order. On the other hand, skilled and qualified labour was defined as people capable of making positive contributions to social order (Berger & Lu, 2005). The former became an object of social contempt and stigmatisation and had limited access to social security, housing, health care, and education. As such, migrants are seen as undesirable, cause of crime and illegal activity, and in times of pandemic, a career of virus.

In 2010, a new labour contract law stipulated that employers must ensure migrant workers' participation in urban social insurance programs, provided an official employment contract had been signed. The local governments are motivated to include migrant workers in social insurance programs because migrant workers are often healthy, and the premium contribution is kept within the urban risk pool. As such, social insurance for migrant workers is used for cross-subsidization of locals. These policies have limited outcomes as the participation rate is low. Employers offer informal contracts with workers, which save contributions to social insurance (He et al., 2022). Additionally, the labour contract agreement has often been misused by employers. Due to fear and the ambiguous terms used, workers find it risky to enter into these agreements (Pai, 2013, p. 40) and, thus, remain out of the formal system.

Migration for Economic Development

In the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping came to hold political power, the most important agenda was economic development and greater participation in the world economy. As such, the market-oriented reform replaced the centrally planned economic mechanism (Liukkunen & Chen, 2016). The labour allocation system and grain rationing were an obstacle to labour movement and a market-oriented economy and saw a relaxation in the ensuing years. The fixed labour of rural and later urban areas was released with the reform in the Commune system and State Owned Enterprises(SOE). As a result, the economic performance of the Rural Household System and SOEs improved.

Until 1983, rural labour migration was restricted through the official registration of residence or hukou. Labourers were not allowed to move outside the province they were living in. The rural enterprises helped people to find jobs in their local area. From 1984, when these village enterprises' capacity to absorb labour reached its zenith, large-scale migration outside the district started. The Chinese government relaxed the restriction on labour migration, and a certificate of temporary domicile was issued to allow residence in towns (Berger & Lu, 2005). As such, the migration to towns has increased drastically. Coastal provinces and big cities such as Shanghai become important destinations for migration. The fixed labour system stopped entirely in the early 1980s after introducing the 'Contract Labour System'. In 1994, the first labour law gave way to the emerging labour market.

Until 1990, most of the migration was limited to the rural enterprises not far from the home. Growing income inequality, surplus labour in the agriculture sector and reform in the hukou system created a push and pull factor for migration. The Chinese government made plans to increase rural migration and increase China's rural labour employment. Employment certificates were made mandatory for migrants, enabling them to enjoy the employment services provided by career centres. In 1997, the state council released a report on establishing a comprehensive labour market planning and information service system to create a labour market system. Temporary residence cards have been issued for one year since 1995. As the Hukou system was further relaxed in 1997, small towns and cities began to grant hukou to rural migrants. In 1998, the State Council approved the policy permitting migrants to obtain local urban hukou after living there for a certain period as long as they had a fixed residence, a stable and legal occupation or a source of income. However, it was a discriminatory policy for unskilled migrant workers mainly working in informal sectors with no stable job.

In the early 1990s, the layoffs of urban workers in state enterprises triggered anti-migrant sentiment due to increased competition from incoming rural migrants. With burgeoning urban migration, the city government became concerned with protecting residents' interests against those of migrants. They controlled the in-migration and only the jobs undesirable to residents were given to migrants. In the late 1990s, the population of rural migrants swelled in cities. There was increasing conflict for jobs between urban residents and rural migrants. The city government responded by prioritising the unemployed and laid-off urban workers against migrants and restricting re-employment and recruitment of migrant workers (Boyce, 2009, p.54).

Since 2000, the Chinese government has taken many positive steps for rural migrants. In January 2002, the State Council released the 16-word policy of "fair treatment, good guidance, improving management and improving services" (Ping & Shaohua, 2005). In January 2003, the State Council issued a notice on better managing and providing services for rural migrants (Fang & Dewen, n.d.). It required the local government to take action to ensure fair treatment of migrants by removing all kinds of fees levied on migrants, providing good working and living conditions, schooling for children of migrant workers, and solving salaries and cuts. Even then, migrant workers face irregular payment, low wages, lack of promotion prospects, and inconsistent employment (Berger & Lu, 2005). Since they are unemployed or employed only occasionally, they bend to the unreasonable demands of jobs.

Another report published in 2004 pointed out that "rural migrant workers have become a crucial component of the industrial workforce, creating wealth for cities and generating tax revenues". Urban employers benefit by employing migrant workers as they are willing to work at lower wages than residents, and the work that is undesirable for residents is accepted by migrant workers (Fang & Dewen, n.d.). In 2004, China reached the Lewis point where it lost the advantage of low wage surplus rural labour. As a result, the wages started increasing and Chinese industries began to lose their competitive advantage. With the decline in the working-age population in rural areas, the transfer of rural workers has declined (Lin, 2012). The rise of China's labour wage led to a different growth strategy. It is based on something other than the low labour cost which has followed since the 1970s. The new strategy is to reduce dependence for growth on exports and increase reliance on domestic consumption and growth of the service sector.

Consequently, China is focusing on urbanisation which will boost the country's consumption and create domestic demand (Guo et al., 2022). This creates the fear that migrant workers might lose their countryside land once they migrate, and a lack of good jobs will keep their income low and increase the income gap. They will lose their only permanent source of survival, making the situation precarious in times of calamity.

There have been policies to facilitate easy labour migration to urban areas; however, it does not ensure the safety and equal rights of migrants. It leaves them at the mercy of market forces innately exploitative of poor labour. Capacity building is important in tackling poverty, it requires providing good health and education to those who live at the margin. Even when rural income increased from migration, it did not break the shackles of poverty. Poor health limits the efficiency of labour and poor education leaves them at the lower strata of society and excludes them from higher-income jobs. Hukou remains an obstacle in providing government welfare to migrants since these services are available only to local hukou holders. Permanent entitlement to government services, such as public education, health insurance plans, and property rights, still depends on where you are registered (Vortherms & Liu, 2022). Hukou gives political rights to hukou holders; as such migrant labourers are reduced to second-class citizens in their own country. Apart from discriminatory conditions that are required to get local hukou, as discussed above, willingness to acquire hukou in the city is less for poor migrants. One has to relinquish all the rights in their village to get a city hukou. This is often seen as a significant loss, given that land is social security for rural populations (Cai, 2016). Even though the government relaxed the hukou system, it remains an obstacle to migration and the welfare of migrants.

Shanghai in Pandemic

During the Covid pandemic, migrant workers worldwide faced severe social and economic upheaval. However, the situation was particularly grim in China, given the uncompromising lockdown and social and legal disadvantages that Chinese workers face. As Wang and Cai have argued, the transitory poverty of migrant workers is a calamity away from the extreme poverty. The Covid pandemic was one such calamitous event for migrant workers. A case study of Shanghai has been taken to analyse this phenomenon.

Shanghai announced a two month long complete lockdown in March 2022. As the Coronavirus outbreak hit China, its strict restrictions to stop the contagion forced many out of their jobs. Shanghai imposed the most severe lockdown after the city of Wuhan, where the first Covid cases emerged. All transportation systems, delivery services, and outdoor activities were stopped, and barricades were erected outside the apartments. People with critical illness could only go to hospital after getting permission from local authorities. Strict lockdowns forced industries to shut down for weeks. The effects of the pandemic were disproportionate for the migrant workers in informal sectors. According to official data, there are 292 million migrant workers across urban centres of China, composing a third of the country's workforce. They primarily work in factories, restaurants, construction, and other low-skilled jobs. There are more than 4.5 million migrant workers registered in Shanghai in 2019.

Most had no job or government assistance during the lockdown ("'We Won't Survive': China's Migrant Workers Fear More Lockdowns as Covid Threat Remains," 2022). Due to the nature of their job, they could not work from home. According to a survey, migrants' unemployment rates were significantly higher than the national average, making them more vulnerable. Unemployment insurance covers only 17% of the migrant population (Wallace & Altstein, 2022). China has not implemented any broad-based income support program like those in the UK, US, or Japan that cover income losses of all lower-income groups who are most in need (Bradsher, 2020). As a result, migrant labour lost their only sources of income during the pandemic without any help from the government. There is a serious mismatch between those covered by China's social safety net and those who really need it. The mismatch pushes many migrant families into poverty (Che et al., 2020).

Due to the suspension of transportation, many found themselves trapped in the city. Many migrant workers who could not return home were compelled to sleep under bridges (Wang, 2022). Industry dormitories had to be vacated after the shutdown of work. Those living in rented

places could no longer afford to live there. Without any source of income, people found it difficult to arrange food to survive, let alone support their families back home. For these migrant workers, returning home was not an option, as they had to complete the mandatory 14-day quarantine at their own cost. Without any government help, they loaned money from relatives or colleagues to be paid back as soon as they got a job. This has economic as well as psychological effects. Loans and unemployment trap labourers into poverty and push them into the chronic poverty category. Also, the mental disturbance it creates reduces a person's productivity, thereby impacting their market performance and intensifying their poverty in the long term (Barrett et al., 2019).

The migrant workers receiving lower wages find it more affordable to live in the urban villages. The rent for the rooms is relatively cheap, however, the condition of these apartments is appalling. These urban villages are important for industrial centres as they provide living space for industrial workers. However, the cities in China are increasingly demolishing these urban neighbourhoods to make space for new residential and commercial complexes (Shen, 2015). Since Shanghai endeavours to become a financial hub, authorities are intent on clearing these 'unhygienic areas'. During the pandemic, demolition was sped up by labelling these areas as Covid hotspots. The Shanghai government declared 72 urban villages as Covid hotspots during the spring outbreak. These areas were described as "key and difficult points" of epidemic prevention and control because of "high population density and poor sanitation and living conditions" (Wallace & Altstein, 2022). This not only profiles the areas where labourers live but also stereotypes the behaviour of poorer sections as unhygienic. The government uses social stigma attached to a section to achieve its political and economic ends. Thus, the evicted populations had to go to another city or return home which added to the uncertainty. Migrant relocation disrupts their everyday environment and erodes their bases of social support. After the Covid lockdown, migrant workers found it difficult to stay in Shanghai. They had to go through the hassle of finding a job in unfamiliar cities. Unemployment and the debt at hand push them below the poverty line. As many workers find it very difficult to get a job post-pandemic, the occurrence of chronic poverty among urban migrant workers is likely to surge.

Assessment

The relaxation in the migration policy for workers was a part of the poverty alleviation program, there were not enough policy changes to facilitate the social and economic well-being of these migrants. The discriminatory hukou system continued and the government's strategy of targeting only rural poverty leaves out the migrant workers. Therefore, the government's claim of poverty eradication by sending people to cities is questionable. Whether migration was directed toward poverty eradication or was intended merely to increase economic output for the newly emerging market needs to be evaluated. The transitory poverty of migrant workers keeps them on the verge of extreme poverty and makes them do undesirable jobs in an inhuman environment. The Covid-19 pandemic has exacerbated this situation. As the case of Shanghai demonstrates, the absence of social and economic security spelled hardship for migrant workers during the pandemic and its aftermath. The transitory poverty of migrant workers will likely transition into chronic poverty if it persists for long. The neglect of urban migrants and their economic vulnerabilities makes the government's declaration of victory over poverty dubious and far-fetched. To remedy this, an accurate assessment of the extent of poverty is necessary. Such an assessment should incorporate migrant workers, who are more often than not at the verge of poverty and go unnoticed under traditional poverty estimates. Further, this will expedite their inclusion in poverty alleviation schemes and help China address the issue of poverty more comprehensively.

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Women's Political Representation in China: Do they Hold Up Half the Sky Yet?

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Abstract

The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) saw a marginal increase in female participation compared to previous Congress, with 619 women delegates out of the total 2,296 delegates. However, out of the 376 members elected in the 20th Central Committee (CC), only

33 were women out of which only 11 could become full committee members. Furthermore, no women made it to the Politburo, breaking away from the custom dating back two decades. This limited representation of women is not only limited to elite politics but also reflected in lower levels of administration. It indicates the clear bias towards men in China's political system which is firmly entrenched in Chinese society. Traditional and cultural gender norms continue to dictate the politics of the nation and subsequently affect policy-making and decision-making at all levels. This suggests that despite advancements in the position of women in contemporary times, there is still a long path ahead before 'women in China hold up half the sky', as announced by Mao.

Thus, this paper discusses evolving trends in women's representation in China's politics at different levels under the overarching theme of gender equality in China. It provides a brief overview of female representation in China historically both within the Party and in the government. It also elaborates on the opportunities and limitations that women face in China's political system. The paper further discusses the official and scholarly Chinese discourse on women's representation in politics. It also analyses the barriers — institutional, societal, and cultural — to women's representation in politics, despite the affirmative action policies put in place by the Party for the upliftment of women's status in society. Furthermore, this paper explores the question of what the status of Chinese women in politics will look like in the post-20th Party Congress era and the implications of this current status of female representation on women rights movement in China.

Introduction

Political representation for women in any country enables them to express their interests as well as legitimate concerns on appropriate platforms and also contribute to finding solutions to their problems. In a non-democratic country like China, this representation becomes much more important due to absence of vibrant civil society and pressure groups. Thus, political representation largely remains the only available platform for women to empower other women. The 2021 review of "Outline for the development of Chinese women (2011-2020)" by National Bureau of Statistics revealed that the overall condition of Chinese women has greatly improved between 2010 to 2020 in fields such as health, education, economy, social security and so on.[i] However, the improvement in political representation has been still abysmal which has kept gender imbalance issues prevalent due to lack of women voices in policymaking. While being famous as one of the largest political parties in the world, it has not done justice to the cause of gender equality as merely less than 30 percent of party cadres are females, indicating overall underrepresentation of women in Chinese political system.[ii] Thus, Chinese leaders already have a difficult task to select women leaders from a limited pool of cadres. In such a scenario, it is important to analyse the reasons behind underrepresentation of women in Chinese politics and what policy measures can be taken to improve gender balance. This paper will first argue about the importance of adequate representation for women in Chinese political system, then analyse trends in women representation at different levels of administration from central to local levels and lastly, it will also elaborate on challenges faced by Chinese women due to lack of representation.

Why Political Representation is Important for Chinese Women

Despite comprising approximately half of the global population, women's proportional representation in politics remains disappointingly inadequate on a global scale, highlighting a persistent underrepresentation.[iii] Studies have shown that a higher representation of women in global politics has encouraged and enacted gender mainstreaming in various policies and laws.[iv] As such, the importance of women's representation in politics, especially in elite politics, cannot be understated. While significant policy efforts on global, national, regional and even local levels have been made for promoting women's participation and representation in politics, wide

gender gaps still persist and achieving gender equality remains a distant dream.[v] This underrepresentation of women in political decision-making bodies and positions negatively affects both policy-making and comprehensive and balanced governance.

When women are also afforded an equal footing in participation and leadership in all spheres of life, they bring diverse and inclusive perspectives to political decision–making and influence policy formulation which address a broad range of societal needs. Furthermore, the presence of women in political decision-making processes is vital for achieving inclusive, equitable, and effective governance; adding towards enhanced legitimacy of governance and public trust in political leadership; and according to a higher primacy to socially inclusive measures. An increased visibility of women in positions of power and in public spheres is also significant for driving the future generations of women leaders — these women not only serve as role models for younger women but are also consequential in challenging the status quo and pre-existing conceptions of traditional gender roles, stereotypes and norms. Studies have also found that women's perspectives and inclusive decision-making have contributed significantly towards holistic and sustainable peace agreements, greater dispute settlement and conflict resolution as well as a healthier security environment.

In line with promoting the global objective of providing women with fair and equal political representation, the United Nations adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 2015.[vi] This alignment between women's representation and international development goals, such as the SDGs, drives down the point that women's involvement in global political processes is necessary in order to achieve global goals for a more sustainable, inclusive and equitable development of the world.

It is important to note that while there is a large variation across countries, gender inequality and underrepresentation of women in politics is a worldwide phenomenon. Nonetheless, research has shown that higher levels of gender equality are directly correlated to the extent of democracy and inclusivity in societies.[vii] In this regard, bridging the gender gap in political representation is even more crucial in contemporary China, given that it is not an open society. This amplifies the cruciality of women's representation in Chinese politics for fostering gender equality, holistic policy-making, and the overall progress of the nation.

Legal Backing for Women Leaders in China

Since the establishment of the PRC, gender equality has been touted as a fundamental policy of the Party-state. Both the 1982 State and Party Constitutions have promoted affirmative action and since the 1990s,[viii] a series of affirmative action policies were adopted to enable women to incorporate a gendered perspective in the formulation and implementation of state policies. For example, the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests was passed in 1992[ix] — later amended in 2005, 2008 and most recently in 2022 — coupled with the National People's Congress (NPC) law which officially introduced a gender quota of 22 percent for women in 2008. Furthermore, bodies like the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF) and the National Working Committee on Children and Women (NWCCW) have also initiated policies in order to promote and encourage women's participation in Chinese politics. In 2021, the Communist Party of China (CPC) made public the Outline of Women's Development in China (2021–2030) in order to improve women's status in Chinese society, with a strong emphasis on employment rights.[x] The recently amended Women's Protection Law added nearly 30 new provisions for protecting women's rights in several areas, such as gender bias in hiring practices, the birth rights of women employees, and sexual harassment in the workplace.[xi]

These policies have directly resulted in greater participation of women in Chinese politics, especially at the local and grassroots levels of governance.

For instance, under the "Enhancing Chinese Women's Political Participation" programme run by the ACWF and funded by the UN Women's Fund for Gender Equality (FGE), several measures aimed at improving laws vis-a-vis women and gender minorities; increasing the participation of women in local governments; enabling community empowerment and civil society groups; and providing advocacy and leadership training for women have all resulted in a significant rise in women's participation in political and public life. Seeing women in power has not only provided a role model for younger Chinese women who might have felt deterred from being active in politics and other leadership roles, but it has also positively impacted social policies promoting women's rights, education, healthcare and employment; contributed to more sustainable economic development and human capital and has actively challenged traditional, societal and cultural attitudes detrimental to achieving gender equality.

However, despite these provisions, women's participation in politics and in the workforce has not always translated into meaningful representation and has further been hindered due to a lack of female leadership, bureaucratic and institutional barriers, making it challenging for women to rise to higher levels of decision-making and even enter some professions, such as the military.[xii]

In line with its advocacy for women's rights and gender equality, China ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1980[xiii] and in 1995, Beijing hosted the Fourth World Conference on Women. However, there is a lag between China's push for enhanced women's representation and the international gender equality regime. China's efforts in the area of women's rights and gender equality have contributed largely to its international image and influence, but when compared to other countries, China's progress in women's political representation appears lacklustre.

Women Representation in China's Elite Politics

The Politburo Standing Committee and Politburo are two of the most powerful CPC bodies in China that control decision-making and also lay out policies for the entire country. Amongst them, Politburo Standing Committee is the strongest institutions which has been until now, filled by only men. Many countries around the world that have gained independence in the post-World War II period, have witnessed women holding top political positions. On the other hand, despite rapid economic growth and increase in per capita income, China has failed to secure a top position for women in both the party and in the government. Compared to Standing Committee, Politburo seat has been offered to six women in over 100 years history of the CPC (Table 1).

However, this fact may not necessarily indicate the real picture of women representation in elite politics. Out of these six women, three of them were wives of contemporary top Chinese leaders and thus, played a crucial role in Chinese politics. For instance, Ye Qun, wife of Lin Biao who was once considered as the successor of Mao, played a crucial role in steering cultural revolution in mid-1960s. She also had a considerable influence in the military when Lin Biao was the defense minister and vice chairman of CPC.[xiv] Similarly, Mao's wife Jiang Qing held important positions in the propaganda department and she was also the most important member of the "Gang of Four" which propagated ultra-leftist thought and prolonged cultural revolution for their own political benefits.[xv]

Thus, although these women leaders assumed authority at the elite level, it did not help women's cause for political representation in China as their closeness to power was largely accrued to their husbands being at the helm of affairs. Apart from these two powerful women, Wu Guixian, a textile worker from Shaanxi also rose to power and went on to become the youngest vice premier of China.[xvi] Similarly, Chen Muhua also entered China's top political leadership and served as vice premier and governor of People's Bank of China. However, both of these leaders could only reach up to the alternate membership of the Politburo despite managing such important portfolios.

Table 1: Women politicians in CPC Politburo

Woman Politician	Tenure in Politburo	Position Held
Ye Qun	9th Politburo (1969-1971)	Chairperson of administrative office of Central Military Commission
Jiang Qing	9th and 10th Politburo (1969-1976)	
Deng Yingchao	11th and 12th Politburo (1977-1987)	Chairperson of CPPCC
Wu Yi	16th Politburo (2002-2007)	Vice Premier and Minister of Health
Liu Yandong	17th and 18th Politburo (2007-2017)	Vice Premier
Sun Chunlan	18th and 19th Politburo (2012-2022)	Vice Premier

Source: https://www.baidu.com/

On the other hand, Deng Yingchao, wife of Zhou Enlai had a different case despite coming from an elite political family. She had been actively working within the CPC ranks since her youth and actively worked for women's cause in Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangdong and several other regions of China before 1949.[xvii] During anti-Japanese war, she actively promoted women's participation in war and drafted an "outline of mobilizing women to participate in war of resistance and founding the nation" in 1938. She was also one of the earliest proponents of All China Women's Federation which works for women development under the CPC guidance. Hence, her elevation to Politburo in 1977 and that too, after her husband's death, showed some hope for improvement of women representation in politics. Her role is also important as she held the chairpersonship of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the highest post any Chinese female politician has held until now, while being in the Politburo.

However, it remained a mere hope for female leaders in China as it took nearly 15 years for the next female candidate to earn a Politburo seat. In 2002, Wu Yi earned a seat in 25-member Politburo due to her remarkable work done to integrate Chinese economy in global economy by entering the World Trade Organization. As the minister for foreign trade and economic cooperation, she is credited for improving US-China economic relations in early 2000s.[xviii] While being the vice premier during 2002-2007, she also played a pivotal role in controlling the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in China as the health minister. Her successor Liu Yandong also became vice premier by rising through the communist ranks and played a crucial role in organizing 2008 Beijing Olympics.[xix] However, despite being hailed as the world's second most powerful woman in 2007, she could not break the barrier of women entering Politburo Standing Committee.[xx] The latest addition to this list Sun Chunlan, had also played an important role in the development of China, but still could only reach up to a Politburo seat. To worsen this situation, 20th Party Congress in 2022 refused even one Politburo seat to female candidate, breaking the tradition established since 2002.

Several scholars have attributed different reasons for this dismal performance by China in terms of women representation in elite politics. Zheng Yushuo explained that as most of the first- and second-generation leaders came from military where women participation was minimal, the


same trend was also reflected in the political leadership.[xxi] This situation has improved in the last few years as the top leadership accommodated people from diverse fields which also provided an opportunity for female politicians to hold important portfolios. However, as Liu Hanzhang suggests, this trend is a reflection of China's "top-down patriarchal political system" and thus, it is rarely influenced by outside public pressure.[xxii] Thus, it would be highly difficult for female leaders to mark their presence in China until the top male leadership recognizes it.

On the exclusion of female from Politburo in 20th Party Congress, Fengming Lu opined that Xi Jinping has been more concerned about creating a reliable team than addressing gender imbalance in top leadership and thereby, maintaining global image.[xxiii] Arguably, both female candidates which were considered most likely to replace Sun Chunlan at the 20th Party Congress – Shen Yiqin and Shen Yueyue – unlike other Politburo members, did not have close relations with Xi Jinping as well as vast experience like their female predecessors. However, Shen Yiqin's appointment as one of the State councillors, a post just below vice premiers, indicates that women leaders can still break into senior leadership to some extent.[xxiv] On the contrary, Shen Yueyue's *tuanpai* (youth league) connection might have created a major hurdle for her promotion as Xi has virtually wiped out this faction from elite politics during 20th Party Congress. Nonetheless, it is also important to note that the 20th Party Congress has seen many established conventions such as age limit being broken. Hence, it is no surprise that female leaders would not find a place in Xi's personalistic and centralized leadership if it does not suit his interests or policies.

Representation in China's De Facto Legislature


The Central Committee of the CPC is considered as the largest lawmaking organ of the party and represents diverse interests including that of gender. However, here also, China's performance in terms of women representation can be termed, at best, as average compared to other countries. The report by Inter Parliamentary Union shows that China stands 89th globally in terms of percentage of women representation in national legislatures.[xxv] As per the report, China has 790 women in its national parliament of 2977 members. This accounts for 26.5 percent of total members, which has seen a major increase from the first National People's Congress (NPC) where only 12 percent women were accommodated (Figure 1). However, it would be misleading as it indicates figures of NPC which comes under state apparatus. Further, women representation among delegates for the Central Committee has also tripled from 9.3 percent in 1956 to nearly 27 percent in 2022.[xxvi] Further, rules for the selection of delegates require that proportion of female delegates from each province should be generally higher than the proportion of female CPC members in that province.[xxvii] However, these delegates are more honorary and seldom contribute to policymaking within the party. In fact, all important decisions regarding every issue of national concern are in reality taken by the CPC through its Central Committee which acts as a de facto legislature. NPC largely acts as a rubber stamp to authorize decisions taken by the party.[xxviii] Thus, analysing representation trends in Central Committee of the CPC would be a better indicator of women's political status in China (Figure 2).

Figure 1: Women Representatives in National People's Congress (1954-2023)



Source: Zeng (2014)[xxix] and Authors' Own Calculations

Figure 2: Women Representation in CPC Central Committee (1956-2023)



Source: Cheng Li[xxx] and Authors' own calculations

In the initial years of China after 1949 revolution, Central Committee was still dominated by military leaders which were mostly men and it had very limited scope to accommodate diverse interests. Thus, in the 8th and 9th Central Committee, women representation was very minimal in percentage numbers, albeit some improvement in absolute numbers over the years. During these years, however, full female members were marginally higher than alternate members, indicating more proactive role of women in decision-making. 10th and 11th Central Committee in 1973 and 1977, respectively, saw the highest representation of women until now as many of the male leaders were either purged or exiled during cultural revolution. However, since 1982, women representation has again gone down to 7-8 percent which marginally increased to 10 percent in 2007. It does not indicate a good picture even though women representation increased in absolute numbers over the years corresponding to increase in total number of Central Committee membership. Moreover, this period also witnessed increase in the number of alternate female members compared to full members who could actually exercise voting rights

and contribute in policymaking. Despite this gloomy image of women representation in elite politics, the only silver lining to this is it has accommodated women from different ethnicities and fields, thus providing them an opportunity to at least voice out women's concerns.

For instance, analysis of female members of the 20th Central Committee reveals that 15% of women Central Committee members belong to ethnic minorities. Apart from 28 Han women leaders, one woman leader each from Hui, Mongol, Bai, Uyghur and Korean minorities have been represented in Central Committee.[xxxi] Further, nearly 50 percent of these leaders have been serving at the provincial level and thus, likely to be more aware about ground reality. Furthermore, nearly 50 percent of these female leaders are come from technical and specialized background and have been assigned related functions. For instance, He Rong, who has specialized in law, has been appointed as the minister of justice in 2023, preceded by executive vice president of supreme people's court.[xxxii] Similarly, aviation expert Li Jianrong has been appointed as the president of China Aerospace Engine Research Institute, which has played a crucial role in the indigenisation of civilian aerospace sector. Such crucial appointments of female technocrats have opened up some space for women leaders to enter into top decision-making bodies in China. However, lack of representation for All China Women's Federation, primary body working for women's rights, is also another indicator of how CPC leaders view these party affiliated bodies representing diverse interests.

Women Leadership at Grassroot Levels

At the provincial and lower levels of administration, situation of women's political representation seems to be slightly better than at the central level. As we go down in administration levels, women representation improves as evident from the 2021 report of National Bureau of Statistics which showed that the proportion of women leaders in village committees was 24.2 percent in 2020 which further improved in neighbourhood committees 52.1 percent in 2020.[xxxiii] However, it has still not been able to achieve the 2010 outline target of 30 percent at the village level.

In 2001, CPC Central Committee had suggested people's congresses and people's political consultative conferences at provincial level should have at least one female leader in leadership position. However, this norm has not been adhered to strictly by most of the provinces till now. More often than not, "at least one woman" is conveniently interpreted as "only one woman", which has actually hindered women's participation.[xxxiv] It is evident from the fact that there have been only four women leaders who have been appointed as the party secretaries of a province until now. This is also reflective of the bias against women which has barred them from assuming the highest position in provinces. However, several female leaders have been appointed to subordinate positions in provinces such as deputy party secretaries and governors or members of provincial party standing committees. A 2021 study revealed that there have been 31 female officials appointed in provincial standing committees in different capacities, which accounted for 8.18 percent of 379 standing committee members across all provinces.[xxxv] The study also inferred that the most usual positions given to female leaders at provincial level are heads of united front work, propaganda and organization – all of which being largely non-developmental departments. Moreover, four of the present party secretaries of provincial capital cities – namely Wang Lixia (Hohhot), Han Liming (Nanjing), Wu Guiying (Changsha) and Shi Xiaolin (Chengdu) – have an opportunity to reach near top political leadership based on previous trends. Especially, the case of Shi Xiaolin is interesting in this regard as she became the youngest party secretary of a provincial capital as well as the youngest female alternate member of Central Committee. Thus, she would be likely to be promoted to at least to vice premiership, provided her performance and merit as the only promotion criterion.[xxxvi]

Apart from these direct government appointments, women's participation in affiliated political bodies has been satisfactory. For instance, trade unions across China in 2017 had 38.3 percent female members, whereas 39.7 percent employee directors and 41.6 percent employee supervisors were female officials.[xxxvii] Further, 7.7 million women had registered as executive committee members of women's federations at the township and village levels which provided them a platform to express their opinions.

Headwinds for Chinese Women in Politics

Despite progress, women in China do not hold up "half the sky" yet. They still face significant challenges in achieving adequate representation in political leadership roles. According to the World Economic Forum's 2023 Global Gender Gap Index, China ranked 107 out of 146 countries.[xxxviii] China has closed 72.7 percent of the gender gap and attained 81.5 percent parity in labour-force participation rate. However, the nation has only secured 11.4 percent parity on the Political Empowerment sub-index, with 4.2 per cent women ministers and 24.9 percent women parliamentarians, making up less than one-third of parliamentarians.

Historically, women in China have had little or no political power, with men dominating social and political structures. Due to the high prevalence of patriarchal and patrilineal values in Chinese society, women's participation in politics and other avenues of public life have been traditionally limited. The influence of Confucian values and ideology on Chinese society only exacerbated women's status in society. Traditional gender roles and societal expectations of women to be (and remain) good daughters, wives and mothers have discouraged women's participation in Chinese politics and have contributed to gender disparities in political representation.

While urbanisation, education and Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening-up policy did significantly enable women to participate in the labour force and other economic avenues, the representation and participation of women in China paint a different picture. Female representation in the Party leadership has been limited and stagnant. Although there are about 2 million female cadres serving in the CPC and other government bodies, they are most often found at the grassroots level.[xxxix] A glass ceiling still exists within the Party, restricting women from rising to leading state and elite Party positions. This holds true when the representation of women in the National People's Congress (NPC) and the grassroots level is compared with that of institutions like the State Council. Women also find it challenging to secure managerial or provincial level roles, positions which are usually dominated by men and are a necessary step for moving up the political ladder. Furthermore, women candidates in politics face resistance in the form of gender stigmas and stereotypes; added pressures of the motherhood penalty; limited access to resources, campaign financing, and networking opportunities; and meagre support from political parties. This limited availability of training, mentorship and support networks as well as the prevalence of male-dominated networks and factional politics impedes women in shaping their political careers.

Moreover, the affirmative action policies instituted by the Party only cover the "four leading bodies" (*si tao ban zi*)[xl] — the Communist Party Committee, the People's Government, the People's Congress (NPCC) and the People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) — and have proved to be hollow. While gender quotas have helped break through traditional gender norms and created a supportive environment for women to enter politics, these quotas are often limited by virtue of the creation of a dichotomy between symbolic and substantive representation as well as the absence of any additional efforts towards the promotion of female cadres. This suggests that despite their performance and similar credentials, women are still relegated to less important positions without real power or influence — even when women rise to the ranks of political leadership, they are usually given softer portfolios such as education,

healthcare, other social sectors and mass organisations, especially those revolving around women's work, rather than high-profile portfolios such as defense, economics, and technology.

Men dominate top leadership roles and policy-making, holding real power in the Party apparatus. This is evident by the fact that no woman has ever been part of either the Politburo Standing Committee or the Central Military Commission. The fact that a lower national retirement age for women exists also restricts women from climbing the political ladder and being awarded a national appointment. Furthermore, negative perceptions of women's leadership abilities may also influence voters' decisions, as women are viewed as weaker and subordinate to men in Chinese society. Derogatory terms such as "leftover women" (*sheng nu* 剩女), used to stigmatise unmarried women, have also negatively affected the status of women in society. For instance, in order to tackle the declining marriage and birth rates in China, Yihuang county in Jiangxi province recently incentivized women to marry unemployed men by offering preferential policies with regard to employment, housing and birth allowances.[xli] This preferential treatment against women not only underlines the fact that the lives of women in China are dictated by societal expectations but also how women's perceived roles as caregivers and homemakers affect their political ambitions.

Since Xi Jinping assumed power in 2012, women have been pushed out of public avenues of life, be it political structures or the workplace, and have been pushed into more traditional gender norms. In Xi's push for China to emerge as a modern socialist country, he has conveniently chosen to ignore socialist feminism and focus more on implementing policies which assert conservative and traditional Confucian family values. Xi has put emphasis on women being good wives and mothers as fundamental to the progress of Chinese society.[xlii] The Party has recently removed the two-child restriction and urged couples to have a third child, in an effort to reverse declining birth rates.[xliii]

Under Xi Jinping, the ACWF has also gone through organisational reforms.[xliv] These reforms have the twin goals of strengthening the ACWF's role in mobilising women's activism while also aligning the federation more closely with the CPC's ideological agenda. Although meant to provide the ACWF with enhanced legitimacy and control, it has also caused civil society organisations to be further co-opted and brought under state control. As such, it has resulted in the curtailment of autonomy for the advocacy of women's rights.

The CPC's anti-feminist politics is conjoint with its motivations to stifle ethnic minority cultures and values. Women from marginalised and minority backgrounds face even more unique challenges when it comes to political participation and representation. Interestingly, data reveals that the amalgamation of gender quotas, minority quotas and non-CPC make it more likely for women leaders to be non-Han and non-CPC members than men.[xlv] When viewed from an intersectional lens, barriers to political representation are further compounded — addressing these challenges is of the utmost importance in ensuring a more diverse and inclusive political landscape.

As more women have sought to become public figures, gender-based violence, discrimination and abuse have also increased, both in public and private spaces. Several incidents of gender-based violence were quickly shut down online, with the Party making use of censorship on social media platforms like Weibo. For instance, when a video of a group of men relentlessly beating up women started gaining traction on Weibo, the platform quickly muted and suspended accounts which shared the content, citing that they were "inciting conflict between genders."[xlvi] Furthermore, the increase in the number of women in public life has also become a tool for the objectification and fetishisation of women; with more interest shown in their private lives than in their work and accomplishments, the significance of women's power and influence has been significantly diminished.

The patriarchal structure of media bodies and media portrayals of women in sensationalist overtones and gendered language have undoubtedly negatively impacted women's careers, private lives as well as the fight for gender equality. Fake pro-CPC Twitter accounts have made use of smear campaigns to attack and discredit women of Asian origin who are in the public eye, especially journalists working in Western media and human rights activists.[xlvii] In all these cases, men have never been held accountable — in 2021, tennis player Peng Shuai spoke out about being sexually harassed by retired top CPC official and former Chinese vice-premier, Zhang Gaoli.[xlviii] However, the post was soon deleted and Peng virtually retreated from any public space. On the other hand, while neither Zhang nor the Party made any comments on the matter, Zhang was seen making a public appearance at the 20th Party Congress, suggesting that no action had taken place against him and he had retained his status in the top brass of the Party leadership.

Moving Towards Women Holding Half the Sky

Over 70 years of PRC and 100 years of CPC, China has not been able to achieve gender parity in politics. Although it has improved marginally from the periods of Mao to Xi Jinping, it has still remained largely symbolic. This has severely affected China's women-oriented policies as they had been often compromised when faced against economic considerations. It has also resulted in the implementation of skewed policies with a strong bias towards men and in turn eschewing diverse narratives that would help cultivate a more inclusive and representative political environment for women in China.

To avoid this, China needs to frame policies which can create awareness about gender equality in politics down to the grassroot level and also attract woman to join politics at a young age. This will allow Chinese female leaders to be eligible to assume higher posts within age limits. Secondly, in the short term, China needs to implement stricter quotas to enable greater women participation at all levels of governance. The paucity of enough talent pool of women politicians can be addressed by strengthening training facilities for them which can expose them to different administrative challenges and prepare them for high-profile roles. More importantly, there is a need to address deeper structural, societal and cultural barriers and discriminatory practices that hinder women's political advancement; for continued efforts to be made to overcome these obstacles in women's political participation and representation; and for the achievement of gender equality and effective governance in China. Ultimately, the aim of all these reforms is to enable women leaders to contribute effectively not only in women-oriented policies but also in decisions of national importance. Otherwise, the underrepresentation of women in leadership positions will continue to be a significant weakness of the PRC party-state system for years to come and Mao's promise of women holding up the half sky would only still remain a distant dream.

Social Organizations and State Control: The case study of Domestic Violence Network (DVN) in China

Monika Kumari

Abstract

Domestic violence, often referred to as "wife-beating" is a serious issue in China. Historically inferior status ascribed to women, discriminating effects of economic reforms, withdrawal of state's protection of women's rights were some of the reasons that has led to continuing gender subordination in China. The Fourth United Nations World Conference on Women, hosted by China in Beijing in 1995, marked a pivotal movement in China's engagement with international

women's movements. This event catalysed the growth of women's NGOs, including the establishment of the Beijing-based Network/ Research Centre for Combating Domestic Violence in China (DVN) in 2000. DVN operates at the intersection of gender advocacy and human rights, with a focus on research, gender training, and legal advocacy. Its primary objective has been to advocate for a domestic violence law in China, the result of which was the 2016 Domestic Violence Law.

Despite its popularity and influence, DVN faced political constraints in engaging with the state. Consequently, it has strategically partnered with the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF), acting as a bridge between civil society and the government. This "embedded" approach has yielded substantial progress in advancing DVN's agenda. Under Hu Jintao's "Harmonious society,' the ACWF and other state agencies were more inclined to promote domestic violence prevention and intervention as a "harmony" project, emphasizing domestic violence as a threat to family stability and social harmony rather than as a gender injustice issue or a violation of women's rights alone. This strategy, aligned with Chinese political discourse, aimed to garner broader government and societal support.

State control over the social organizations, including the feminist and rights advocacy groups has grown in recent years, with the government enacting policies to regulate their activities and limit their influence. As DVN and similar organizations continue their gender and human rights advocacy, there is a looming concern that their autonomy may be further curtailed by the state. This paper employs a case study and qualitative research methodology to analyse the impact of social organizations like DVN on Chinese society and the mechanisms of state control placed upon them. It delves into the intricate dynamics between civil society, government entities, and evolving state policies in the context of addressing domestic violence and women's rights in China.

Key words: *Domestic Violence Network (DVN), DV law, ACWF, harmonious society, state control, embedded.*

Introduction

Domestic Violence constitutes a significant public health concern and poses a direct threat to social stability. While many nations dismiss it as a private "family affair," it exerts a profound impact on one's health, overall quality of life, public health, and the well-being of society in general. The term 'domestic violence' or 'violence against women' (VAW) can be defined "any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual, or mental harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life" (WHO 2021).

Violence has been described as a product of the imbalance of power in the context of gender, family, and social relationships (Chan 2009). The number of victims, predominantly, although not exclusively women and minors, have continued to mount in the light of ineffective social, legal, and healthcare systems. The All-China Women Federation in China cited gender bias and discrimination in people's thinking as the fundamental reason behind the various forms of violence against women (ACWF 2009). Statistics reveal that approximately one in three women, on average, falls victim to domestic violence (Su 2022).

In China, the deeply rooted patriarchal social structure and family system have historically shaped the economic and social dynamics within the Chinese society. Chinese culture has traditionally framed a woman's identity within the context of hierarchical relationships, primarily centred around her father, husband, and son (Pearson & Leung 1995). Traditional

Chinese culture has been described as so tolerant of violence at home that violence of all kinds against women, even their killing, is culturally acceptable (Malley Morrison & Hines 2004). But this ignores the effects of the legal system in modern society. Such tolerance may be partially true regarding minor violence, control, psychological abuse, help-seeking behaviour, and professional practice but not necessarily regarding severe violence.

The societal and cultural acceptance of women's subordination is recognized as an important contributing factor to violence against them (Liu 1999). Numerous studies have reported strong relations between patriarchal forms of authority and firmly held beliefs in patriarchal gender relationships and incidents of spousal violence in Chinese populations (Chan 2004; Liu and Chang 2005; Parish et al. 2004; Xu et al. 2005). Furthermore, cultural acceptance of wife abuse (Liu, 1999; Yick & Agbayani-Siewert, 2000), and the absence of legislation categorizing family violence as illegal (Liu & Zhang, 2005), can compel a victim of spousal violence to remain trapped in abusive relationships (Wu et al., 2005). The prevailing cultural belief that family issues should remain strictly private affair further complicates the disclosure of such abuse. When combined with the current inadequacy of resources available to victims, these cultural factors may contribute to a situation of double victimization (Rhind, Leung, & Choi, 1999).

In post-1949 modern China, the People's Republic of China government enshrined the principle of women's equal rights with men across various domains, including politics, economics, culture, education, and social life, within constitutional legal documents (Chen, 1999). However, the realization of true equality in practice has fallen short of legal mandates (Liu 1999; Xu 1997). The government's shortcomings in addressing domestic violence have been a critical concern, particularly due to the insensitivity of the criminal justice system towards the illegal acts, inadequate legislation to combat violence against women, and a lack of inter-departmental coordination to assist victims.

With the implementation of the Open-Door economic policy in place from the late 1970s, China witnessed rapid economic growth and significant social upliftment. These changes positively impacted the social status of women, exemplified by events such as the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995. During this conference, a declaration was passed to empower women and advance gender equality, symbolizing the belief that women can effectively contribute to all facets of society.

The Chinese government has, through the years, revised and improved relevant laws to eliminate and crackdown all forms of violence against Women. The Marriage Law was revised in 2001, explicitly prohibiting domestic violence within marital relationships. Furthermore, the Law on the protection of Women's rights and Interests, revised in 2005, incorporated special provisions addressing violence against women and sexual harassment. In addition to these national legal measures, 25 of China's provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities have independently developed and issued localized laws aimed at preventing and eradicating domestic violence. The National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009-2010) incorporated the prevention and prohibition of domestic violence as an essential part. Similarly, the National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2012-2015) went a step further by proposing "the development of the anti-domestic violence law, the enhancement of mechanisms for multi-sectoral cooperation in domestic violence prevention and control, the integrated system of prevention, deterrence and rescue, and the protection of children from all forms of sexual abuse." In 2008, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Justice jointly issued Several Opinions on the Prevention and Control of Domestic Violence. Besides, the Anti-Domestic Violence Law was included in the legislative work plan of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPC Standing Committee in 2011. However, the

first Anti-domestic Violence Law (DV law) was not passed until December 2015. While there has been a considerable progress in the legislations regarding domestic violence and violation of human rights, much is still needed to be done.

Despite the enactment of the DV law, its impact has fallen short of expectations. Although the passing of the Domestic Violence Law marked a significant milestone for protection of victims in family violence, its effects have remained below expectations. A recently published report concerning family violence court cases in Beijing from March 1, 2016, to the end of February 2021, revealed a total of 320 court verdicts, encompassing civil, criminal, and administrative cases. This averages to only 64 verdicts per year. Notably, there was a peak of 200 verdicts (62.5%) in 2016, the year the law came into effect, followed by a sharp decline to fewer than 60 cases annually from 2017 onwards. Alarmingly, there was just one verdict during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, as reported by the Beijing Yuanzhong Family & Community Development Service Centre (2021).

Nationwide court statistics reveal similar findings, underscoring the inadequate attention given to family violence within the Chinese criminal justice system. Between 2014 and 2016, Chinese courts of various levels reported having handled 94,571 first-instance divorce cases claiming to involve family violence. Notably, only 3,741 (3.96%) cases were later affirmed to have involved family violence (Wei, 2017). As with court case statistics, empirical research on family violence published in the Chinese language is also limited. While Chinese scholars paid increasing attention to family violence in 2016, this attention quickly faded (Zhang et al., 2019). Therefore, a lot is still needed to be done in the area of Domestic Violence in China.

Domestic Violence Issue and the role of social organizations

The founding of the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF) in April 1949 marked the beginning of a golden, though brief, period for feminists in China. By mid-1950s, there were already over 40,000 officials of the ACWF system nationwide working at and above district level. Women in many cities were organized into women congresses and grassroot organizations. However, in 1957 the ACWF suddenly made a conservative turn at the Third National Women's Assembly, departing from its previous policy of mobilizing women to participate in production as a means of achieving women's liberation, and adopting *qinjian jianguo, qinjian chijia* (diligently, thriftily build the country, and diligently, thriftily manage the family) as its central task (Zheng 2006).

It was in the light of the Fourth World Women's Conference held in 1995 in Beijing that led to the establishment of several new women's NGOs in China. Prior to the conference, the Huairou NGO Forum, which convened before the main event, significantly expanded the understanding of NGOs and their operations among the Chinese population. The forum served as a catalyst for fostering cross-cultural exchange and collaboration between western and Chinese women, leading to the establishment of several NGOs in China. These organizations emerged both before and after the Huairou Forum, and they included entities such as the Rural Women Know-All Magazine, the Migrant Women's Club, the Jinglun Family Centre, the Centre for Women's Legal Studies and Legal Services at Peking University, the Centre for Women's Studies at Peking University etc. Others established between 1993 and 1995 included the Association of Women Judges, the Association of Women Prosecutors, the Association of Women Journalists, the Capital City Social Club of Women Professors, the Association of Women Mayors, and the Association of Women Entrepreneurs.

In comparison to the ACWF and its affiliated groups, commonly referred to as government-organized NGOs (GONGOs), these newer women's NGOs in China have emerged as distinct entities. However, it is important to note that these newly formed entities, often referred to as

women's NGOs, were all affiliated with the ACWF as its constituent groups or members. This may have been a strategic choice to navigate the challenging regulatory environment of the People's Republic of China and access resources and support while gradually asserting their independence. In 1996, the ACWF achieved consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Tis had several potential benefits for the affiliated organizations in having a global reach, access to resources, information sharing, funding, and network-building.

NGOs in China have, through several years, been instrumental in protecting women's rights, and providing services for their welfare. They have been helpful in raising awareness about domestic violence as a public health hazard and arranged social and legal help for the victims. The leading NGO in regard is the Centre for Women's Legal Studies and Legal Service of Peking University. In the 15 years since it was founded in 1995, this Centre had dealt with over 3,000 cases nationwide to protect women's rights and interest. They also played a crucial role in advocating for the passage of the Anti-Domestic Violence Law in China, which was enacted in 2016. This law marked a significant milestone in addressing domestic violence by providing legal protections for victims and specifying the responsibilities of law enforcement and social organizations. Other works that these NGOs involve is to conduct research on domestic violence to gather data and evidence on the prevalence and impact of this issue. This research has been used to inform policy discussions and advocate for evidence-based solutions.

Case Study of Domestic Violence Network in China

One of the major products of the 1995 Beijing Conference was the establishment of the Anti-Domestic Violence Network (ADVN) or Beijing Fanbao. The ADVN was the first multi-field and multi-sector network that specialized in domestic violence against women in China. Its vision was to eliminate gender-based violence and create a gender-equal society, propel reform of relevant regulations by researching, training and advocacy. Founded in 2000 by Professor Chen Mingxia of the Academy of Social Sciences along with Beijing professionals and scholars, Domestic Violence Network (DVN) emerged in response to the transnational women's human rights movement against violence against women. The Fourth United Nations World Conference on Women, hosted by China in Beijing in 1995, had brought Chinese activists into an unprecedented level of contact with international Women's movements, nourishing an explosive growth women's NGOs, and broke the silence surrounding the issue of violence against women (VAW), including domestic violence (Howell 2005, Hsiung and Wong 1998). Through the Beijing declaration and Platform for Action, the transnational women's human rights movement mainstreamed the gender and human rights perspectives into international policy documents, drawing particular attention to VAW as a serious rights abuse (Fraser 2001). Following the Beijing Conference, domestic violence began to attract more research and policy attention. (Xu Campell & Zhu)

ADVN connected the existing non-governmental women organizations via the Internet, using network to build an information-sharing platform for the cooperation of various gender equality organizations. This meant that previously existing gender equality organizations could share resources, and a common response to "domestic violence" could be discussed. ADVN was the first and the only popular women's NGO in China taking on the issue of domestic violence as its exclusive focus on research and activism. Since its inception, ADVN had been organized around a broad set of programs aiming at preventing and intervening against domestic violence through multiple measures and approaches. In 2000, the ADVN was affiliated under the China Law society (CLS). It was a common practice that organizations affiliate themselves under the name of an official organization in order to legitimize themselves politically. Chen Mingxia explained that associating with the CLS was done as legislation is fundamental for the Anti-Domestic Violence movement. Secondly, the China Law Association had ready access to the

essential, relevant government branches like legislative, juridical, and public security offices and is trusted by them. Therefore, NGO such as ADVN could use creative, non-confrontational ways of persuading officials to accept their ideas. However, DVN was committed to promoting organizational specialization following the examples of international NGOs and maintain its independent identity and operation as an NGO. Its recruitment and capital operation were independent, and every year accepted audit inspection from the investors. (Dong, 2015).

The structure of ADVN was free, open, and democratic. It was open to any individual or organization that wants to contribute to the shared goal of stopping domestic abuse of women. Strategic goals are set and big decisions are made democratically among representatives across the network, no matter how much debate surrounds issues. This kept ADVN members active and committed to implementing plans. Its structure was comparatively relaxed and when it applied for funding from its main four donors, that is, the Ford Foundation, Oxfam Netherlands, the Swedish International Cooperation Development Agency, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, and other organizations, it did it as "teams of experts" or through individual network members. Among these organizations, the Ford Foundation's was the greatest supporter because of part of its program officers' specific interest in the fight against violence against women. The foundation also played a key role in coordinating and lobbying for other sources of funding.

The Network's operations can be divided into different phases. In its First phase (2000-2003), the Network came with a project called "Countermeasures Studies and Interventions in the Fight Against Domestic Violence." This was carried out under the auspices of the "Project Management Committee." 2003 onwards the ADVN's management model changed from the "Project Management Committee" to the more universally used method by international NGOs, of the "Board + Implementation Body" model. The board was composed of women studies experts and feminist movement activists that met once every three months to listen to the ADVN's quarterly work reports and made decisions on the major discussion issues and strategic planning. The implementation body's daily management and strategic planning was separate, set up with one director and a few full-time project officers responsible for specific aspects of the project. In 2005, the ADVN carried out their first strategic planning meeting to determine the organization's vision of the future, mission goals, operations management, and defined their work for the five years ahead. In the same year, they repeatedly participated in NGO development training courses run by Winrock International, attending courses covering areas such as financial affairs, team cooperation, board capacity building, and others.

In 2009, the ADVN carried out their second strategic planning session, reaffirming their organization's mission and management structure. By that time, the network had taken part in all kinds of advocacy and training projects, and counted 71 group members' covering the entire nation's 28 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions (including 37 women's federations' rights protection departments at all levels, as well as 24 separate hotlines for anti-domestic violence help, women's shelters, assorted legal services centers, and other grassroots NGO institutions), with over a hundred members active in the fields of law, psychology, social work, journalism and communications, NGOs and other individual members of the network-based community organizing.

The formation of this NGO signals a conscientious effort among the Chinese activists to move the issue of domestic violence to the vanguard of the women's movement's agenda in China; thus, DVN is not only a member but also an organizer of what Milwertz and Bu (2007) describe as the "epistemic community focused on domestic violence "in China. As Milwertz and Bu also point out, this epistemic community has developed through Chinese activists' exchanges with

international feminist activism; thus unsurprisingly, it subscribes to the gender and human rights framework promoted by the transnational women's human rights movement, which spearheaded the international feminist anti-gender violence campaign (Bunch 1995, Bunch et al. 2001).
However, ADVN also faced several challenges throughout its journey as an independent NGO operating under a strict regime. On May 18th, 2014, ADVN/ Beijing Fanbao announced that their fourteen years of work had finally come to an end. At this time, the State Council had already included domestic violence legislation in the working plan for 2014. After more than a decade of advocacy by NGOs such as ADVN and other women activists, China's national Anti-Domestic Violence Law finally came into effect in March 2016.

Challenges to ADVN: Dual Identity and State Control
ADVN evolved into an organization with one foot in the political system and the other in the NGO world and faced multiple difficulties because of this dual identity. This identity had a positive impact during the organization's developmental process, but in the end suppressed the Network's ability to adapt to changes of social development. Where it allowed the ADVN to rely on support inside the system to carry out its NGO work, the system's indecision in bringing change also led it to lose legitimacy, causing all the projects to face difficulties. Also, because of Chinese social norms, relying on members from the system's elite to establish the implementation body of the organization, and using the decision-making processes common to international NGOs led to "decision making without responsibilities," causing many staff to leave. The dual identity is also reflected in the ADVN's financing and working model. It relied on international funding in the long run, and carried out anti-domestic violence advocacy by cooperating with government-related organizations and departments. When the pattern of international funding, the development of Chinese civil society and the public welfare sector started to change, this model began to become problematic.

For a long time, the Anti Domestic Violence Network did not have an independent Industry and Commerce registration, instead it always relied on its connection to the semi-official China Law Society, making it a "civil society organization with a foot in the political system". These kinds of organizations were common in China at the time, therefore the ADVN can be considered a good example of this trend. This tactic had serious advantages, as the China Law Society is associated with 25 other mass organizations such as the Chinese Federation of Literary and Art Circles and the Chinese Writers Association, among others. Placed directly under the State Council's leadership, the China Law Society's president is often a retired leader of the Supreme People's Court or of the Supreme People's Procuratorate. In the Chinese context, such organization is nearly a government body, but to the international foundations, the China Law Society appeared at least nominally as a mass organization and its governmental ties were trivial compared to the Women's Federation's. On the other hand, by relying on the name of the China Law Society, the ADVN's projects were carried out smoothly, especially within the public security, prosecution, and legal departments. Therefore, from 2000 to 2010, the ADVN always stayed on good terms with the China Law Society.

However, at the end of 2010, due to revisions in the country's foreign exchange management policy passed the year before, the China Law Society became unable to accept donations from foreign sources. The ADVN had no other choice than to cut ties with it and register with Industry and Commerce as "Beijng Fanbao." This shows that the ADVN's tactics emphasized seeking approval within the system, in order to reduce risk and secure authoritativeness and legitimacy for the work carried out. However, due to China's current transitional period, the changes in and of the political and economic system, as well as the system's inherent unpredictability, even the most conservative risk-taking strategies cannot guarantee a stable future. That is how

China's strict disruption between foreign exchange and NGO management in 2009 led to the passive termination of the previously positive collaboration between the ADVN and the China Law Society.

Other women's organizations like the Women's Legal Aid also lost their affiliated identity within the system. Perhaps this was not always a fatal blow to their influence. For example, the Peking University's Women's Legal Aid Center (now registered as the Beijing Zhongze Women's Legal Consulting Services Center continues to operate to this day, with a great deal of influence among women's NGOs. But the ADVN and the Center are different, as when the Network launched its policy items, it needed a high degree of collaboration from the Women's Federation departments as well as public security departments, prosecution, and legal departments across the country. Therefore, the loss of its affiliation with the Law Society represented a much bigger issue than the loss of Peking University's support for the Center, since the ADVN's works was much more dependent on the country's political and administrative apparatus, while the Center's essential mission was to provide legal aid to women.

Since the founding of the ADVN, it was hoped that it would provide a new model for NGO management. Through the high level of separation between decision-making and implementation, organizations could overcome the common problem of having power concentrated in the hands of one person with other members following orders. Overall, the Anti-Domestic Violence Network's efforts in this regard have been very successful. The image the public has of the ADVN is that of the organization itself, rather than of one leader.

The ADVN's decision-making branch, the board, had become increasingly elitist. A vast majority of the board members were scholars from the country's most prestigious schools and from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences as well as senior leaders and experts in the women's movement. They worked mostly in the areas of law, media, and women's studies. As a gender equality organization that strived to advance progressive ideals, accruing top talent was not a problem, as it provided valuable social capital. However, considering that most of these elite members came from within the system, had various sources of stable income, and high levels of education and social capital, NGO work tended to be merely an activity they did in their spare time. That is to say, the success of the organization was not necessarily each board member's top priority nor a matter of life and death.

Similar to other civil society organizations in China affected by the 'Colour Revolution' and later the 'Jasmin Revolution,' women's NGOs in China have faced several challenges. This is caused by the restrictive policies of the Chinese government, which is trying to resist foreign interventions in China. As a result, the number of women's NGOs in China is declining. Many influential Chinese NGOs that are financially supported by foreign funds, such as Gongmeng founded by XU Zhiyong, the Center for Women's Legal Studies and Legal Service of Peking University headed by GUO Jianmei, and Aizhixing (for helping people with AIDS) headed by WAN Yanhai have come under suspicion. Since the 'Colour Revolution,' particularly since the 'Jasmin Revolution,' NGOs with foreign support or foreign related background have been negatively affected or even dissolved. For instance, the Center for Women's Legal Studies and Legal Service of Peking University was detached from the University in 2010. It had to register in another name, that is, Zhongze Center for Women's Legal Consultation Service. Less than six years later, on 1 February 2016, the Center was shut down and there appears to be little hope of reopening soon. Gongmeng was dismissed when its head XU Zhiyong was arrested and then sentenced to four years in prison. The head of Aizhixing is now a political refugee in the United States though his institute still exists, at least its web site is accessible. Furthermore, the

women's NGOs in China were taken aback when "China's Feminist Five" were arrested on 7 March 2015, one day before the 2015 Global Women's Summit held at the United Nations. They were detained on suspicion of "picking quarrels and provoking trouble" after planning a multi-city protest aimed at bringing an end to sexual harassment on public transport. Women's NGOs in China were threatened although the action by Chinese authorities was not focused on gender.

The ADVN also faced a hard time being one of the most popular NGOs that specially advocated against Domestic Violence. In 2009, the Chinese government tightened the policy about social organizations receiving foreign capital, thus cancelling DVN from CLS. ADVN also received funding from four international foundations since its founding. They provided substantial grants with three-year funding periods, giving stable and reliable support. This funder-recipient relationship on the one hand allowed the ADVN to operate on a large scale, conducting various training across regions and departments. In 2009, the global financial crisis caused international foundations to significantly reduce their support for Chinese organizations (For example, the grants given by the Ford Foundation reportedly shrank to what they were in 1979.). The continued support of our projects had already been made more complicated when, for various reasons, policies restricting foreign donations to social organizations were tightened. The ADVN had no choice but to leave the China Law Society and seek independent Industry and Commerce registration.

The women's NGOs in China were also negatively affected by China's Law on the Management of the Activities of Overseas NGOs within Mainland China since foreign foundations, the major donors of Chinese NGOs, are also defined by that law as NGOs. According to Article 5 of the Law, foreign foundations must not engage in or fund political activities. Since the concept of "political activities" is broad and hard to define, and since human rights and politics are so closely related, it will be much harder for women's NGOs in China to get funds from foreign foundations when that law applies.

In such a situation, Women NGOs are trying their best to continue their undertakings by changing policies. For instance, the NGOs like Maple operate while keeping close relation with the ACWF. The All-China Women's Federation (ACWF) is a state-sponsored organization in China that focuses on women's rights and gender equality. It has close ties to the Chinese government and is often seen as a key advocate for women's issues within the framework of the Chinese Communist Party. Some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or advocacy groups may choose to work with government-affiliated organizations like the ACWF to have a more significant impact and access to resources. In some cases, advocacy groups may choose to work within the existing political and social framework rather than explicitly challenging it. By aligning their goals with the government's priorities, they may believe they can achieve more concrete results for the causes they champion. Another alternative is to keep a low profile or limit their activities to research, education and training and then wait and see the results of the implementation of the Law on the Management of the Activities of Overseas NGOs within Mainland China. Due to the sensitivity of the concept of human rights, Chinese human rights NGOs try to balance between trying to desensitize their activities to get permission from the authorities, while worrying that what they are doing may have the effect of strengthening the sensitivity of human rights in China.

Implementation of the DV Law & role of NGOs

One of the major achievements of ADVN along with other NGOs and activists was the promulgation of the Domestic Violence law (DV) in 2016. This law defines DV as the "infringing of physical, psychological or other harm by a family member on another by beating,

trussing, injury, restraint and forcible limits on personal freedom, recurring verbal abuse, threats and other means." The definition covers not only marital relations but also cohabitating partners and family members. The DV law also highlights special protection for DV victims who are minors, the elderly, the disabled, pregnant, and lactating women, and seriously ill patients. However, this law provides a relatively narrow definition of DV and it does not include sexual violence and economic control, which are equally prevalent forms of DV. The DV law also clearly excludes violence against former spouses and intimate partners who are not living together, and it is ambiguous whether the law is applicable to same-sex partners or not.

Since the enactment of the DV law, NGOs in China have played a very proactive role in supporting its implementation. On the other hand, China's government responded at a comparatively slower pace to the need for improving the quality of implementation of the DV law, such as strengthening the capacity of law enforcers. Other stakeholders like employers have remained unaware of the DV Law and their responsibilities form preventing and addressing the impact of DV in the workplace even though the DV law states that employers should take anti-DV actions.

Women's organizations are the most active actors for implementing the DV Law, particularly NGOs that focus on gender-based violence. They have conducted evaluations of the implementation of the DV law on various scales. For example, Beijing Equality, which was co-founded by one of the co-authors of this article, has developed four evaluation reports regarding implementation progress of the DV law after one year, twenty months, two-year and four-year points, respectively. NGOs have also carried out considerable capacity building activities for relevant stakeholders including police, lawyers, social workers, community officials, counsellors, media professionals, as well as peer supporters to strengthen their services provided to DV.

In addition, women's NGOs have been working on DV issues in many marginalized groups, such as disabled women, women living with HIV/AIDS, and Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) groups. NGOs have shared findings and policy recommendations from these studies with representatives from the National People's Congress to call their attention and advocate for future policy change. Several NGOs also carried out sensitization activities for service providers to address DV from a marginalized groups' perspective and built capacity for women living with HIV/AIDS, LGBTI and disabled women on preventing and responding to DV.

Despite the progress made during the past four years, there are still considerable challenges in effectively implementing the DV Law. There is a lack of comprehensive rules or guidance for implementation at the national level, which is needed to clarify detailed procedures, specific responsibilities, and division of labour among different government departments for amore coordinated and collaborative response to DV.

Beijing Equality in their evaluation report stated that police officers in many places were still not aware of their responsibilities of issuing written warnings or the procedures. It is not uncommon for police officers to ignore the request from the survivors for issuing warning letters or not to even file their complaints. Unless serious injuries are involved, the police usually refuse to assist the survivors to go to hospital, examine injuries, apply for protection orders on their behalf, or refer them to other available services. Even if the police are called and discover misdemeanour assaults, they are directed to mediate 'disputes' among family members (Han 2017). In comparison to US and England, law enforcement intervention into DV is much rarer in China. Until recently, DV was almost exclusively resolved through informal mediation by family members, employers, and quasigovernmental organisations such as the Women's Federation and village and neighbourhood committees. In the past few years, formal legal

interventions by police and the courts have assumed a more visible role through Central and local initiatives, but mediation remains a cornerstone of China's DV intervention strategy (Han 2017; Palmer 2017). Even in cases of misdemeanour assaults that legally can subject perpetrators to administrative detentions of 15 days or less, police are directed to mediate 'disputes' among family members (Han 2017). As a result, police intervention has not generally been considered a legitimate and effective approach to addressing domestic abuse in China.

There is also a limited number of issued protection orders. The approval rate of protection orders was sixty-three percent in 2018. In addition, because of the conservative definition of DV in the DV Law, the protection order is rarely applicable or available to former partners or divorced couples who may still suffer from incidents of domestic violence. Local government departments and courts lack necessary human resources and expertise to properly implement judicial means, such as issuing the protection order or conducting follow up actions to ensure compliance by abusers and protection of victims.

Impact of COVID-19 on Domestic Violence in China

The onset on COVID-19 pandemic had further exacerbated the issue of domestic violence across the world. Lockdowns had left many women trapped with their abusers and exposed them to great danger. As per the United Nations report, since the outbreak of COVID 19, all types of violence against women and girls, particularly domestic violence, had intensified, with shelters at capacity and helplines in some places seeing a five-fold increase in calls. UN Women executive, Director Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka said "Men's violence against women is also a pandemic- one that pre-dates the virus and will outlive it. It too needs our global, coordinated response and enforceable protocols. It too affects vast populations of all ages." Situations could be even more pronounced in countries like China, where though domestic violence is prevalent, there is a dearth of research, such as intervention studies, to address the issue (Su 2022).

In the early days of the pandemic, for instance, police records show that in Jinali city, Hubei province, China, there was a three-fold hike of domestic violence cases influenced heavily by the pandemic and its prevention measures. Cases had doubled in January 2020 in comparison to January 2019 (Zhang 2020). In February 2020, when 162 instances of family violence were reported, the numbers had tripled in comparison to the year before. Males accounted for 97.44% of the perpetrators and females accounted for 94.67% of the victims, indicating that women are more vulnerable to such violence (Cao and Feng 2020). In Qianjiang, another rural county in Hubei province devastated by the COVID-19 pandemic, the local police department recorded 85 and 83 cases of family violence in January and February, respectively, which were double the numbers from the same period in 2019 (Xiong 2020). The unprecedented outbreak and continuous spread of the COVID-19 virus starting in December 2019 resulted in a strict lockdown and nationwide long-term home isolation, which has possibly led to increased levels of family violence in China. A Beijing-based NGO dedicated to combating violence against women, Equality, reported a surge in calls to its help line since early February, when the government locked down cities in Hubei Province, then the outbreak's epicentre.

Family violence has increased not only in the Hubei province but across China. Guangdong, a coastal province in south China that is the most populous and has the largest economy, also imposed a strict lockdown. This province then reported coastal prefecture located in south Guangdong, a local women's rights advocacy centre received 42 complaints of family violence during January and February, which is an increase of 20% when compared with the same period from the previous year.

Family violence has been proven to have a significant effect on divorce (Bowlus and Seitz 2006; Ellis and Stuckless 2006; Supreme People's Court of China 2018). The likelihood of abused

women divorcing their spouses is 1.7–5.7 times higher than among women with no history of abuse (Bowlus and Seitz 2006). According to the latest report released by the Supreme People's Court of China in 2018 entitled "Judicial Big Data Special Report on Divorce Disputes," the country's divorce rate has steadily climbed for 15 consecutive years since 2003 (Supreme People's Court of China 2018). A total of 4.461 million divorce cases were processed in 2018, which represents an annual increase of 2.0% (Ministry of Civil Affairs of China 2019). The report further stated that family violence was reported in 14.86% divorce cases, among which 91.43% were cases of violence against women (Supreme People's Court of China 2018).

It is worth noting that the divorce rates in China peak every year after the Spring Festival, suggesting that longer periods of reunion may stimulate or aggravate existing conflicts among family members. For example, in the period from 2013 to 2018, the divorce rate was two times higher than usual within one month after the Spring Festival (Tian 2020). This pattern seems to have been transferred onto the long-term lockdown. After the two-month lockdown was finished, the number of divorces in China surged in March. Some examples of this can be seen in Xi'an, the capital city of Shaanxi province, and other cities, including all four tier-one metropolises (Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Shenzhen) with populations of 20-30 million people, indicating an emerging divorce wave across the country (Deese 2020; Fang 2020; Zhang 2020).
The nationwide lockdown and orders to stay at home during the COVID-19 pandemic forced victims to live in constant proximity with perpetrators, resulting in increased opportunities for and the aggravation of family violence. Moreover, in cases where family violence already existed before the COVID-19 pandemic, the lockdown and isolation may have worsened the situation. It is therefore important to evaluate how police officers, prosecutors, and judges respond to the family violence at the onset and during the COVID-19 crisis and ensure that the local and national authorities take immediate attention to such cases.

Way Forward
Domestic Violence in China is an enormous and multi-faceted issue. It is intertwined with traditional Chinese beliefs favouring gender inequality and family unity and with current political and economic changes. Since 1980, there has been a growing movement of activism that began to break the silence on domestic violence and to campaign for laws and services to protect and support survivors' rights and lives. NGOs like ADVN and others have spent decades advocating for the Anti-Domestic Violence Law that was finally passed in 2015. With the passing of the law, Domestic violence has gradually started to become a public discourse rather than a private family matter.

However, China still faces a few challenges including traditional beliefs and values about gender roles, a narrow definition of domestic violence, continuing reliance on informal mediation as an intervention strategy and other problems (Du 2021). Categorizing domestic violence as a "family affair" is a key barrier to domestic violence research development in China. It prevents public and policymakers from understanding the full scale and scope of domestic violence in China. Mistreating domestic violence crimes as "family affairs" is a vital manifestation of the deep-rooted cultural influences in China, ranging from traditional Confucian beliefs in social harmony to the assumed social norms of not interfering with other people's businesses (Su 2022).

Based on the imbalanced progress of implementation of the DV Law and its challenges, NGOs and practitioners urge the National People's Congress to carryout law enforcement investigations, inspections, and issue national level implementation guidelines for the DV law. The definition of DV should include sexual violence, economic control, and DV against a

former spouse; elaborate specific procedures for granting protection orders; written warning letters and mandatory reporting; clarify roles and responsibilities among all stakeholders including the leading agency in facilitating the cooperation among different departments in a coordinated response. These efforts will ensure that benefits of DV reaches every household and every individual in a timely manner.

Mass media and digital media also plays an important role in turning the tide against domestic violence. People's mindset has been changing due to the persistent lobbying and campaigning conducted by dedicated activists and determined women's rights groups. Although many accounts of feminists' groups have been suspended on micro-blogging accounts, many still operate to generate awareness among the people. Digital activism or cyber-activism represents a new paradigm used to build up an online community, connect with other users and spread a message within and beyond country borders. Although, there is still a huge part of society that has no access to the online sphere, digital activism may provide a space and a platform to empower marginalized voices. The #MeToo campaign can be understood as the zenith of the previous social media campaigns to denounce sexual harassment and gender violence, worldwide.

Apart from this, the government should strengthen the current mechanism of government-led cross-sectoral cooperation to fight against violence against women, and increase gender awareness among those working for police, courts, judicial organs, procuratorial organs, educational departments, health departments, media, social services, etc. in its gender mainstreaming strategy to improve cooperation among these relevant departments and ensure women's equal and legitimate rights. The government should also set up more shelters, improve the current reporting system and support system for victims so that the abused women could receive timely and effective assistance and support, including medical help and psychological assistance. With these small but consistent efforts, domestic violence in China can be tackled systematically.

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Deepening of Surveillance in China and India's Initiation: Comparative Study of Contact Tracing Applications during the Pandemic[2]

Rakshit Kweera

Abstract

The Covid-19 pandemic proved to be a watershed movement in the history of humankind. China, where the virus is supposed to have originated, deployed quick response health code as an essential feature of pandemic management. Available in popular apps such as WeChat and Alipay, the citizens are profiled into red, green, and yellow risk codes, with the red code restricting access to public places and provisions for immediate isolation. Response code built on sophisticated information infrastructure known as Internet Plus and Urban Grid Management System (wanggehua guanli), a net-based surveillance system. Reports are indicating that the government is revamping the response code feature and implementing it in other governance mechanisms even after the pandemic. On the other hand, India also experimented with contact tracing applications during the pandemic with the Aarogya Setu application launched by the central government. The application based on location data surveillance didn't have the intended impact, as the physical surveillance mode dominated India's pandemic management response. In this paper, I will be doing a comparative study of China's quick response health code and the Aarogya Setu application of India to discuss the penetration of surveillance in both countries. This paper also aims to bring the non-western perspective of surveillance in two of the world's most populous countries with complex political and social structures.

Keywords*: Surveillance, India, China, Contact Tracing, Pandemic, Aarogya Setu, Quick Response Health Code*

Introduction

Covid-19 pandemic is a watershed moment in the history of mankind. It posed serious questions, the solutions of which were not easily available. The fate of the developed and developing countries was no different as both had to grapple with this emergency afresh and upgrade and rebuild existing infrastructures and services. On the whole, economically wealthy countries and those viewed as having excellent medical technology and health systems had a higher rate of Covid-19 deaths than countries without those advantages, at least at the relatively early stage of this pandemic. China is believed to be the originating country of the virus, with cases being detected as early as December 2019. On 20 January 2020, the Spring Festival holiday was interrupted by a nationwide lockdown that sought to intercept the flow of many people likely to spread a newly discovered disease. During this time, at least 760 million residents were confined within their households (Hessler, 2020). India was late entrant to the scene with the first case of novel Coronavirus was reported on 30th January 2020, a student studying at Wuhan University belonging to Kerala's Thrissur district. India reported its first death due to Coronavirus on 12th March 2020, one day after WHO declared COVID-19 as a pandemic. The unique feature of this pandemic has been the technological intervention: in disease surveillance, physical containment of population, and overall pandemic management. The novelty of this

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new national form of surveillance technology leveraged active consent from citizens with mobile phones to form citizen-bodies-device networks that emanate what we term a *corona* of public health surveillance (Yang et.al, 2021). The mobile application specifically the deployment of contact tracing application became the first technological intervention which every country in the world undertook. It will interesting to see how two of the world's largest populace China and India dealt with this technology.

Quick Response Health Code

Quick Response Health Code (QRHC) was pioneered in Shenzhen and Hangzhou provinces by Tencent's WeChat and Alibaba's Alipay, in collaboration with local governments, and launched on 9 February 2020 and 11 February 2020 respectively, just days after Wuhan was in full lockdown from 23 January 2020. Alipay's health code was developed upon "DingTalk employee health code", a corporate internal system to monitor and manage its employees as they returned to work after the Chinese New Year national holidays (24 January-2 February 2020) to prevent COVID outbreak at the workplace. Such a corporate initiative quickly evolved into a local government project at the request of the Yuhang District of Hangzhou (where the headquarter of Alibaba Group is located) on 4 February 2020 to Alibaba to develop a system for effectively managing residential compound lockdowns. Before releasing the health code, Tencent and Alibaba, "had already developed real-time pandemic maps and apps to minimize exposure, conduct e-health queries, influence public opinion, and facilitate decision-making for critical medical resource allocation" (Chen et al. 2022, p. 2).

Seeking national intervention on 29 February 2020 a national health code called "Epidemic Prevention Health Code" was launched on the website (www.gjzwfw. gov. cn) and application of the General Office of the State Council. It used information reported by individuals and system-generated data from three dimensions—spatial (where one has been), temporal (how many times and how long one has been to a COVID hotspot), and relational (who are the close contacts)—to produce three coloured codes: green, yellow and red. The health code mini apps on WeChat and Alipay covered all 33 administrative regions in Mainland China. Since May 2021, a golden colour was added to indicate one's vaccination status, as a golden rim, a golden mascot in the middle, or a golden tag of "fully vaccinated" under or next to the user's name.

Aarogya Setu

India is the emerging market of the digital revolution. The country already has more than 700 million smartphone users, and over 40 percent of the population is internet users. The first step of the Indian Government after national lockdown was to introduce a contact tracing mobile application called 'Araogya Setu' on 2 April 2020. The Application works on contact tracing method and helps the government in early identification, monitoring, and mitigation of the COVID-19 pandemic. This was the fastest growing mobile application with 100 million installs in 13 days of launch. Application is developed by NITI Ayog, National Informatics Centre (NIC), Indian Institute of Sciences (IISC), Indian Institute of Technology Madras, along with other private players like 1mg, Make My Trip (MMT), Goibibo, etc under the aegis of Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEITY). Aarogya Setu (AS) is designed to keep track of other app users with whom a person comes in contact. It then alerts app users if any of the contacts test positive for COVID-19. The app uses the phone's Bluetooth and GPS capabilities. It will record all other AS users that it detected nearby using Bluetooth. It will also use a GPS log of all the places the device had been at 15-minute intervals. These records are stored on the phone till the time any user tests positive or declares symptoms of COVID-19 in a self assessment survey in the app. In such cases, the records are uploaded to the server.

The data collected by the AS app is broadly divided into four categories — demographic data, contact data, self-assessment data and location data. This is collectively called response data.

The Aarogya Setu Data Access and Knowledge Sharing Protocol was issued by the Chairperson, Empowered as Data Management) of Group 9 (on Technology and Data Management) on 10th May 2020. The protocol was issued to ensure secure data collection by the AS mobile application, protection of personal data of individuals, and the efficient use and sharing of personal or non-personal data for mitigation and redressal of the COVID-19 pandemic. AS was the official contact tracing application of India which was used in parallel to the contact tracing applications of various state governments such as 'Corona Watch' of Karnataka and 'Quarantine Monitor' of Tamil Nadu.

Methodology (Comparative Study)

For the present study, I will be using a comparative analysis method in which I compare a single case that is the contact tracing application of India: Aarogya Setu and of China: Quick Response Health Code. By comparative study of these two applications, I will chart the commonalities and differences in the administrative structures, institutions, digital infrastructures, civil society/citizens response, and future scope of these applications. Comparison of some selected parameters will give us a larger overview of the socio-political system of surveillance in both countries. For the present scope of analysis, I have limited my comparisons to these parameters only.

Administrative Authority and Accountability in India and China

After the initial breakdown of the virus in Wuhan, China had to face a lot of legitimacy crisis. The government was criticised for a lackadaisical approach in dealing with the virus. However the CCP (Communist Party of China) was quick to assess the situation and deal with it. The approach was two-pronged. At the first level, the CCP exercised political authority and took legitimate responsibility for dealing with the crisis. Guo (2022) calls this the Party-State-Society triangle in China. When the pandemic emerged, the party-state-society triangle allowed the central authority to impute blames to the local state cadres, present itself as a benign, paternalistic arbiter, and claim the leadership to mobilize the whole society against the pandemic, hence preserving its political legitimacy and improving controls over the state apparatus. Later, responsibilities and authority were delegated to over four million grid managers who police over 650,000 communities nationwide.

The 'gridded management system' is officially claimed as an 'innovative governance model' embodying the idea of co-governance (*gongzhi*) and assuming the role of grassroots self-management and autonomous governance. This system was first experimentally implemented in cities within or around Zhejiang province at the beginning of the 2000s when Xi Jinping was the top leader of Zhejiang province and was expanded nationwide after Xi came to power in late 2012. As shown in the official slogan of 'dissolving small disputes within the grid and big conflicts within the community' (*xiaoshi buchu wangge, dashi buchu shequ*), the proclaimed goal of the gridded management system is to 'preserve social stability via dissolving disputes at the local community level (Gang, 2018).

This 'gridded management' system played a key role in China's reverse course in containing the epidemic. According to the report by the State Council on 11 February 2020, after the outbreak, there were only nearly four million community workers in the 650,000 communities nationwide. Yet relying on the 'gridded management' system, under the official slogan of 'winning the People's War against the epidemic,' a Maoist-styled mass movement was effectively mobilized. For instance, in Shanghai, according to the official statistics, between 28 January and 3 March 2020, over 200,000 volunteers took part in 6,786 volunteer service items

– on average, every volunteer worked for over 40 hours in total[3]. The Chinese authorities are adept at utilizing the 'disaster nationalism' such as 'disasters regenerate a nation' (*duo nan xing bang*) and 'China, add oil' to divert citizens' attention, criticism or dissatisfaction with the government to the governments' efforts (e.g. the 'People's War') and, most significantly, to the citizen's responsibility, fidelity and even sacrifice in supporting and cooperating with the government's efforts (Zhang, 2020).

In India, Health is a state subject, but during the pandemic the central government invoked many laws to control the severe health emergency. After Covid-19 cases increased, the central government invoked the Disaster Management Act 2005. A nationwide lockdown of 21 days was declared on 25March 2020 by the Modi Government and was then extended until 31 May 2020. On 1 May 2020, the Ministry of Home Affairs, in its guidelines after the nationwide lockdown was extended (third phase), made AS mandatory for employees of private as well as public sector offices, failing which it would invite penal action under the Disaster Management Act, 2005 as well as under Sec. 188 of Indian Penal Code. It mandated the local authorities to ensure 100% coverage of the app in containment zones. The guidelines were issued by the National Executive Committee set up under the National Disaster Management Act (NDMA), 2005.

At a press conference on 26 May 2020, NITI Ayog CEO announced that the code and bug Bounty program for the application are now open source. Few weeks earlier on 11th May, MEITY had released the Aarogya Setu Data Access and Knowledge Sharing Protocol. This protocol also removed ban on reverse engineering and allows retention of contact, location and self assessment data for up to 180 days. Both these measures were raised by privacy advocates from the inception of the application. Several other issues were also dealt by central government with regards to AS. For instance, server data for all users who have not tested positive for COVID-19 to be purged 45 days after they were uploaded, and the data for those who have tested positive will be removed 60 days after recovery. Nevertheless, according to the Government of India, based on preliminary data, it was found that among the Aarogya Setu app users who were recommended testing, 24% were found COVID-19 positive, nearly fivefold higher compared to the overall COVID-19 positivity rate in the country. The application also helped civic authorities of the country to identify the disease trends and map containment zones within their cities[4].

The state government and local municipal administration also dealt with the pandemic within their jurisdictions. As stated earlier, various state governments launched their contact tracing application, sometimes making it mandatory to avail of certain services. The Indian Government also requested all state governments to invoke the Epidemic Disease Act (EDA) of 1897 to address the COVID-19 emergency. The Odisha State government brought an ordinance, which provides that any person violating the epidemic regulation shall be imprisoned for 2 years and given a fine of Rs. 10,000. Similarly "the Telangana Epidemic Disease (COVID-19) Regulation 2020" was passed by Telangana government. These were state-specific laws dealing with the pandemic.

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[3] Wu Yu, Xu Xiaoqing and Wang Jingyuan, 'Shanghai ershi yu wan ming yiqing fangkong zhiyuanzhe nuli jianxing zhiyuan fuwujingshen' ['Over 200,000 COVID-19 Volunteers in Shanghai Endeavor to Fulfill the Spirit of Volunteer Service'], *Xinhua Net*,4 March 2020, accessed 19 July 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/local/2020-03/04/c_1125662136.htm.

[4] Patel L. Aarogya Setu app data is helping AMC identify potential hotspots. Ahmedabad Mirror; 2020 June 15; available at https://ahmedabadmirror.indiatimes.com/ahmedabad/others/aarogyasetu-app-data-is-helping-amc-identify-potential-hotspots/articleshow/76376752.cms (last accessed 26 Jun 2020).

The local administration or the city administration was a vital unit regarding pandemic management in India. Although the District Magistrate was tasked with implementing the laws and given the jurisdiction to declare the area as a containment zone and restrict access, the panchayats and city administration played a vital role in the pandemic. The panchayats across the country was involved in awareness campaigns, food security, providing health kits to the poor, building quarantine centres for the poor migrants, and others. The influx of unprecedented migrant's population from the cities to the villages was a challenge, the management of which was the responsibility of the panchayats. The city municipal administration similarly produced many success models[5] during the pandemic. Agra city model to provide door step delivery of essential services in 100 wards was appreciated, Ranchi's 'Tatpar' initiative – assigning dedicated vehicles to pick travelling migrants from various locations, provide footwear, food and medicines, conduct screening for COVID and facilitate transport to other neighbouring dates, and Pathnamthitta Corona RM' software to create a database of Covid patients and their contacts to name a few.

Physical and Digital Surveillance Infrastructure of India and China

It is generally argued that the adoption of new surveillance technologies invades privacy, marginalizes the disadvantaged, and harms political freedom (Brayne, 2020). In China the Social Credit System (SCS) is one such mechanism which has penetrated the length and breadth of Chinese society. SCSs can be classified into two categories, market-centered SCS and state-centered SCS. Whereas market-centered SCS work similarly to their western counterparts, the unique feature is the state-centered SCS. It has two common forms. First is the blacklist system, which surveils severe laws and norm-breaking behaviours. In this form, the citizens are given SCSs based on their lawful behaviour. Second is municipal SCS developed by municipal governments, where citizens are given credit scores based on performance in their civic life. For example, mistreating one's parents and running a red light are included in many municipal SCSs' metrics. The state SCSs have invented many new punishments to increase deterrence (Liu, 2022). These include travel bans, school bans, reduced employment prospects, and public shaming. Apart from blacklist there is also a 'redlist' maintained by the state which is called the reward list. The redlisting allows citizens certain privileges in their day to day life. SCSs work with the help of surveillance technologies which are integrated into the SCS system. Artificial Intelligence (AI) facial recognition software is said to be currently utilized in tandem with over 200 million surveillance cameras in China. These large scale measures give the Chinese state the capacity to track every facet of life of the citizens. The AI software also alerts the authorities when violations have occurred such as writing and sharing anti-government ideologies. The technology can also identify videos of anti government protest and block users from viewing them.

Internet Plus roadmap started in 2015 to integrate cloud computing, big data, and Internet of Things with various industries such as manufacturing, commerce, agriculture, etc. The power of digital infrastructure had to be leveraged to take the Chinese economy from manufacturing-led growth in the last two decades to internet-based digital capitalism in the next upcoming decades. In the last 8 years after the launch of this initiative the Chinese digital economy has skyrocketed with digital giants such as Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu emerging as the biggest business conglomerates in their verticals leveraging the open business opportunity given to the foreign companies. The Internet Plus policy has also boosted the security and surveillance market in China. Hikvision and Dahua have emerged as one the world's biggest video

[5] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/govt-lists-emerging-covid-19-success-stories-in-20-districts/articleshow/77919339.cms?from=mdr

surveillance product manufacturers. Hikvision is not only a leading player in video surveillance market at the global level but also holds around one-third of market share in India[6]. Prama Hikvision, the Indian subsidiary, has registered an operating revenue of 500 crore INR in the financial year 2022. The subsidiary is also aligned with the Make in India project with company establishing state of the art manufacturing facility near Mumbai. Another Chinese company Dahua Technologies also has a sizeable presence in the India markets.

The Chinese state and CCPs involvement in private firms is well-established (Livingston, 2020). This is true for the above video surveillance companies as well, but during the pandemic, the involvement was once again strengthened. Alibaba and Tencent worked hand in glove with the Chinese state in collecting, analyzing, and managing the data collected through the Health Code Applications. Digital platforms have become gatekeepers of data flow in the Chinese economy. For instance, Alipay and WeChat provide electronic ID for individual users, so people can access government services without traditional state-issued ID cards. Thus, "Alipay and WeChat have penetrated deeply into the Chinese platform ecosystem and created institutional dependencies; thus, end users, advertisers, and complementors are becoming dependent upon these two platforms" (Liang, 2020).

India is at the starting phase of physical and digital surveillance, the infrastructure for which is beginning to develop. Aadhar can be said to be India's first stint at digital surveillance. Aadhar was started in 2009, as a biometric registration (Unique Identification Number) project to identify and authenticate beneficiaries for the different schemes of government and to plug leakages and corruption in the system. The government has made the use of Aadhar mandatory in many social service schemes and it is a de facto national identity of Indian citizens. The biometric feature of Aadhar has been criticized by the civil society and it is argued that it enhances the capacity of state surveillance and infringes upon the privacy of the individual (See Khera, 2018; Rao and Nair, 2019). The government passed the Aadhar Act for the same, which was challenged in the Supreme Court. The SC's 2018 Aadhaar verdict, stated that privacy, is a postulate of dignity guaranteed by the Indian Constitution under right to life and liberty. Dignity, in the court's view, requires balancing individual autonomy with the idea of a dignified living in the context of state welfare programmes. This balancing of autonomy with dignity implies the privileging of dignified living in socioeconomic terms over individual autonomy to personal data submitted under Aadhar enrolment. This implies that court justified the data collection and mandatory use of Aadhar in cases of social welfare. Since then, Aadhar is ubiquitously used by the central and respective state governments.

Apart from Aadhar, India's physical surveillance infrastructure has also developed in the last decade. The central government is rolling out various schemes for the deployment of CCTVs in border surveillance, railways, and in other critical sectors. Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has also proposed to launch the National Automated Facial Recognition System (NAFRS) which will be using the Facial Recognition Technology and Artificial Intelligence (AI), upgraded on the existing CCTV infrastructure. According to Comparitech report[7], Hyderabad, Delhi, and Indore are the three Indian cities in the list of top 10 surveilled cities of the world. Hyderabad currently has 900,000 cameras for 10,801,163 people equals 83.32 cameras per 1,000 people, whereas Delhi has 449,934 cameras for 22,547,000 people equals 19.96 cameras per 1,000 people. The police departments fully utilized this physical surveillance infrastructure during the pandemic. For instance, Hyderabad saw detection of mask violations through CCTV

[6] http://bwcio.businessworld.in/article/Prama-Hikvision-inaugurates-India-s-first-and-largest-integrated-security-surveillance-facility/03-10-2019-177104/

[7] https://www.comparitech.com/vpn-privacy/the-worlds-most-surveilled-cities/

cameras installed across the city. The three commissionerates — Hyderabad, Cyberabad, and Rachakonda —ramped up their efforts to fine mask violators through the use of artificial intelligence (AI) tools. Around 2000 cameras were enabled with artificial intelligence to monitor mask violators (Sur, 2021). Similar instances were observed in cities such as Delhi and Chennai.

Similar to the Internet Plus policy of China, India also launched a flagship programme called Digital India in 2014. Digital India was launched with a vision to transform India into a digitally empowered society and knowledge economy. With an aspiration to transform e-governance, the Government of India approved e-Kranti programme with the vision of "Transforming e-Governance for Transforming Governance". Digital India is not only limited to social sectors but has expanded its reach to the Telecom sector, Electronics sector, Digital Service sectors, etc. Digital India has given a fillip to a lot of private companies who are now heavily investing and sometimes partners of the government in various schemes. Indian private enterprises have now entered into the security and surveillance markets as well. The two sectors that stand out are video surveillance i.e. CCTVs, and the Drone sector. According to 6wresearch, the Indian video surveillance market size by revenue is projected to grow at a strong CAGR of 17.8% during 2021-27. The liberalized policies of the government, such as industry-friendly civil Drone Rules, 2021 have motivated the private sector to invest heavily. IdeaForge technologies, Vinveli, Boatlab dynamics, and Alpha design are some of the start-ups involved in military and civil drone manufacturing. In the video surveillance sector we have Indian companies such as CP Plus competing with Chinese giants such as Hikvision Technologies. CP Plus has been awarded many Smart City projects in India, has partnered with Punjab Police for CCTV in Prisons in border areas, and has provided CCTV surveillance services during MahaKumbh 2019. Other emerging companies in this sector are Cyient Technologies, INNEFU labs, STAQU, etc., who are currently in contract with many state police departments providing services such as AI-based facial recognition, Integrated Patrol management system (IMCAP), etc.

Civil Society and Citizen's Response during the Pandemic

Citizens in China have always embraced and responded positively to state surveillance and the response to QRHC was no different. Kostka's (2019) ground-breaking research used national survey data to show high support for SCSs among the Chinese public: only 1% of respondents in her national survey disapproved of SCSs. Chinese people also support the health code system and trust the Chinese government (vis-a-vis private companies) in providing COVID information, protecting personal data, and implementing expansive surveillance systems (Wu, 2021; Liu and Graham, 2021). Chinese citizens' trust in their governments of all levels increased during the pandemic: a survey data shows that their trust in their national government increased to 98% in 2020 (compared to 95% in 2018) and such trust is positively related to their support of precautionary practices in combating the COVID-19, including the continued use of the health code in post-pandemic times (Chen et al. 2022).

Such a trust in the government and government-managed technological systems is cultivated and propagated in the state-controlled media and social media. Despite a growing awareness of privacy as individual rights, most Chinese people believe that public or collective interest outweighs personal privacy protection in terms of pandemic control (Liu, 2022).

In spite of all this the Chinese government restricted free speech and activists, citizens, and health caseworkers faced serious consequences for their opposition to the government. For example, Chen Qiushi, human rights lawyer, reporting on coronavirus led to its disappearance. Businessperson and journalists such as Fang Bin, Li Zehua who criticized the government response to coronavirus disappeared as well. A video journalist Zhang Zhan could face up to

five years in prison, as the Chinese authorities accused her of disturbing content and information that misleads public opinion and distorts the truth. Additionally, China in April 2020 prohibited the dissemination of another informative project, the "Terminus 2049" and also imputed unsubstantiated charges to the report's three volunteers Wei, Tang, and Chen Me. This project aimed to compile all previous censored articles and to evaluate future publications that will be arguably 32 rejected and obscured by CCP (Hsu, Butler, 2020). To add to this China has the Great Firewall to restrict any foreign digital news information to penetrate to the citizens which was again criticized by the civil society.

Censorship on social media, some of which were run by CSOs, was significantly reinforced. Many WeChat and microblog accounts were hacked or attacked. Numerous news stories on the crisis were removed, including those from state-affiliated media. The public outcry and respect for Dr. Li Wenliang, who sought to provide information in medical circles about the virus very early in Wuhan and was disciplined for it before his death, was prominent throughout China. A citizen filed a lawsuit against the Hubei Provincial Government for its mismanagement of the epidemic; news of that suit was also removed from the media (Hu and Sidel, 2020).

After the deployment of AS the civil society organizations, especially concerned with data privacy, launched a series of attacks on the security and privacy vulnerability of the application. Organisations such as Internet Freedom Foundation, Medianama, Centre for Internet and Society, etc. raised concerns as follows: AS fails the Test of Proportionality set by the Right to Privacy Judgement in 2018. AS also lacks Algorithmic Accountability. The Terms of Service for AS absolves the government form any liability arising out of misidentification of an individual's COVID-19 status, as mentioned in the liability clause. Therefore, individuals are left at the mercy of opaque algorithms which perform risk assessment and do not have any remedy in case of false positives. The application also fares badly when it comes to cyber security. An ethical hacker from France reported several privacy and security flaws in Aarogya Setu. A Bengaluru-based software engineer had also managed to hack the app. The programmer, who goes by the name Jay, apparently breached the app's defences in less than four hours.

The civil society was also filling writ petitions in the court when AS was made mandatory following the MHA orders of 1 May 2020. A slew of petitions were filed in Kerala High Court challenging the constitutionality of the guideline mandating 100% coverage of the app in workplaces and containment zones, arguing that such a mandate is unconstitutional and sought the quashing of the MHA order. Following which in the hearing held on 12 May 2020, the court had orally asked the centre regarding the practicability of the mandatory condition, given the fact that the smartphone penetration rate in the country does not provide a fertile ground for such an imposition. The court had also asked the Centre to respond to the concerns raised regarding the privacy safeguards of the application[8]. Following the court directives the central government had to release new guidelines (on 17 May 2020) in acknowledgement of the low smartphones penetration rate among the working class. However the plight of the citizens especially the working class and the migrant workers did not improve with these guidelines.

In India, citizens were not a homogenous unit regarding the plight faced by mandatory usage of AS. When the country was in a strict lockdown, the daily wage labourers including migrant workers were the worst hit and were left with no income and work. Some relaxations were given in April 2020 for construction workers to return to work, but with a caveat. Central government

[8] How 'Aarogya Setu' can be made nadatory when many workers have no smart phones, Kerala HC asks Centre, https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/kerala-hc-to-centre-how-aarogya-setu-mandatory-when-workers-have-no-smartphones-156646.

organisations involved in construction, including various metro rail corporations, were instructed by the Central Public Works Department (CPWD) to ensure that "all labour personnel/staff" returning to work from 20th April have downloaded the government's COVID-19 tracking app — Aarogya Setu. This proved to be discriminatory as the most of low-class workers did not have a smartphone and were not able to avail the services. Another class of citizens who were severely affected was the migrant labourers. Migrants take up significant space in India's large urban centres, with the Census of 2011 indicating that almost 46 per cent of India's urban population is migrants. They work in both formal and informal sectors, such as in manufacturing and construction, as well as occupation such as brick making and textiles (Srivastava and Sutradhar, 2016). The media was flooded with pictures of migrant labourers returning to their home states walking thousands of kilometres.

In an order issued on 29 April, the Ministry of Home Affairs allowed states to co-ordinate individually to transport migrants using buses. On 1 May, the Indian Railways resumed passenger movement (for the first time since 22 March) with Shramik Special trains to facilitate movement of migrants stranded outside their home state. Between 1 May and 3 June, Indian Railways operated 4,197 Shramik trains transporting more than 58 lakh migrants. Again this was not as smooth as intended. The railways on 11th May said it was mandatory for those travelling via the 15 'special trains' to download AS (Qureshi, 2022). This created havoc and the migrants were forced to walk on the railway tracks when denied entry in the train as they were determined to return back. Based on an RTI request, the Railway Board admitted that more than 8700 people died while walking on the railway tracks in 2020. So, migrant labourers, construction workers, and gig workers, etc., were directly impacted by the mandatory use of AS and had an underpinning to their dignity to work and earn livelihood.

Kweera (2023) elsewhere argues that mandatory technologies such as AS have implications for the third tenet of Human Security i.e. the basic right to live with dignity. It was not only the lower class who had to comply with the mandatory use of AS, the middle class and upper class had to comply with the orders. For instance, in June 2020, AS was made mandatory for mall goers in Hyderabad. Gujarat government also made AS mandatory for the employees entering the offices. In the city of Noida and Greater Noida the government authorities asked the residents to download the AS app on their smartphones. As per the order, it is mandatory to have the app on your when venturing outside. If anyone is caught without the app in a public place, she or she will be considered in violation of the coronavirus-forced lockdown and can face a fine of Rs 1,000 or six months of imprisonment. This led backlash with many legal complaints filled to the District Magistrate to withdraw the order.

Surveillance Creep and Future Scope of These Applications

Surveillance creep means a technology intended for beneficial purpose are later used for surveillance purposes. Same holds for QRHC in China. Like the social credit system, the QRHC was not compulsory but enforced through soft coercion required for access to public services and mobility in public spaces and transport. During the COVID-19 outbreak, the health code was incorporated into the social credit system to regulate social behaviours (Engelmann et al. 2019). As discussed earlier, the state social credit system is an overarching state surveillance framework of the Chinese government. The incorporation of QRHC in SCS further enhances state's capability. In the social credit system the state already maintains different lists and different level of punishments based on each list. These are Blacklist, Special Attention List, Administrative Punishment List, and Redlist. While the first three maintain a list of bad behaviour, the last one is a list of good behaviour.

Many issues have been raised so as to the future of these health applications. In the case of QRHC the convergence of government and private enterprises raises many eyebrows. The government is the data controller and enterprises the data processor. The government as data controller lacks transparency and the use of this data in other surveillance mechanisms such as state social credit system also raises the risk of surveillance creep. The enterprises with advantages in technology, big data processing, and capital may use the data for commercial purposes beyond the intended use of these applications. The signs of both of these are now beginning to show.

The Chinese government has an ambitious plan to create a National Digital Health Code (NDHC) for all the country's citizens. Based on the model of QRHC or rather the expansion of QRHC at the national level, the NDHC was announced as part of five year National Health Information Plan to "digitize national health information" by 2025. China's National Health Commission in late 2022 announced that each resident would be given a "fully functional digital health code". The Chinese central leadership learnt its lessons from the pandemic. The local authorities administered the data that was collected and the health code along with the itinerary code which was managed by three telecom giants, China Telecom, China Mobile, and China Unicom had local versions which were difficult to manage centrally. Wang argues that "Local variations have undermined the central government's objective of accurate pandemic prevention and control and have created confusion, chaos and led to unrest. These failures might have strengthened the central government's desire to pursue administrative centralisation. The ambition to build a national health platform shows the central government has convinced itself that political centralisation can only be achieved through the centralisation of the flow of data[9]". The proposed NDHC can be said to be the expansion of state surveillance where it is proposed to be used in all the governance and security services such as in border governance, etc. This serves well with the larger project of the CCP for centralizing administrative power and construction of a unified imagination of the Chinese state.

Second is the issue of privacy and dignity of the individuals. While Health Code is installed on two commercial platforms, the underlying assumption is that governments allow tech giants to harness massive data sources. In fact, local governments have released guiding opinions and regulations to promote and normalize the use of Health Code, while Alipay and WeChat can share data with local police (Mozur et al., 2020). The sharing of users data by the central and the local government without users consent is a breach of privacy. The state's rationale is trading off privacy with security but the unintended consequences of this breach are not taken into account. This breach gets institutionalized by the burgeoning state surveillance machinery and the citizens are just conformers in this process without any signs of resistance.

Aarogya Setu was not able to outperform as was the case of QRHC. From its inception, the application faced legal and technical hurdles. The government tried to make it mandatory but the population needed to be digitally ready to deal with such form of technological state surveillance. The Karnataka court finally ended this fiasco of mandatory usage of AS. The Karnataka High Court passed an order saying that in the absence of law, neither state nor central government agencies can deny any benefit to an individual for not having AS on his phone. The order was passed in response to a petition filed by SFLC board member Anivar Arvind in Karnataka High Court. Apart from this, "In accordance with the provisions of the said protocol, the contact tracing feature of the Aarogya Setu mobile application has been discontinued and contact tracing data collected through it has been deleted," MoS for electronics and information technology, Rajeev Chandrasekhar told the Lok Sabha. He also stated that "Approved officials

[9] https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/03/01/unifying-chinas-digital-health-system-beyond-covid-19/

of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, State Health Departments, the National and State Disaster Management Authorities and District Civil Surgeons were given secure access to the data collected through the Aarogya Setu"[10]. AS is dead, as per media reports. The application which was intended for contact tracing has not only been discontinued by the central government but has also outlived its utility in the digital space. The application was downloaded 200 million times which is a mere 14 percent of the Indian population. The penetration was low considering the utility and scope of the application. The intended purpose of contact tracing is successful only when most of the population uses the application. In India, it proved to be just another technological intervention without any concrete results.

Discussion

India and China fare unevenly when it comes to penetration of surveillance. The present comparison of contact tracing applications during the pandemic, though not an idle case, gives a detailed account of the institutions, structures of power, and societal behaviours of both. Similarities seem distant, and the trajectory of growth surveillance is showing a different picture altogether. Here I discuss what emerges from the above comparative study.

First of all, in China we see the consolidation of power by the state and the party. The centralization of surveillance and the decentralization of accountability on the provincial level were once again established in this pandemic. The legitimacy of the state gets strengthened with the mobilization of the provincial governments and especially grid members who are projected to be at the forefront of the disaster which is a 'people war' to be won at any cost. When failures occur, the provincial and local government has to face the onslaught, although the burden of management of the pandemic was born entirely by them.

The QRHC, although a provincial initiative was never projected as such and consolidated into a central-level state-party initiative which became a success story of the Chinese state. In this way the decentralized technological surveillance initiative was centralized and legitimized by the Chinese party and state. In India, we saw that the central government taking charge of the subject of Health by invoking emergency provisions. The central government through the launch of a pan India contact tracing application tried to centralize the pandemic management technologically but did best to penetrate only 14 per cent of the population. Many respective state governments had launched their contact tracing applications making it sometimes mandatory within the states. Also physical surveillance and not digital surveillance was the key to pandemic management in India in which the state governments, panchayats, and the local governments and their health machinery was fully mobilized. This machinery worked in tandem with the central government directives and also shared the responsibility and accountability of success and failure with each other.

Secondly, the surveillance and digital infrastructure of China was strengthened in this pandemic after the launch of QRHC. The existing state social credit system and the natural integration of QRHC with it strengthened the existing system and provided a new impetus to the Chinese state for surveillance assemblage (Haggerty and Ericson, 2017). Additionally the private enterprises rolled out the QRHC for the provincial governments and deepened its ties with the local level digital and surveillance infrastructures. With the launch of policies such as Internet Plus, Chinese private enterprises have now become global giants with penetration across the world markets. During this pandemic the relationship has become more symbiotic with the state giving access of the citizens data and local administrative networks to the enterprises whereas companies provide technological solutions which mine this data not only for the present purpose

[10] https://www.livemint.com/news/india/aarogya-setu-contact-tracing-data-deleted-feature-discontinued-govt-tells-lok-sabha-11675901604009.html

of pandemic management but also for long term plans of the ubiquitous state surveillance. In India, on the contrary, AS was not able to integrate with the present surveillance infrastructures because of a lack of data and population penetration. AS was also not integrated with the local databases as the state and local administration had their contact tracing application. The private players too could not benefit due to a lack of synergy between the different governments. In India the physical surveillance infrastructure like CCTV and FRT were upgraded during the pandemic. In spite of that we are yet to find surveillance assemblage of Aadhar, AS, and CCTVs.

Thirdly, citizens embraced QRHC In spite of criticisms from the western media. This aligns with the citizen's acceptance of the state social credit system where public and collective interest is traded off with the right to personal privacy. The civil society and dissenting voices was silenced in the social media and other platforms. Many cases of discriminatory usage of QRHCs emerged but did not hamper the approval rating of QRHCs. This approval has much to do with the continuous exposure of Chinese citizens to surveillance. May it be SCSs, or the recent official platform (i.e., *Xuexi Qiangguo*) to rate and rank citizens based on multiple metrics the citizens actively participate and have fully embraced this model of state surveillance. In India, the civil society was very vocal immediately after the launch of AS. The privacy and security vulnerability was exposed and government had to continuously upgrade the technology. The citizen's especially the lower class didn't embrace this technology because of the sheer digital divide and the hardships faced by its mandatory usage. Government was unable to project success cases and efficiency of AS, so the middle and upper class was also not enthusiastic and the impact of AS was not seen as intended.

Fourthly, in China, QRHC though starting as a provincial initiative has been hijacked and appropriated by the centre. Learning from the pandemic experience the plan is to introduce a National Health Code. This tendency of centralization of surveillance is strengthened in China with QRHC acting as a catalyst for a larger state surveillance project. In India, AS is almost dead. It was India's experiment with technological surveillance without having dedicated digital and surveillance infrastructures to back it. The applications inability to be integrated with Aadhar or other existing systems also closed its scope of future usage.

Conclusion

Countries across the world experimented with technological surveillance as a preventive measure during the pandemic. Contact tracing technology was adopted across to break the chain of transmission of the virus. China introduced the Quick Response Health Code and India Aarogya Setu. It started as a provincial initiative in China but was implemented in the entire country. The urban grid management system was the engine that made it successful on the ground. In India, AS being a national initiative it found less resonance in the states where local administration relied more on physical surveillance. The digital and existing surveillance infrastructure in China as the social credit system allowed them to steer through but in India, it was not the case. To add to this we had citizens in China fully embracing the system whereas in India due the low penetration and digital divide the citizens criticized the system. The Chinese state seeking the opportunity is now using QRHC to deepen the surveillance infrastructure in the health sector as well whereas India, who is in the initial phase of technological state surveillance is still trying to find the socially accepted model of surveillance.

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Tracing the Evolution of Rural and Labou Protests in Contemporary China

Wriju Banerjee

Abstract

Although demonstrations have never been uncommon in the history of China, protests have evolved with changes in the political, economic, and social landscapes in which these demonstrations occur. Over the past few decades, China has witnessed a surge in social unrest which has occurred in the backdrop of massive economic growth. As the Chinese populace enjoys the fruits of economic prosperity, rising incomes and greater opportunities, urbanization has simultaneously impoverished migrants from rural areas leading to inequality while stressingfault lines based on class divisions. These changes are also reflected in the composition of protests, as well as the claims made against the perceived transgressions and violation of rights. Social unrest also manifests in diverse forms and patterns of protests, from the highly visible and confrontational street protests to the more subtle and indirect forms of resistance. The state's responses to these new, emerging claims staked against it are also shaped by its perception of these protests' credibility. This paper seeks answers to questions concerning the evolving nature of protests in China.
In what ways have labour and rural agitations changed in China? Do these changes correspond to changing dynamics of labour and employment markets spurred by economic reforms and an era of unprecedented growth? Most importantly, in what form or manner hasthe Chinese state attempted to resolve these conflicts in its bid to create a 'harmonious' society? In order to answer these questions, the paper examines the key factors that have contributed to the rise of protests in contemporary China, including social inequality, corruption, and the erosion of civil liberties, and adopts a qualitative research methodology, drawing on a range of primary and secondary sources, including news reports and academicliterature.

Introduction

China's history has been punctuated by a spectrum of protests that reflect the intricate interplay between its evolving socio-political landscape and the aspirations of its people. From rural up-risings to labour disputes, these demonstrations have served as a lens throughwhich we can understand the complexities of state control and societal grievances.
In 1993, official Chinese statistics counted 8,700 "collective incidents" (*quntixing shijian*)(i.e., protests, demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, group complaints, and so on). A dozen years later, the number of such incidents had, by government measures, surged to over 87,000— nearly 250 per day.[1]
Moreover, protests are by nature dynamic and reflect the level of advancement in productive forces of any country. By analysing the changes in the protest structures, tactics, and demands,

this paper seeks to uncover the status of protesting groups in the contemporaryperiod, here considered the period after the founding of the PRC in 1949.

The paper examines the evolution of protests in the context of rural land disputes as well as urban labour conflicts. It seeks to delineate changing claims made by protestors in these two spaces along with changes in the policies of the state during this period, while contextualising them in the specific historical era to which they belong – from collectivisation, to reform and then on to the post-reform era. This paper then surveys the tactics of mobilisation and interest-articulation employed by protestors, before bringing into light the various considerations that the Chinese state encounters in distributing entitlements,while highlighting factors that shape the decisions it eventually takes.

Rural Protests

Rural unrest has a long history in the PRC. Although the CPC won power in 1949, various socialist policies faced backlash in the rural areas from feudal and sectarian organisations. Landlords and rich peasants particularly opposed policies of taxation, cooperation and unified purchase. However, increasingly the protest techniques employed by these groups came to be used by poor peasants and collective units themselves, and the success of state-sponsored collectivisation led to strengthened local social organisation.[2] Further, the *hukou*, or the household registration system established in 1958 functioned to limit internal migration and bound peasants to the collective units to which they were assigned. These units became the bedrock for rural protests that erupted in response to agricultural disasters which characterised the early years of people's communes.[3]

Post decollectivization, the commune has transformed into the township, the brigade into the administrative village, and the team into the natural village. While the natural village heldformal land ownership rights, real power over transferring ownership and land usage rested with the commune and higher administrative levels.[4]
In the post-reform era, land requisition has become the primary cause of rural unrest in China. These abusive land practices have also resulted partly from administrative and financial decentralisation, leading to declining power of the central state over local society.[5] Rural land is regulated under the household responsibility system, through which official landownership is conferred over the collective, which in turn confers land-use rights to individual households on fixed-term contracts. The system allows reallocation at any moment, leading to ambiguity.[6] This legal ambiguity allows the local state to claim de jure ownership of rural land, depriving the peasants who use the land from pursuing other non-agricultural production.[7] This has created a system wherein local states not only get unmitigated power toreallocate land, but also to decide the level of compensation.[8] In fact, among China's mass incidents, more than 60% have been related to land disputes when local governments in China worked closely with manufacturers and real-estate developers to grab land from farmers at low prices.[9]
The pursuit of urban development paired with weak protection of land rights have causedentire villages and urban neighbourhoods to be torn down, and has exacerbated landlessnessamong peasants. As observed by Siciliano, linkages between land grabbing and rural-urban migration are increasingly associated with social instability and conflicts due to aspects of internal migration, specifically the hukou registration system and environmental degradation.[10]

Labour Protests

Large-scale labour protests have never been uncommon in Communist China. Workers have played a major part in large demonstrations throughout the history of PRC, spanning across the hundred flowers campaign, the cultural revolution, and the Tiananmen protests of1989. However, protests specific to labour unrest were relatively lesser in number until the reforms. Incidences increased in the mid-90s, with official estimates stating that 1.1 million workers across 30 cities participated in labour related demonstrations in 1995. This number jumped up to 3.6 million workers in 1998.[11] Since then, labour protests have become routineand have been identified as a major obstacle to social harmony by the Chinese state.

The relatively low number of protests leading up to the reforms can be attributed to the genuinely great strides made in the Maoist era. Employment conditions at the time epitomised all that was superior about socialism: cradle to grave welfare, permanent job tenure, subsidized housing provision, life-long medical and pension benefits, and guaranteed,superior wages. The top of the labour hierarchy was held by permanent workers in state- owned industries, benefitting from the 'urban bias' in resource allocation.[12]

The loss of wages, employment benefits and job security in the post-reform era occurredalongside unprecedented economic growth. Thirty years after the liberalisation of the economy, there was a drastic increase in the number of migrant workers (225 million by theend of 2008 according to the National Bureau of Statistics) and a simultaneous decline in state-sector employment (78.3% to 21.9%).[13]

The situation of migrant workers deserves special mention here, as they make up a large chunk of the workforce in burgeoning urban areas, specifically in manufacturing and construction industries. Agricultural reforms had the effect of improved labour productivity, and coupled with the baby boom of 1950s and 1960s rural areas witnessed a growing labour surplus. Additionally, migrant workers were willing to engage in work in the informal sectorcharacterised by the four "Ds" – dirty, draining, dangerous, and disgraceful, that urban localsdetested.[14]

Sensing their utility in fuelling the country's manufacturing boom, various restrictions on migration such as the *hukou* system were relaxed.[15] Abolition of food coupons in urban areas had similar effects, such that the number of rural migrant workers grew from less than 2 million in the late 1970s to 30 million in the late 1980s.[16] However, holders of rural hukou remain suspicious of attempts of the state to confer them urban status as it might deprive of farmland and a house plot in their village, which acts as a safety net in case of unemployment. This forces them into a position of legal ambiguity, with most rural migrants'floating' between rural and urban spaces.[17]

Despite their role in the growth of the city economy, migrant workers are subjected to worse conditions of employment than urban local workers. This includes substantially lowerwages and longer working hours, with many working seven days a week past their legally mandated eight hours per day and 36 hours of overtime per month. Lack of social protectionin the form of on-the-job-injury insurance, medical insurance and a pension scheme are alsocaused by discrimination and inappropriate institutional arrangements.[18]

Regardless of these abject conditions, generally the ability of migrant workers to mobilisehas remained low. The risks associated with participating in protests is substantially higher for migrant workers than for registered urban workers. Due to the legal ambiguity of their position, as well as greater competition in the informal labour market, they are more readily replaceable. This leads to a greater mobility rate for migrant workers than their urban counterparts.[19] As such, contestation with the state in the form of protests carries the risk of being fired or even expelled from the city wherein they are employed. As a result, although migrant workers face more unfavourable conditions, they are still less likely than urban workers to participate in protests.[20]

Thus, the path of market reform was paved with legislation that decreased the livelihood and status of workers. The reform for enterprise autonomy and director responsibility of 1984led to the rise of the manager's dictatorial power over workers and unions.[21] The labour contract system of 1986 was another important step in the restructuring of enterprises, aimed at improving production efficiency by 'smashing the iron rice bowl' system of employment in order to create a labour market, effectively introducing labour flexibility and giving managers a legal mandate to hire-and-fire workers.[22] Policy of labour re-optimisation serveda similar purpose of rendering surplus workers redundant, and by 1995 the permanent employment system was officially dismantled.[23]
Tackling this problem spurred the Chinese government to institutionalise conflict resolution through the revival of labour dispute arbitration system, which had been abolishedin 1955. By 1997, approximately 270,000 labour dispute mediation committees at the enterprise level, and 3,159 labour dispute arbitration committees at county, city and provincial levels had been established.[24]

Work stoppages and strikes have been an enduring feature of the reform period. Remarkably, their widespread nature and converging interests especially at times of economic crisis such as the 2008 financial crisis has not changed the nature of these protests,which remain cellular and local in scope. However, labour protests have also witnessed a tendency of workers to go beyond their workplace into the public arena and attempt to build cross-class solidarity, such as the ACFTU donating 100,000 yuan to student hunger strikers in mid-May 1989 protests.[25] Subsistence rights remained top priority in many other demonstrations, with slogans like"We Want To Work", "Our Children Want to Go To School", "We Want Jobs" and "We Want Food", "We Don't Demand Fish Or Meat, Just Some Porridge," revealing worker's desperation and outrage.[26]

In recent years, Xi Jinping's government has taken a hard-line stance in pacifying labour activism, which has led to economic slowdown and many factories announcing relocation plans since 2012 with minimal or no compensation to workers. Many of these workers were migrants and nearing retirement age, and hence collective action took the form of strikes with the demand of pension insurance, encouraged by the Social Insurance Law in effect since 2011.[27] Strikes at the Yue Yuen shoe factory in Dongguan and the Lide Shoe Factory in

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[1] O'Brien and Stern, "Introduction: Studying Contention in Contemporary China."
[2] Perry, "Rural Violence in Socialist China."

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[3] Perry.
[4] Ho, "Contesting Rural Spaces: Land Disputes, Customary Tenure and the State."
[5] Lu and Tao, "Organizational Structure and Collective Action."
[6] Siciliano, "Rural-Urban Migration and Domestic Land Grabbing in China."
[7] Lin and Ho, "The State, Land System, and Land Development Processes in Contemporary China."
[8] Su et al., "Land Taking and Electoral Rule Setting."
[9] "China's Land Grab Is Undermining Grassroots Democracy."
[10] Siciliano, "Rural-Urban Migration and Domestic Land Grabbing in China."

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[11] Chen, "Subsistence Crises, Managerial Corruption and Labour Protests in China."
[12] Lee, "Pathways of Labor Activism."
[13] Nair, "Remaking Labour."

[14] Li, "The Economic Situation of Rural Migrant Workers in China."

[15] Tang and Hao, "Floaters, Settlers, and Returnees."
[16] Li, "The Economic Situation of Rural Migrant Workers in China."
[17] Hao and Tang, "Floating or Settling Down."
[18] Li, "The Economic Situation of Rural Migrant Workers in China."
[19] Knight and Yueh, "Job Mobility of Residents and Migrants in Urban China."
[20] Chen and Mason, "To Protest or Not to Protest?"
[21] Lee, "Pathways of Labor Activism."
[22] Nair, "Remaking Labour."
[23] Lee, "Pathways of Labor Activism."
[24] Lee.
[25] Lee.
[26] Chen, "Subsistence Crises, Managerial Corruption and Labour Protests in China."
[27] Chan, "Changes and Continuity."

Guangzhou captured global attention and were successful in forcing companies to pay compensation. The current administration has thus showed a renewed interest in quelling labour disputes in favour of workers and uses revolutionary rhetoric in the process of doingso.

Tactics

Popular mobilisation against perceived injustices by state or non-state actors in any country needs its own language and rhetoric. While such mobilisations are routine in democratic countries, mobilisation in authoritarian states is rare as societal actors would needto believe that their actions may lead to change. However, Communist China differs from other authoritarian states in this regard, for it routinely encourages, even compels its citizens to express their private criticisms publicly in the form of big-character-posters, struggle sessions, denunciation meetings, demonstrations and the like.[28] The example most readily apparent here is the cultural revolution, but leaders after Mao have made use of the same tactics to encourage mobilisation.

When we look at the tactics employed by protestors to air their grievances, the effects ofsuch state-mobilised movements become apparent. Mobilisation is carried out by appropriating the language of the state to suit the protests' purpose. Throughout history, resourceful protest leaders have been conscious of central government rules and adept at seizing on official rhetoric – whether framed in terms of Confucianism or class struggle – topress claims against local power holders. Moreover, these efforts are often guided by the genuine belief that the Centre has good intentions, but is unaware of the transgressions and malfeasances of local officials who protect each other.[29]

A tactic that has evolved from an official channel of communication to a means of mass mobilisation is the petitioning (*xinfang*) system. *Xinfang* (literally meaning 'letters-and- visits') is essentially a large network of complaints offices vertically spanning many administrative jurisdictions.[30] This term is almost synonymous with *shangfang*, or 'appeal toa higher authority'. But while higher authorities need information to intervene, the task of conducting an investigation to collect this information is delegated to lower authorities, where cover-ups are common. Michelson opines that ultimately, "by prolonging the search

[28] Perry, "Studying Chinese Politics."

[29] O'Brien, *Rightful Resistance in Rural China*.
[30] Michelson, "Justice from above or Below?"

for justice from above, the futility of petitioning the state only contributes to the seemingly inexorable expansion of the ranks of rural petitioners."[31]

In this regard, Chen provides three reasons why 'troublemaking tactics' are a useful optionfor those aggrieved. Firstly, a highly selective sorting system needs variables to distinguish important and valid petitions or claims from unimportant ones. Secondly, although the system is inefficient, it is one of only a few channels for interest articulation. Finally, it gives higher authorities a controlled way (and some levers) to hold local officials accountable.[32] Higher authorities can cite the need for harmony and the principle of 'stability above all' to spur local officials into resolving petitioners' grievances.

State Repression and Violence

'Mass incidents' in China have increased over the past few decades, reflecting an acute awareness among people of glaring social inequalities fueled by unmitigated economic growth. The Chinese government's response to these new claims staked against them depends partly on the nature of these contestations.
Research on contentious politics in authoritarian states usually adopts the language of a 'zero-sum game' wherein all contention is characterized as an existential threat to the regime,with protestors putting forward radical claims in a violent manner.[33]

However, the experience of Chinese society disproves this angle. Perry and Selden opine that "for all the popular anguish and the variety and depth of contemporary protest, to date no significant organizational focus, whether enshrined in a political party or social movement, has emerged at the regional, national or even local level effectively to issue a sustained challenge to Communist Party leadership".[34]

In the case of China, the CPC has been able to mitigate, to a large extent, existential threats to its order. Its ability to do so rests on demobilization, a strategy of divide-and-ruleinherited from its revolutionary history. Similar to how the party was able to polarize identities during the revolution, Maoist institutions divided society on several lines which impacted their ability to mobilize effectively. Work units (*danwei*) isolated the industrial labour force, people's communes (*renmin gongshe*) enforced rural self-sufficiency, job

[31] Michelson.
[32] Chen, "Collective Petitioning and Institutional Conversion."
[33] Cai, *Collective Resistance in China*.
[34] Perry and Selden, *Chinese Society Change, Conflict and Resistance*.

allocations (*fenpei*) rendered intellectuals beholden to the state, labour insurance (*laobao*) bestowed generous welfare benefits upon permanent workers at state-owned enterprises at the cost of the rest of the workforce, personnel dossiers (*dang'an*) marked citizens with "good" or "bad" political records, household registrations (*hukou*) separated urban and rural dwellers, while class labels (*Jieji chengfen*) differentiated between "five red categories" (*hong wulei*) and "five black categories" (*hei wulei*) of people.[35]

While these institutions, particularly the *danwei* and *hukou* have been weakened since thereform era, the government's continued resilience can also be attributed to its ability to absorb dissent through formal mechanisms. Nathan highlights the importance of "input institutions" here – local elections, people's congresses, administrative litigation, mass media – which enable citizens to air their grievances "without creating the potential to threaten the regime as a whole".[36] The Xinfang system as it has evolved demonstrates twin usage of official means and 'troublemaking tactics' to push officials into taking action.[37]

When such official channels of communication fail, protests are usually organised locallyand are confined to specific classes of people, as these are tacitly encouraged by the state. Asan example, Jiang Zemin's strategy in handling student demonstrations in Shanghai during the winter of 1986-87 was to separate student and worker protestors with barricades. Three years later, Deng Xiaoping meted out harsher punishments to workers in the 1989 protests compared to students. The difference in the reception of Falun Gong protests compared to single-issue protests leads Perry to observe that movements with significant organisational ties and socially diverse memberships are more likely to face repression compared to those that are more local and homogenous in nature.[38]

Similarly, Li observes through quantitative analysis that protests that link up with others are more likely to lead to repression, as are the use of violence and pressing for radical political claims.[39] Interestingly, the findings did not uncover any significant correlation between formal organisation and chances of protest policing. Bovingdon asserts that the CPCremains intolerant of any organised activity not controlled by some branch of the party.[40] This is evidenced by the repression of Falun Gong protests and autonomous trade unions, as

[35] Perry, "Studying Chinese Politics."
[36] Nathan, "China's Changing of the Guard."
[37] Chen, "Collective Petitioning and Institutional Conversion."
[38] Perry, "Studying Chinese Politics."
[39] Li, "A Zero-Sum Game?"
[40] Bovingdon, "The Not-So-Silent Majority."

well as the logic that formal organisations are capable of forming cross-class, cross-regionaland cross-nationality associations, and are thus more powerful and more likely to pose a threat to the regime. However, the various ENGOs that have emerged in China since the 1990s as well as the movements launched by these formal organisations defy this logic. Thiscan be attributed to the fact that their framing and methods resemble the blueprint of other successful protests: their claims are issue-based, local, and are framed as an appeal to the central authority to correct injustices carried out by malfeasant local governments.[41] Moreover, these claims rarely pose a threat to the legitimacy of the CPC. Regardless, their emergence and success in gaining concessions forms a break from the usual treatment metedout to non-party formal organisations. A state-society model is useful in analysing the linkages between the two, and offers better explanatory insight for the environmental movement in particular as well as for future civil society organisations in China generally should they rise.[42]

Another factor that determines the possibility of repression is the social identity of the contesting groups. Here, the power of the protest is simply a product of the social power of the protestors. Cai provides an example of peasant protests in the Guangxi autonomous region against a court ruling regarding ownership of a piece of land, where a number of peasant activists were jailed, while several others were detained with harsh punishments against those prosecuted.[43] Rural protests against forcible land acquisition have been pronounced, and their repression highlights an important point: that the state chooses to repress where it believes repression would not be met with much resistance. Peasants and ethnic minorities tend to fall within this category of subordinate groups. Li finds that protestsstaged by these groups increases the possibility of police presence. Moreover, since the legitimacy granted to the Chinese state by ethnic minorities like the Uyghurs is highly conditional and since they perceive the state as unitary, any crackdown on religious beliefs takes on an anti-state and anti-Han dimension.[44] Since radical political claims are usually metwith state violence and repression, and these radical claims are most likely to be put forth by those identities that perceive themselves to be marginalised, protests organised by ethnic minorities are statistically more likely to suffer repression.

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[41] O'Brien, *Rightful Resistance in Rural China*. [42] Sun and Zhao, "Environmental Campaigns."[43] Cai, *Collective Resistance in China*.

[44] Hastings, "Perceiving a Single Chinese State."

Conclusion

The findings in this paper suggest that the scope of protests in China have changed in definite ways. From feudal opposition to socialist policies to the consolidation of local socialstructures through state-endorsed collectivization, rural protests evolved from reactionary measures to expressions of agrarian discontent. Ambiguous landownership, the *hukou* system and the perils faced by the collectivisation endeavour have all provided fertile ground for these demonstrations.

Labour unrest, a product of economic reform, reveals the tectonic shifts in China's economic landscape. The juxtaposition of pre-reform socialist guarantees and post-reform economic liberalization clearly illustrates justifications for the surge in labour disputes.

Workers, once recipients of job security and welfare, found themselves navigating a new paradigm of market-driven labour markets. The resulting protests underscored the adaptability and unity of the working class in seeking better conditions amid economic transformation, while also re-emphasizing their organising potential that socialist leaders ofyore have depended upon.

Animating the entire history of contention in the PRC is the tacit acknowledgement of artificial boundaries separating people by class and region. This separation, with a few notable exceptions, has been ingrained into the Chinese political landscape, and even contention is played out routinely following certain accepted code of conducts. The theatre ofcontention in the Chinese polity requires the acquiescence of both the ruler and the ruled, andsuccessfully playing out one's part is rewarded with a receptive government for the aggrievedand stability for those who govern.

Sinicization in the People's Republic of China: An Analysis of Language Policies

Rituja Ghosh

Abstract

The construction of the modern Chinese state has occurred as a product of slow expansion and consolidation at the expense of smaller political units of various semi-nomadic and mobile people along China's borders. Throughout history, mobile and semi-nomadic people resisted China's 'civilizational stature' in the northern and western steppes - the Mongols, Khitans, Jurchens, Uyghurs, and Tibetan nomads. China has faced challenges to its nationalism along its periphery throughout various phases of Chinese history. China's focus on its peripheral regions has historically been a quest for 'stability' and 'security'. The consequence of China's peripheral strategy has been the 'sinicization' or the imposition of standardized Mandarin on ethnic minorities.

The policy of following Mandarin Chinese as the medium of instruction in schools in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) sparked widespread protests in 2020. It is important to note that Inner Mongolia has preserved the traditional Mongolian script, unlike Mongolia, which uses the Russian Cyrillic script. The changes that were introduced at the school level are similar to cultural policies pursued in Xinjiang in 2017 and Tibet in 2018. Restriction and repression of languages of ethnic minorities have seen a rise in an effort by the Chinese Communist Party to assimilate minority groups in the 'nation-state.' These attempts at cultural assimilation have accelerated under the leadership of Xi Jinping. The 2020 protests in Inner Mongolia must be seen in the larger context of Han dominance and sinicization of other ethnic groups in China undertaken through a series of policies such as the repression of language, which is central to the cultural expression of an ethnic group.

This paper analyzes the impact of 'sinicization tactics or Han ethnic supremacism employed in the People's Republic of China. The paper seeks to study the patterns of continuity and change in the cultural policies of ethnic repression. Through the case study of Inner Mongolia, the paper aims to analyze the prevailing patterns and contemporary trends that have emerged in the People's Republic of China with respect to ethnic repression of minorities. The research methodology followed for the paper would be qualitative, following a discourse analysis method studying the official statements of the Chinese Communist Party, speeches of public officials, as policy documents.

Keywords: Sinicization, Cultural Assimilation, Peripheral Regions, Ethnic Repression, Cultural Policies, Language

I. Introduction: Understanding 'Sinicization'

China's ethnic diversity is a key factor often overlooked in contemporary analysis of China's rise in global affairs.The People's Republic of China is often perceived as a culturally homogeneous nation. Within the People's Republic of China, the ethnic Han Community accounts for a majority of the total of 56 officially recognized ethnic groups by the People's Republic of China. It is imperative to understand the policies that the People's Republic of China employs towards its minority ethnic groups to understand China's orientation as a nation-state as well as to understand China's own posturing in world politics. The present ethnic groups in China are a product of the Ethnic Classification Project carried out in 1953 in the People's Republic of China which resulted in 38 ethnic groups gaining recognition officially in the People's Republic of China. (Zang 2016).

Thomas Mullaney in his work, notes that during the 1953 census carried out in the People's Republic of China, out of the 200 groups that demanded state recognition in the province of Yunnan a mere 25 of these ethnic groups received official state recognition.(Frangville,2011) One of the key insights that emerges from Mullaney's work is that due to the sporadic and partial nature of China's colonization towards ethnic minority groups. China's internal colonialism tends to be overlooked and neglected in the study of Chinese politics (Frangville 2011).

The word 'Sinicization' comes from the root 'sinicize', which means somebody or something modified under Chinese influence, and the suffix denotes the process, the act or the outcome of this process resulting in the 'Sinicization'.The earliest appearance of the word Sinicization was in the context of the Chinese influence on the Japanese language and religion(Cheng 2021). Sinicization is usually interpreted as the process by which all non-Han or non-Sinitic people who entered the Chinese realm, whether as conquerors or conquered, are culturally assimilated as Chinese. (Cheng 2021). The word 'sinicization' served the purpose of describing the allure for Chinese notions, language and material culture over culture originating outside China (Cheng 2021).

Cheng puts forward the argument that there are three primary discourses within which the concept of Sinicization is employed. The first is the historical acculturation of border peoples and assimilation of domestic peoples to Chinese language, culture,and economic life, resulting in stability within China; the second one , being the inherent superiority in Chinese culture; the third discourse is diversity and mixture of the people living inside historical and contemporary China resulting in the stability of the Chinese polity. (Cheng 2021). One of the earliest employment of the term 'sinicization' can be found in the work of the anthropologist Berthold Laufer. In one of Laufer's articles published in 1917 there is a mention of the Lolo people of Southwest China who did not have family names prior to their contact with the Chinese; they are referred to by Laufer as "Sinicized Lolo" as they adopted Chinese surnames. (Cheng 2021) .

Mandarin or Mandarin Chinese refers to China's standard spoken language. Scholars have opined that one of the main objectives of language reform in China was to create a standard language that was more accessible and represented a significant change from the previous condition of language in China, wherein Classical Chinese was available for access to only a segment of society. (Weng 2018).

Weng has argued, therefore that the creation of a "new language was intimately connected to the goal of a new social order." (Weng 2018). Historically, the "national language" or Guoyu during the Qing dynasty referred to the Manchu language. Guoyu is now equivalent to Mandarin or the "national language".Putonghua or "common speech," is another term associated with standard language. Putonghua originated under Japanese influence in the 1900s and came into official use in the People's Republic of China from the mid 1950s onwards to describe the standard spoken Chinese language. Guoyu and Putonghua illustrate the phenomena of national language standardization that was created in the decades between 1910- 1930s to serve a new national society.(Weng 2018).

Weng, in his analysis of the evolution of the modern standardized Mandarin, warns that it would be a fallacy to think of the modern national standard language in the People's Republic of China as a simple descendant from the imperial dynasties rather than modern-day Mandarin represents a break. The 'Guanhua' (national language) of the Ming and Qing dynasties was phonologically different from the modern Mandarin language. It was also not codified and used in the same way. The Guanhua of the Ming and Qing dynasties was a language for a very restricted class of people who were required to communicate across regional boundaries.

The May Fourth Movement of 1919 introduced several innovations towards approaching the Mandarin language. The intellectuals associated with the May Fourth Movement advocated a shift from Classical Chinese to the vernacular, comparing the shift from a 'dead language' to a 'living one'.The vernacular during this period thus came to be seen as reflective of the people's experiences. (Weng 2018).

Language reformers in China aspired for a nationalized society in which literacy was universal. Mandarin today is reliant on the phonology of the Beijing dialect. Beijing dialect as the standard for Putonghua is the result of 1000 years of Beijing being the capital of the Liao, Jin, Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties(Weng 2018). However, one should note this generalization of Beijing as the capital largely overlooks the periods in history wherein Beijing was not a capital, such as the beginning of the Ming dynasty between the years 1368 and 1421 and also during the Republican period when the capital was moved to Nanjing in the decades between 1928- 1937. (Weng 2018)

Scholars have also termed sinicization state-led cultural assimilation strategies that are aggressively implemented and promoted in the People's Republic of China and are an integral part of its nation-making tactics. Sinicization has been synonymous with the logic of Chinese racial domination. Sinicization in this context signifies aggressive, state-led promotion of the Han culture language and the associated dissolution of non-Han groups' culture, identity and language and social erasure or disappearance of these groups into the modern Chinese nation. (Law 2012) Sinicization involves a two-fold process of inclusion on one hand and inferiority of the racialized groups, which are placed in hierarchical systems and positions. (Law 2012)

Sun Yat Sen who served as the first provisional president of the Republic of China and the first leader of the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party of China) was widely hailed as one of the most influential figures in modern-day Chinese politics. Sun Yat Sen casts a long shadow of influence over China's nationality policy. Sun Yat Sen, being a follower of Confucianism, articulated that anyone can be a member of the Han community by simply accepting Han culture. Confucianism encourages the intermingling of different ethnic and cultural groups to form a harmonious Han community. (Zang,2016). The underlying assumption of Confucianism in this regard is that the non-Han ethnic

groups can let go of their uncivilized cultural practices and participate in Han society by adopting and adapting to Han ways of life. Confucianism, therefore, encourages the gradual assimilation of non-Han people into Han society. Scholars have contended that Confucianism perceived the non-Han people as 'barbarians' and hence called for their gradual assimilation into Han society by adapting Han values rather than the policy of exterminating the non-Han peoples. Sun Yat-sen insisted that the non-Han groups were essentially sub-branches of the Chinese nation, which would be assimilated into a cultural and political sub-group under the leadership of the Han. (Zang,2016).

The Chinese Communist Party projects an image of ethnic harmony in China and downplays ethnic conflict in China through the scrutiny and control over public information and discussion surrounding ethnic affairs. A key tactic employed by the Chinese Communist Party is 'propaganda'. The Chinese Communist Party employs propaganda to manage the perceptions of both domestic audiences and foreign onlookers. Mass persuasion and social transformation were one of the key tasks performed by the Chinese Communist Party during the Mao era. There has been a shift since the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989, the focus has shifted for the Chinese Communist Party from political indoctrination towards shaping public opinion to garner consensus on key policies advocated by the Chinese Communist Party. (Brady 2012, 159-181).

I. Research Methodology

Research methodology refers to a coherent system of ideas that allows us to acquire knowledge through a logical structure of inquiry. Research tools specifically refers to the specific tools we use to collect and analyze data. (Lamont 2022,11-37)

The research is qualitative in nature. The qualitative research method is premised on attaching meaning and motivations that underlie cultural symbols, as well as a detailed understanding of the processes in the social world.In this paper, a qualitative research method will be employed to understand the processes and meaning attached to events and their evolving significance across time and space. (Kalof, Dan and Dietz 2008). The research being premised on the qualitative mode of research will aim to move beyond pure description and provide analyses of the events and environments being studied. (Bryman 2003, 45-71).

Within the framework of qualitative research, the study is descriptive.This research is based on a content analysis method among the many descriptive methods.Content analysis enables us to look at qualitative data objectively.Content analysis allows one to break down the information that has been obtained through various sources. Content Analysis involves an array of characteristics, namely close reading of relatively small amounts of textual matter and interpreting given texts into new narratives.(Krippendorff 2013, 24).In summation, content analysis consists of various research methods that aim to derive inferences from all kinds of data: verbal, textual, symbolic, pictorial, and communication data. The research is interpretive. Interpretive research implies that claims about International Relations are tied to a particular context or time that gives them meaning, which may change. (Lamont 2022, 11 - 37)

The research derives its analysis from many of the Government Guidelines, White Papers, and Directives issued, as well as Official Statements of Senior Officials of the People's Republic of China. The research also relies heavily on secondary sources of information in the form of journal articles

media reports to form the basis of its analysis. This research utilizes the qualitative methods of research to weave quotes from the analyzed texts, whether it is secondary sources, or primary sources in the form of White Papers or official documents to derive analysis.

Generally, discourse is defined as text above the level of a sentence. Discourse analysts focus on how certain events and phenomenons are represented. (Krippendorff 2013, 24). A discourse analysis method will be used. Meanings are socially produced, and discourse analysts recognize this as the representation of the texts being studied. In line with the discourse analysis framework of the study, this research recognizes that a given discourse can not be entirely understood in isolation or be detached from all other discourses. Discourses are ordered and scaled in relation to one another. Discourse analysis entails identifying asymmetries in various representations of discourses in relation to one another.(Neumann 2008, 61-77). The use of discourse analysis makes the social world easier to comprehend by demonstrating how different elements of the social world interact with one another. The incorporation of discourse analysis makes us aware of the fact that everyday events, narratives are evolving, being shaped, and changing at a rapid pace. (Neumann 2008, 61-77).

Critical discourse analysis aims to understand the reproduction of power relations, such as dominance and inequality, through understanding the creation and reception of discourses. (Dijk, 1993).Texts are crucial as they perform the task of persuasion. Analyzing texts, therefore, is crucial. It is important to note that power relations, such as dominance of a particular discourse, may be enacted through routine, subtle everyday forms of text and talk that may appear on the surface as 'regular' or 'natural'.(Djik, 1993).In modern society, institutions maintain and enforce discourses to maintain order. The capacity to exercise power is closely intertwined with ideology. Hence, institutions, through their discourses, can help us gauge the orientations that are enforced in society through the analysis of the ideas that form critical discourses that are upheld and disseminated. The study of discourses is therefore crucial to understanding the reproduction of power relations in society. (Gölbaş 2017)

- ***Aim of the Study:***

The research will evaluate the prevailing discourses and narratives surrounding ethnic relations in China. Through the employment of primary sources in the form of Government directives, guidelines, White Papers of the People's Republic of China, and secondary literature, the research aims to understand the evolution of linguistic policies in China. The aim is to understand the reproduction of power relations within the nation of China through the analysis of language policies as well as the patterns of continuity and change. By examining the case study of Inner Mongolia, the research aims to gauge the prevailing orientation of the state dispensation towards ethnic minorities in contemporary China. The orientation of the Chinese Communist Party and its worldview can be gauged through its policy statements. This research aims to decipher through the official statements in light of the aftermath of the 2020 Inner Mongolia protests - the orientation of the Chinese Communist Party. The patterns of continuity and change can be arrived at through critical analysis of the discourses put forth by the Chinese Communist Party. This paper aims to understand the fundamental orientations of the Chinese Communist Party towards various ethnicities in China and to understand the reproduction of power relations in contemporary China through linguistic policies. The paper aims to study, through the case study of Inner Mongolia the recurring patterns in ethnic governance in China concerning regions inhabited by ethnic minorities and the changes in approaches to ethnic minorities in the contemporary era.

- ***Research Questions :***

1. What are the key orientations concerning ethnic governance that emerge from the ethnic governance adopted by the People's Republic of China ?

2. What are the key tactics employed by the Chinese state towards ethnic minorities?

3. What do the 2020 Language Protests in Inner Mongolia demonstrate about the patterns of change and continuity toward the governance of ethnic minorities in China?

- ***Limitations of the Study :***

The study is mostly based on secondary sources based on available literature about China's ethnic policies. This paper does not employ primary data written in the Chinese language due to the difficulty in access to primary sources and limitations of understanding the Chinese script and language. The study also relies heavily on the works of scholars,many of whom are not Chinese themselves.The study also suffers from usage of limited media reports.

III. Ethnic Governance in China

The first National People's Congress convened in 1954 established the system of regional autonomy for ethnic minorities in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China. The Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy defines the relationship between the Central Government and the Ethnic Autonomous Regions as well as the relationship between different ethnic groups in ethnic autonomous regions. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 2005). However, one must note that the legal effect of the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy is not limited to the ethnic autonomous regions only; every individual in China and all state organs must abide by and implement the law. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 2005). Thereby highlighting the stringent grip with which the modern Chinese state deals with matters of minority ethnic communities,

Ethnic policies tend to divide the Chinese population, and hence China's contemporary domestic propaganda around ethnic policies focuses on building ethnic unity and avoiding any ethnic conflict. One of the key themes of ethnic propaganda centers around promoting the idea of "one family" comprising all Han and non-Han minority groups. (Brady 2012). The 2005 White Paper for Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China outlines that "people of all ethnic groups in China have made important contributions to the creation of a unified multi-ethnic country and the creation of the time-honored Chinese civilization, as well as Chinese historical progress".(Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 2005). This statement clearly outlines the posturing of the People's Republic of China as a 'civilizational state' within which minority cultures are not only subsumed but must contribute to the 'ideals' of the Chinese civilization.

The White Paper further states that the Communist Party of China (CPC) has made efforts to "solve China's ethnic problems" - a clear indication of the roadblocks faced in the nation-building project in the People's Republic of China due to ethnic problems of integration. The White Paper mentions explicitly the Han Dynasty as responsible for consolidating the country into uniform systems of law, language, carriage, and currency. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 2005) .By crediting the Han Dynasty with the consolidation of the modern Chinese state in its official documents, the People's Republic of China showcases its underlying hierarchical ordering

wherein the Han Dynasty's structures are synonymous with the governance frameworks of the modern Chinese state. The White Paper further references the Office of the Protector-General of the Western Regions in what today is Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and other administrative structures, such as the prefecture county system in areas where Mongolians lived to establish the legitimacy of the imposition of modern Chinese governance structures and cultural assimilation efforts carried out by the modern Chinese state in these autonomous regions of ethnic minority composition. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 2005)
It is vital to note that Chinese ideas of racism are independent of the experience of colonialism by external powers and instead draw on long held notions in Chinese society around the notions of blood, skin color, lineage, purity, pollution, and barbarism. Myths of descent, such as the biological descent of the Han people being linked to 'the Yellow Emperor'. The Yellow Emperor was a symbolic figure considered to be the first ancestor of the Han race and hence the idea of 'the superior yellow race' came into being. This Han-centered view of a superior state and people provides a world view based on a hierarchy with the core concept of racial superiority forming the basis of assimilation and incorporation of the non-Han or the barbarian people as part of the Chinese civilizational state. (Law 2012)

The Chinese Communist Party's policy on ethnic minorities evolved by drawing inspiration from Chinese racial nationalism, illustrated in the views of both Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-Shek. In the book China's Destiny, the 'common destiny' of what Chiang calls the five racial stocks of the Chinese people throughout history shared not only a common lineage but a common history. (Law 2012)

Scholar Yan Sun, in her work, identifies the three primary contending schools in China regarding ethnic governance - the liberal autonomists, integrationists, and socialist autonomists. She illustrates through her work that contention among the three groups revolves around the tradeoffs between autonomy and ethnic particularism(Sun 2019). Broadly, the Liberal Autonomists attribute the rise of ethnic grievances to the dearth of autonomy rights. The Integrationists, on the other hand, blame the policies of ethnic particularism for politicizing identities and undermining national cohesion. The Social Autonomists accept the tradeoffs between autonomy and ethnic particularism and seek more policies of ethnic particularism. (Sun 2019)

IV. **Linguistic Engineering in China**

Language is a key tool for maintaining distinction among different ethnic groups. Post 1949, China observed a trend of reforming the written languages of China's ethnic minorities and for certain ethnic minority communities that did not possess their own written language to create a written form of their spoken language. The period post-1949 was one wherein the Chinese Government emphasized upon the need for China's ethnic minorities to learn Mandarin to integrate into Chinese society. (Brady 2012)

The Chinese Communist Party has had a long, drawn-out mass campaign as a means of engaging in public political education. It has undergone reformation since the Mao era, and now, broadly, the terms' activities' and 'campaigns' are preferred for public political education carried out to the masses. The Chinese Communist Party targets the general public in several ways, such as soft propaganda messages emphasizing political stability and social harmony. Such as the example of Tibet, where monks regularly undergo political education in the "correct way to perceive' the Dalai Lama and on other topics around patriotic education. (Brady 2012)

The Communist Party of China actively promotes ideological political education. The guidelines of the Communist Party of China are most often geared towards reform and innovation of ideological and political theory courses. (english.gov.cn 2019). It is significant to note that such directives also openly call for the improvement of teaching staff, establishing that it is equally important to shape the thoughts and beliefs of educators from time to time to align with the official narratives of the Communist Party of China. The priority of the Communist Party of China lies in ideologically molding citizens, especially of restive, peripheral regions through education so that their beliefs and thought processes align with the official narratives surrounding the history and cultural practices in China. Xi Jinping, since assuming power, has paid inspection tours to minority regions. Most notable among these was his celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Tibetan Autonomous Region and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. President Xi Jinping's visit to Tibet for the 70th Anniversary for Tibet's 'peaceful liberation' emphasized the need to implement the guidelines of the Communist Party of China for the governance of Tibet to ensure 'lasting stability and high quality development'. (Xuanmin 2021)

It is to be noted that China drives the narrative of ensuring stable order and, modernization and development to justify its control over the ethnic autonomous regions. It should be noted that during the same visit, Xi Jinping also called for 'efforts to strengthen the military training and preparedness'. (Xuanmin 2021). It should be observed that the militarisation of Tibet has accelerated owing to its strategic location and following the border standoff with India in 2021.

Xi Jinping's visit signals the Chinese Communist Party's confidence in establishing order and gaining support in the once-restive region.Xi Jinping also inspected ethnic and religious work. Xi Jinping instructed local officials to make Tibet identify more with the "great motherland, Chinese people, Chinese culture, the Chinese Communist Party and socialism with Chinese characteristics." (Xuanmin 2021). Xi asserted it is only when people follow the party that rejuvenation of the Chinese nation can be realized, essentially emphasizing that the party reigns supreme over all other ways of life, cultural practices, and beliefs that theTibetans may hold. (Crossley and Tian, 2021)

In his inspection of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in northwestern China, Xi Jinping emphasized efforts to implement the Communist Party of China's Central Committee's decisions and carry out plans and policies for the Communist Party of China for the governance of Xinjiang. Xi Jinping stressed the significance of ensuring lasting social stability and security and balancing development and security imperatives. (Xinhua 2022). Xi Jinping highlighted the significance of formulated ethnic theories and policies characterized by ethnic equality and unity, regional ethnic autonomy, shared development, and prosperity. He also stressed the significance of "stay committed to the correct and Chinese way to address ethnic issues. ". (Xinhua 2022). Thereby underscoring that locals should refrain from addressing cultural and social issues. Xi Jinping reiterated that all Chinese citizens should have a "correct understanding of Xinjiang's history, of its ethnic groups" (Xinhua 2022). The framing of 'correct history' in the case of ethnic minority areas is premised on the understanding of history within which the experiences of the minority ethnic groups are subsumed.
However, despite these efforts, the debate over the ethnic governance model adopted by China continues. (Leibold 2015) Scholars such as Ma Rong have argued that the People's Republic of China shares similar preconditions and features as that of the Soviet Union in terms of its ethnic governance which may lead to its eventual fracturing (Leibold 2015).

Despite the autonomous status given to many of the regions with minority ethnic populations, the loyalty of the minority ethnic groups to the overarching structures of governance laid down by the

People's Republic of China's Government is of supreme concern as it tries to establish in its Official White Paper on Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities of 2005 on the "long-standing existence of the united, multi-ethnic state in Chinese History" and also highlights the "the identification of all ethnic groups with the central government and their allegiance to it". Thereby showcasing the tendency to subsume minority ethnic cultures and their practices within the larger overarching governance structures of the modern Chinese state. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 2005)

Scholars have analyzed that similar to the category of 'whiteness' in the United States, Han is an ethnic category that is historically contingent - an ethnic category that has been constructed, performed, and institutionalized within the cultural framework of the Chinese state. Han ethnocentrism has remained a distinct problem for policymakers in China throughout the 20th century.(Leibold 2010).

China has applied more aggressive Mandarin language policies and stricter social control mechanisms over its population, particularly the ethnic minority groups in the peripheral parts of China. Scholars have applied the concept of 'internal colonialism' to study ethnic minorities in China. (Chen, Miller, Shakespear, 2023). The political and social subordination of the minority ethnic groups in relation to the Han has been a neglected area of study. (Chen, Miller, Shakespear, 2023). Internal colonialism as the name suggests, refers to the idea that colonial mechanisms and tactics of governance are not restricted to use in an overseas nation but may also function within a nation's borders. (Chen, Miller, Shakespear, 2023).

Recent studies by scholars indicate that while Tibet and Xinjiang are the most cited for internal colonization in China, other cases also fit the framework(Chen, Miller, Shakespear, 2023).The political conditions in Hong Kong have pointed to several onlookers commenting that the handover of Hong Kong by the British was a transition from a British to a Chinese colony. Internal colonialism in China is articulated by the stringent political governance measures, such as in the case of Hong Kong, the imposition of a National Security Law to contain dissent, as well as the imposition of Mandarin on the Cantonese-speaking population of Hong Kong.(Chen, Miller, Shakespear, 2023).Hence, the two-pronged strategy of political governance and ethnic repression is implemented to assert dominance in the regions wherein the ethnic minorities reside in the People's Republic of China.

Preferential policies towards ethnic minorities in China are premised on Chinese society's differentiated and hierarchical nature. China's Confucian heritage lacks a tradition of 'group rights' but rather is focused on 'reciprocity' and 'compassion', which requires powerful actors to nurture and look after the weak in exchange for a degree of subservience and loyalty to the Chinese nation. A degree of paternalism underlies China's ethnic policy towards its minorities since the inception of the People’s Republic of China. (Leibold 2016).

Several preferential policies for China's ethnic minorities are present within the governing structures of the People's Republic of China with the aim, as per statements, to 'sustain' and 'support' the minorities to enable them to keep pace with the Han ethnic majority. The preferential policies are aimed directly at ethnic minorities and in some instances, are defined geographically and designed for ethnic minorities residing in the peripheral parts of China.(Leibold 2016). Preferential policies towards the ethnic minorities in the People's Republic of China, therefore, serves as a tool of statecraft set of instrumental policies to uphold territorial sovereignty, preserve social stability and maintain the power of the Han elite. (Leibold 2016) In practice, the preferential policies towards ethnic minorities

in China do not aim towards a more inclusive society but rather is premised on maintaining the ethnic status quo and securing the control of the Chinese Communist Party over the frontier regions. (Leibold 2016)

With the advent of the internet, narratives within the digital space have emerged that assert both Han supremacist thought and discontent over social and political rights accorded to the ethnic minorities in the People's Republic of China. Among the preferential policies, Han supremacists most often criticize education and population control policies. (Leibold 2010).

V. **Language and Education in China**

Linda Tsung, in her work, arrives at important insights surrounding the complex language policy and practices in modern-day China. Tsung, through her work, argues that languages in China rest on a hierarchy. This hierarchy is political. As an official policy, the Chinese Government promotes multilingualism; however, there is a long history of power relations between the various linguistic groups.(Gumina 2018). Tsung demonstrates through her work that the aggressive promotion of the national language has put multilingualism under threat in China. Although the Chinese Government officially claims to uphold diversity, the emphasis on Chinese language education as the sole marker of success paints a contradictory picture. The hierarchical nature of languages is enforced, maintained, and preserved through China's highly competitive national-level testing practices. All students in China take grade completion exams and college entrance exams in Chinese, not in any of the minority languages. (Gumina 2018)

Significant strides have been in achieving equality in the Chinese educational system since the founding of the People's Republic of China; however, inequality prevails along the lines of ethnic classification. (Chen 2016) There has been a legacy of gaps between the educational development levels of the Han in relation to the ethnic minorities in China. Ethnic minorities in China have historically been located at the periphery of the cultural realm of the Confucius cultural circle, whereas the Han resided in the central region of the middle and lower ends of the Yangtze River. The knowledge imparted in the traditional educational system of imperial examination was in the Chinese language and infused with Confucian ideology. Apart from the Yuan and Qing dynasties, where the Mongols and Manchus ascended to the ruling class, respectively, most of Chinese history perceived ethnic minorities as passive recipients of Confucian schooling. (Chen 2016)

Minority education lags behind the national benchmarks. A range of factors such as underdeveloped educational infrastructure, poor teaching quality, and the confinement of ethnic minority students within their communities, thus alienating them from the mainstream in China, are reasons for the minority to lag in educational parameters. (Chen 2016). Inaccessibility to the modern school system, particularly to the ethnic minority communities residing in the remote mountainous and steppe areas is also a key factor for the lagging behind of the ethnic minorities compared to the majority Han population.(Chen 2016). The underlying notion of 'civilizing project' characterizes the mainstream educational policymakers and practitioners' understanding of the function of minority education. The notion of ethnic minorities from a 'culturally backward' position places them at par with the Han mainstream. (Chen 2016). Therefore, from the official Chinese discourse, minority language education is seen as an endowment from the state. Studies also indicate that students from ethnic minorities are under-represented at the university level. The backwardness of ethnic minorities in various stages of education, from school to university, indicates the social stratification that reproduces itself in the education domain.

Educational policies specifically aimed at addressing ethnic minorities have been implemented since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. These policies have been based on the National Minorities Policy (NMP), which stipulates equality among all ethnic groups in China. However, in reality, the adherence to this policy has been inconsistent, which has alternated between granting ethnic minorities special provisions on the one hand and suppression of rights on the other. (Sato 2022). In the 1990s, the Chinese Communist Party adopted a policy of encouraging Han Chinese to relocate to peripheral regions, including Inner Mongolia, in an attempt to assimilate ethnic minorities and, in turn, suppressing their right to freedom of religion and expression. The destruction of cultures of peripheral regions of China and the imposition of Chinese cultures on ethnic minorities residing in the peripheral regions has been justified as China aims for unity and national security. (Sato 2022).

Scholars have cited an intrinsic relationship between minority education policies and socio-political agendas and changes in the country. This is reflected in directives issued by the Chinese state. Such as a directive on minority language education was issued with a statement that implicitly excluded minority groups from the promotion of English language education. The State Council Directive of 2002 stated that in bilingual education, the relationship between the minority language and the Mandarin Chinese should be 'correctly managed', further stating that English should only be offered as a medium of instruction where favorable conditions exist. (Feng Sunuodula 2009).Therefore, indicating that English should be promoted with caution in the restive regions of China. The 2004 Bilingual Learning Document states that Mandarin Chinese be made the primary or sole language for the medium of instruction in elementary and middle school classrooms. In effect,' bilingual education' has come to signify that Chinese is the only medium of instruction for primary school onwards and minority languages are to be relegated as a school subject. The implementation of the Bilingual Learning Policy has been rigid. (Feng Sunuodula 2009).

Xi Jinping takes an active interest in the United Front Work and Ethnic Minority Issues and, since 2017, has been the head of the powerful Central Leading Small Group on United Front Work, which is involved directly in formulating and implementing policies for China's ethnic minorities. (Ranade 2021) One of the most notable policy initiatives of the United Front Work has been replacing ethnic languages taught in schools in ethnic areas with Putonghua or Mandarin. The Chinese Communist Party has been systematically replacing ethnic minority languages with Mandarin. (Ranade 2021)The potent power of education is realized by the Chinese Communist Party, and due to this, young students from ethnic minority regions are selected for education in the Chinese Mainland; more recently, the curriculum includes "Xi Jingping's thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for the new era". (Ranade 2021). The Chinese authorities have begun implementing a unified Chinese language teaching plan. In Inner Mongolia, a notice was served to publishing houses to discontinue books that did not adequately highlight "awareness of common roots '.Textbooks such as 'Inner Mongolia History and Culture', and 'Mongolian History' will be banned. This is a clear indication of steps taken towards the erasure of the unique Mongolian culture. (Ranade 2021)

The accelerated push for the assimilation of minority ethnic people in the People's Republic of China is also highlighted as breaking long-held tradition a Han official, Chen Xiaojiang, from the Communist Party's Watchdog has been selected to lead the National Ethnic Affairs Commission, which has traditionally always been held by individuals from the minority ethnic communities such as Hui, Uyghur, Mongol cadres. Many onlookers have remarked that this appointment signifies the death knell of the commission in serving its purpose of representing the interests of ethnic minorities. (Lew 2020)

VI. **The Struggle for Identity: The Case of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region**

In its task of nation-building, the Chinese Government has long struggled to bring the country's borderlands or peripheral parts under its control. It took nearly a decade for the Communist Party of China to subdue the restive province of Yunnan in the Southwest and Tibet after establishing the People's Republic of China. Han migration began in the present day Inner Mongolia Region began in the 19th century. The native Mongol population in Inner Mongolia began to dwindle, and the native Mongol population was already a minority by 1949. Only 20% of the population in Inner Mongolia are Mongolian. During the Cultural Revolution, the region suffered severe violence -Buddhism, which was firmly rooted in Inner Mongolia, was crushed. (The Economist 2017).

Reforms in writing were a priority for the Chinese Communist Party as Mao Zedong advocated for the reforms and the phoneticization common to all writing systems in the world. The Cyrillization of the Mongolian script that occurred in the Mongolian People's Republic has been described by linguists as a "national tragedy." The Mongolian script in the Mongolian People's Republic, therefore, came to resemble the Russian script. In 1957, when China was pursuing its nationalist agenda, it no longer supported the Pan-Mongol linguistic unity in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region and demanded the promotion of pinyin-based Latinization. The authorities of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region resisted the Latinization reform based on rejective Chinese influence. The opposition of the authorities of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous region combined with the unstable political atmosphere at that time in China and the associated technical difficulties of language reform led to the eventual stagnation of the language reform. (Wang 2020).

In the period following the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese Government prioritized improving the ethnic relations with the peripheral regions; this led to the policy decision to abandon the Latinization reform and the preservation of the traditional Mongolian script.(Wang 2020).

Uradyn Bulag, in his work, highlights the unique predicament or 'linguistic anxiety' as termed by him that Mongols suffer in the People's Republic of China. Bulag notes that Mongols have been nationalized one generation after another; however, they have also been 'denationalized' at the same time as they have been perceived under Chinese policies as an 'ethnic group', thereby essentializing them to their immediate identity. Bulag notes that language loss in Inner Mongolia was a consequence of Chinese settler colonization.In the 20th century, Inner Mongolian nationalism developed due to cultural loss and colonization. Within the Mongols, the groups that had suffered the greatest degree of language loss became the most ardent nationalists, such as the Tumed community, the Hachins. (Bulag, 2003)

Bayar, in her work, observes that the concept of civilization and culture is utilized to align with the official discourse of nation-state and ethnicity in the People's Republic of China. Bayar observes that historically Chinese cosmology or Confucianism considers China proper as the center of the 'realm under heaven.' The places beyond this realm have historically been considered peripheral, remote, and wild. Bayar notes that in ancient Chinese literature, the land of the barbarians represented a geographical space that was desolate and wild. In Chinese public discourse, the term 'caoyuan' denotes the land where ethnic minorities such as the Mongols live- behind the Great Wall. (Bayar, 2014). The notions of 'civilization', 'barbarian', and cultural distinctiveness are deeply ingrained in the governance structure and the orientation of the Chinese state toward ethnic minorities.

VII. **The 2020 Inner Mongolia Language Protests**

The Chinese Government in August 2020 announced that classes at the school level in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous region would no longer be taught in Mongolian, and under the new directive, literature, politics, and history would be taught in Mandarin. Several parents have reacted vehemently to the directive of Mandarin language education by stating that they would prefer to keep their children home. Many students have been de-enrolled by their parents as a result of the directive.(Graceffo,2020). For example, in Naiman County, 40 students registered for school on the first day, whereas the normal number of Mongolian students is 1000. Evidence of protests by parents has also emerged on the internet in the form of videos wherein parents are seen trying to remove children from school grounds and police preventing them from doing so. Riot police were deployed in large numbers to prevent a strike. Several other videos on social media of Mongolian children chanting "Our mother language is Mongolian !" (Graceffo,2020). Through the mass protests, Mongolians have asserted that it is their inalienable right to have the right to learn in their mother tongue-Mongolian. (Graceffo,2020).

Following the widespread opposition to the Mandarin language school instruction in Inner Mongolia by the Mongolian population, the provincial state media has removed Mongolian programs and replaced them with Mandarin language shows. (Ekstrom, 2023). In an attempt to curb the backlash against the decision to introduce Mandarin in school education in Inner Mongolia, the Chinese authorities have also banned the only Mongolian social media platform - Bainu. The social media platform Bainu has been shut down. (Graceffo, 2020)

The outrage over the imposition of Mandarin in school-level education demonstrates that for a vast majority of Mongolians the steps taken towards imposition of Mandarin Chinese is the beginning of their cultural marginalization and eventual erasure of their mother tongue. The expansion of Mandarin language education in Inner Mongolia's schools threatens the Mongolian language and is part of a broader strategy of cultural assimilation of the Mongols into the Chinese society dominated by the Han.

One of the consequences of introducing Mandarin to the school curriculum is likely to be a significant reduction in the number of hours of Mongolian instruction on average each day. The new policy therefore, introduces a major shift in the meaning of bilingual education from that of Mongolian schooling that teaches Mandarin as a language to that of Mandarin schooling that teaches Mongolian as one of the subjects taught in the school curriculum. It also entails that Mongolian teachers will have to learn Mandarin as the medium of instruction or risk their job security. (Ward,2020).

Since the eruption of the protests in Inner Mongolia, ideological training classes aimed at strengthening the ideological control of the Chinese Communist Party and aligning the consciousness of the Mongolian public with the Chinese Communist Party's vision of a Han-centric China were carried out. 360,000 people from various sectors have attended these ideological training classes. The Inner Mongolian Education Department, on its official WeChat platform, has celebrated the execution of these ideological classes. The Chinese Communist Party has carried out extensive digital propaganda campaigns through two WeChat official accounts, the Inner Mongolia Daily and the Inner Mongolia Education Department. (Baioud, Khuanuud, 2023).The WeChat Official Accounts of the Inner Mongolia Daily and Inner Mongolian Education Department after the 2020 language protests in Inner Mongolia reflect intense propaganda of 'national unity and development' discourses. (Baioud, Khuanuud, 2023).The Chinese Communist Party links development and progress with speaking Chinese as opposed to the mother tongue languages of the ethnic minorities.(Baioud, Khuanuud, 2023).

VIII. **Aftermath of the 2020 Language Protests in Inner Mongolia: Evaluating Official Stances**

During the annual legislative session of the People's Republic of China, while deliberating with the lawmakers from the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, President Xi Jinping remarked on efforts to promote standard spoken and written Chinese language and the usage of state-compiled textbooks. President Xi Jinping also emphasized the idea of identity and motherland and strengthening ties with the Chinese nation, Chinese culture, the Communist Party, and socialism with Chinese characteristics to be sustained by people of all ethnic groups. ("Xi stresses promoting standard spoken, written Chinese language," 2021). It is interesting to note that President Xi Jinping's remarks reveal an approach of both 'cultural assimilation' and 'integration' of ethnic minorities.

The Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in the Inner Mongolia Region of China has reprimanded local officials for the manner in which they handled the language reform in school-level education. (Asia News 2020). One must note that it is not a disapproval of the language policy but rather a criticism of the manner in which it was implemented, hinting that a more stringent approach in its implementation should have been followed.

The policy of promoting education to promote national unity can be traced back to a September 2019 speech by President Xi Jinping where he emphasized in a conference on national unity that the Chinese nation is akin to 'one big family'. ("China Imposes Mandarin-Language Teaching on Kindergartens in Ethnic Minority, Rural Areas" 2021). President Xi Jinping's statements highlight the prevailing propaganda advocated by the Chinese Communist Party that does not acknowledge the distinctiveness of ethnic minorities in China but adopts an assimilationist tone while addressing the ethnic minorities. It is interesting to note that the official narrative of the state dispensation of the People's Republic of China is premised on the promotion of Putonghua in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, which is perceived as a 'progressive step'. The Communist Party of China links this to a benevolent step taken by the Chinese Government, due to which greater career options will now be available to Mongolians in China.

It should be noted that the aggressive promotion of Mandarin Chinese is also termed as 'scientific' and 'progressive'. The local sentiments of fear of cultural erasure, and linguistic anxiety of the Inner Mongolians are not given any voice or legitimacy in the official statements. (China Daily 2020)

IX. **Patterns of Continuity and Change**

The introduction of Mandarin Chinese language in school-level instruction is similar to the situation in the Qinghai province a decade ago; the Chinese Communist Party introduced similar changes to the Tibetan medium of instruction in schools, relegating Tibet as a subject taught in school and ushering in effect a Chinese medium system of education. In the restive province of Xinjiang, similarly, mother tongue education has been banned. (Roche, Leibold 2020)

Analysts have dubbed the situation in Inner Mongolia as linked to the 'second-generation ethnic policies.' The second-generation ethnic policies entail an erasure of ethnic distinctiveness and the forging of a common culture, consciousness, and identity. (Roche, Leibold 2020)This approach has been applied steadily in the People's Republic of China. This entailed not only the implementation of a universal Chinese medium education across the People's Republic of China but also the elimination of a range of preferential policies to minorities. Ethnic minorities no longer enjoy special exceptions to family planning laws. The removal of special policies for ethnic minorities implies the vision of

the Chinese Communist Party to create a homogenous society premised on nationalism. (Roche, Leibold 2020) .

X: **Conclusion**

With the advent of the internet, the articulation of ethnic pride of the majority Han community is likely to be more vociferously advocated. The internet is also a tool utilized by the Chinese Communist Party to project an image of relative 'backwardness' and 'underdevelopment' for the restive provinces. Digital platforms will likely be a tool for manipulation of the narrative by the Chinese Communist Party. It also implies counterintuitively that advocacy and International backlash against China's continued approach towards ethnic minorities will likely garner global criticism. The policies implemented towards the ethnic minorities within China can not be seen in isolation to the nation-building project undertaken by the Chinese Government; however it also provides vital insights into China's posturing in relation to other states. Such as the ‘middle kingdom’ orientation of China is suggestive of China adopting a belligerent attitude towards smaller Asian countries in its immediate neighborhood as well as of the tendency to subsume within Chinese culture all other asian cultures.

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Zhonghua Minzu and Chinese Nationalism: A Case Study of Inner Mongolia

Kriti Chopra

Abstract

Liang Qichao coined the term "Zhonghua minzu" to refer to the Han in 1902, and it was only later that it was re-imagined as a nation with the Han at its centre. Zhonghua Minzu has expanded from a Han nation to include every ethnic group who has ever lived in the PRC's current territory. Minorities are included in Zhonghua Minzu because the Han brought advanced culture to their 'frontier' regions. The concept of a common identity has been codified and passed down in Chinese history as "Zhonghua Minzu." The broad term has been used in anti-Manchurian revolutions to signify the nation of Chinese people and was taken up by the CCP after the Communist Revolution. Through the years, the Communist regime has used this concept as the foundation stone for nation building propaganda and, by default, policies affecting minorities. The Chinese government has always sought to homogenise its whole territory and establish "one nation, one China". In order to reach this goal, rather than allowing ethnic minorities in the majoritarian Han nation to flourish and coexist, laws curtailing their ethnic practices have been enforced.

The proposed paper aims to study the conception and evolution of the idea of Zhonghua Minzu through the contestations between nation building and ethnic identity paradigms in China. The rise of an indigenous ideology to advance and project a cumulative Chinese identity has occurred in the state of China. The 56 ethnic groups are recognised by the Chinese state. The conception of Zhonghua Minzu elucidates an overarching national identity over ethnic identity. The frontier regions have seen ethnic conflicts due to the policies of the government of the day. This study will undertake an assessment of the implications of these policies on the territory of Inner Mongolia. The implementation of the idea of Zhonghua Minzu has caused conflicts among the minorities in China. The Mongols in Inner Mongolia have agitated against the new laws rolled out by the government. These responses will be an important part of the framework as they provide an empirical picture of the interactions between national and ethnic identity. A predictive theoretical analysis will be provided to elaborate upon the identity politics within the paradigms of nationalism. The development of Chinese national identity will also be assessed under the lens of world IR to juxtapose the unique and similar characteristics of its evolution

Keywords: Chinese identity, Chinese Nationalism, Zhonghua Minzu, Inner Mongolia, Theoretical Analysis

Introduction

Central to Chinese nationalism is the idea of Zhonghua Minzu, sometimes translated as the Chinese people or the Chinese ethnic group. It encapsulates the concept of a multiethnic Chinese identity that goes beyond the boundaries of any one ethnic group. Inner Mongolia, an autonomous area in China's north, is a miniature version of the intricacies of the country as a whole. Inner Mongolia, with its large Mongolian population and rich cultural history, provides an interesting case study of the tensions between Chinese nationalism and regional identities.

The concept of Zhonghua Minzu has grown and developed from an inclusionary policy of a newly minted CCP trying to form a cohesive state to one of disenfranchisement of ethnic identity in favour of Chinese national identity. From the Qing dynasty to the current CCP regime, the bare notion of Zhonghua Minzu has changed in nature to suit the needs of the Chinese state. With the rise of great power politics in the 21st century, it has become the "imagined" identity with which the CCP wishes to build a prima facie homogeneous nation-state. The emergence of national identity as a tool of "smart power" within international relations has further enhanced its role in contesting national interests over and above international relations.

After 1949, China's minority policy amalgamated the Qing tradition with a communist positive agenda. In the 18th century, when the Qing emperor accomplished his quest for universal rulership by expanding the Qing empire far into Central Asia, the concept of a multiethnic Chinese state arose from Qing ideology and strategy. The imperial geobody was rebuilt as a Sinocentric and multiethnic nation-state during the nation-building era in the first half of the twentieth century. Both the Guomindang and the Communist Party pursued dominant national unification policies by establishing a new narrative of national belonging deeply rooted in history. However, China's sub-par international position and the Republican state's internal crises impeded the adoption of any geographical idea of national unity. Ethnic diversity in the People's Republic of China has been reorganised along a majority-minority dichotomy. Historical diversity was reduced to 56 rigorous minzu "containers" defined by severe language, religion, and customs restrictions. Minorities were absorbed into the unified Chinese country, with minimal regional autonomy provided. Although the autonomous areas created aspirations of membership among their titular nations, the official minority policy in the 1960s and 1970s was fiercely assimilationist, producing an upward momentum of ethnic opposition to the government. Since the 1990s, central government-stoked popular nationalism has expanded into an increasingly broad perception of Chineseness in a globalising world. Different theoretical approaches, such as primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism, can be used to understand and analyse the notion of Zhonghua minzu. Each viewpoint offers a unique perspective on the link between Zhonghua Minzu, identity politics, and foreign affairs.

Understanding Zhonghua Minzu Under Assessment - Primordialism, Instrumentalism and Constructivism

In order to juxtapose the concept of Zhonghua Minzu within these theoretical frameworks, it is important to understand the essence of these theories with respect to identity and how they perceive the notion of conflicting identities within one human.The primordialist theory of identity is a perspective that came up in the fields of sociology and anthropology and seeks to explain the origins and nature of individual and group identities. This theory suggests that identities are innate, natural, and deeply rooted in human nature. "In other words, primordialists argue that certain aspects of identity, such as ethnicity, nationality, religion, or culture, are inherent and biologically or psychologically determined" (Dabringhaus, 2018).

Primordialists assert that identities are not socially constructed or learned but are rather intrinsic to individuals or groups. They believe that these identities are fixed and unchanging, stemming from ancient and evolutionary times. Certain genetic or biological characteristics contribute to the formation of identity. For example, they might argue that people with similar ethnic backgrounds share specific genetic traits, leading to a common sense of identity. The theory emphasizes the emotional attachment people have to their identities. This emotional connection is seen as a powerful force that shapes group cohesion and loyalty. “Primordialists argue that shared identities foster a sense of belonging and solidarity among individuals who identify with the same group” (Kataria, 2018). This sense of belonging can create bonds that motivate group members to cooperate and protect one another. Primordialist identities are believed to be resistant to change and impervious to outside influences. This perspective implies that conflicts arising from identity differences might be deep-rooted and challenging to resolve.

It is essential to note that while the primordialist theory presents one perspective on identity, it is not without its criticisms. Many social scientists and researchers argue that identities are complex and multifaceted, influenced by both inherent factors and social constructions. Alternative theories, such as constructivism, argue that identities are socially constructed through interactions, institutions, and historical contexts. In understanding identity formation, it's crucial to consider a combination of various theories and perspectives to gain a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of this complex phenomenon.

The constructivist theory of national identity is a perspective within the field of sociology and political science that focuses on the idea that national identities are socially constructed rather than inherent or natural. This theory suggests that national identity is not an objective or fixed characteristic, but rather a product of historical, cultural, and political processes shaped by interactions among individuals and groups. “The constructivist theory posits that national identity is created and maintained through social interactions and shared experiences among members of a specific nation” (Subuddhi, 2009). It is not a pre-existing entity but emerges and evolves over time. The concept of "imagined communities," popularized by political scientist Benedict Anderson, is central to constructivist theory. It refers to the idea that nations are not based on face-to-face interactions but are large, diverse groups of people who perceive themselves as part of a shared community, despite never having met or interacted with most other members of the nation. Constructivists emphasize the role of symbols, myths, and narratives in shaping national identity. National symbols such as flags, anthems, historical events, and stories play a crucial role in fostering a sense of belonging and a common identity among the citizens of a nation. The historical context plays a significant role in shaping national identity. The way history is interpreted, the narratives promoted, and the collective memory of a nation influence how its identity is constructed and reinforced. The constructivist theory acknowledges that political institutions and elites can play an active role in constructing and promoting a particular national identity. Governments, leaders, and institutions often use education, the media, and other means to shape the collective identity of a nation. “National identity is not static; it can change and evolve over time due to various factors, including political events, immigration, globalization, and cultural exchange” (Mcdonald, 2008).

In summary, the constructivist theory of national identity challenges the notion that national identities are fixed and innate, instead emphasizing that they are socially constructed and subject to change. This perspective highlights the role of historical, cultural, and political processes in shaping the

collective sense of belonging and identity within a nation. It also suggests that nations are not natural entities but rather products of human imagination and interaction.

The instrumentalist theory of identity is a sociological and political theory that views identities as tools or instruments used strategically by individuals or groups to achieve specific objectives. Unlike essentialist or primordialist perspectives that see identities as fixed and inherent, instrumentalists argue that identities are flexible and subject to manipulation for utilitarian purposes. According to instrumentalists, individuals and groups adopt or emphasize certain identities based on the situation and their goals. Identities are seen as means to an end rather than intrinsic aspects of one's nature. Identities are used as instruments to gain advantages, resources, power, or influence in specific social, political, or economic contexts. For example, an individual may emphasize their national or cultural identity to appeal to a particular audience or gain political support. Identity emphasis can vary depending on the social and political context. People may downplay or emphasize different aspects of their identity to achieve specific objectives or fit into particular social environments. "Instrumentalists recognize that identities are not fixed or objective realities but are socially constructed concepts that evolve over time and are influenced by interactions with others" (Ellingsen, 2000). The instrumentalist theory also acknowledges the role of power dynamics in shaping and using identities. Dominant groups may use identity to maintain control over marginalized or minority groups, while the latter may strategically mobilize their identity for empowerment and resistance. This theory highlights that political leaders, institutions, and media can manipulate identity narratives and symbols to influence public opinion and consolidate power. It's important to note that instrumentalist theory does not deny the emotional or affective aspects of identity. People may genuinely feel a connection to certain identities they strategically employ. However, the theory emphasizes that identity is not solely an expression of internal feelings but can also be influenced by external factors and motivations.

Critics of the instrumentalist theory argue that it might oversimplify the complexity of identity formation and overlook the genuine and deeply rooted aspects of identity that are not solely driven by instrumental considerations. Additionally, the instrumentalist approach has been criticized for focusing primarily on the strategic aspect of identity without fully accounting for the emotional and cultural dimensions that contribute to the construction of identity. As with any theory of identity, a comprehensive understanding requires considering multiple perspectives and recognizing the interplay of different influences.

Establishing the Linkage and Creating the Multi-Pronged Theoretical Framework to understand Zhonghua Minzu

The concept of Zhonghua permeates the very nature of the Chinese Communist State under Xi Jinping. Each theory of identity provides a unique characteristic to understand the complex implementation of an identity across a set of heterogeneous peoples. Primordialism posits that ethnic identity is a natural ascription that cannot be created. It is a constant or given identity that is rooted in the 'primordial' existence of a particular group. It stems from markers like race, language, religion, culture, etc. In contrast, instrumentalists argue that ethnic identity is influenced by socio-political and economic factors. They are not constant and can change substantially as an individual can belong to multiple groups. Instrumentalism also tries to explain the Marxist understanding of ethnicity as a false consciousness used to undermine class consciousness. Alternatively, both of these strands of thought have been succeeded by the evolutionary theories of nationalism and ethnicity. Benedict

Anderson's 'imagined community' theory provides that a nation can be an imagined political community that is sovereign in nature. There exists a deep sense of comradeship that cuts horizontally across class, race, and religious divisions in society. The nation becomes the community with which the individual identifies and is ready to die for.

Amongst these theories of ethnicity and nationalism, the idea of Zhonghua minzu can be situated in the instrumentalist and evolutionary understandings of identity. The Chinese nation supersedes the primordial Mongol identity in a bid to create a common, overarching national identity. Ethnic conflict thus stems from the contestations between primordial and imagined' identities. The tenets of primordialism allow for the growth of ethnic conflict among rival ethnic groups that are historically opposite. The Mongol identity is, by its very nature, in conflict with the Chinese Han identity. The instrumentalist understanding, on the other hand, allows for the individual to subscribe to both Mongol and Chinese national identities as and when required socio-politico-economically. The CCP's propagation of ethnic laws undermines ethnic identity in favour of Chinese national identity. The imagined community of the Zhonghua minzu, which calls for ethnic unity, or minzu tuanjie, is a bid to homogenise. This is done under the garb of civilizing the frontier ethnic groups to create parity with the majority Han population.

Each perspective of primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism, provides a distinct lens to examine the relationship between Zhonghua Minzu, identity politics, and international relations. Primordialist theories emphasize the deep-rooted, essentialist aspects of identity, often tracing them back to primordial attachments such as ethnicity, culture, or biology. From a primordialist perspective, Zhonghua Minzu would be seen as a natural and pre-existing entity, rooted in a shared historical and cultural heritage. It would be seen as an inherent part of Chinese identity that transcends political boundaries. Primordialism could argue that the sense of belonging to the Chinese nation is deeply ingrained and has shaped the collective consciousness of the Chinese people, influencing their behavior and interactions in international relations.

The connection between Zhonghua Minzu, identity politics, and international relations is multifaceted. Identity politics, driven by the concept of Zhonghua minzu, can have both domestic and international implications. Domestically, it plays a significant role in managing ethnic diversity within China and shaping the political landscape. It seeks to foster a sense of belonging, loyalty, and unity among different ethnic groups, contributing to the stability of the Chinese state. However, it can also lead to tensions and conflicts between the central government and minority groups seeking greater autonomy or recognition of their distinct identities.
In the realm of international relations, Zhonghua minzu and Chinese national identity shape China's interactions with other countries. It influences China's foreign policy goals, perceptions of its position in the world, and approach to regional and global affairs. The concept of Zhonghua minzu, when projected externally, can be used to assert China's historical and cultural influence, legitimize its territorial claims, and promote its interests on the international stage. It can also contribute to a sense of solidarity and kinship among overseas Chinese communities, impacting their engagement in transnational activities and interactions. Overall, the connection between Zhonghua Minzu, identity politics, and international relations is complex and dynamic, encompassing domestic dynamics, statecraft, and the projection of national identity on the global stage. The specific nature and implications of this connection can vary depending on the theoretical lens employed and the specific historical and political context under consideration.

Benedict Anderson's concept of "imagined communities" provides an interesting lens to examine the idea of Zhonghua minzu. According to Anderson, an imagined community is a socially constructed community that is not based on face-to-face interactions but is built on a shared sense of belonging and identity. In the case of Zhonghua Minzu, we can understand it as an imagined community encompassing the diverse ethnic groups within China. “It is an imagined community because the Chinese nation, as a whole, consists of a vast population dispersed across a vast territory, making it impossible for all individuals to have direct interactions with each other”(Mark, 2017). Instead, the community is imagined through symbols, narratives, and cultural practices that create a sense of belonging and shared identity among its members.

Anderson argues that print capitalism played a crucial role in shaping imagined communities. In the case of Zhonghua Minzu, the Chinese language, with its standardized script and printed materials, has played a significant role in disseminating a common cultural and linguistic framework across different regions. Shared texts, such as newspapers, novels, and educational materials, have contributed to the creation and dissemination of a collective consciousness and a sense of community among the Chinese people. Moreover, the concept of Zhonghua minzu is deeply tied to historical narratives, myths, and collective memories. These narratives construct a shared understanding of the Chinese nation's history, cultural achievements, and common destiny. They create a sense of continuity and connection between the past, present, and future, fostering the collective imagination of the community.

It is important to note that Anderson's concept of imagined communities does not imply that the community is fictional or false. Rather, it emphasizes the role of social construction and imagination in creating a sense of belonging and collective identity. Zhonghua Minzu, as an imagined community, has real-world consequences in shaping individual and collective behaviors, influencing political dynamics, and impacting international relations.

Thus, reading Anderson's concept of imagined communities offers valuable insights into understanding the concept of Zhonghua minzu. It highlights the role of symbols, narratives, and shared cultural practices in constructing a sense of belonging and identity among the diverse ethnic groups within China. The imagined community of Zhonghua Minzu plays a significant role in shaping the Chinese national identity, influencing domestic politics, and contributing to China's engagement in international relations.

The Case of Inner Mongolia and Zhonghua Minzu

The concept of Zhonghua Minzu as an overarching Chinese national identity, can sometimes create tensions and conflicts with other ethnic identities within China, such as the Mongols. These conflicts arise due to the complex dynamics of identity politics, historical legacies, and the quest for autonomy or recognition of distinct ethnic identities. One of the main sources of tension is the perceived dominance of Han Chinese culture and language within the concept of Zhonghua minzu. The Han Chinese have been the majority ethnic group in China, and their culture and language have historically played a significant role in shaping the idea of Chinese identity. This dominance can lead to the marginalization or erasure of other ethnic identities, including the Mongols, within the discourse of Zhonghua Minzu.

Ethnic minority groups like the Mongols may resist assimilation into the dominant Han Chinese culture and seek to preserve and promote their distinct cultural practices, languages, and traditions. They may assert their own ethnic identity, emphasizing their unique history, language, and customs.

In some cases, they may also demand greater autonomy or recognition of their rights to self-determination within the framework of a multiethnic China.

“The tension between Zhonghua minzu and ethnic identities like the Mongols can be further exacerbated by historical legacies, such as the Mongol-led Yuan Dynasty's rule over China in the 13th and 14th centuries” (Graceffo, 2020). Historical grievances, territorial disputes, and differing interpretations of history can contribute to strained relations and a sense of cultural or political exclusion. The Chinese government's approach to managing these tensions is complex and has evolved over time. During the early years of the People's Republic of China, the government sought to integrate Inner Mongolia into the Chinese state. Policies were put in place to promote Mandarin Chinese as the official language, and Han Chinese migration to the region was encouraged. During 1966-1976 a significant change from past policies occurred, with widespread unrest and persecution of traditional and ethnic practices, notably in Inner Mongolia. Inner Mongolia, like other ethnic autonomous areas in China, was awarded autonomous region status in 1979. This action attempted to recognise the region's cultural and ethnic diversity while also granting it some administrative autonomy. Inner Mongolia witnessed substantial economic progress under Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening-up era. The region grew into a significant mining, agricultural, and energy production centre, contributing to China's overall economic prosperity. For economic expansion, the PRC has continued to use Inner Mongolia's enormous natural resources, particularly in mining and energy production. Concerns about the environment and protests have raised scrutiny of resource extraction activities and requests for more sustainable development.

On the one hand, the government promotes a narrative of national unity and harmony under the umbrella of Zhong Minzu, aiming to create a sense of belonging and loyalty to the Chinese nation. On the other hand, the government has implemented policies to protect and promote the cultural heritage and development of ethnic minority groups, including support for language education and cultural preservation. However, there have been instances where tensions between Zhonghua minzu and ethnic identities have escalated into protests, social unrest, or demands for greater autonomy. The government's response to such movements has varied, ranging from accommodation and dialogue to crackdowns and assimilationist policies, depending on the specific circumstances and perceived threat to national unity and stability.

The nature of ethnic conflict between a peaceful Mongol population and the nationalist party-state apparatus of the Chinese government. The land border law and the language law are a few examples from the extensive propaganda book of Chinese policy-making. The nationalist agenda of China to establish itself as a major power has its roots in its internal territorial disputes. The rise of China in the world forum has been hindered by the humanitarian conflicts in its own backyard. Resolutions have been passed in the US Congress describing China's treatment of the Uyghurs as genocide. Petitions are in the process of being presented to the US for formulating resolutions in favour of recognising the cultural genocide happening in Inner Mongolia against the Mongols. A World Mongol Congress has been formed to mobilize the diaspora of Mongols across the world to take action. The course of this proposed study expects to see further action with respect to new laws, human rights activism, and theoretical scholarship. China's gradual erasure of its minorities can be tracked through the years, and activists fear that for Inner Mongolia, the ticking bomb of Uyghur-like genocide has begun. While previously the Chinese governments have passed laws in favour of the ethnic groups and promoted the idea of Zhonghua minzu through soft propaganda.

The Xi Jinping government has, since its advent, advocated for strong arm ethnically discriminatory policies. It has stopped providing adequate explanations for human rights violations and instead focused on “internal matter” rationalisation. It is important to note that when we provide an introduction to ethnic identity in Inner Mongolia, there are geopolitical considerations that have made its case different from the collectivisation of minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet. While China has tried to implement laws aimed at homogenisation as a part of its overarching ideology of Zhonghua minzu, the non-violent nature of Mongolian identity politics has to be analysed for cause and effect.

In March 2022, Xi Jingping expressed a no tolerance policy for ethnic unrest and violence in the country. With the economies of the world trying to make a comeback from the pandemic, the head of the State of China was resilient in perpetuating the idea of Zhonghua Minzu as the heart of religious harmony in China. Towards the end of the year 2022, the Mongolian President visited Inner Mongolia to take part in the winter martial games held annually as a part of Mongol tradition in the autonomous region. The official visit and displays of camaraderie between the Mongolian Head of State, Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh, and Xi Xingping are testaments to the factors that affect the collectivisation of Chinese Mongols. The official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China states that both countries uphold each other’s respective sovereignty, independence, and the path they each choose for development. When it comes to matters involving their individual core interests and top priorities, they will support one another. They will improve communication, collaboration, and learning about governance among diverse departments. The Belt and Road Initiative and the Development Road Initiative, the Global Development Initiative and Mongolia's New Recovery Policy, and China's two-step development plan and Mongolia's "Vision-2050" long-term development policy are all areas where the two sides will work to increase synergy. These three areas of focus will strengthen the ties between China and Mongolia and provide them with a powerful boost as they continue to develop.

The geopolitical importance of Mongolia as China’s neighbor and vice versa implies a direct dependence on each other for a host of issues. From regional harmony and long-term economic development to purely strategic reasons. At the same time, China has not seen the interference of Islamic countries like Pakistan on the Uyghur issue due to the economic and strategic relationship between the two countries taking priority. China's status as a big power has always called for internalizing human rights issues and disallowing any foreign interference. While the West has continued to politicize Chinese human rights violations and sanction them for them, countries that have direct connections with the ethnic minority populations residing within China are notoriously quiet. For nations like Mongolia, going up against China regarding issues like the Language Bill, which sought the erasure of Mongol language, takes a backseat in the light of the economic growth offered by the Chinese State.

The Mongols of Inner Mongolia have had the chance to use bilateral relations to their advantage as well. Their annual war games, celebration of the historical herding Mongol communities, and all other recognition of their culture have afforded them a luxury that the Uyghurs can only dream of. Additionally, from a historical perspective, the Mongolian invasion of China was a much more comprehensive endeavour and the roots of ethnicity were sown in the region going back to the 13th century Yuan Empire. Since then, the people of Inner Mongolia have had ethnic ties to the Han Chinese in the region. These common historicities have allowed for a more peaceful minority community to develop in the region, along with the acceptance of various “minzus” within the

Chinese empire. The modern Chinese State began with a more accepting stance on minorities and strived to allow them to exist as is, under the banner of the Chinese State. The banner has morphed from a prima facie acceptance of minority culture to an attempt towards 'assimilation' of minority culture within the Han Chinese identity. While the Uyghurs and Tibetans have had a long and violent struggle with the Communist regime of China, the Mongols have largely remained peaceful. Though it is important to note that it was easier to take over the Inner Mongolian demography by utilising the incentives offered by the Communist regime for inter-community marriage with Mongolians and Hans (Howland, 2011).

The colonisation of China by settlers was a major factor in the disappearance of the Mongolian language. In the early 20th century, Inner Mongolian nationalism emerged as a reaction to both this cultural loss and imperialism. The most fervent nationalists, or communist-cum-nationalists were those communities who had lost their language. For instance, the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Organization, the first all-Inner Mongolian political party, was created and managed in 1925 by the Harchin, a highly Sinicized Mongol clan dispersed throughout modern-day eastern Inner Mongolia and Liaoning province. Uradyn Bulag mentions in the 2003 article *Mongolian Ethnicity and Linguistic Anxiety in China* that Inner Mongolia, after the 1949 revolution had established its own autonomous territory and by the virtue of the Republic of Mongolia's ties with the Chinese State, then trying to legitimize itself, provided a high degree of autonomy to the Inner Mongolia region. Soon though, reforms in Mongol language were brought up to homogenise the script between those Mongols residing in Inner Mongolia and those in MPR. This was however, banned by Zhou Enlai as he proposed the Chinese cyrillic script to be undertaken as the mother script in order to undertake any new language reforms within the Chinese territory. He still proclaimed that the Mongols were free to practise their own language. Thus, it is under these fake notions of free will that the Chinese Mongol identity has sought to situate itself.

From the above conception, it has to be noted that the relations between the State of Mongolia and People's Republic of China has provided an umbrella to the ethnic struggle and also the lack of one. While martial and nomadic races also have to contend with geographical barriers of large swaths of lands separating their people. A lot of their struggle has thus stemmed from environmental factors as well. The Communist regime has converted Inner Mongolian land into industrial manufacturing units, harming the nomadic herding community's historical practices. While this was done under the garb of holistic economic development, with Inner Mongolia producing record high grain output for the year 2022 (Xinhua, 2022), the Inner Mongolian community has expressed their protest against the environmental destructions caused by ferrous mining and over-excavation of natural resources in the region. With increasing pollution levels, healthcare has become a major concern for the nomadic community. Along with this, a large part of their cultural heritage is connected to the land and cultural practices. While these find national recognition and representation in the annual war games attended by both Mongolian and Chinese Heads of State, the question is will it become another tokenism?

Conclusion

It is important to note that the relationship between Zhonghua Minzu and ethnic identities within China is prismatic and varies across different regions and contexts. The dynamics of identity politics, historical factors, and government policies all play a role in shaping these complex relationships and

the conflicts that may arise. The bilateral relations between China and Mongolia have also influenced the lack of collectivisation among the Mongols living in Inner Mongolia. The politico-socio-economic partnership between the two nations has fostered an image of comradeship and bonhomie between the two races. The lack of political and social action among the Inner Mongolians also highlights that the clash between their ethnic and Chinese identities may not be as incongruous as it is for Uyghurs or Tibetans. The geopolitical sphere undermines the nationalist overtures of the Chinese government within Inner Mongolia. Further, the grasslands and mines of the north-west frontier region have been providing record breaking energy and wheat supplies to the country. The economic value of the region further reiterates the importance of peace between the Han Chinese and the Mongols. Further, the lack of religious extremism has also been a factor in the treatment of minorities like Mongols and Uyghurs. Scholars have argued that China's internal policies regarding Zhonghua Minzu are not without controversy and can be viewed differently by different stakeholders. Critics argue that these policies can lead to cultural assimilation, marginalization of ethnic identities, and the suppression of dissent. The effects of these internal policies on China's foreign policy can also be a subject of debate and scrutiny in the international community.

The concept of Zhonghua minzu, or the Chinese nation, has evolved over time and remains relevant in the 21st century as a significant aspect of Chinese identity. Its evolution reflects historical, political, and social transformations, as well as the challenges and opportunities China faces in the contemporary world. The concept of Zhonghua Minzu has its roots in ancient Chinese civilization and historical narratives that emphasize a shared cultural and historical heritage. Throughout history, the idea of a unified Chinese nation has been shaped by various dynasties, political systems, and intellectual movements. The formation of the modern nation-state and the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 further solidified the notion of Zhonghua Minzu as a unifying identity for diverse ethnic groups.

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Indian Music: A New Tool in Reshaping The Dream of “Dragon and Elephant Dancing Together”

Archan Saha

Introduction

India and China, often symbolized as the Elephant and the Dragon respectively, have shared a complex relationship characterized by cultural exchange, economic cooperation, and geopolitical tension. The term "Dragon and Elephant dancing together" encapsulates the dream of harmonious coexistence and shared progress between the two Asian giants. Indian music and movies have emerged as influential soft power tools in reshaping this dynamic relationship. India's Bollywood industry and traditional music have increasingly found an audience in China, facilitating a cross-cultural dialogue, enhancing mutual understanding, and fostering goodwill. To illustrate, movies like *"Dangal"*, *"Secret Superstar"*, and *"3 Idiots"* have achieved enormous popularity in China, demonstrating the connective power of shared narratives and emotional resonance.

The soft power of Indian music and film can potentially mitigate political tensions and strengthen people-to-people ties, contributing towards the 'Dragon and Elephant dancing together' dream. This paper will explore this perspective in depth, partitioned into several chapters that examine case studies and reference various academic and industry sources. Each chapter will provide a detailed analysis of how specific films or music productions have impacted Indo-Chinese relations, the social and cultural responses they have received, and the implications for the future of this relationship. This paper delves into the historical context of India-China relations, explores the influence of Indian music and Bollywood movies in China, and speculates on the future of this unique relationship, shaped by the fusion of cultural exchanges and artistic diplomacy.

Harmonic Encounters: Tracing the Historical Musical Exchange between China and India

Throughout the annals of history, music has proven to be a universal language that defies geographical boundaries, acting as a conduit for cultural exchanges and shared experiences. China and India, two ancient civilizations, have woven a rich tapestry of musical interaction over the centuries.

Ancient Crossroads: The Musical Echoes of the Silk Road

The ***Silk Road***, a historic trade route connecting China and India, served as an intricate web of cultural exchange. Along these routes, Buddhist monks and traders carried more than just goods; they transported melodies that would resonate through time. *Faxian*, also recognized as *Fa-Hien*, was a Chinese Buddhist monk who embarked on a journey by walking from China to India with the purpose of obtaining Buddhist scriptures. His journey took place between 399 and 412 CE, during which he visited sacred Buddhist sites in Central, South, and Southeast Asia. He described his journey in his travelogue, "A Record of Buddhist Kingdoms" 《佛国记》.While Faxian's primary aim was to acquire Buddhist texts, his journey along the Silk Road would have inevitably led to cultural exchanges, including those related to music. The Silk Road was a network of trade routes that facilitated the exchange of not only commodities but also cultural ideas, art traditions, and aesthetic tastes. The Silk Road thus acted as a conduit for the exchange of not only material goods but also the intangible treasures of music, fostering a cross-cultural musical dialogue that continues to reverberate through history.

Buddhist Chants and Hymns:

Among the earliest instances of musical interaction between China and India was the spread of Buddhism. Buddhist monks journeying from India to China brought with them not only spiritual teachings but also the musical traditions of their homeland. The chants and hymns, laden with spiritual depth, found resonance in the hearts of the Chinese populace. These harmonious melodies not only facilitated religious expression but also fostered cultural bonds between the two civilizations.

Buddhist chants and hymns, known for their meditative quality and deep spirituality, found a receptive audience in China. The essence of Buddhist teachings – impermanence, compassion, and the nature of suffering – resonated deeply with the spiritual sensibilities of both China and India. This resonance was not only intellectual but also sonic. The musical rhythms and melodic patterns of Buddhist chants mirrored the rhythm of life, the flow of breath, and the heartbeat of existence. This resonance spoke to the shared human experience, transcending borders to create a sense of unity among diverse cultures.

As Buddhist teachings and practices took root in China, the musical component underwent a subtle metamorphosis. Chinese musicians and monks adapted the Indian chants to suit their own tonal systems and cultural contexts. This adaptation led to a harmonious fusion of styles, giving rise to a unique form of musical expression that bore the indelible imprints of both India and China. Buddhist monasteries became cultural hubs where musical exchange flourished. Monks from India and China came together to engage in musical dialogues, exchanging chants and musical traditions. These exchanges served as a means of cultural transmission, fostering a deeper understanding of each other's musical and spiritual heritage.

The Musical Encounters During The Tang Dynasty:

The Tang Dynasty was a golden age of art and culture in China, and this period was also marked by significant musical exchange between India and China. The Tang Dynasty was a period of brilliant imperial growth and cultural flourishing. The era saw a thriving of foreign styles, with Persians, Arabs, Indians, and people from the Malay Peninsula found in the foreign quarters of port towns.

This multicultural environment fostered a rich exchange of ideas, traditions, and art forms, including music. Popular tunes of the period included "South India" and "Watching the Moon in Brahman Land," indicating the influence of Indian music. Performances by exotic dancing boys or girls were ever the rage, often accompanied by these popular tunes. These performances not only entertained but also served as a medium for cultural exchange.

Musical ensembles were presented to the emperor from various regions, including India. The main instruments used to play the "*duobuyue*" 【多部乐】 (multinational) music of the Tang period developed from instruments brought to China from Persia, India, and Egypt. Some parts of the music itself are Indian, Central Asian, Korean, and Uighur, reflecting the diverse influences in Chinese music during this period. "*Nishang yuyi qu*" 《霓裳羽衣曲》 (*Raiment of Rainbows and Feathers*), composed by Tang emperor Xuanzong (玄宗, ruled 712-756), is a version of an Indian Brahman melody. This shows that Indian music not only reached the common people but also the royal court. The adoption and adaptation of an Indian melody by the emperor himself signify the respect and appreciation for Indian music. During the Tang Dynasty, several musical instruments were introduced and exchanged between India and China. Here are a few examples:

Pipa: The Pipa (琵琶), a lute-like instrument, was brought from India and underwent transformation in China. It became one of the most popular instruments in Chinese music. The exchange of plucking techniques between Chinese musical instrument Pipa and Indian classical musical instrument Sitar during this era led to a harmonious fusion that showcased the interplay of musical traditions.

Long-necked Lutes: Long-necked lutes from India were also introduced to China during this period.

Drums: Various types of Indian drums found their way to China, adding to the percussive richness of Chinese music.

These instruments not only enriched the musical traditions of both regions but also facilitated further cultural exchange. This cross-pollination resulted in a musical alchemy that birthed new sounds, reflecting the harmonious coexistence of diverse musical traditions, symbolizing the unity forged amidst the diversity of musical instruments from both civilizations.

Interlinked Expressions: Classical Chinese and Indian Music

The classical musical traditions of China and India, rich with history and complexity, share intriguing parallels that underscore the universality of musical expressions. Despite the geographical distance and cultural distinctions, both traditions reveal interconnected threads of melody, rhythm, and philosophy.

Parallel Philosophies:

Both Chinese and Indian classical music are deeply rooted in philosophical frameworks that mirror their respective cultural ideologies. In China, the concept of *Yin* (阴) and *Yang* (阳) —— the balance of opposing forces —— resonates in their music's use of contrasting tones and dynamics. In Indian classical music, the notion of "*Raaga"* – musical scales with distinct emotional flavours – parallels the concept of yin and yang, as both systems seek equilibrium within diversity.

Melodic Language:

Despite distinct scales, Chinese and Indian classical music both emphasize intricate melodic patterns. The pentatonic scale, common in both traditions, evokes a sense of universality. The Chinese pentatonic scale, for example, aligns with the Indian concept of "*Swaras*," which are the fundamental notes forming the basis of ragas. Both systems showcase the capacity of melody to convey profound emotions.

Rhythmic Complexity:

Rhythm forms a cornerstone of both traditions, illustrating their interlinked nature. Chinese classical music employs rhythmic cycles, with each beat containing multiple subdivisions akin to Indian *Taals*. Indian classical music's rhythmic cycles, such as "*Tintaal*," parallel the intricate rhythmic structures found in Chinese compositions. Both traditions explore rhythmic variations that require a deep understanding of temporal intricacies.

Instruments and Timbres:

Traditional instruments also bridge the gap between Chinese and Indian classical music. The Chinese Guqin (古琴) and the Indian Sitar, while differing in appearance, share a similar purpose: to evoke nuanced emotions through their resonant tones. Likewise, the Chinese Erhu (二胡) and the Indian Sarangi possess comparable roles in expressing intricate melodies. These instruments demonstrate how musical expression transcends cultural divides.

Improvisation and Expression:

Both traditions emphasize improvisation, allowing musicians to infuse their unique interpretations into performances. In Indian classical music, the *Alap* introduces a raaga through slow, expressive improvisation. In Chinese classical music, there isn't an exact counterpart that follows the same structure and purpose as the "alap." However, there are elements of improvisation and free expression within various Chinese musical forms, such as the "Qin (or Guqin) music" (琴音), where musicians can create intricate melodies within a certain tonal framework. The improvisatory nature of both forms provides musicians with the freedom to weave their personal narratives into the larger tapestry of tradition.

Musical Collaborations in Modern Era:

In the contemporary world, the crossroads of globalization and technological connectivity have paved the way for unprecedented cross-cultural collaborations. This phenomenon is particularly evident in the realm of classical music, where musicians from China and India are joining forces to create innovative compositions that bridge their rich traditions.

In 2012, Indian expats, corporations, and diplomatic missions in China established 'Chaiti,' a cultural group aimed at promoting Indian classical music. Since the year of establishment, they organized annual shows featuring renowned Indian musicians. In 2016, Sarod players Amaan Ali and Ayaan Ali performed to enthusiastic crowds in Shanghai and Beijing. Named after a Hindu music-associated month, 'Chaiti' introduced Chinese audiences to traditional Indian ragas and folk music, showcasing

various Indian classical musical instruments like "Sarangi," "Sitar," "Sarod," and "Tabla", along with a diverse array of vocals from the Hindustani music genre. The founding members of 'Chaiti,' Ravi Shankar Bose and his associates Soudamini, Siddharth Sinha, and Madhumita Bhuyan, were instrumental in establishing this platform that fostered Indo-China musical exchange, enhancing appreciation and understanding between India and China.

One example of Indo-Chinese musical collaboration is "*Saath Saath — Music Across the Waters"*, a project that involved a set of cross-cultural collaborations between musicians and scholars in India and China, featuring a musical dialogue between folk musicians from Central China, Hong Kong and Hindustani musicians. *Saath Saath: Music across the Waters* was a project curated by Tejaswini Niranjana, a cultural theorist and professor at Lingnan University, Hong Kong. It was started in 2016, aiming to forge creative dialogue and experimentation around musical practices in China and India, the two Asian neighbours with cultural ties since ancient times. The project involved Hindustani vocalists, Chinese instrumentalists and singers, Cantopop lyricists, composers, and scholars from India, Hong Kong and China. The project was performed in various venues, such as Talent Studios in Mumbai.

Another instance of such cross-cultural collaboration occurred during the Indian Heritage Centre (IHC) Culturefest 2016, where a fusion music performance took place. This unique performance featured a diverse group of Singaporean musicians who blended traditional Indian and Chinese instruments. Among the instruments used were the Sanxian (三弦), Keyboards, Tabla, Percussions, Sitar, Indian flute, and Dizi (笛子). The performance showcased a harmonious blend of sounds from the aforementioned instruments. The repertoire included compositions such as "Jasmine Flower" 《茉莉花》, which creatively combined a Chinese folk melody with Indian raga, infusing it with a jazzy flair. Another piece, "Bo Shambo," a classic Indian tune, spotlighted the traditional Indian flute and the Chinese dizi, both played in a style true to their respective origins. This collaboration achieved a distinctive auditory experience by skillfully juxtaposing the musical scales of India with the sentiments of China.

In October, 2021, an Indo-China musical collaboration facilitated by CGTN's online music exchange program "The Bridge," Chinese and Indian musicians united virtually to create a unique cross-cultural fusion. Renowned Indian musician Sayak Barua and Chinese music producer Wei Qiong joined forces to compose and perform "Serene Strings," a special duet. Despite physical distance, the two artists drew inspiration from each other's musical traditions, infusing elements of Indian raga with Wei's mastery of the guitar, drum, and strings. Their friendship, formed during Sayak's time in Beijing, laid the foundation for their collaboration. The resulting melodious piece showcased the harmonious blend of the sarod and sitar, highlighting the powerful connection of music across cultural boundaries. This collaborative effort exemplified how music transcends space and language, fostering understanding and appreciation between India and China.

Bollywood Music in China: A Melodious Bond

Bollywood, the Indian film industry, is renowned for its vibrant music that forms an integral part of its movies. This music, characterized by its catchy tunes and emotive lyrics, has found a receptive audience in China, a testament to the universal appeal of music that transcends linguistic and cultural barriers.

The popularity of Bollywood films in China has led to an increased interest in their soundtracks. This phenomenon can be traced back to the 1950s when the song "***Awaara Hoon***" from the movie

“Awaara” struck a chord with audiences across the globe. The movie was a huge hit in China with its initial release and re-releases drawing a viewership of over 100 million. The song ‘Awaara Hoon’, written by lyricist Shailendra and sung by Mukesh, became an instant sensation that reverberated across diverse strata and regions, not only within India but also far beyond its borders. Its compelling resonance echoed in countries such as China, the Soviet Union, and the Middle East.

In China, the song achieved a remarkable cultural crossroads, capturing the hearts of its people, including none other than Chairman Mao, who purportedly held both the song and the film in high esteem. The song's influence expanded beyond national boundaries, attaining recognition as the second-greatest Bollywood song in a BBC poll conducted in May 2013.

What made "Awaara Hoon" an enduring masterpiece was its transformative power, leading to its reinterpretation in numerous corners of the world. Countries like Greece, Turkey, the Middle East, the Soviet Union, China, and Romania embraced the song's essence and manifested it through localized versions. At the core of the song is the refrain "Awaara Hoon," encapsulating the identity of a wandering soul. This evocation signifies not only the singer's carefree and resilient spirit but also resonates as a beacon of hope and optimism amid life's adversities.

The allure of "Awaara Hoon" transcended temporal confines, making its presence felt even in the contemporary era. Evidence of its indelible mark in China surfaced as a video clip emerged, featuring a Chinese man harmonizing the tune alongside his companions. The video's virality underscored the song's continuing impact, demonstrating how its charm could bridge cultures and epochs. The 1980s saw another wave of Bollywood music making its mark in China. the song ***"I Am a Disco Dancer"*** from the 1982 film "Disco Dancer" ignited a unique resonance in the hearts of Chinese audiences.

This mesmerizing song finds its roots in the movie "Disco Dancer," a production that starred the charismatic Mithun Chakraborty. This film emerged as a commercial triumph, particularly in the Soviet Union and China, acting as a harbinger of cultural delight. The film's vibrant soundtrack, in which "I Am a Disco Dancer" held a pivotal place, surged in popularity, infiltrating dance halls and soundscapes of the 1980s with its infectious rhythm. Unraveling the factors behind its immense popularity in China unveils a captivating tale. To begin, the triumphant success of "Disco Dancer" in China itself laid the groundwork. The kaleidoscope of energetic dance sequences and exuberant music resonated deeply with the Chinese audience, effectively becoming a harbinger of the song's triumph.

The song's allure, however, traversed beyond mere borders or linguistic constraints. Its magnetic tune and lyrics carried a universal charm that effortlessly bridged cultures and languages. Even as the lyrics flowed in Hindi, the music's lively rhythm coursed through the hearts of non-Hindi speakers, epitomizing the universal language that music speaks. The song's meteoric rise in China harmonizes with the broader narrative of growing cultural ties between India and China. The blossoming interest in Bollywood films and music, a catalyst of the strengthening cultural exchange, amplified the reach of enchanting melodies like "I Am a Disco Dancer."

Another song "***Jimmy Jimmy Aaja Aaja***" from the same film also gained immense popularity in China. The song, composed by Bappi Lahiri and sung by Parvati Khan, was being widely used by Chinese people on the short video app Douyin (抖音) — the Chinese name for TikTok — to voice their frustration at Beijing’s stringent zero-Covid policy.

In the videos, people were seen mockingly showing empty vessels to highlight how they had been deprived of essential food items during the lockdowns. The song was sung in Mandarin as "Jie mi, jie mi" 《借米、借米》, which translates into "Give me rice, give me rice". The videos often featured users wearing a “bindi” and makeshift saree — a traditional attire of Indian women — and carrying an empty vessel while dancing and lip-syncing to the popular Hindi song.

This distinctive method of protest had successfully evaded the attention of Chinese authorities, who swiftly eliminate any content they consider to be critical of the nation's governing system. The popularity of "Jimmy Jimmy Aaja Aaja" in China underscored the universal appeal of Indian music and its power to connect people across borders. Lata Mangeshkar, one of India’s most celebrated playback singers, has also had her songs played beyond the Great Wall of China. Her melodious voice and emotive singing have touched the hearts of listeners worldwide, including those in China.

Bollywood’s Rising Popularity in China

Bollywood, India's cinematic treasure trove, has steadily woven its tapestry into the hearts of Chinese audiences, establishing a robust presence within the Chinese film market. Let's delve into a handful of Indian cinematic gems that have ignited fervor among Chinese moviegoers:

"Dr. Kotnis Ki Amar Kahani": A poignant narrative that transcended borders, "Dr. Kotnis Ki Amar Kahani" is a 1946 masterpiece directed by V. Shantaram and penned by Khwaja Ahmad Abbas. This film lovingly chronicles the life of Dr. Dwarkanath Kotnis, an Indian physician who selflessly served China during the tumultuous Japanese invasion of World War II. Its profound tale not only resonated with Indian hearts but also captivated the international stage, gaining recognition when it competed at the 1947 Venice Film Festival.

“Dangal”: The impactful story of "Dangal," featuring the exceptional Aamir Khan, etched its mark deeply in the hearts of Chinese audiences. This riveting narrative of a father's unwavering dedication to train his daughters into formidable wrestlers struck a harmonious chord with the values of perseverance and family unity cherished in both nations. Its depiction of gender equality and unwavering resolve resonated with Chinese audiences,, reflecting shared values despite cultural differences.

“Secret Superstar”: The magnetic appeal of Aamir Khan reached beyond Indian shores, as "Secret Superstar" charmed Chinese audiences. This cinematic gem weaves the tale of a young girl's dreams of becoming a singer, resonating with universal aspirations and the power of determination.

“PK”: The Indian film "PK," featuring Aamir Khan, has garnered substantial acclaim in China. Upon its release in China on May 22, 2015, the movie made an enormous impact by hitting 5,400 screens, amassing an impressive $7.03 million within its initial week. The film etched history by accumulating over $16.70 million, equivalent to 100 million yuan, in China, marking the first time an Indian film reached this milestone in the Chinese cinema domain. This triumph was marked by a grand premiere at Shanghai Art Center, the largest theater in Shanghai. "PK" resonated strongly with Chinese audiences due to its distinctive narrative and stellar performances. Aamir Khan's portrayal of an alien in the movie received particular praise, solidifying his popularity in China.

“Hindi Medium”: The poignant "Hindi Medium," illuminated by the brilliance of Irrfan Khan and Saba Qamar, delved into the intricacies of India's educational landscape. Its resonant exploration of societal dynamics found a harmonious echo among Chinese viewers.

“Bajrangi Bhaijaan”: The heartfelt saga of "Bajrangi Bhaijaan," led by the magnetic Salman Khan, traversed cultural boundaries to touch Chinese hearts. This narrative of a man's arduous journey to reunite a lost girl with her family in Pakistan tugged at the strings of compassion, forging a connection that transcended national borders.

“Toilet: Ek Prem Katha”: Addressing a poignant societal issue in India, "Toilet: Ek Prem Katha," graced by the presence of Akshay Kumar, resonated deeply with Chinese viewers. This film's exploration of open defecation issues in India underscored the potency of storytelling as a tool for change. These cinematic marvels did far more than merely entertain; they acted as windows into Indian society and culture, painting vibrant vignettes that stirred curiosity and fostered cross-cultural understanding. By blending captivating narratives with universal values, these films bridged the divide between nations, uniting audiences through shared emotions and relatable tales.

Chinese Films: A Resonant Echo in India

The magnetic allure of Chinese films has gracefully traversed oceans, captivating Indian audiences with their narrative magic. Among these cinematic gems, "Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon" 《卧虎藏龙》, meticulously directed by Ang Lee, stands as a testament to the global resonance of Chinese storytelling. This cinematic masterpiece, adorned with an enthralling plot-line and awe-inspiring martial arts sequences, found a warm reception within Indian hearts. Its universal appeal even led to its Hindi dub, a testament to its undeniable charm.

Another jewel within the crown of Chinese cinema is "The Wandering Earth" 《流浪地球》, a cinematic marvel that soared as one of China's highest-grossing films. The film's spellbinding narrative and visual splendor intricately woven into impressive special effects ignited a fervor of admiration among Indian viewers. The film's intrigue was echoed across Indian shores.

The digital realm, led by streaming giant Netflix, played a pivotal role in bridging Chinese cinema and Indian audiences. The platform's embrace of several Chinese films and TV shows brought forth a cinematic mosaic that spans cultures, strengthening the bond between Indian spectators and the enigmatic world of Chinese storytelling. The luminous constellations of Chinese actors and actresses have illuminated the Indian horizon, garnering admiration and acclaim from Indian aficionados. Jackie Chan (成龙), a virtuoso known for his acrobatic fighting style, comic timing, and ingenious stunts, has not only graced the silver screen but has also captured the imagination of Indian hearts. His cinematic treasures, including "Rush Hour," "Shanghai Noon," "The Karate Kid," and the beloved "Kung Fu Panda" series, have woven a tapestry of admiration and joy among Indian moviegoers.

Bruce Lee, a name synonymous with unparalleled martial artistry, has transcended time to claim his rightful place in the hearts of Indian audiences. Revered as one of the greatest martial artists of the 20th century, his legacy continues to flourish within India's cinematic culture. The resonant echoes of films like "Enter the Dragon" 《龙争虎斗》, "Fist of Fury" 《精武门》, and "The Way of the Dragon"《猛龙过江》have indelibly etched martial arts movies into India's cinematic consciousness. Within this galaxy, the names of Xu Kai, Yang Yang, Shen Yue, Li Bing Bing, Gong Li, Angela Gong, Tiffany Tang, Maggie Cheung, Zhang Zi Yi, Shu Qi, Yang Mi, and Ariel Lin shine brightly, celebrated for their captivating performances in diverse Chinese dramas. These stellar

shows, adorned with their talents, are seamlessly dubbed into Hindi and presented on Indian television or streaming platforms, transcending language barriers to strike a harmonious chord with a wider audience.

Beyond the realm of mere entertainment, the resonance of Chinese movies and dramas in India reverberates with a cultural symphony that enriches understanding and appreciation. The profound impact of Chinese cinema has woven an intricate web that reaches far beyond the silver screen. It has ignited an ardent curiosity for Chinese culture within Indian hearts, fostering a cultural exchange that is as enriching as it is harmonious. The cinematic tales, with their unique narratives, have bridged geographical distances, forging a connection between two diverse worlds. It is an artistic journey that traverses cultural landscapes. Through the magic of storytelling, Chinese cinema has delicately brushed vibrant strokes of culture onto the Indian canvas, leaving an indelible mark that speaks to the heart of shared humanity.

Challenges in Reshaping India-China Relations through Indian Music and Movies

While the potential of Indian music and movies to reshape the India-China relationship is promising, several challenges must be acknowledged and addressed to realize this vision of harmonious cultural exchange and cooperation.

Cultural Sensitivities and Adaptation:

The diversity of cultures and values between India and China can pose a challenge in ensuring that the entertainment content produced resonates with both audiences. Adapting Indian narratives and themes to suit Chinese sensitivities without diluting their essence can be a delicate task. Striking this balance requires a deep understanding of each culture's nuances and a commitment to creating content that fosters mutual understanding rather than misunderstanding.

Political and Regulatory Barriers:

The entertainment industry operates within the broader framework of political and regulatory dynamics. Geopolitical tensions or policy changes can impact the flow of cultural exchange. Instances of censorship, restrictions on content, or changes in visa policies can hinder the smooth dissemination of Indian entertainment in China and vice-versa. Negotiating these hurdles requires diplomatic efforts and clear communication channels between the two governments.

Cultural Stereotypes and Misinterpretations:

Despite the potential for cultural exchange, there is a risk that misinterpretations and stereotypes could arise from unfamiliarity with each other's cultures. Indian music and films might inadvertently reinforce existing misconceptions, leading to skewed perceptions. These misunderstandings could undermine the very goal of fostering mutual understanding and could potentially exacerbate tensions.

Language and Localization Challenges:

Language barriers present a practical obstacle to the widespread acceptance of Indian entertainment in China and vice versa. While subtitles and dubbing can bridge the linguistic gap to some extent,

preserving the authenticity and emotions of the original content can be challenging. Ensuring high-quality translations that capture the nuances of dialogue and lyrics is crucial for maintaining the intended impact of the content.

Market Competition and Trends:

The global entertainment landscape is highly competitive, with trends constantly evolving. Indian films and music face stiff competition not only from other international content but also from home-grown Chinese productions. Adapting to changing tastes and preferences while maintaining cultural integrity is a delicate balance to strike.

Sustainability and Long-term Engagement:

Sustaining the momentum of cultural exchange requires long-term commitment and consistent efforts. Relying solely on short-term successes may not yield lasting impacts on bilateral relations. Building enduring platforms for collaboration, such as film festivals, music tours, and cultural exchange programs, is vital for nurturing a continuous dialogue between the two nations.

Addressing these challenges is essential to ensuring a successful and harmonious exchange of cultures. By acknowledging cultural sensitivities, navigating political dynamics, countering stereotypes, overcoming language barriers, staying adaptable to trends, and fostering sustainable engagement, the obstacles can be transformed into stepping stones toward a more connected and cooperative future between the “Dragon” and “Elephant.”

Conclusion: Future of India-China Relations through Entertainment

The convergence of Indian music and movies in China has the potential to serve as a unique catalyst for shaping the future trajectory of the India-China relationship. Entertainment, often seen as a soft power tool, has the capacity to transcend political and diplomatic barriers, fostering connections at the societal and individual levels. As the Indian music and film industries continue to make inroads into the hearts of the Chinese populace, the stage is set for a more harmonious and cooperative bilateral relationship.

Cultural Diplomacy and Mutual Understanding:

The power of entertainment lies in its ability to convey emotions, aspirations, and shared human experiences across cultural boundaries. Indian films and music, with their universal themes of love, family, and societal challenges, resonate with Chinese audiences on a deeply emotional level. These narratives offer windows into Indian culture and values, facilitating mutual understanding and dispelling stereotypes. For instance, the success of Bollywood films like *"3 Idiots"* and *"Bajrangi Bhaijaan"* in China showcases how storytelling can bridge gaps and foster empathy among diverse audiences.

Strengthening People-to-People Connections:

Entertainment acts as a bridge between people, offering a common ground for engagement and conversation. As Indian films and music gain popularity in China, they provide shared experiences that spark discussions and interactions among individuals from both countries. These interactions go beyond geographical borders, fostering a sense of camaraderie and friendship. Online fan communities, discussions, and social media interactions centered around Indian entertainment allow people to connect and bond over shared interests, leading to more positive perceptions of each other.

Economic and Collaborative Opportunities:

The success of Indian films in the Chinese market presents economic incentives for collaborative ventures between the two countries' entertainment industries. Co-productions, joint projects, and talent exchanges can lead to economic benefits and foster deeper collaboration. This economic interdependence can in turn influence political and diplomatic ties, as mutual interests encourage cooperation and peaceful interactions. This synergy in the entertainment sector echoes the global reach of K-Pop, where collaborative ventures, cross-cultural exchanges, and international tours contribute to not only economic growth but also enhanced diplomatic ties.

Soft Power Diplomacy:

The concept of soft power diplomacy is epitomized by the global popularity of K-Pop bands like BTS. South Korea strategically harnesses the influence of its music industry to promote its cultural identity, values, and societal norms worldwide. BTS, in particular, has transcended language barriers, cultivating a massive international following that engages not only with their music but also with South Korean culture. Their achievements in terms of cultural exchange, philanthropy, and diplomatic initiatives illustrate the potential of entertainment to forge connections, influence perceptions, and contribute to favorable diplomatic environments.

The influence of Indian entertainment also extends to the realm of soft power diplomacy. The Indian government, recognizing the potential of Bollywood and music in enhancing India's global image, actively promotes cultural exchanges with China. Film festivals, music concerts, and art exhibitions serve as platforms for showcasing India's rich cultural heritage, thus contributing to a positive perception of the nation among the Chinese public. These initiatives create a favorable environment for enhanced diplomatic ties and collaboration on various fronts.

Addressing Historical Misunderstandings:

Entertainment can also play a role in addressing historical misunderstandings that have clouded India-China relations. By highlighting historical connections and shared heritage, Indian music and films can promote a sense of historical continuity, emphasizing areas of cooperation rather than conflict. Cultural narratives that celebrate the historical links between the Silk Road and ancient trade routes, for example, can shift the focus from discord to shared legacies.

In conclusion, the future of India-China relations through the medium of movies and music is promising and multi-faceted. The fusion of Indian music, films, and cultural exchanges has the potential to shape a more collaborative and harmonious bilateral relationship. By promoting mutual understanding, strengthening people-to-people connections, generating economic opportunities, wielding

soft power diplomacy, and addressing historical misunderstandings, Indian entertainment is contributing to the realization of the dream of the "Dragon and Elephant Dancing Together." As the realms of art and culture continue to intertwine the destinies of these two nations, the dream of a harmonious and cooperative relationship becomes ever more attainable.

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Indian Cinema in China - Media India Group
List of Best Chinese Movies Dubbed in Hindi - Trendpickle
Chinese Movies & TV | Netflix Official Site
Best Chinese Actors 2021 (78 people) - MyDramaList
Top Chinese Actress's (60 people) - MyDramaList

Sino-Japanese Art Exchanges in the 20th Century and their Implications onChinese Avant-Garde

Sugandha Tandon and Yamini Meena

Abstract: *The relations between China and Japan are extensively articulated post the 1970s dueto the Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration, which aimed at the normalisation of diplomatic relations between China and Japan. However, these two nations have a long history of cultural exchanges,from China's influence on Japan in the ancient era to Japan's influence on Chinese art in themodern period. This research builds on this emerging arena of scholarship by delving into ahistorical framework of cultural and artistic exchanges between China and Japan and its impacton Chinese Avant-Garde in the first decade of the twentieth century.*

Drawing on three case studies, this research examines the role of Japanese art and artists in shaping the development of modern art in China. The first case study focuses on the impact of Japanese oil paintings on the Chinese art scene, particularly the National Fine Arts Exhibition of 1929. This exhibition marked the first official exhibition to present Japanese oil paintings in China and had a far reaching impact on the Chinese and Japanese art scenes, including the often overlooked influence on the Chinese woodcut movement, which serves as the second case study. It focuses on the impact of Japanese printmaking circles such as the "Creative Print" and "New Print" on the Chinese woodcut movement. The third case is student exchange during the early 1930s, who on returning to China, injected intellectual vitality thereby leading to atransformation in the Chinese art world. However, a deeper analysis reveals that this knowledge transmission through the exchange is not one-directional- from Japan to China but a multi-directional one.

The framework of travelling theory by Edward Said and methodology of John Clark provides a useful lens for understanding this exchange as an interaction between two nations. By providinga more equitable and comprehensive analysis of the multifaceted interactions between China andJapan during the given epoch, the findings of this research demonstrate the significant role of Japanese art and artists in shaping the development of modern art in China. It further underscoresthe importance of investigating cultural exchanges within the broader scope of art history and cultural studies, to bring forth the historical frameworks that influence cross-cultural interactions which further leads to the evolution of artistic trends.

Introduction

Chinese art history, particularly in recent scholarship[1], reveals the pivotal role of museums as vehicles for disseminating state legitimacy and glorification of the nation. Museums serve not only as channels for communicating a nation's identity but also as vital instruments in public education, echoing the perspective advocated by Zhang Jian, the founder of Nantong Museum. Zhang, alongside other reformers, envisioned that China's progress could be achieved throughthe dissemination of knowledge and culture. Museums, and by extension, art exhibitions, havethe power not only to promote national identity but also to reinforce social hierarchies and individuals' relationships with the state (Lawrence 2021). This paper explores the relationship between the first National Fine Arts Exhibition and the national narratives it embodies, which subsequently influenced developments in the Chinese art scene. It does so by unveiling how Sino-Japanese artistic societies and joint exhibitions transcended geopolitical constraints, giving rise to an artistic renaissance, a chapter often overlooked yet profoundly significant in the cultural history of both nations.

The first case study examines the first National Fine Arts Exhibition (NFAE), which wasorganised by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of China, marks a crucial juncture in the history of Chinese art. Considered as the first exhibition in Chinese modern history, this exhibition, perhaps rightly so, portrays the truly multifaceted nature of national identity as it highlights the duality of an intricate dance between traditional and modern. This is examined not only because the purpose of this exhibition might be to portray the artistic ethos of the nation,and 'demonstrate national optimism and pride' but two galleries in this exhibition were devoted to contemporary Japanese paintings. There are multiple reasons for choosing to juxtapose Chinese traditional ink paintings with contemporary Japanese paintings.

The first lies in Japan's emergence as a beacon of modernity that captivated early 20th-century China. Influential Japanese art historians like Okakura Tenshin introduced a new perspective on Asian historiography, with Japan positioned as a cultural leader equal to Western traditions. This narrative emphasised a historical connection between China's rich cultural heritage and contemporary Japanese culture, presenting Japan as an Asian cultural vanguard (Huang, 2020). This perspective finds resonance with Fenollosa's (1963, xxx) influential work, as illustrated by agraph depicting the trajectory of Asian art. It portrays a decline in Chinese art during the 20th century, juxtaposed with the resurgence of Japanese art.

The perception of Japan's advanced modernization is palpable in China's approach to organising national exhibitions. As elucidated in an article of the 1903 *Shenbao,* lamentation existed regarding China's "great land and products remain unknown to the world," highlighting the nation's struggle for global recognition (Claypool 2013, 155). This reflects China's aspiration to compete internationally, coupled with a sense of inadequacy compared to both Western nations and Japan's impressive strides. This perceived discrepancy, fraught with a sense of missedpotential, provides a glimpse into how China envisioned its place in the world order at that time.

However, it's important to note that while Japan aspired as the dominant figure in Asia, China sought recognition as a self-governing nation-state. Amid the political turmoil, ideological conflicts and military clashes, both nations turned to their cultural heritage to preserve their unique national identities. Despite their disparate political goals—Japan's imperial expansionism and the Republic of China's drive for self-strengthening—the development of Chinese art historyin the early twentieth century witnessed collaborative exchange rather than competition and rivalry (Huang, 2020).

[1] Read Ho, Kirk Denton, *Exhibiting the Past: Historical Memory and the Politics of Museums in Postsocialist China*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2014 and Marzia Varutti, *Museums in China: the Politics of Representation after Mao*, Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2014; Selina Ching Chan. "Museum Processes in China." In *Museums and Their Communities*, Routledge, 2013; Lehto, Xinran Y. and Cai, Liping A. (2011). "Tourism and Museums in China; Karp, Ivan, and Steven D. Lavine, eds. *Exhibiting Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of Museum Display*. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991.

This can be observed through an examination of the 1903 Osaka Fifth Domestic "Encouraging Industry" Exhibition material, revealing China's strategic considerations for self-presentation. Although it's not within the scope of this study to examine the vicissitudes of similarities and points of departure between the Osaka Exhibition of 1903 and the 1929 National Fine Arts Exhibition (NFAE), it is plausible to state that Japan provided critical insights into the new exhibitionary culture. It unveiled the artful nature of the ostensibly rational, scientific, encoded, and, above all, modern reality system at exhibitions.[2] (Claypool 2013, 155).

To contextualise this exchange, an exploration of Asian modernity is imperative. Japan, transitioning from isolationist policies, blended traditional aesthetics with modern innovations, asdetailed by scholars like John Clark (2003). This fusion created an alternative model of modernity that laid the groundwork for subsequent artistic interactions among Asian nations. A compelling example is the Bengal Renaissance Movement in late 19th and early 20th-century India with *nihonga*[3]. This transformative period witnessed a resurgence in various domains,

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[2] The politics of display within these exhibitions reflect a shared intention to convey overarching narratives encompassing national advancement, cultural essence, and modernization. In the Osaka Exhibition of 1903, the curation of displayed artworks and commodities was underpinned by Japan's endeavour to spotlight its march towards modernity and industrial growth. Here, the selected pieces underscored technological ingenuity, skilled craftsmanship, and contemporary design, often infusing traditional crafts with modern innovation, echoing the overarching theme of progress. Likewise, The National Fine Arts Exhibition of 1929 in China saw the assembly of artworks intricately linked to the era's political and cultural aspirations. Pioneering a nascent Republic, the exhibition aimed to mirror the nation's cultural identity while pursuing modernization. The showcased artworks spanned a wide spectrum, ranging from classical Chinese paintings to avant-garde oil paintings.

[3] *Nihonga* is a Japanese art movement that emerged in the late 19th century, emphasising the use of traditional Japanese painting techniques and materials to create works with contemporary themes. including art and literature, driven by a desire to harmonise traditional values with Western knowledge. For instance, the wash technique or *morotai*, a defining feature of *nihonga* art, was adopted by the artists of Bengal School. The Japanese were also inspired by Indian iconography[4] as evident in Shunso's painting Saraswati and Taikan's Indo Shugojin (Inaga, 2009). Artists fromboth the Bengal School (Abanindranath Tagore, Gaganendranath Tagore, Nandalal Bose, and Asit Kumar Haldar) and Japanese *nihonga* movements (Yokoyama Taikan and Hishida Shunso) drew inspiration from each other, fostering a rejection of Euro-American art techniques and forming an alternative model of modernity rooted in tradition (Sarker, 2023).



Hishida Shunso, *Saraswati*. 1903.
Private Collection



Yokoyama Taikan, *Indo Shugojin*. 1903.

This research, grounded in the methodological approach inspired by Edward Said's concept of "travelling theory," embarks on a comprehensive analysis, employing a structure that hinges on three meticulously studied case studies. Said's approach provides a nuanced lens through which the multifaceted role of Japanese art and artists in shaping the trajectory of modern art in Chinais dissected and explored. This methodology, rooted in the examination of the flow of ideas, influences, and experiences across cultures, has significantly shaped the formulation of research questions and the structure of the paper, facilitating an in-depth exploration of cross-cultural artistic interactions. Said's methodological stance of investigating the movement of ideas and their transformative impact informs the formulation of the research questions that underpin each case study. Firstly, the inquiry navigates the question of how Japanese oil paintings influenced the Chinese art scene, a query that is driven by the desire to understand the profound implications of this artistic exchange. At the forefront stands the pioneering case study that scrutinises the impact of Japanese oil paintings on the Chinese art realm, notably the groundbreaking 1929 National Fine Arts Exhibition. This exhibition, serving as a cornerstone, symbolised the formal introduction of Japanese oil paintings into the Chinese art scene.

[4] Japanese artists incorporated elements, symbols, or themes (e.g the vina, goddess *Kaali* with human skulls around her waist) from Indian culture and mythology into their own works. As Satō Shino has pointed out, these two pieces prefigure Abanindranath Tagore's Bharata Mata (Mother India, 1905–1906) a symbolic piece of the Swadeshi nationalist movement. Sato's observation highlights a possible influence or connection between these artworks, suggesting that the later artwork might have drawn inspiration from the earlier ones (Inaga, 2009).


The framework with John Clark methodology of how 'endogenous' interlaces with 'exogenous' enables to reframe these interactions as an exchange, revealing the intricate layers of influence woven through artistic, cultural, and personal dimensions. It underscores the pivotal roles played by artists, connoisseurs, and patrons as mediators, shaping this intercultural dialogue. An examination unveils the deeper threads that connect the two nations through the vibrant tapestry of their artistic and cultural history. It not only sheds light on the instrumental role of Japaneseart and artists in shaping China's artistic evolution but also underscores the significance of investigating cultural exchanges within the broader purview of art history and cultural studies.

By spotlighting the historical frameworks that give rise to cross-cultural interactions and the subsequent evolution of artistic trends, this research enriches our understanding of the profound impact of Sino-Japanese artistic exchanges on Chinese Avant-Garde.

Brushing History onto Canvas: The National Fine Arts Exhibition of 1929

The Chinese government during the early 20th century vivaciously promoted Chinese art and culture in both national and international levels through art exhibitions. Seventeen exhibitions were hosted from 1933 to 1935 where Chinese traditional paintings were displayed. In some instances, contemporary works were juxtaposed with ink paintings from the Song, Ming andQing dynasties. Two widely published exhibitions during this given epoch were the *Chinesische Malerei der Gegenwart* (Chinese Contemporary Art) exhibition in Berlin in 1934 and the *International Exhibition of Chinese Art* in London from 1935-1936.

The choice of artworks shows the preference of the Kuomintang government for traditional andnationalistic subjects in the 1930s. These antiquities and traditional ink artworks served as objects to empower the nations, where they lay claim over the pristine past and lay ground for modernity to emerge. These artworks differ from the government sponsored exhibition held inthe National Fine Arts Exhibition (NFAE) where traditional ink paintings were displayed with western style oil paintings. A deep exploration of the artworks maps the trajectory of Chinese artists and cultural authorities negotiating China's national identity with modern artistic and cultural representation. Thus, modernity which is a multifaceted and mutable cultural construct isexamined in this section by delving into the social and historical context of the exhibition, the motivations behind and the choice of artworks displayed.



Catalogue cover of *Chinese Contemporary Painting*, Prussian Academy of Arts in Berlin, 20 January- 4 March 1934



Catalogue cover of *International Exhibition of Chinese Art*, Burlington Galleries, London, 27 November 1935- 7 March 1936

Lawrence (2021) in her article explores the development of "fine arts" as a politicised concept in China where the term is not only for aesthetic creations but as a "carrier of universal values and receptacles of cultural essences." Therefore, in the twentieth century, fine arts and aesthetics washighlighted as a significant component of civic education. Cai Yuanpei, the first Chinese ministerof education in the new Republic, attributed

social function to art, which resulted in aesthetic education being included in national higher education curricula. (Li, 2006). Yuanpei in his speech titled "Replace Religion with Aesthetic Education" asserted the role of aesthetics by stating that while science promotes rationality, beauty ignites passion, both of which are essentialfor modern national citizens (Yuanpei, 1917). The exhibition, thus, was a part of this aesthetic education.

The National Fine Arts Exhibition, organised by the Ministry of Education took place in Shanghai from 10 April to 30 April 1929 at New Pu Yu Benevolent Association. The art exhibition predominantly featured the creations of contemporary artists, encompassing various categories such as calligraphy and painting (shuhua 書畫), epigraphy, with a particular emphasison seal carving (jinshi 金石), Western-style painting, artistic photography (meishu sheying 美術攝影), and the decorative arts (gongyi meishu 工藝美術) and architecture (jianzhu 建築).(Lawrence, 2021). This grouping of artworks, according to Lawrence, reflected the preferencesof literati collectors. For instance, the category encompassing epigraphy, painting, and calligraphy (jinshi shuhua 金石書畫) within a single designated building caters to the literaticollectors during the imperial era, who had a distinct predilection for these artefacts in their collection and connoisseurship practices. Seals and stone carvings too catered to long bearing fascination with the text of connoisseurs. In addition to this, there was a Reference Department, which demanded an extra fee for entry. This section, with the purpose of attracting discernible visitors also attracted immense media attention. An article in Shenbao described this as a "focal point" of the exhibition. (Cheng, 1929). Particularly significant was the presentation of high-quality Japanese oil paintings to the Chinese audience, marking it as the first official exhibition in China to feature quality artworks from Japan. The East building was dedicated to western paintings where European, American and Japanese paintings were displayed. Twogalleries, showcasing a selection of eighty-two works, were devoted to contemporary Japanese paintings. The Japanese collection was curated from institutions such as the Japanese Imperial Fine Arts Academy, the Nikakai, the Shunyokai, and the Kokugakai (Appendix 1). Its arrangement in terms of space, lack of visitor restrictions, supplementary entertainment, and special rotating displays collectively offered the audience considerable freedom to shape their own distinct encounters with both the artworks and the exhibition as a whole.

This examination shows that this exhibition, perhaps rightly so, portrays the truly multifaceted nature of national identity as it highlights the duality of an intricate dance between traditionaland modern. This is examined not only because the purpose of this exhibition might be to portraythe artistic ethos of the nation, and 'demonstrate national optimism and pride' but also during theselection of the images and reason of their selection in the exhibition and especially in the catalogue.

This paradoxical testament is examined by Andrews (2012, 181- 209) where she delves into the importance this exhibition played not only in the development of Asian modernism but the lives of Japanese artists. These artworks had an impact on Chinese artists which in turn led to the emergence of new art forms in the Chinese art scene. This lies in conjunction with Bernard (2012), who in his study, observes that exhibitions not only reflect but shape the narratives of thenations thereby, influencing the trajectory of its art scene.

A perusal through the silk-bound catalogue reveals their adherence to the tradition as observed intraditional style binding, the title is in Chinese calligraphy with an English translation, however, only Chinese text is inside. The catalogue, which is divided into two volumes namely modern (jin) and ancient or premodern (gu). The modern section includes seven sections plus a foreign section with Japanese paintings. Although there are only six works in the catalogue, which mightnot be an adequate depiction as compared to the exhibition, Cai Yuanpei, head of the Ministry ofEducation at that time wrote a preface that laid greater emphasis on Japanese paintings. The selection of six paintings in the catalogue, however, depicts two things, the preference for members of the organizing committee and the preference for female nudes. The paintingsselected were of Wada Eisaku, Mitsutani Kunishirō, Terauchi Manjirō, and Umehara Ryūzaburō.(Andrews 2012, 184)

While the artworks chosen encompassed a broad spectrum, ranging from refined academicpaintings like Wada Eisaku's "Tulips" (now housed in the Bridgestone Museum, Tokyo), to a rawand seemingly spontaneous depiction reminiscent of Matisse, such as Ume-ara Ryūzaburō's "Woman," the exhibition's central focus on the human form, particularly the female nude,presents a highly specific and limited perspective. This curated selection of artworks assumes a critical role, as it centres on the portrayal of the female nude—a subject considered modern and progressive in the realm of art. This departure from earlier conservative cultural policies in the nascent Republic carries significant weight. It signifies a pivotal juncture, given the historical prohibition of nude models in art school curricula, a paradigm shift that accompanied the tenure of Cai Yuanpei.



Wada Eisaku, *Tulips*. 1927. Oil on canvas. Ishibashi Museum of Art, Kurume, Fukuoka, Japan



Ume-ara Ryūzaburō, *Woman*. from *Meizhan tekan*.

Influence of Japanese Oil Paintings on the Chinese Art Scene

The importance given by Cai Yuanpei to Japanese paintings in the catalogue didn't remain limited to text. The impact transgressed the boundaries of influencing the art styles and permeated educational practices, development of aesthetic theories and even broader teacher-student relationships, which in turn reinstates that Japan played a pivotal role in the development of China's perspective on modernity in the realm of art.
This exhibition has also paved the way for a robust relationship between the two nations which persisted even after the increasing strains of 1930.[5] Ideological structures like Asian cultural nationalism and the structure of art education remained as well too. Bearing the reputation of Asian modernity (Clark 2003; Andrews & Shen 2012; Okamoto, 2003), Japan continued to attract Chinese art students, which as explored later in detail continued to impact the Chinese art scene. Some examples are the painter Fu Baoshi who was deeply influenced by Kosugi Hōan's painting style[6] and the printmakers Li Hua[7] and Liu Lun[8], inspired to turn away from oil paintingto print-making as had their mentors in Tokyo, and the young Cantonese oil painters mentored by Satomi Katsuzō who would form the Chinese Independent Artists Association. These diverse responses by individual artists and private groups show the many ways in which Japanese artisticinfluence permeated the Chinese art scene.

In terms of ideas, since Japan was referred to as an 'advanced cultural state', the works displayedin NFAE acted as references in providing direction to the Chinese art world. In light of the absence of high-quality

European artworks, Japanese artworks assumed a double role. TheJapanese oil paintings functioned as exemplars representing “Oriental Art,” embodying theartistic style and culture associated with the East. Simultaneously, these artworks also served as models for the broader cosmopolitan art scene, offering a standard by which various cultural and stylistic expressions from around the world were evaluated and understood. The absence of European works heightened the significance of Japanese paintings, not only in their regional context but also on the global stage of artistic representation and influence. The Chinese art community found inspiration and insight into contemporary artistic trends through these Japanese artworks.

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[5] The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the Shanghai war in 1932 had a profound impact on the relationship between China and Japan, thereby shaping the dynamics between these nations in years to follow.

[6] Fu Baoshi, while studying in Japan, was influenced by Kosugi Hōan's traditional Japanese painting style. This influence is evident in Fu Baoshi's works, where he combined traditional Chinese techniques with contemporary expressions. He adopted elements of Hōan's brushwork, composition, and subject matter. One example of Fu Baoshi's incorporation of Kosugi Hōan's influence can be seen in his painting titled "Landscape of the Four Seasons"In this artwork, Fu Baoshi combines traditional Chinese landscape painting techniques with Hōan's emphasis on delicate brushwork and subtle ink tones. The composition reflects the influence of Hōan's meticulous attention to detail and the poetic sensibility of Japanese painting.

[7] Fu Baoshi's influence from Li Hua, a Japanese printmaker, is evident in his exploration of new artistic techniques and subjects, evident in his painting "Dancing on the Banks of the Yellow River". The dynamic composition and rhythmic lines in the painting evoke the fluidity of Li Hua's print designs. Additionally, the portrayal of lively figures engaged in a traditional dance mirrors Li Hua's interest in depicting everyday life and cultural traditions.

[8] Liu Lun's influence on Fu Baoshi is evident in the latter's painting "Autumn Moon over the Han Palace". This artwork showcases Fu Baoshi's incorporation of Liu Lun's printmaking aesthetics. The use of bold, contrasting lines and intricate details in the painting's architecture and foliage mirrors Liu Lun's approach to woodcut techniques. Theatmospheric depiction of the moonlit scene also echoes Liu Lun's emphasis on creating evocative and mood-enhancing visual narratives.

The NFAE played a pivotal role in bringing forth the role of private Japanese painting societies, which previously were invisible to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During the warlord period in China (1916-1928), especially under the leadership of Cai Yuanpei, Chinese private art societies maintained independence from the politics of the given epoch. This resulted in not only a good collection of art but also expertise, resources and willpower to make the exhibition see the lightof day. This is significantly important as this was done during the times when the Republican government was fleeing and did not have the means or the resources to administer it or financially support it. One such organisation is Tianmahui[9] which had already held a couple of exhibitions of paintings, sculpture and photography which paved the way for talent and expertiseto organise the NFAE of 1929. Having taught at Shanghai Art Academy and working outside theeducational structure for more than a decade proved fruitful to administer an exhibition on a huge scale where the experience of handling artists, advisors and art critics was required for implementation.

The aftermath of the 1929 National Fine Arts Exhibition catalysed the development of non-governmental art organisations in China. Notably, the Chinese Painting Society, inspired by similar organisations in Japan and the West, emerged. An illustrative example is the Nikakai group, composed of artists freshly returned from

Europe, where European modernist influences were vividly reflected in their exhibition pieces. However, in 1930, ideological shifts led to their departure and the establishment of Japan's Independent Artists Association, championing auniquely non-Western approach to oil painting. This departure had far-reaching consequences, asit led to mentorship and collaboration between Satomi Katsuzō and Chinese art students. Their return to China gave birth to the Chinese Independent Artists Association, as meticulously documented in Andrews' 2013 work (Andrews 2013, 200).

Exploring Exhibition Catalogues, Critics' Perspectives, and Impacts

The Japanese artworks were highlighted not only by Cai Yuanpei but the exhibition journal "Meizhan" (The Art Exhibition), and published by the organising committee in the format of a tabloid newspaper. The journal reproduced a selection of additional Japanese artworks thus providing a comprehensive representation of contemporary Japanese Art. The artworks featured in *Meizhan* included the Wada Eisaku and Terauchi Manjirō nudes, (which were represented in the exhibition catalogue too), Ishikawa Toraji's "After the Bath," Kobayashi Tokusaburō's modernist still-life and Nakamura Fusetsu's academic historical painting.

[9] The Heavenly Horse Society was founded in 1919 by professors and alumni of the Shanghai Art Academy, and itmade a significant contribution to the growth of contemporary oil painting, design, and photography in the 1920s.



Ishikawa Toraji, *After the Bath*. *Meizhan 8*. 1929:7. In The Role of Japan in Modern Chinese Art, edited by Joshua A. Fogel, 189. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.



Kobayashi Tokusaburō, *Still Life with Fish*, 1929. In The Role of Japan in Modern Chinese Art, edited by Joshua A. Fogel, 189. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.



Nakamura Fusetsu, *Obtaining the Lanting Sutra by Trickery*, oil on canvas, 1920, Tokyo National Museum of Modern Art (exhibited in Second Teiten). *Meizhan 6*. 1929: 2. In The Role of Japan in Modern Chinese Art, edited by Joshua A. Fogel, 190. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.

The Japanese catalogue meticulously reproduced all eighty-two of the Japanese oil paintings thatwere part of the exhibition. It included concise and standardised artist biographies, adopting a format similar to the Art Annual (Bijutsu nenkan) published by Asahi Newspaper Company (Asahi shinbunsha). Several artists featured in the exhibition displayed a distinct interest in China, retained their central positions in the canon of

modern Japanese oil painting.even in the postwar period when artistic activities were declining. In addition to this, the artworks that were sent to Shanghai not only are objects of display in Japanese museum collections but alsocontinue to serve as canonical examples of these artists' bodies of work. (Andrews 2012, 191)

These artworks were recognised by Chinese critics.. Li Yuyi, in his coverage of the exhibition within a special issue of Funü zazhi (Ladies journal), a well-established monthly publication by the Commercial Press, began his essay by highlighting that the exhibition not only encompasseda wide range of art from various eras but also featured artworks from distant lands, including several dozen remarkable masterpieces from Japan's four prominent art societies. He went on to observe that, despite the historical roots of major exhibitions tracing back to the French Salon,the Japanese Bunten and Teiten exhibitions held more prestige in the East and were considered exemplary models. (Yuyi 1929, n.p.)

The combined insights from the preface of "Meizhan Tekan, Volume 1" and Li Yuyi's critique within the pages of "Fanu zazhi" offer a comprehensive perspective on the 1929 National Fine Arts Exhibition. In the preface, the assertion that art traditions have evolved from the ancient emphasis on "Rites and Music" to the modern emphasis on "science and art" encapsulates the transformative trajectory of artistic priorities. This evolution aligns with a broader global trend,
where artistic definitions and foci have undergone shifts reflecting changing cultural contexts. The preface delves into the nuanced categorization of art, drawing parallels between the Chinese and European definitions. The assertion that the "broad definition of art can include music" reflects the multidisciplinary nature of artistic interpretation, while the delineation of specific art forms in Europe and China emphasizes the divergence and convergence of artistic paradigms.

Li Yuyi's critique within "Fanu zazhi" contextualizes the Japanese artworks within the exhibition's thematic narrative. His recognition of the Japanese Bunten and Teiten exhibitions as exemplary models shed light on Japan's pivotal role in shaping the Eastern art discourse. Thehigh quality of the Japanese artworks assumes a strategic significance, showcasing Japan'smodernization during the 19th and 20th centuries and affirming its stature as an influential cultural force in Asia. This recognition reveals the diplomatic, sociocultural, and aesthetic facets embedded within the exhibition's curation. (Andrews 2012, 192) In regards to the broader curation of the exhibition complex, art critic Xu Zhimo caricatured a visitor exclaimed,

"Upstairs I looked at paintings, downstairs there was also theater, with famous performers, opera fans, and small troupes all present. When tired of watching opera, I could go to the exhibition’s western-style cafeteria and order dishes. The venue was sobig and there were so many things to see. I ran around until my legs were sore and my head was dizzy." (Zhimo 1929, 1-2)

In addition to this, Xu, who served on the exhibition's organising committee, expressed the concept of art as a public heritage in the inaugural issue of the exhibition's accompanying periodical, "Fine Art Exhibition." He praised the exhibition as the "initial formal manifestation ofthe government's endorsement of the arts." Further commenting on the inclusiveness of exhibition, the exhibits, according to him, rectified the situation where "the entrances to collectors" were either "barred with steel" or guarded by armed Indian sentinels.(Zhimo 1929, 1)

The exhibition's embrace of diversity is further exemplified by the Fine Art Exhibition periodical, which was published every three days throughout the event. This periodical served asa vibrant platform for public discourse by attracting a wide spectrum of contributors, including social critics, artists, both amateur and professional, who penned essays on a range of subjects such as the societal roles within the art sphere, various artistic mediums, and the artworks featured in the exhibition. The periodical also served as a platform for debate between “the two Xu’s” : Xu Zhimo and Xu Beihong concerning the merits of modernism versus realism.

Xu Beihong, who had previously withdrawn from the exhibition's organising committee inprotest and chose not to exhibit his own work, launched a vehement critique of modernism titled "I Am Confused," which drew

a sharp response from the journal editor Xu Zhimo, who staunchly defended modernist painting. Xu Zhimo commenced his rebuttal with an English quotation from Bertrand Russell (1872–1970): "The opinions that are held with passion are always those for which no good ground exists; indeed the passion is the measure of the holder's lack of rational conviction." (Andrews 2012, 201)

Despite their passionate disagreement regarding the value of modernist art, Xu Zhimo and Xu Beihong shared a common knowledge and appreciation of Western artistic models. This is in stark contrast with other contributors to the journal who adopted entirely different tones and targeted distinct audiences. Some contributors emphasised the inclusive and civic role of the art exhibition, while others employed the style reminiscent of imperial-era connoisseurship style. For instance, Feng Zikai, artist and cartoonist wrote multiple pieces addressed to the general public who view artworks as "useless," advocating them to appreciate art through emotions, thus aligning with Cai Yuanpei's emphasis on art's emotional appeal and civic role. In contrast, artist and collector Chen Ziqing, wrote a piece titled "Speaking of Seals" addressing fellow collector-artists, where he advocated an antiquarian approach to seal carving, emphasising the meticulous study of ancient epigraphic models. This view, rooted in imperial-era literati culture, showed little concern for art's broader cultural context. (Lawrence 2021, 31)

Carving Cross-Cultural Pathways: Japanese Printmaking and the ChineseWoodcut Movement

The evolution of the Chinese Woodcut movement during the 1930s bore an indelible mark on Japanese printmaking circles. While the 1929 National Art Exhibition did not host a designated print section, its role in catalyzing the subsequent surge of Chinese print-making societies in the cosmopolitan landscape of the 1930s remains pivotal. Japanese printmaking circles, notably associated with the "Creative Print" and "New Print" movements headed by figures such as Ishii Hakutei, Yamamoto Kanae, Kosugi, and Yoshida Hiroshi in the early twentieth century, played adefining role in shaping the development of this movement (Andrews, 2012). Woodblock printing finds its origins in ancient China, with its zenith reached during the Tang Dynasty (7th to 10th centuries AD). Japan later adopted and adapted this technique to create what is known as Ukiyo-e, a highly impressive style of relief printmaking. Ukiyo-e not only borrowed fromChinese woodblock printing but also infused it with unique Japanese aesthetics and themes, giving it a distinctive character and making it an essential part of Japanese artistic heritage. In theearly twentieth century, Japan experienced the emergence of two significant print movements. The first, known as "Shin hanga" or "New Print," aimed to rejuvenate traditional methods with Western influences. The second, "Sosaku hanga" or "Creative prints," emphasised individual creativity inspired by folk art and Western abstract styles (Hinkel, 2022).

'Creative Print' and 'New Print' Movements

The New Print movement and the Creative Print movement aimed to revitalise the ukiyo-e genre,which had declined following Japan's modernization and industrialization in the last half of the 19th century. The New Print movement sought to resurrect the high-quality production methods of the distant past, incorporating elements like thick mulberry paper and vibrant mineral pigments. The revival of this movement succeeded largely because the woodblock prints offered a distinct creative expression that set them apart from contemporary reproduction methods like lithography and established art forms such as ink painting. The movement adhered to a division of tasks among the artist, printer, and publisher. Notable figures within this movement, such as Kawase Hasui and Yoshida Hiroshi, found inspiration in the Impressionist style and marketed their prints primarily to Western audiences.

In contrast, the Creative Print movement artists enthusiastically adopted Western notions of self-expression, valuing the idea that the artist was the singular creator of their work. Unlike the New Print movement, these artists rejected the commercial aspects of printmaking and instead assumed complete control over the entire process. They conceived the initial design, carved the woodblocks, and executed the printing themselves. This approach reflected the ethos of creating art purely for artistic expression, devoid of commercial motivations. Although both schools shared an affinity for traditional Japanese themes, especially landscapes featuring bridges and reflective water, the Creative Print artists notably deviated from previous aesthetics. They incorporated inspirations from Japanese folk art traditions and integrated Western ideas ofabstract and Expressionist art. This fusion of influences resulted in a captivating eclecticism within their works (Hinkel, 2022).

Emergence of the New Woodcut Movement in China

Beginning in the 1930s, almost all Chinese art forms were caught up in the turbulent currents of Chinese politics. Young Chinese artists turned to European avant-garde print styles as a means toconvey their concern and frustration about the worsening political, social, and diplomatic conditions in China (Andrews, 1998). Probably the most straightforwardly political of the visual arts was woodblock prints. Woodblock printing was certainly not new to China and traditionally was the common medium for mass-producing Buddhist devotional art for over a thousand years. However, it was during the 1930s, amidst the Creative Print Movement, and with the backing of the Chinese writer and literary critic Lu Xun, that this traditional art form underwent a transformation to fulfil fresh political objectives. Lu Xun commenced the development of his notions for literary and artistic innovation during his medical studies in Japan from 1902 to 1909.He recognized the potential of woodcut prints as a powerful tool for propaganda and mass education, effectively harnessing their graphic potency for societal transformation.

The development of the woodblock movement is divided into two distinct stages, demarcated by the Japanese invasion of 1937.[10] Woodcuts created prior to 1937 are characterised as exemplifying "multi-faceted modernism," while those produced after the invasion generallyadopt themes of unity, collectivity, and ideological undertone, and a more realistic and accessiblestyle (Corban, 2017). During the period of brutal Japanese occupation from 1937 to 1945, Western style artists turned their artistic focus on themes related to anti-Japanese war, they utilised both oil painting and woodcut techniques to encourage fellow citizens to actively oppose the Japanese invaders. Simultaneously, their works conveyed a poignant sense of empathy and distress in response to the profound suffering experienced by the Chinese populace (Andrews, 1998).

One of the most famous early prints coming out of the New Woodcut Movement is Li Hua's "Roar China" as shown on the left, inspired by China's helplessness in the face of Japanese aggressions that started with the Manchurian Incident in 1931. The print depicts the Chinese
giant, bound and blindfolded, roaring with rage as he gropes for a knife to free himself. The boldness and simplicity of this print are characteristic of the period that witnessed the revival of woodblock prints but now with clear nationalistic messages. Besides patriotism, a major theme of these politicised woodcuts was social protest. With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 the twin themes of patriotism and social protest

came together and gained wide popularity. During this period, most woodcuts were black and white, sombre and dark to illustrate the suffering and despair of the Chinese.

Lu Xun organised a series of international woodcut exhibitions between 1930 and 1933, under the guidance of his Japanese acquaintance Uchiyama Kanzo, who was the proprietor of the Uchiyama Bookstore in Shanghai. The inaugural exhibition of 1930, titled "German, Russian, and French Woodblock Prints," took place at the Japanese Union hall adjacent to the Uchiyama Bookstore, which had an impressive attendance of four hundredvisitors within just two days. In 1931, Lu Xun extended an invitation to Japanese artist Uchiyama Kakechi, seeking his expertise to demonstrate Western relief printmaking techniques to young Chinese artists. The majority of these students, like Li Hua, Jiang Feng, Zheng Yefu, and Hu Yichuan hailing from various public and private art schools and associations in the Shanghai-Hangzhou region, embarked on paths as printmakers and educators. They constituted the nucleus that played a pivotal role in shaping the future progression of woodcut art in China.

[10] The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), which commenced with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7, 1937, and concluded with Japan's surrender on September 2, 1945.



Hu Yichuan, *To the Front!*, 1932.



Jiang Feng, *Kill the Resisters*, 1931.

Furthermore, during the mid-1930s, a dynamic exchange of ideas and collaborations flourished between the Creative Print Society based in Guangzhou, led by Li Hua, characterised by its enthusiastic approach to the New Print movement, and the Japanese Shiro to Kuro Society, also known as the White and Black Society, with prominent members like Ryōji Chōmei, Hiratsuka Unichi, and Maekawa Senpan. This exchange facilitated a robust interplay of ideas and techniques, contributing significantly to the evolution of the artistic landscape in both nations.

The period following the Manchuria invasion of 1931, saw the emergence of various woodcut groups, notable among them was the Modern Research Society in Shanghai, the Wooden Bell Woodcut Research Society in Hangzhou, China Modern Prints in Guangzhou, and the Peking-Tianjin Woodcut Research Society in Beijing. Due to the frequent arrests of printmaking artists and the suppression of organisations by political forces, printmaking clubs sprang up and faded rapidly. The woodcuts crafted during this revolutionary period offer viewers a profound insight into the experiences of the Chinese people and how artists harnessed this medium to convey the human condition and provoke social transformation. This concept is pivotal for comprehending the essence of the avant-garde woodcut movement.

Beyond Borders: Student Exchange and Intellectual Vibrancy

As the twentieth century commenced, the Chinese art community, influenced by the ideas of "Science and Democracy," strongly supported the movement to "Reform Chinese Painting." There was a widespread adoption of Western artistic methods and styles, and it became trendyfor artists to pursue studies in Europe and Japan (Guolin, 1998). Japan in particular, emerged as afavoured choice among Chinese artists seeking overseas education due to its geographical proximity to China, the similarity between its writing system and Chinese characters, and its remarkable achievements in rapid modernization following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, which
presented Chinese students with accessible pathways to engage with contemporary culture and scientific advancements (Chu, 1998).

Japanese Art Education as a Site for Visual Modernity

The initial introduction of Western art in China was also facilitated by the Japanese as China hadto bring in its first art instructors from Japan. These educators, predominantly alumni of the Tokyo School of Fine Arts, were assigned to key cities across China, including Beijing, Tianjin, Taiyuan, Xi'an, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Fuzhou, and Chengdu. Following 1912, many of the Japanese instructors went back to Japan. This was partly due to the uncertain political climate and also because their roles could be taken up by students returning from abroad and graduates of local training institutions (Kao, 1983). These returning students brought back not only different techniques and styles but also entirely new ways of thinking about art. With the introduction of new mediums like oil painting, prints, watercolours, and cartoons in China, the longstanding dominance of traditional ink painting in the Chinese art scene was disrupted. This resulted in a break from traditional artistic norms, leading to the birth of imaginative andinnovative forms of art.

Japanese education played a significant role in shaping new Chinese painting styles. Beyond the confines of classrooms, students actively engaged in exhibitions, workshops, and artist clubs thatthrived within Japan's evolving art scene. This dynamic environment facilitated encounters with not only academic teachings but also hands-on experiences and interactions with the vibrant art culture in Japan. The era was characterised by frequent exhibitions featuring European paintings,thereby exposing Chinese students to the works of modernist artistic movements such as Impressionism, Post-Impressionism, Cubism, Fauvism, and more. These encounters served as a wellspring of inspiration, igniting the creative energies of these students and leaving a mark on their artistic sensibilities. For instance, artists like Xu Beihong and Liu Haisu went to Tokyo to learn Western art and later taught oil painting in China. Meanwhile, the Cantonese school artists, Gao Jainfu, Chen Shuren, Zhang Kunyi, Zhou Yifeng, learned how to modernise traditional techniques from the Nihonga style. Other eminent artists and writers like Fu Baoshi and Feng Zikai, also received artistic training in Japan and developed their unique styles upon returning to China (Shen, 1998). Fu Baoshi’s journey and contributions in particular, stands as a testament to the interplay of artistic influences between China and Japan. As one of the last Chinese artists to study in Japan in the 1930s before the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, his work, mainly dominated by landscape and figure paintings, embodies the profound knowledge of art history, intellectual ideas and painting techniques which he learnt in Japan. His academic studies on Chinese art under famous art historian Kinbara Seigo were significant in his reconnection with Chinese artistic traditions. Fu Baoshi aimed to reinvigorate older methods of realistic representation, emphasising the use of colour and ink wash. In his landscape paintings, he demonstrated a mastery of dotting and inking techniques, introducing a new approach that expanded upon

established conventions. He also translated Japanese scholars publications in Chinese art for the Chinese readers, which not only facilitated a cross-cultural exchange but also shaped the development of Chinese art history in twentieth-century China (Lee, 2015).



Fu Baoshi, *Scholars Trekking in Snow Mountains*, 1945



Fu Baoshi, *Beauties*, 1945

The early Nanjing period was marked by significant transformations in Chinese art scene, largelyinfluenced by student exchanges. For many artists of this era, modern art and Western art were seen as synonymous. They held the belief that by learning and adopting Western artistic forms, China could forge an artistic identity that resonated with its new domestic and international situation (Shen, 1998). Therefore, this period witnessed a significant influx of innovative art concepts, particularly new avant-garde art concepts like constructivism[11] and surrealism[12], as Chinese students returned from their overseas studies. This juncture marked a pivotal turning point for Chinese art, breaking away from traditional norms and introducing novel and imaginative artistic expressions that challenged established conventions.

[11] Constructivism was an influential art movement that originated in Russia after the Russian Revolution, around 1919. It reached its peak during the 1920s and early 1930s. It emphasised the use of geometric forms, industrial materials, and a focus on functionality, aiming to integrate art into everyday life and support the goals of the new socialist society.

[12] Surrealism was an influential art movement that emerged in the early 20th century, around the 1920s. It emphasised the exploration of the subconscious mind, dreams, and the irrational. Surrealist artworks often featured unexpected and bizarre imagery, blurring the lines between reality and imagination.

Their influence was particularly pronounced in the establishment of new artistic societies, created with the specific aim of reforming China's artistic landscape. Some of these societies were Wintry Friends (Hanzhiyou) (active 1929 -1937), Society of Xuanhe Seal Studies (Xuanhe Yinshi) (1935-1951), and Society of the Virtuous (Zhenshe) (active 1912- 1942). These groups assumed pivotal roles in nurturing and advancing the understanding and practice of epigraphy, calligraphy, and painting (Yang, 2014). Another notable example was the formation of the StormSociety (Juelanshe) in 1931. Artists like Pang Xunqin, Ni Yide, Chen Chengbo, Zhou Duo, and Zeng Zhiliang played a pivotal role in founding this society, drawing inspiration from the art scenes of Japan and Paris. The Storm Society was the only artists collective with an established manifesto. Authored by Ni Yide, this manifesto served as a declaration of discontent with the prevailing artistic norms. It was imbued with a sense of nationalistic yearning for China'shistorical grandeur, a sentiment that resonated deeply with the youth of that era. The society organised a series of exhibitions from 1932 to 1935, which showcased an eclectic array of artisticcreations that drew inspiration from diverse European artistic movements such as fauvism,cubism, symbolism, expressionism, futurism, abstractionism, and surrealism.

Period	**Artist who went from China to France**	**Artists who wentfrom China to Japan**	**Artists who stayed in China**
Early Nanjing (1912-1927)	Pang Xunqin, Xu Beihong Liu Haisu	Ni Yide Gao Jainfu Chen Shuren Chen Chengbo Zhang Kunyi Zhou Yifeng	Zhou Duo
Republic of China (1928-1937)		Chen Chengbo Fu Baoshi Feng Zikai	Zheng Zhiliang

Multi-Directional Flow of Ideas between China and Japan

In the early 20th century, European modern art movements such as dadaism[13], constructivism[14], and realism[15] were gaining influence in the Japanese art scene. Chinese students actively contributed to popularising these emerging European art trends. In 1934, an exhibition titled 'TenChinese Painters in Japan' was organised by a group of young Chinese artists. This exhibition, held at the Tokyod Gallery in Tokyo, showcased artworks by Li Zhongsheng, Liang Xihong, Fang Rending, Zhao Shou, Su Wonong, Yang Yifang, and other Chinese artists. Most of these artists were studying at Nihon University or the Tokyo School of Fine Arts, and their showcased works largely followed the styles of cubism, surrealism, and fauvism.

During this era of emerging artistic movements, various experimental art groups flourished, including the 'Chinese Independent Art Society,' formed in Tokyo in 1934 by Cantonese students.Andrews and Shen (2012) suggest that the establishment of this society might have been influenced by the Japanese 'Independent Art Association.' Satomi Katsuzo and other Japanese association members provided guidance to select Chinese students, indicating this influence. In 1935, the Chinese Independent Art Society organised its inaugural exhibition at the Guangzhou Education Centre, a significant event that allowed members to present their avant-garde artworksto a broader audience. This exhibition featured not only the society's works but also contributionsfrom artists in Guangzhou's artistic community. It even included paintings by Japanese artists connected

to the society's members, reflecting its commitment to cross-cultural engagement. Subsequent exhibitions maintained an open submission process, nurturing an environment whereChinese art could align with international trends, enriching the artistic landscapes of both nations.

The returning students harnessed their publications and writings to introduce new techniques, styles, and ideas that characterised the contemporary Western art world. The Chinese Independent Art Society published 'Independent Art' in 1935, advocating for the pursuit of 'pure art' and underscoring the importance of artistic integrity and authenticity. Central to their cause was the advocacy for artists' creative freedom and autonomy in their pursuits. Pioneering artists such as Zheng Ming, Liang Xihong, and Li Dongping wrote essays, edited magazines, and published art journals to introduce novel artistic concepts and movements, bridging the gap between Chinese and Western art forms. Their advocacy for creative freedom played an

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[13] Dadaism was an avant-garde art movement in the early 1920s that emerged during World War I, characterised by its rejection of traditional artistic conventions, embracing absurdity, and often using satire and nonsensical elements to challenge societal norms and express disillusionment with the status quo.

[14] Constructivism was an influential art movement that originated in Russia after the Russian Revolution, around 1919. It reached its peak during the 1920s and early 1930s. It emphasised the use of geometric forms, industrial materials, and a focus on functionality, aiming to integrate art into everyday life and support the goals of the new socialist society.

[15] The Realism art movement emerged in the mid-19th century and was prominent until the late 19th century. It aimed to depict subjects truthfully and accurately, often focusing on everyday life and ordinary people, in contrast to the idealised or stylized representations of earlier art movements instrumental role in shaping China's art scene during the 20th century. By linking their theoretical endeavours with tangible artistic expressions, the influence of their work reverberatedacross cultural boundaries, fostering a vibrant exchange of ideas.

Conclusion

The paper's careful examination of these interactions sheds light on the enduring power of personal, cultural, and artistic connections, highlighting their profound impact on the world of artand culture.

The case studies presented in this paper highlighted the intricate historical context of cultural andartistic interactions between China and Japan. By delving into these cases, we gained a deeper comprehension of the multifaceted dynamic that shaped artistic currents in both nations during this pivotal period. A deep exploration of the first case study of the 1929 National Fine Arts Exhibition reveals that it transcended mere artistic display, serving as a vehicle for diplomatic engagement and intercultural dialogue. The exhibition's cross-cultural dynamics are evidenced by the inclusion of Chinese, Japanese, and Western pieces, emphasising its inclusive nature and international character. The particular emphasis on contemporary Japanese oil paintings within the exhibition's curated selection underscores the role of artistic diplomacy. It served as aconvergence point for diverse artistic expressions, embodying the complexities of cultural synthesis amidst evolving national narratives. The juxtaposition of tradition and modernity,evident in the exhibition's curation, reinforces its pivotal status and signified a paradigm shift in Republic’s artistic ethos.The curated focus on the female nude, juxtaposed with traditional ink paintings, signifies not only a paradigm shift in the artistic ethos of the Republic but the search for alternative modernity distinct from its western counterpart. The impact of this curated selection reverberates beyond the immediate context, shaping the emergence of new art forms and artistic practices within the Chinese art scene, as explored in the next case study.

The second case study underscored the transformation of woodblock prints from traditional artistic forms to potent canvases for political and social commentary. The influence of Japanese printmaking circles, particularly the "Creative Print" and "New Print" movements, introduced Chinese artists to innovative woodblock printing techniques and ideas that emphasise individual creativity and self-expression. This influence paved the way for the Chinese Woodcut movement,where artists like Lu Xun, Li Hua, Jiang Feng, and Hu Yichuan played pivotal roles in embracingthese innovative techniques, demonstrating their commitment to artistic growth and societal transformation.

The third case study provided a lens through which we examined the nuanced circulation of ideas, styles, and practices across geographical and cultural boundaries, leaving an indelible impact on China's artistic landscape. Chinese students who returned from foreign countries played instrumental roles in introducing European art trends like constructivism and surrealismto both Japan and China, marking a departure from traditional techniques. This cultural exchangewas exemplified by art groups like the Storm Society of 1931 and the exhibition 'Ten Chinese Painters in Japan,' which prominently showcased styles such as surrealism and fauvism, signifying a distinct departure from conventional artistic expressions. Furthermore, publications and writings by these returning students bridged the gap between Chinese and Western art forms,fundamentally transforming the Chinese art scene.

These case studies not only shed light on the immediate artistic impact but also align with Clark's(2003) perspective, which underscores the role of Asian modernity in shaping artistic narratives. By showcasing Japan's ability to blend traditional aesthetics with modern innovations, these exchanges present an alternative model to the Euro-American narrative of modernity. The research highlights the broader implications of Asian nations influencing one another, enriching the discourse of global art history and cultural studies.

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Appendix 1

List Of Japanese Exhibitors, 1929 Chinese Ministry Of Education National Art ExhibitionOrganizing Committee
Committee Chair: Masaki Naohiko

Members: Nakamura Fusetsu, Fujishima Takeji, Okada Saburōsuke, Mitsutani Kunishiro,Wada Eisaku, Yamashita Shintarō, Kosugi Misei (Hōan), Ishii Hakutei, Yamamoto Kanae, Wada Sanzō, Umehara Ryūzaburō

Participating Artists Imperial Fine Arts Academy

[Six fellows of the Imperial Fine Arts Academy and also organizers of the exhibition:]
Okada Saburōsuke, Wada Eisaku, Fujishima Takeji, Nakamura Fusetsu, Mitsutani Kunishirō, Wada Sanzō

[Eighteen artists, all jurors for the Teiten:]
Nagatochi Hideta (1873–1942), Nagahara Kōtarō (1864–1930), KobayashiMango(1870–1947), Tanabe Itaru (1886–1968), Ishikawa Toraji, Ōta Kijirō (1883–1951),Ōkubo Sakujirō (1890–1973), Kanayama Heizō (1883–1964), Katada Tokurō (1889–1934), Yoshida Hiroshi (1876–1950), Tsuji Hisashi (1884–1974), Nakazawa Hiromitsu (1874–1964), Minami Kunzō (1883–1950), Shirataki

Ikunosuke (1873–1950), Yunoki Hisata (1885–1970), Shimizu Yoshio (1871–1954), Kojima Torajirō (1881–1929), Aoyama Kumaji (1886–1932)

[Eight artists, "Recommenders" for the Teiten:]
Ōta Saburō (1884–1969), Ōno Takanori (1886–1945), Yoshimura Yoshimatsu (1886–1965), Yoshida Shigeru (18831953), Takamura Masao (1876–1954), Sōma Kiichi (18851966), Terauchi Manjirō, Okuse Eizō (1891–1975) Nikakai [thirteen members and thirteen associates:]

shii Hakutei, Yamashita Shintarō, Koide Narashige (18871931), Kumagai Morikazu (1880–1977), Kuroda Jūtarō (18871970), Masamune Tokusaburō (1883–1962), Nabei Katsuyuki (1888–1969), Nakagawa Kigen (1892–1972), Sakamoto Hanjirō (1882–1969),Tsuda Seifū (1880–1978), Yasui Sōtarō (1888–1955), Yokoi Reiichi, Yuasa Ichirō (1868–1931)

Below are thirteen associate members:
Hanihara Kuwayo (1876–1934, female), Hayashi Takeshi, Kawakami Sakyō (1889–1971), Koga Harue, Kojima Zentarō, Satomi Katsuzō, Shiizuka Ichio, Suzuki Tsuguo (1894–1984), Suzuki Yasunori (1891–1974), Taguchi Seigo (1897–1943), Yoshida Takashi (1897–1929), Kojima Zenzaburō, Tōgō Seiji (1897–1978)

Shun'yōkai [8 members:]
Kosugi Misei (Hōan), Yamamoto Kanae, Adachi Gen'ichirō (1889–1973), Koyama Keizō (1897–1987), Yamazaki Shōzō (1896–1945), Kitō Kamejirō (1897–1952), Kobayashi Tokusaburō, Okamoto Ippei (1886–1948)

Kokugakai [6 members:]
Umehara Ryūzaburō, Yamawaki Shintoku (1886–1952), Kawashima Riichirō (1886–1971), Tsubaki Sadao (1896–1957), Kōno Michisei (1895–1950), Ōhashi Kōkichi (1898–1984)

Cultural, Historical Trajectories of US-China Relations and the Role of Anson Burlingame

Chhavi Raj

Abstract

As far as US-China relations are concerned, scores of scholars have given countless theories, arguments, policies, etc. Given its multifaceted character and temporal as well as spatial dynamism, it is well beyond the scope of a single study to capture all aspects of US-China bilateral relations in its entirety. The scholarship on US-China relations from a traditional perspective has focused primarily either on the US or the Americans, describing the Chinese as a mere respondent to western initiatives. Such studies often adopted a 'top-down approach' highlighting the roles of politicians, government, and economy, diminishing the roles of individual and their experiences through which both countries actively engaged themselves. These episodes can be used as a reference to unfold how the shared pasts of personality like Anson Burlingame (1820-1870), the US ambassador to China, later representing China at various diplomatic missions, did play a significant role in the national development. This research paper tends to be different as it will make

an attempt to analyse US-China relations from the theme of shared historical experience highlighting individual roles that were conducive to bringing these two nations closer through diplomacy, student and scholar exchange programmes, lectures, and other cultural events. It even played a crucial role in the policy formulations of the US concerning China around that period. It will make an attempt to trace the causes and elements attributing to the cultural as well as Political conflicts in the bilateral relationship.

Introduction

As far as US-China relations are concerned, scores of scholars have given countless theories, arguments, policies, etc. Given its multifaceted character and temporal as well as spatial dynamism, it is well beyond the scope of a single study to capture all aspects of US-China bilateral relations in its entirety. China and the US from a historical perspective are entirely distinct. To put it simply, China is an old, one of the ancient civilizations and an emerging country while the US is a young and established country. While exploring the causes of the US-China strategic conflict as well as the trend in their deteriorating relationship, it is pertinent that "the former's emergence in the twenty-first century to the status of great power has largely transformed their relationship and has compelled leaders in both countries to redefine their positions towards each other. Moreover, historically, there have been dramatic shifts and inconsistencies in the US-China bilateral relationships that persisted even in the contemporary times, and its effects were being witnessed by the world gradually with many twists and turns.

While discussing US-China relations, the majority of scholars have focused primarily on the period after 1972, the year in which President Richard Nixon paid a visit to China, as it marked the beginning of a new era in their bilateral relationship. The majority of scholars are of opinion that the period from 1979-2009 witnessed the most stable US-China bilateral relationship as they both reaped the maximum benefit out of it through engagement policies. However, an often neglected yet important episode in the US-China relations, which can be called the "golden era" in the bilateral relationship, and the main person behind this friendship between the two old and young nations was Anson Burlingame 蒲安臣 (*Pu'anchen*), the US ambassador to China, who later represented China at various diplomatic missions.

Despite the odds and setbacks at that time when there were no co-cordial relations between US-China, he played a crucial role by bringing the two nations closer through a series of bilateral engagements known as the "Burlingame treaty" 蒲安臣条约 (*Pu'anchen tiaoyue*) and despite being an American he led the first diplomatic mission to the West in order to negotiate the unequal Chinese treaties with other European nations on behalf of inexperienced China. It is because of his diplomatic skills, efforts, and sympathy towards China, he was able to convince the US to sign the first fair and equal treaty with China, despite the fact that other nations were trying to impose unequal treaties on China forcefully.

His admiration for China as a sovereign nation and a venerable civilization convinced him to adopt a policy of patience and peaceful dealings with the Chinese. While he was leading a delegation to London on behalf of the Qing Empire, he came to know that China doesn't have a national flag, he quickly designed a Chinese flag, using the imperial colour yellow and a dragon image which symbolizes great power, good luck, and strength in Chinese Culture, this prompt reaction of his shows that he knew the country quite well and was willing to introduce China to the international community. He had always condemned the use of force against one race by another at home, and he continued to follow the same in China.

While negotiating with the Russians during his service in St. Petersburg, he passed away on February 23, 1870, due to illness, which reflects his dedication and commitment to China and, how desperately he wanted China to be included in the family of nations. Even today, the Chinese government is paying a pension to his family for the selfless service Burlingame had provided to China, from the day he was appointed till he passed away. He was merely 41yrs old when he commenced his journey as the US Ambassador to China in 1861 with no prior experience and China too on his part showed no interest in him when he arrived in China. However, by the time he passed away, he had represented China in countries like the US, the UK, France, and so on.
When China was humiliated at the hands of westerners, what role did the US play in shaping Sino-Western relations? What was the nature of engagement and policies adopted by the US? Moreover, when imperialist subjugation prevailed in the east, what course did US-China relations take? Did the US come to the rescue or did he shake his hand with the imperialist? "Did the US join the other Western nations in diplomatic and military efforts to extract privileges and concessions from China or did it seek to secure the US interests by actively defending the integrity of the weak imperial Chinese government? This paper attempts to analyse US-China relations through the framework of shared pasts of people like Anson Burlingame, Ge Kunhua that played a significant role in shaping the national development as well as in shaping their bilateral relations.

A Critical Reflection on the Burlingame Treaty in the Chinese and American Discourse

The US and China concluded the "Burlingame-Seward Treaty" "蒲安臣条约 (*pu'anchen Tiaoyue*)" in 1868 to expand upon the "Treaty of Tianjin" (1858) "天津条约 (*Tianjin Tiaoyue*)." The treaty, which was an extension of the 1858's US "Treaty of Tianjin" was perhaps the Burlingame Mission's greatest diplomatic achievement. It explicitly declared that "China maintains dominion and authority over all its territory and activities as it was not specifically addressed in the existing treaties. It also introduced free immigration between both nations, the stationing of Chinese envoys in the US, as well as the protection of the US and Chinese citizens in their respective countries. More significantly, both the nations agreed to follow the cooperative policy."

The US committed not to intervene with China's internal administration in connection with the building of railways, telegraph lines, or other important domestic improvements. Correspondingly, China withholds the right to decide the time and place for such infrastructural improvements. subsequently, China agreed to pursue Western assistance for such innovations and to safeguard foreign personnel as well as property dealing with such services (Charles, I. B. 1919). The articles under the treaty envisioned to "reinforce the 'essence of equality' between the two nations but despite the mutual safeguards, the 'Burlingame Treaty' ultimately consolidated the US trade interests with China on the idea of the 'most-favoured-nation' concept, along with Britain and France, and it ensured a regular supply of low-cost Chinese immigrant labour for the US." (Babones. S, 2017)

As far as cooperative policy is concerned, Burlingame firmly believed that to move beyond the pattern of Western aggression and Chinese resistance to it, a new relationship based on mutual respect for their civilization had to be established. For Burlingame "cooperative policy" meant cooperation with China as well as cooperation with the western nations. It was an attempt to replace the existing cultural confrontation with discussions and conciliation. It represented a civilize and considerable alternative to force. Moreover, its success relied primarily on cooperation among major countries, in particular Britain, which had a considerable interest in China, and was the most powerful nation amongst them. In order to achieve his goal of peaceful East-West settlement, Burlingame established a formal system of cooperation among Western countries in China around 1863.

He succeeded in achieving an agreement with the following minister plenipotentiary, Bruce of England, Jules Berthemy of France, and L. D. Balluzeck of Russia in a panel discussion to respect China's territorial integrity and to help China in joining the family of nations. Burlingame succeeded in attaining the agreement of his three Western colleagues in Beijing to the following: to claim only their nations treaty rights in the ports and not to claim any concessions that violated China's sovereignty or territorial integrity; not to interfere in China's internal affairs; but to jointly defend their treaty rights against anyone who violated them; and to provide moral support and military advice to the government, but not to place foreign officers on the field of battle. These were the first apparent signs of the "cooperative policy" in China. However, it did not mark the end of Sino-Western enmity. To Burlingame, cooperation was more than simply a desirable policy necessitated by America's limited influence and interests in Asia. It was rather an expression of the liberal Western ideas of peace, freedom, justice, and self-government, which he believed the US had championed since 1776. In China too he found another principle to fight for, as China was humiliated at the hands of imperialist powers through a series of unequal treaties. Although practical issues such as trade and concessions were important to him, the primary objective of his policy was to change the way, in which foreigners dealt with China as well as with the Chinese. Interestingly, it can be argued that extreme trust, frankness, and honesty for an American by the Chinese reflects what, backwardness or something else?

As far as rationale behind sending foreign officials abroad was concerned, China's officials argued that, the Treaty Powers had economic and missionary interests in China, which necessitated the presence of diplomatic and consular representatives. Whereas China had no such interests abroad which would necessitate any such participation (K. Biggerstaff, 1936). Additionally, the motivation behind dispatching "Burlingame mission" is concerned, China's foreign office gave two basic reasons for sending this mission, first, regarding misunderstandings, as it has resulted from the fact that foreign governments and their policy formulators assumed to have complete knowledge about China, whereas the Chinese were completely ignorant of conditions and whereabouts in foreign countries. Second, China did not have any means to check the improper actions of foreign ministers stationed in Beijing as they did not have any access to the superiors of foreign ministers residing in Beijing. Adding to it, a more specific reason for appointing Burlingame as China's envoy to the Treaty Powers was that he might be able to shed some light on the confusion existing in the West regarding China's actions and intentions as he knew China quite well.

Moreover, the approaching revision of treaties (such as the Treaty of Tianjin) was also a factor, possibly the most significant one that enabled China to dispatch the "Burlingame Mission." The Chinese were afraid that if these demands were not met, the imperialist powers would resort to force again. It was expected that Burlingame would be able to convince the countries to which the mission was authorized that China was growing as swiftly as it could and, on their part, they must show forbearance and patience as far as dealing with China was concerned.

The "Burlingame Mission" was an attempt to limit foreign demands, particularly western demands on China in the form of extensive treaty revisions. According to David L. Anderson, in Burlingame's opinion, allowing the Chinese to manage their affairs was not only admirable but also beneficial for the US and other Western nations. He argued, that perhaps by keeping China liberal in all of these aspects and allowing space, in short, leaving her on its own would enable China to feel safe. He further argued that infrastructural development such as the railroad and telegraph should not be used to disrupt or destroy China, rather leaving China on its own will eventually emerge her from isolation and will embark her on a path of trade, which will bring huge profit to the West.

Despite Burlingame's exaggeration, the treaty did not succeed in eliminating the unequal treaty system. Nonetheless, the Burlingame treaty recognized China as a sovereign nation capable of assuming and asserting its responsibilities and rights in international relations. It was perhaps China's first equal treaty with any foreign country. Additionally, as far as the appointment of Burlingame as China's envoy was concerned, there were mixed opinions from Chinese officials. It can be argued, in the words of western scholars that it was an extraordinary step in the history of modernization and internationalization of China, whereas domestically, within the government it was a controversial move. Wo Ren, one of the highest officials in the *Zongli Yamen*, strongly opposed the idea of a mission.

On the other hand, few eminent Chinese officials like Wen Xiang were in the favour of Burlingame. In fact, he played a leading role in appointing Burlingame as China's envoy. The two important articles of Burlingame Treaty were articles five and six, which dealt with free immigration between China and the US. It was aimed against laws that were discriminatory against the Chinese living in the western states. More importantly, the treaty provided measures for the federal protection of the Chinese against discrimination. Besides, article eight of the treaty dealt with a "non-intervention policy" and implied that it was China's sovereignty to decide "the time, manner, and circumstances" concerning the construction of railroads, telegraphs, or other domestic infrastructural improvements. Considering the history of "gunboat diplomacy, coercive methods, and exploitation by the Western imperialist powers, this article was crucial as a support for China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The treaty, according to Burlingame, had its root in the desire to give control of China to herself, in opposition to the aggressive approach which would take China away from them.

Additionally, as far as the reasons which were conducive to bringing these two nations closer at the time, Xu Guoqi, one of the leading experts on Burlingame has illustrated a few reasons. The first reason was that both China and the US were amid a severe political crisis at the time. In the US, a civil war was in progress, perhaps it was the deadliest and the most destructive war the US ever fought in history. On the other hand, in China, the Qing Dynasty was resisting the Taiping Rebellion which agitated since 1850. With the revival of the Han Chinese and Manchus alliance, the Qing empire succeeded in suppressing the Taiping rebellion and subsequently proceeded with some reforms in their foreign policy.

Meanwhile, in the US, Abraham Lincoln's armies began their deadly march to victory. The second was that at the time the US didn't follow in the British footsteps by engaging China militarily, as it didn't have any territorial ambitions in China, rather it focused on acquiring the "most favoured nation" status for the US which would have ensured the same privileges for the US as it was for other European nations. Third, considering the US's limited interest in China at that time, they focused on carrying out a relatively small but profitable trade with the Chinese as well as the protection of its citizens in China. The last reason could be that around the mid-nineteenth century, the US itself was a weak nation, preoccupied with its internal affairs as well as matters of great concern of international affairs that they didn't give much importance to China. (Xu Guoqi, 2005) David L. Anderson another leading scholar on US-China relations, has aptly described the US's mid-nineteenth century policy as ambivalent and inconsistent, the reason being the clash between American ideals and self-interests. He further illustrates that though the US rendered support for the idea of China's independence in international affairs around nineteenth century, at the same time their officials also tried to seek privileges and advantages which undermined China's sovereignty (D.A, 1986). At the time, the US policy with respect to China basically revolved around twofold ideas, whether the US should join the other imperialist powers in extracting privileges and concessions through diplomatic and military means or should it seek to secure US interests by defending the integrity of weak imperial China.

The evolution of basic conflict between Idealism and Pragmatism in the US's foreign relations has its root in the historical events of the birth and development of the US as a nation. Following the US's independence from the British colony in July 1776, the early American settlers made an effort to pursue the ideals of "self-government, equality, and opportunity," but at the same time they also encountered the harsh realities of the "dense forests, cold winters, and hostile foes." Since the Americans had both the essence of spiritual as well as worldly, hence they criticized self-indulgence but not self-interest (D.A, 1976). The US which had recently emerged as a nation was filled with people looking for wealth and opportunity and eventually, these forests were gradually transformed into farms and towns, and ultimately into a new nation.

This gradual process of transformation enabled Americans to emerge with a sense of moral righteousness. On one hand, it was successful in establishing their spiritual faith but on the other, it also gave rise to internal conflict between the pursuit of "gain and good." Additionally, among the citizens of the newly established United States, there was a great sense of pride and self-satisfaction as they assumed US's "democracy and republicanism" to be unique. Irrespective of the actual economic, social, and political causes and effects of the American Revolution, a belief rapidly emerged among Americans that they had accomplished something exceptional. (D.A,1976) Besides, they consider their own nation to be the most liberal, democratic, republican, and the most progressive polity ever created. Thus, many Americans perceived it as a responsibility to share their exceptional creation with others. The majority of Americans had never visited China, yet they believed that it lagged far behind the US because they considered their own nation as an epitome of progress and freedom. Further, Americans' perception of China was primitive and backward with its old-fashioned imperial government as well as ancient Confucian tradition, in short, contrary to all that US had achieved. Stanley Hornbeck, a US based diplomat argued that, among every tussle between the Chinese and the foreigners, the US concern was to seek, in order to extract the maximum profit, what will serve their interest more, whether to stand with the Britishers or to stand with the Chinese.

David L. Anderson has pointed out in his book *Imperialism and Idealism: American Diplomats in China, 1861–1898*, "was it possible for the US to cooperate entirely both with the Chinese as well as the foreigners at the same time? 'Cooperation' as per him could be either with the Westerners against China or with the Chinese against European demands, but in a majority of the cases it could not be both, as it constantly weakened Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity." Consequently, the bigger challenge was what kind of cooperation was the US going to provide, as the definition of "cooperation" was inconsistent, for instance, J. Ross Browne, Burlingame's successor at the US legation in Beijing differed sharply with the Burlingame's approach of "cooperative framework" and, preferred a forceful Western method against China. Instead of cooperative policy, the following four decades of "The Burlingame Treaty," China witnessed numerous foreign aggressions which revealed the inconsistency of these perceptions. A critical analysis of both the Chinese and American sources exhibits that, the US did play a significant role in both the case of Burlingame mission as well as the Chinese Education Mission, which occurred in the late nineteenth century. In both cases, Americans took initiative with the encouragement from the Chinese side, contrary to common perceptions of the US's passive role in China. These cases exhibits that both the Chinese and Americans had high hopes for the role that the US might play in their bilateral relationship and took effective measures to define the new directions in terms of mutual cooperation.

Conclusion

This paper highlights the positive aspect of the shared history rather than the confrontational episodes as the objective of this work is to unfold the shared experiences which brought both China and the US together. According to Xu Guoqi, as far as the "Burlingame Mission" is concerned both sides had great expectations of it, but due to widespread political and diplomatic conservatism, the dominance of Western imperialism and, "anti-Chinese" sentiment throughout the US, outcomes were restricted. The mission succeeded in attracting few outcomes initially and was visionary too but was not as productive as policy experts from both sides expected it to be. Besides, as far as the rationale behind the mission is concerned, Wang Yuanchong, a historian at the University of Delaware argued that "the mission's central objective was to safeguard the US commercial interest in China, rather than helping China or safeguarding its territorial integrity." Perhaps, at the time, the US was looking for a colonial market to expand its trade to contest with other Western powers (Cai Yineng, 2021). The perception of "shared history" was different for both sides, the US perceived it as a "mission to uplift China" or rather to "transform China as per the US model." On the contrary, China perceived it as a series of humiliations in the form of unequal treaties and extraterritoriality, etc. which disseminated a sense of subjugation in their subconscious (Zhang Bajia, 2021).

Today the "shared history" approach is particularly relevant as the US-China bilateral relations is the most important bilateral relationship, considering that the state of their bilateral relationship not only affects them rather, it has a significant role in deciding the future world order. Moreover "in many aspects, both the US and China are in the same boat and their fates remain interconnected." Subsequently, Burlingame's contributions and spirit should not be forgotten, in fact in a time like this when the relations between the two nations are deteriorating and perhaps would have hit the rock bottom in the history of their bilateral relationship. The "shared history" approach, as well as his roles and works in establishing their friendly relations, should be highlighted more often and today we need more people like Burlingame who could resolve the issues diplomatically which will be beneficial for both the US and China. In Frederick William's words, "the real importance of Burlingame lies not much either in the individual or in his efforts it lies rather in the use of an idea which he considered as the guiding principle throughout his abroad service." Henry Kissinger has quite precisely argued in his book *"On China"* that "China and the US needed each other because both were too large to be dominated, too special to be transformed, and too necessary to each other to be able to afford isolation" (H.K, 2012). While looking at the state of US-China relations today, the "shared history" theme might shed some light, or assist in providing suggestions for managing their differences and rebooting the relationship these two nations had once during the mid-19th century.

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Grid Management and the Chinese Surveillance State

Ekta Singh

Abstract

The long-term impact of covid-19 crisis that brought the entire world to a standstill is still being debated and yet to unfold. Undoubtedly, most countries irrespective of the regime type were stretched beyond their capacities and adopted harsh policies to contain the virus. Most of the recent research has attributed the different national responses to differential 'state capacity' and have criticized 'Regime type' as a differentiator to assess crisis governance given the mixed track record of different regimes in effectively handling the challenges posed by Covid-19. The article argues how 'Regime type' remains a crucial variable shaping and mediating state capacity and role of political leadership by interrogating how the interaction between state capacity and regime type played out in China's handling of covid-19.

From information control to grid governance to use of digital infrastructure in 'mission mode', China utilized multiple dimensions of its high state capacity all made possible within a single party authoritarian structure and the overall context of dynamic state-society relations. The article analyses China's grid management as an important tool of the Chinese Communist Party to construct a technologically sophisticated surveillance state. In critically analysing the role of grid-management in containing the pandemic, the article seeks to unravel the role of such surveillance technologies in governing mobility and maintaining social control by bolstering state capacity.

Keywords: state capacity, regime type, covid-19, grid management, authoritarian regime

Introduction

The long-term impact of covid-19 crisis that brought the entire world to a standstill is still being debated and yet to unfold. Undoubtedly, most countries irrespective of the regime type were stretched beyond their capacities and adopted harsh policies to contain the virus ranging from lockdown, monitoring, testing and vaccination drives. Looking at the responses of different countries, it is difficult to declare superiority of any particular regime. Among the authoritarian regimes, while Singapore did well, Iran did very poorly. Countries like Vietnam and Russia present mixed pictures. After the initial cover-up and successful containment of the virus, China was gripped with multiple waves of Covid variants that it found difficult to manage and led commentators to re-evaluate their assessment of China's response.

Democracies on the other hand, have also not been clear winners -While New Zealand, Germany, South Korea, and Taiwan braved the crisis impressively, US, UK and Italy floundered badly. The distinction between democracies and authoritarian regimes seemed to blur as the political leadership around the world resorted to strict control. Recent reports have suggested how democracies were engaged in gross violations of democratic standards for emergency measures during the Covid-19 pandemic ranging from discriminatory measures, derogation of non-derogable rights, abusive enforcement, no time limit on emergency measures, disproportionate limitations on the role of the legislature, official disinformation campaigns, and restrictions on media freedoms. (V-Dem Working Paper Series: 110, 2020).

Responding to the narrative of authoritarian setting as more conducive for crisis governance or the 'authoritarian advantage' thesis (Shwartz, 2012) in the context of the pandemic, social scientists have been emphasizing how the reality is more complex and nuanced, and rarely captured by over-simplified assumptions about the relationship between regime types and pandemic intervention outcomes. Scholars argue that some of the most successful examples of containing COVID-19 are found in democratic societies, such as South Korea and Denmark, while

some of the worst examples, such as Iran, have been authoritarian countries (Alon et al. 2020; Kavanagh and Singh 2020). Others point out that the pandemic, after all, originated from the lack of transparency and accountability in China (Kavanagh and Singh 2020). Some authors predicted that any authoritarian advantage that appears in the short run would melt away in the long-term management of the COVID-19 crisis, including mental health and economic recovery (Cepaluni et.al, 2020).

Nevertheless, the way different countries handled the crisis presents a unique opportunity to gain important insights about governance *per se* and crisis governance in particular. In the words of eminent scholar on China, Elizabeth Perry, Covid-19 'offers an unusually illuminating natural experiment for investigating the sources of effective governance' (Perry, 2021).

Most of the recent research has criticized Regime type as a differentiator to assess crisis governance given the mixed track record of different regimes in effectively handling the challenges posed by Covid-19 (Kleinfield, 2020, Davis, 2023; Perry, 2021). Instead, scholars have identified factors like political leadership (Perry, 2021), preparedness emerging from earlier experience of handling public health emergencies, state capacity and public trust or legitimacy (Kleinfield, 2020), 'societalization' of pandemic unpreparedness (Lo and Hseih, 2020) as crucial variables in their assessment of national responses to Covid-19.

Rather than seeing these factors in isolation, the present article interrogates how the interaction between state capacity and regime type played out in China's handling of covid-19. The article differs from Perry (2021) in contesting the idea that political leadership can be analyzed outside the institutional context of regime type. In doing so, the article contributes to the literature on state capacity and political regimes in four ways. Firstly, it makes an important intervention by arguing that Regime type shapes and mediates how state capacity is utilized. Since State capacity is better understood as 'potential' which is different from 'outcomes', and to that extent high state capacity does not necessarily mean state will actually translate the potential into high performance. As a potentiality how and in what ways will state capacity be used will depend on political factors. Definition of 'performance' might also differ based on regime type.

The article follows Hanson (2015) in understanding state capacity as 'an instrument available to rulers, who make use of it at their discretion'. The article concords with Knutson and Kolvani (2022) in arguing 'how regime type and state capacity shape the abilities and incentives of political leaders to respond to COVID-19'. Secondly and more importantly, the paper seeks to highlight the distinct dimensions of state capacity in communist states. The article builds upon Harrison (2023) argument which identifies secrecy, productive capacity and durability as additional dimensions of state capacity in communist regimes. Thirdly, while acknowledging the variations within authoritarian regimes the article joins research that challenges 'authoritarian advantage' thesis in responding to the pandemic. Fourthly, the article argues that the need and relevance of emphasizing the same is required now than ever before as the trend towards democratic backsliding becomes more widespread. Arguments declaring superiority of authoritarian regimes runs the risk of alienation from democracy as a form of government.

The paper is organized into three main sections. Section one lays out the theoretical framework discussing concepts of state capacity and its relationship with political regimes. Section two discusses China's response to the covid-19 crisis, particularly the 'grid management system' through a discussion of different aspects of state capacity, when contextualized within a particular kind of authoritarian regime- the Single Party Communist State. Section three as the concluding section explicates the relationship between Grid Management and state capacity in the context of China and analyses how state capacity is shaped by the Regime type.

I: Theoretical Framework

(i) Conceptualizing State Capacity

In simple terms, "state capacity" refers to the 'state's ability to get things done' (Lindvall & Teorell, 2016). State capacity has been variously defined as 'a government's ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services" (Fukuyama 2013, 350); "institutional capability of the state to carry out various policies" (Besley and Persson 2011) and the "degree of control that state agents exercise over persons, activities, and resources within their government's territorial jurisdiction" (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). Hanson and Sigman (2021) define state capacity as the ability of the state to "coerce, tax, and administer."- as a combination of extractive, coercive and administrative capacity. Quite clearly state capacity is a multi-dimensional concept.

In a sense, state capacity represents state power emerging from its ability to implement its policies and goals (Mann, 1984; Slater, 2010; Soifer, 2015; Lindvall& Teorell, 2016). Lindvall& teorell (2016) see state capacity 'as a form of power that is exercised by using specific resources to enhance the effectiveness of specific policy instruments'. Michael Mann understood state capacity in terms of two meanings of state power- 'despotic power' and 'infrastructural power'. While despotic power connotes 'the range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalised negotiation with civil society groups' (p.188); by 'infrastructural power' Mann referred to "the capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm" (Mann 1984: 189). While despotic power connotes power "over" society, infrastructural power is exercised "through" society (Mann, p. 5). In countries like China, state's infrastructural power emanates from the ability of the CCP to penetrate the society.

In an important distinction, Lindwall & Teorell (2016) distinguish between state autonomy and state capacity as 'its autonomy reflects the extent to which it is not controlled by external forces; its capacity reflects the extent to which it controls the outcomes it attempts to achieve' (p. 14). Scholars have drawn attention to the fallacy in the existing literature of understanding measures of state 'capacity' in terms of 'outcomes' and instead lays emphasis on "inputs" to arrive at a definition of state capacity as the extent to which a state is able to achieve the outcomes that the government that controls the state attempts to achieve (whether it is to "make and enforce" rules, "carry out" policies, or "control" populations and territories)'.

In other words, 'State capacity' is a function of resources the state commands to achieve desired outputs. The resources at the disposal of the state could be myriad-financial, institutional, and legitimacy (Soifer, 2008). Lindvall & Teorell (2016) identify three building blocks in understanding state capacity- namely, resources, policy instruments and outcomes. Resources referring to "all the assets the state can use to carry out policies more effectively' identified as *revenue* (state income), *human capital* (the quality of the state administration), and *information*. Bemelmanas-Videc et al. (1998) understand the 'instruments' or tools which could be "sticks" (coercion), "carrots" (economic incentives), and "sermons" (propaganda) similar to what Mann (1984) calls "military", economic" and "ideological" power. It is important to distinguish between "sermons" understood in terms of persuasion or propaganda and political legitimacy which connotes what Lindvall & Teorell (2016) call 'an internalised motivation to obey'. To the extent that legitimacy or acceptance is seen as an important aspect of state capacity, the concept of 'state capacity' needs to be embedded within the larger context of state-society interaction. As Lindvall & Teorell put it, 'The political regime – and, more generally, how states and societies interact – also affects the legitimacy that leaders and states enjoy. Since legitimacy is an internalized motivation to obey, the ability of states to make citizens comply depends, at least indirectly, on the regime, and the state's autonomy, not only on state capacity narrowly defined'. (Lindvall &

Teorell, 2016, p.15). In a recent paper, d'Arcy and Nistotskaya (2016) argue that states need both "teeth" (coercion, an instrument) and "eyes" (information, a resource).

Having said that, it is now widely recognized that state capacity cannot be equated with outcomes. Since state capacity is distinct from outcomes, at best, we can measure 'inputs' of state capacity (Lindvall & Teorell, 2016). Information as one of the most "fungible" resource makes it the most important measure of state capacity. James Scott has famously noted how the capacity to process information by codifying it in standardized categories, thereby making it 'legible' has been an important factor in augmenting the power of the Modern State and proven to be crucial to effective governance (Scott, 1998). In Scott's analysis, "legibility" practices by the state to simplify governance tasks inevitably homogenizes local diversity and local knowledge.

Building on Scott's work, Melissa and Zhang (2016) reemphasize the importance of legibility, defined as 'the breadth and depth of state's knowledge of its citizens and their activities' as a crucial component of state capacity and administration. The scholars link "legibility to the state's ability to curb free-riding in collective action dilemmas' by providing evidence of how legibility allows the state to ensure fiscal tax compliance and better public service provision. However, state's attempts to make society graspable through information gathering is not always a benign endeavour and there is an ever-present danger of societal backlash around concerns of privacy and surveillance. The degree of legitimacy of the political system in the eyes of the people is an important metric of how state's attempts to make society legible are accepted. That brings us to the relationship between legitimacy and state capacity. Soifer sees legitimacy as an important resource that captures state capacity, besides financial and institutional. as other scholars like Whitehead (1995) have similarly stressed on it as the "cognitive capacity" (Whitehead, 1995).

According to Michael Mann (1984) one of the most important elements of the state's infrastructural power is information: "it [the state] stores and can recall immediately a massive amount of information about all of us". Soifer (2008) identifies three analytical approaches to 'infrastructural power' that convey three different ways to conceptualize state capacity namely, "national capabilities" measured in terms of resources at its disposal, "weight of the state" understood in terms of the intentional effects of the state on the population it seeks to control or how much the state's radiating institutions actually influence social actors and "sub-national variations" pointing at "the uneven reach of the state, centered on the varied ability of a particular state to exercise control within its territory" understood both territorially and in terms of societal actors.

A national capabilities approach to infrastructural power would focus on the logistical techniques available to the state— the technologies of fingerprinting, retinal scans, passports, and the like. 'Weight of the state' approach explores state's power in terms of its effect on the identity and discourse of citizens- how for instance scholars of nationalism often focus on the ability of the state to inculcate the population with a belief in its officially constructed discourse of national identity. Since state capacity is something that is being built up gradually over time, many scholars have argued that historical legacies are important predictors for present day levels of capacity (Acemoglu & Robinson 2012; Broms 2016; D'Arcy & Nistotskaya 2017).
State capacity cannot be understood unless contextualized within the larger framework of state-society relations. While Mann's infrastructural power speaks of an autonomous state with an intentionality, Foucault explores how state power operates more broadly and manifests itself in the ability to discipline society at large, for instance, by creating certain subjects and social identities and denying others through administrative routines, quotidian rituals, or outright oppression. By challenging the distinction between state and society, Foucault moves away from

the idea of a potentially autonomous state with intentions that is central to Mann's concept of infrastructural power.

The infrastructural power of the state has been further entrenched by digital governance. The adoption of digital technology for surveillance has significantly expanded both the pace and reach of the state. Based on a comparative study of the adoption of "contact tracing apps" during Covid-19 by various countries, Cingolani (2021) suggests how the relational ("two-way street") aspect of infrastructural power becomes pronounced in the digital age. In studying 'how digital infrastructural power plays out in the context of emergency responses to a global health crisis' Cingolani arrives at the finding of how peoples' trust in governments emerges as the strongest determinant of relational state capacity.

Relational state capacity has a long tradition (e.g., Migdal 1988) and is not incompatible with autocratic regimes. In fact, the fertile literature on authoritarian states sees the use of infrastructural mechanisms to create societal dependency through state policies as a fundamental channel for authoritarian durability (e.g. Slater and Fenner 2011). A core idea of this literature is that regime consolidation requires the substitution, or at least complementarity of coercion with softer legitimacy-building instruments such as persuasive discourses, socially inclusive regulation and the presence of territorially-embedded organizations (Göbel 2011). Information, persuasion and symbolic power are in that sense considered key components of state capacity (Loveman 2005; Lodge and Wegrich 2014; Lindvall and Teorell 2016; Brambor et al. 2020).

In other words, what emerges is that state capacity cannot be understood outside state-society relations which is a function of regime type.

(ii) State Capacity and Regime Type

China's handling of Covid-19 in the initial phase led many commentators to proclaim the superiority of China's political system. Gerhards and Zurn (2021) touted China as the winner in global competition between political systems declaring the superiority of China's "technocratic autocracy'. However, as China struggled to manage the crisis in later stages, it invited reevaluation of such claims.

State capacity has indeed been found to have a strong effect on improving development outcomes across regime types (Hanson, 2015). However state capacity and regime type in interaction seems to produce varied outcomes. Hanson (2015) based on empirical evidence from a time-series-cross-sectional dataset covering up to 153 countries during the 1965-2010 time period concludes that 'better developmental outcomes can result from either democracy or state capacity but the combination of high levels of both democracy and state capacity is not synergistic'. In other words, democracy and state capacity work as 'substitutes' rather than complements. However he contends, 'once accounting for state capacity, we find that democracy leads to better development'. There is now a widespread recognition that there exists considerable variation within authoritarian regimes. Different types of autocracies rely on different sections of society for support, have different kinds of decision-making procedures, choose leaders in various ways and respond to societal pressure in different manners. In their paper "Which dictators produce Quality of Government?", Charron and Lapuente (2011) investigate "how different forms of authoritarianism… build up their state apparatuses in characteristically different ways".

Asbald (2017) contends that compared to other autocracies, party based autocracies have stronger incentives to invest in the extractive capacity of the state (since they need revenue to distribute to a broad segment of the population), they have long time-horizons, and because of the highly institutionalized nature of the regimes, they avoid the fear, incompetence and bad information that

plagues many other dictatorships leading to hypothesize that compared to other types of autocracies, party-based regimes are associated with higher levels of fiscal capacity seen as a measure of state capacity.

Focusing on individualistic-collectivist dimension of culture Gorodnichenko and Roland (2015), argue that collectivist countries are more capable of solving collective action problems, such as mounting a coordinated response to a pandemic.

Analysing the relationship between political regimes and covid-19 deaths, Annaka (2021) based on statistical evidence demonstrates that authoritarian countries do not necessarily adopt more stringent measures to combat Covid but are likely to conduct more tests leading to lower death rates. The result implies that authoritarian states can strengthen citizens' support through testing and lowering casualties.

In a comparative study of China and Taiwan's constrasting responses during 2002–3 SARS outbreak, Schwartz (2012) attributed China's effective response to 'authoritarian advantage' constituted by centralized decision making powers, public support for government initiatives, and government ability to shape the tone of the crisis in the mass media. Concerned about and unnerved by a potential legitimation crisis for democracy, researchers however have urged democratic states to find ways to strengthen their state capacities (Schwartz 2012; Kavanagh and Singh 2020) and enhance social trust (Schwartz 2012). Interestingly, Covid-19 crisis witnessed reversed response from both the countries.

In a ground-breaking work Harrison (2023) points at the distinctive dimensions of state capacity and tackles secrecy-capacity trade-off under communist regimes. Though writing in the context of Soviet Union, the findings have wider relevance for single party authoritarian regimes. Harrison considers, productive capacity, durability and secrecy as important dimensions of State capacity within single party authoritarian regimes. Single party regimes are thought to be more durable than others (such as military and personal dictatorships) because they offer ways to institutionalize rent sharing, career advancement, and orderly succession, preventing intra-elite disputes from breaking out into violence'.

In an interesting finding, Harrison (2023) suggests how secrecy promotes state capacity till a certain threshold 'by providing minimal assurance of the power to take decisions without being manipulated by foreign and domestic adversaries'. However beyond a point, 'increasing secrecy continues to fortify the defenses of the ruling party, but it begins to work against the goals of state building because the costs of secrecy began to eat away the capacity of the state to do anything more than keep its own secrets and keep the ruling party in power' (p.53) As he further states, 'it is straightforward to see how secrecy might impede the state's capacity for error correction. Learning from mistakes and unintended consequences depends on two things—the free circulation of information and the sense that people are free to draw attention to policy failures—both inhibited by secrecy. A state that repeats mistakes because it cannot learn from them might eventually lose durability too' (Harrison, 2023)

'For the dictator, by contrast, secrecy is not a necessary evil but a good. Such a ruler should be willing to give away some state capacity so as to have more secrecy. Beyond X, where secrecy is beginning to erode state capacity, lies a point such as Z. Here the ruler willingly sacrifices some capabilities in order to conceal mistakes and wrongdoing, maintain a façade competence, and suppress criticism and opposition In the case of communist parties in power, it appears that they wanted two things: to secure their own regime, and to build a powerful state. At first sight, these two objectives looked fully compatible. Looking more closely, the notion of the secrecy/capacity

tradeoff drives a wedge between them. It suggests that secrecy promoted both regime security and state building up to a point. Beyond that point, increasing secrecy continued to fortify the defenses of the ruling party, but it began to work against the goals of state building. This was because the costs of secrecy began to eat away the capacity of the state to do anything more than keep its own secrets and keep the ruling party in power' (Harrison, p.53)

To simplify, according to Harrison, secrecy might be a policy (flexible and freely chosen), a culture (inherited and predetermined), or an institution (with elements of both). Empirical support for the idea that secrecy can be varied in response to changes in the context is found in the work of Egorov, Guriev and Sonin (2004). They note that, to retain power, authoritarian rulers need to control both society and their own bureaucracy. Control of the media helps them control society, but it also impedes control of the bureaucracy because bureaucrats become the main source of information. To cap it all, state capacity seems to acquire distinct dimensions depending on the regime setting which also shapes state-society relations. The next section analyzes China's response to covid-19 as a way to substantiate the key arguments laid out in the conceptual section.

II: China's Response to Covid-19

China's delay in responding to the covid-19 crisis has been attributed to its "fragmented authoritarianism" that prevented local state machinery to act swiftly without orders from the top leadership (Mei, 2020). However, there are others who question the thesis given Xi's recentralization of power and setting up of new governance structures like the National Supervisory Commission to oversee public health and education (Holbig, 2023). There were different aspects of state capacity that gained salience at different points of time while also working together in case of China. The section tries to unpack the same.

(i) Mobilizing State Capacity in 'Mission' Mode

At the initial stages when covid-19 virus was detected and spread in the city of Wuhan, reports have pointed how local, provincial and national authorities in China downplayed the severity of the virus and kept international health officials and scientists in the dark. However, after the initial period of keeping the onset of the disease with the potential of human-to-human transmission in wraps, China flung into action declaring the public health emergency as a 'people's war' spearheading what has been termed as "campaign-style crisis regime" (Jiang & Tang, 2021).

The Mission-mode governance mode involved not only using existing capacities of the state but also establishing new institutions and more importantly, incorporating different sectors of the society in winning the 'war against the virus'. Some have preferred to call it 'mobilizational capacity' of the state. Almost all of China's SOEs, Shiyedanwei, and quasi-government organizations (particularly, China Charity Federation and the Red Cross Society of China), were mobilized. Constructing 'campaign-style transboundary regime'-among governmental departments, within the political system, and across the boundaries of socio-economic sectors, involved using the political mechanisms of a campaign for crisis governance. It included three elements: the idea of a people's war, formal and informal institutional arrangements, and the interest alignment structure (Jiang & Tang, 2021).

Chen (2021) considers a campaign as a deployment of bureaucratic (state) capacity in achieving state performance. The invocation of nationalism allowed the Chinese party state to "bring latent state coercive and administrative capacities into full swing" as it dealt with the public health emergency in "national crisis mode" (Holbig, 2023). In fact, 'state of exception' allowed states worldwide, especially countries like China to intensify technologies of mass surveillance (what came to be called as 'coronoptican').

Using Hanson and Sigman (2013) framework of state capacity as a combination of coercive, extractive and administrative capacity, Holbig (2023) argues how China utilized its coercive capacity in the deployment of surveillance technologies *en masse* in a bid to curb the spread of the virus. China capitalised on its advanced capabilities in this arena in order to identify individuals who may be COVID-19 positive and enforce a quarantine. These measures included facial recognition, communication monitoring, drone technology, and smart policing. As part of its administrative capacities to monitor compliance and to cater to quarantined households, a so-called "grid management system" was revitalized, mobilizing party cells and community workers to provide households with food and daily necessities. The "national crisis mode" allowed the central authorities to mobilize massive human and material resources across the country, thereby strengthening the ability to produce and deliver public goods and to regulate industrial activity to complement public health responses to the pandemic within short time. The rapid activation of latent administrative capacities allowed the Chinese party- state to avoid some of the vulnerabilities resulting from structural bottlenecks such as lack of sufficient medical personnel, intensive care beds and other medical equipment that have brought public health systems in multiple countries, including in European democracies, to their knees (Holbig, 2023).

In its protracted fight against the virus, China came up with its approach of "zero-Covid-19 policy" that relied on mass testing and mass isolation centres, forbade dining in all restaurants, and closed kindergartens, schools and colleges. Chinese top leadership's insistence on continuation with the policy and reluctance to buy western vaccines vindicates the salience of regime type and the role of political leadership within it. For Xi, Zero-Covid policy symbolised 'China -model' which he was not prepared to forego. As the social and economic cost of China's stringent measures began to intensify reflected in children being separated from their parents and forced to quarantine in isolation centres, food shortages, denial of hospital treatment of chronic and terminal illnesses, Chinese leadership was forced to rethink continuation of the stringent measures. Suicides, mental health issues and other social problems were reported on Chinese social media. protests and online criticism defied the official picture.

China's abrupt decision to ease its "zero COVID" policy of strict government restrictions rapidly and radically in response to a nationwide wave of protests in November 2022 triggered an exponential spread of novel coronavirus infections driven by Omicron subvariant.

(ii) Information Control, Quantification and Propaganda

China's response during the Covid-19 crisis reveals not only suppression of information regarding the gravity of the crisis in the initial stages as it engulfed Wuhan given its potential of human-to-human transmission, but as the crisis unfolded and snowballed into a pandemic, it has also been engaged in manipulation of data. The Party state used its media infrastructure extensively to shape and propagate the narrative of its successful handling of the crisis. Early on, the Chinese leadership was publicly suspected to have put consistent pressure on the World Health Organization and its Director- General, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, not to disseminate information and recommendations that could be detrimental to China's image as major global power.

Holbig (2023) points out how-

'*According to tried and tested rules of the CCP's propaganda apparatus, epidemic events belong to the same set of classified information as natural disasters or terrorist attacks as all of them could lead to panicking reactions and thus endanger social stability and political legitimacy' The local actors – including professionals, cadres or journalists – are not allowed to openly report about public health emergencies on their own initiative. Rather, they are supposed to communicate via internal channels only and wait for official news, usually licensed at central level by Xinhua*

News Agency, to be published in unison by all state media. Reporting or discussing infection-related matters was not only discouraged but also heavily penalized.'

The most famous example is of Dr. Li Wenliang, the doctor who tried to raise the alarm but was forced to sign a confession admitting to "spreading false rumors" — and then, ultimately, died of the coronavirus. Authoritarian regimes have little incentive to share data with world at large is well documented. However, data and quantification have been very crucial to Party State's legitimacy among its people. Wallace (2022) argues how CCP's use of quantification as a tool plays an important role in generating compliance to its policies. Quantification helps on one hand in making the party state appear accountable, on the other hand, also helps communicate the merits of its policies through comparisons and easily understood yardsticks. Significantly, this also benefits the CCP elites who create the policies under evaluation, by reinforcing their 'success'. In the context of covid-19, not only did China under-report the casualties but relying on too narrow a definition of Covid deaths (limiting it to respiratory failure) allowed it to keep the official figure way below the actual deaths. In the later stages China even stopped publishing its Covid-19 case count. Through automated text analysis and a close examination of a sample of Facebook posts by English-language Chinese state media, Molter & Diresta (2020) observe how a significant share of coverage focused on positive stories, how narratives were adjusted retroactively (the most famous case of Dr. who was first penalized and then later celebrated), and use of ads to spread messaging. China's propaganda to showcase a certain image has been touted as 'Information authoritarianism in China' (Ding & Lin, 2021).

China's response to covid-19 has also been analysed through the framework of "co-production" and collaboration between citizens and state. Zhau and Wu (2020) identified three channels of citizen-government collaboration-residential committies, government organized NGOs and Self-organizations. The relative success of voluntary organizations in curbing the spread of virus has been attributed to 'information disclosure' by the party state to enhance citizen compliance and cooperation (Wu, Xiao and Yang, 2021). However, one cannot deny that information disclosure by the party state was selective and was circumscribed when it impinged on the legitimacy of the party state.

(iii)Micro-managing the Social: Combining Grid Management with Digital Governance
China has been at the forefront in deploying technology for information gathering. Like Social Credit, Grid management, which entails dividing communities into small units and equipping them with information and surveillance technology complements other components of the Chinese surveillance state (Pei, 2021). Grid management was highly effective in helping the Chinese government enforce restrictive measures to contain the outbreak of the pandemic by enforcing pervasive surveillance of residents grouped into small geographical areas (grids). As part of the broader administrative system, grid members both monitord the grass roots while at the same time providing services to them.

The aim of grid-based management in the epidemic was to build a "seamless government" management mode of "horizontal to the edge, vertical to the end". Vertically, it accelerated the flow of power, resources and information, and improved the efficiency of epidemic response. Horizontally, the idea was to break the boundaries of departments, levels and functions, so that government departments can form a joint force to formulate and implement epidemic prevention policies (Xiang, 2021).

Grid-based management uses digital technology to break the disadvantages of traditional government departments' segmentation and vague rights and responsibilities, break through the "information island", build a regional epidemic management and service platform, strengthen the

horizontal connection of relevant government departments, and they can update and share epidemic data, so as to quickly form a joint force of departments and maximize the allocation of medicalsSanitation, transportation, municipal and other resources to effectively implement relevant anti-epidemic measures.

Grid governance is achieved mainly through three mechanisms: intelligence gathering, case coordination and real-time reporting for stability maintenance. Scholars have argued that while grid governance provides an important infrastructural power for intelligence gathering, the realization of this power could be hindered by contradictory logics among different levels of government.
Samantha Hoffman (2017) contends that the 'modern grid management is an early attempt at an automated version of the commune and danwei systems' which 'has enabled the organization of data to generate better situational awareness and predictive capacity, as well as enhanced tracking and monitoring of individuals'. The binary and utilitarian 'Mass Line' which is effectively implemented under the 'gridded management' system facilitates and strengthens the Party's control and power in Chinese society.

The 'gridded management system' is officially claimed as an 'innovative governance model' embodying the idea of co-governance (*gongzhi*) and assuming the role of grassroots self-management and autonomous governance. As shown in the official slogan of 'dissolving small disputes within the grid and big conflicts within the community' (*xiaoshi buchu wangge, dashi buchu shequ*), the proclaimed goal of the gridded management system has been to 'preserve social stability via dissolving disputes at the local community level.' The goal is reached mainly through ever progressing surveillance that can 'detect and monitor and handle threats.' As noted by Feng Chen and Yi Kang, this pivotal capacity of acute perception relies on local or grassroots' governments' collection and analysis of existing and potential social contention and early warning mechanisms, which is expected to be well carried out through the 'gridded management' system. By and large, the 'gridded management' system is based on, or built inside *shequ* and divides neighborhoods in each *shequ* into individual grids (normally 10,000 square meters or 200–300 households per grid), where hired or volunteered 'grid managers' (*wangge yuan*) are responsible for a certain number of households in their assigned grids and this 'monitoring and reporting' mechanism by the grid managers is linked with a digital management system. The specific responsibilities of the grid managers vary slightly in different regions, while overall they involve collecting information and providing almost all kinds of services ranging from relaying government policies, assisting in combating crimes, mediating neighborhood disputes to even repairing sewers and dealing with unauthorized stalls. In a nutshell, as proclaimed by the authorities, under the 'gridded management' system, there are 'round-the-clock personnel in charge, coordinated actions from all parties and fully covered inspection' with a view to managing, handling and following up with everything (*shi shi youren guan, jian jian you genjin).*

Relying on the 'gridded management' system, under the official slogan of 'winning the People's War against the epidemic,' a Maoist-styled mass movement had been effectively mobilized. Hundreds of thousands of volunteers joined the community workers to carry out the various policies and measures ranging from conducting a blanket screening of migrants and people backing from other regions, taking temperatures, logging residents' movements, monitoring quarantines, tracing infections and close contacts to purchasing and delivering food, sending people to the hospital, buying masks, and psychological counselling.

China utilized its advanced technological capacities ranging from AI, Cloud computing, Big Data for surveillance detection and monitoring. There is a history to China's advanced digital state capacity. China's development of technological capacities has been helped by strong state capacity

and leadership (Zhou, 2022). A mobile application called 'health code' has been introduced by internet giants Tencent and Alibaba to track users' movements in order to monitor individuals. Tencent launched the Health Code (*jiankang ma)* based on China's most popular phone payment App- Alipay first in Shenzhen in early February and soon across the country which used the colors of green, yellow and red to demonstrate in real time whether an individual posed a contagion risk based on the health condition, places where she/he is based and had visited before taking public transportation, entering malls, supermarkets or restaurants and so forth. It was encapsulated in the 'green code, travel freely, red or yellow, report immediately.' Digital infrastructure enhanced china's state capacity to handle the crisis exponentially.

As noted earlier, the 'grid-management' model was not an innovation during the pandemic crisis but was experimented as early as 2004. It can be traced back to two pilot projects in Beijing's Dongcheng District and Zhejiang's Zhoushan City in 2004 and 2007, respectively. The hallmark of Beijing's new system was the vertical and horizontal integration of administration. Throughout the entire time, the grid system was understood as a hybrid system that enabled the party-state to both control and service the grass roots. Like nearly all major policies, implementation of grid management was left to the provincial authorities, who enjoyed considerable freedom in the design and roll-out of this new mechanism of social control.

Grid management considerably augmented the powers of sub-districts and neighbourhood committees while also tightening control over them. Subdistricts, or jiedao, are the lowest level of urban government in the formal administrative hierarchy. The Party-state's penetration into urban society does not stop at the subdistrict level. Beneath the subdistrict level are urban neighborhood resident committees (*shequ jumin weiyuanhui*)— often referred to simply as neighborhood organizations (*shequ*). These are the urban equivalent of rural villages. Like subdistricts, neighborhood organizations as an administrative concept did not emerge until the post-Mao era in response to the dissolution of the work unit (danwei) system. The residential committees in Chinese communities are legally autonomous grassroots organizations, but also serve as a governmental liaison to connect residents in the communities (Xu, 2007) In the pandemic crisis, residential committees within communities served as an effective mechanism to connect state mobilization and citizen compliance as they became the driving force to enforce the policies to stop the spread of the virus.

Originating from computing language, grids use mapping and geo-coding technology to gather information on the urban landscape, including events and urban elements such as public utilities. This information is then locally centralized and shared with government agencies which dispatch teams to resolve problems. While grids were first piloted in 2004 to improve grass-roots management, their value for social control and service provision only became fully evident during the coronavirus pandemic when high levels of accurate tracking and information were required.
The grid system envisions a dual role for grid members. They are both responsible to the state and the party, as well as being rooted in the locality. This has two implications. First, contractually bound to the hierarchical management system, they are agents of the party-state. Ezra Vogel noted long ago that bureaucrats 'are not expected to be politically neutral; even if they are not party members they are expected to be devoted to the Communist cause and to specific policies as well'. Likewise, grid members are expected to implement local policies and participate in party activities such as anti-crime campaigns. At the same time, the casualized working relationship guarantees that they are compliant with the requirements regulating their position. This top–down approach therefore severely diminishes the role of the people in governance. Here, the masses are to be administered and guided rather than enabled to resolve their own problems. Second, the grid system nominally positions grid members as being of the people and for the people. The focus on recruiting locals therefore strikes a balance between allegiance to the hierarchy and locals and

between social control and service provision. The recruitment process sets up and reinforces the functions that grid members have to fulfil as part of a top–down contractual bureaucracy (Mittlesaidt, 2022)

According to MIttledaidt the functions of grid members further position the grid system as a top–down management mechanism rather than fostering mass participation, and social stability rather than service provision. Working under a contract, grid members gather the data necessary to categorize objects, organizations, incidents, and people. Information is centralized at the street level and shared horizontally with functional departments and vertically with higher levels of administration. The role of the grid member as an agent of the bureaucracy is manifested through recruitment standards, tasks, and assessment standards.
In the scholarly literature, chinese bureaucray has been touted as "Cadre-based model" or 'Mission type of public administration' (Rothstein, 2015) as against Weberian model of bureaucracy. Delegation of power by the central authority, an upward accountability system and an emphasis on political loyalty have been identified as the defining characteristics of bureaucracy in China (Bardhan,2020). Grid management allowed the Party State to expand the bureaucratic mode to neighbourhood committes with the party regime taking note and addressing the principal-agent problem while also shaping state-society relations.

III: Conclusion: Grid Management and State Capacity in China

There are historical roots to China's state capacity (Zhou, 2022). Undeniably CCP has been providing 'organizational capacity' and the role of leadership in China has been stronger. This has allowed and prompted China to build technological and mobilizational capacity facilitating Grid Management System which in turn has further strengthened state capacity. Quite clearly, the relationship between state capacity and grid management is a mutually reinforcing one in China. China developed the grid due to state capacity and then the grid helped to build more state capacity. Mittlestandet (2022) sees Grid management as an 'embodiment of state-society relations' as retaining a managerial approach while collapsing service provision into security.
More precisely, grid management signifies extension of bureaucratic capacity of the Party State to include neighbourhood committees as official arms of the state. Bureaucratic capacity shapes the pattern of state-society interaction. There happens to be an inverse relationship between bureaucratic capacity and state coerciveness in China (Huang and Yang, 2002). Strong bureaucratic capacity allows the Chinese state to mobilise sections of the society in line with its directives diminishing the need to use outright coercion. By incorporating neighbourhood committees and sub-districts within the ambit of local state capacity, not only did China enhanced its capacity of surveillance but the central government's incorporation of neighborhood organizations into its bureaucratic framework led to a fundamental expansion of the Party-state's local control capacities.
Prior to the pandemic there was no clear central position in favor of delegating law enforcement authority to subdistricts and no clear commitment to use neighbourhood organizations as social control entities fearing major 'principal-agent problem' that it might unleash (An and Zhang, 2023). The pandemic however made neighbourhood level coercive control necessary necessitating a series of sociopolitical and institutional controls to incorporate them. Directives on expanding capacity came hand-in-hand with directives on enhancing top down control through personnel management reforms. In contrast to other countries, the administrative expansion in China seems to be permanent as evident in 'health code switching' instances reported recently to stifle dissent (Thorntern, 2023). An and Zhang (2023) in what they have called 'pandemic state-building', attribute this near permanent expansion of administrative capacity of the Chinese State to the groundwork of institutional reforms that happened prior to the onset of Covid-19 and in course of it that allowed the Party State to delegate authority to both subdistricts and neighbourhood organizations during Covid.

This paper however while concurs with the fact that high state capacity in the form of technology and institutional reforms allowed the Party state to build grid management system but differs from An and Zhang (2023) in emphasizing the specificity of Regime type- as a Communist Party State – that has added distinct dimensions to state capacity in China. Regime Type has shaped and mediated how and in what ways state capacity is utilized. China's handling of Covid-19 reveal how in the initial stages of the crisis China resorted to secrecy but became more cautious of its adverse impact on state capacity ('secrecy-capacity trade-off') as the crisis intensified. The institutional reforms that added to its productive capacity came in handy in China's handling of covid emanated from 'durability' aspect of state capacity in China. To cap it all, state capacity is an interactive process - a product of institutions governing relations between the state, mass publics, and bureaucrats that may vary.

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Historical Resolutions as an Institution in the CPC:Understanding the Third Historical Resolution

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Abstract:
Since its inception in 1921, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has adopted three Historical Resolutions so far. While their contents are marked by the distinctness of the eras they were adopted in, commonalities also exist in the resolutions and in the intent behind their adoption. The first Historical Resolution closely followed the Yan'an Rectification where "erroneous ideas", "left errors" and "right errors" in politics, military, organization, and ideology were analysed and corrected in the party under the leadership of Mao Zedong, bringing consistency in understanding basic issues of the Chinese revolution within the party. The second Resolution assessed the "grave blunder" of the Cultural Revolution drawing a clear distinction between right and wrong erroneous "leftist" and "rightist" viewpoints existing at that time. The party then moved away from the hallmarks of the Mao era such as class struggle and personality cult towards the cause of reform and opening up in accordance with new realities and development requirements. The third Historical Resolution was adopted at the historic juncture when the party has completed 100 years, achieved its first centennial goal, and is charting a course to achieve the second centennial goal in an international situation that is becoming increasingly complex for China. Unlike the first two Resolutions that attempt to resolve "certain questions", the third one focuses more on achievements and historical experiences. This paper attempts to ascertain and analyse the institutional value of the Historical Resolutions in the CPC. It will first delve into

understanding the defining characteristics of these historical resolutions which include building consensus, adopting unified thinking, and consolidating the position of the party leader. It then seeks to explore and explain that all the Historical Resolutions carry an external dimension, which appears to be the strongest in the Third Historical Resolution with its strong emphasis on the "New Era" that can be seen as China's response to external complexities. In essence, this paper underscores the role of Historical Resolutions as CPC's strong commitment to addressing evolving challenges and attaining its objectives

INTRODUCTION

Mao Zedong once said, "We will not be able to achieve greater success unless we have a clear understanding of our history and of the roads we have travelled."(*xue er shixi*, 2021) Reflectingthis understanding and importance of history, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has adoptedthree Historical Resolutions since its inception in 1921, which clarify the history of the party and provide the "correct" way of looking at and assessing history. Inside China, historical Resolutions have been seen as documents occupying an important position in the party's theoretical innovation. These Resolutions were adopted at crucial historical junctures, carryinghistorical significance and epochal value in "unifying the party ideology and promoting the creation of future." (*Wang*, 2022)

History may be seen as an instrument to drive and justify policies. Indicating the high importance that the CPC attaches to history, it has been paying increasingly more attention to history in recent years which is apparent from its focus on "Historical Nihilism", "a phrase used in China to express doubt and scepticism over the CPC's description of past events."(Economic and Political Weekly, 2022) The CPC also attaches importance to the periodization of its history as is visible in the Historical Resolutions. Such as the periodizationof the First Great Revolution, the Agrarian Revolution, and the War of Resistance Against Japanin the First Historical Resolution; Seven years of basic completion of the socialist transformation (1949-1956), Ten years of initially building socialism in all spheres (1956- 1966), and so on in the Second Historical Resolution and similarly in the Third Historical Resolution as well. The periodization makes it easier to identify and understand what were/arethe characteristics of that era and to assess how correct were the guidelines and basic policies followed by the party in that particular historical period.

Historical Resolutions have been studied by scholars both inside and outside China. However,the majority of the literature on this topic comes from inside China. Apart from the academia,the Chinese state media has also paid a lot of attention to the Historical Resolutions through articles and commentaries in the leading newspapers and party journals.

Available literature in China on this subject describes these Historical Resolutions as documents that, while explaining the party history and the trajectory of the revolutionary communist movement in China, provide the party's guiding role for the future. Some in Chinaeven term these the "most important and authoritative historical documents since the foundingof the party".(*Peng*, 2021) Some scholars are also of the view that the three Historical Resolutions "condense the collective wisdom of the whole party, lay a solid foundation for unifying the thinking of the whole party and building the core of the party's leadership, point out the further development direction of the party and the country's goals, and contribute to therealization of Marxism."(*Yuanjie*, 2022) While others have argued that the three Resolutions have gathered the collective wisdom of the CPC Central Committee and the entire party in order to ensure that the party's revolutionary cause is advancing along the correct path."(*FangQian*, 2022) These scholars also believe that the "Historical Resolutions are basically the product of major historical changes." (*Zhang Wen*, 2022)

As it is evident, CPC's Historical Resolutions have been widely discussed by scholars from many different aspects such as its effect on the party's cause, leadership and growth trajectoryof the country. Now with the adoption of the third such Historical Resolution, it appears to holdan institutional importance in the CPC. While commonalities exist in the resolutions and in theintent behind their adoption, their contents are also marked by the distinctness of the eras theywere adopted in. With the adoption of the Third Historical Resolution, it is worth exploring what these resolutions stand for and what are the hallmarks of these resolutions when viewed collectively.

INSTITUTIONAL VALUE OF THE HISTORICAL RESOLUTIONS

Unifying the thinking in the party through authoritatively appraising the past The First Historical Resolution "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party"
《关于若干历史问题的决议》 was adopted on April 20, 1945, by the enlarged Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 1945b) Adopted under the leadership of Mao, it closely followed the Yan'an Rectification where "erroneous ideas", "left errors" and "right errors" in politics, military, organization, and ideology were analysed and corrected by the party.It also answered important questions about the revolution that united the party and brought
about consistency in understanding basic issues of the Chinese revolution within the party. It criticizes leaders such as Chen Duxiu, Lo Chang-lung, Li Lisan and declares them as counter-revolutionaries or Trotskyists. It pronounces Wang Ming guilty of committing both left and right errors. Furthermore, it criticizes Zhang Guotao for trying to split the party and betrayingit. Overall, it gives an elaborate description of what went wrong and what was done right in thetwenty-four-year history of the CPC.

The First Historical Resolution, not only criticized "counterrevolutionary" CPC leaders and some of their actions but also further strengthened Mao's leadership and enabled Mao to authoritatively carry out an appraisal of historical errors. Thus, paving the way for Mao to increase his authority and enhance his acceptance within the party in taking the revolution forward without relying on the CPSU line. The Resolution clearly gives a verdict on certain actions and decisions and labels them as "Right Chen Duxiuism" and "Left Putschism" thus giving a verdict on past events. These verdicts still stand authoritatively in the official party history narrative. Within the Chinese academia, there

is a recognition that “The 'left' or 'right' mistakes made by the CPC in dealing with the Chinese revolution were largely the result of copying the instructions of the Communist International” and “the party needed an undisputedpolitical leader of its own, with its own unified thinking.” (*Liu Huadong* et al., 2021) This undisputed political leader turned out to be Mao, who authoritatively differentiated “right” from “wrong” in the First Historical Resolution. The most prominent example includes the assessment of Chen Duxiu, his actions and the party line around the time of Shanghai Massacrein 1927.

By the time the First Resolution was passed, it was already clear that Japan will soon be defeated in the Second Sino-Japanese War and that the CPC had a great chance of emerging victorious in its revolution. Four years after the First Historical Resolution was passed, the CPCemerged victorious in its New Democratic Revolution. However, the First Resolution also came at a time after the Third International (Comintern) was dissolved and the CPC-led revolution was increasingly falling under the leadership of Mao. This was reflected in the PartyConstitution adopted in 1945 which mentions Mao Zedong Thought as a guiding ideology.(Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 1945a) The Party Constitutionwas adopted 2 months after the adoption of the First Historical Resolution. The inclusion of Mao Zedong Thought in the Party Constitution marked a deviation from the CPSU line and shifted focus on taking the revolutionary trajectory forward with a unified thinking on the basisof the CPC’s understanding and the local conditions.

The second resolution titled “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party sincethe Founding of the People’s Republic of China” 《关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议》 was adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on June 27, 1981. (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 1981) It primarily deals with the 32 years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China with mistakes of the party, especially mistakes by Mao Zedong as its highlight. It notes that The Great Leap Forward (GLP), the rural people’s communes, and The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) negatively affected the people and the country. It notesthat “the Great Leap Forward and the movement for rural people’s communes were initiated without careful investigation and study and without prior experimentation.”(CentralCommittee of the Communist Party of China, 1981)

On the Cultural Revolution (CR), the Resolution evaluates Mao Zedong in a critical manner. It highlights the grave errors and negative consequences of the CR that was initiated and led by Mao Zedong. It argues that Mao'sprincipal theses for initiating the CR were entirely erroneous and inconsistent with Marxism, Leninism, and the reality of China. The text criticizes Mao's definition of the CR as a struggleagainst the revisionist line or the capitalist road, stating that it led to the confusion of right andwrong on the one hand, and the negation of Marxist and socialist principles on the other hand.It also accuses Mao of launching the CR without proper reliance on party organizations and the masses, leading to chaos, the paralysis of party organs, and the rejection of capable intellectualsand the masses. The text asserts that the CR did not bring about any revolution or social progress but rather caused disorder, damage, and retrogression. In doing so, the Second Resolution just like the First Resolution gives an authoritative verdict on the past events and provides a unified thinking to the party on how to look at the past.

It is important to recall, CPC under Mao had viewed Soviet Union’s peaceful coexistence withthe Western bloc as capitulation and revisionism whereas the CPSU saw it as in the mutual interest of

both systems. (Marxists.org, n.d.) This was one of the factors that led to the Sino- Soviet split. However, to meet the needs of modernization underscored in the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee which was to set China on the course of nationwide economic reforms, China needed favourable external conditions for its modernization and economic reforms. It also needed close economic, political and cultural relations with the outside world owing to its modernization needs for necessary funds, technology and overseas markets. (*Niu Jun*, 2023) Against this backdrop, there was a push for the acceleration of negotiations on the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations in the second half of 1978. Some Chinese scholars believe that between the U.S. and China, the push to normalize relations cameprimarily from China. (*Da Wei*, 2019)

"The completion of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States not only played a role in the existing international situation, but also played a decisive role in the profound adjustment of China's domestic development strategy." (*Da Wei*, 2019) The two major events of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States and reform and opening up happened in quick succession. It is in this context that it becomes important to view the external dimension of the Second Historical Resolution.Adopted two years after the establishment of Sino-U.S. relations and during the ongoing tide of reform and opening up in China, it played the role of an authoritative testament that China was ready to move away from the hallmarks of the Mao era such as class struggle, focus on economic development, pursue domestic reforms, and open up to the outside world. It also laidthe groundwork to carry out reform and opening up in full swing and in ensuring that the cooperation with the West, especially the U.S. is not viewed as capitulation inside China as Mao viewed vis a vis the CPSU. In a broader context, the Second Resolution was not only a pivotal document in terms of its content but also came at a pivotal time and unified the thinkinginside the party. Scholars have noted that just a year before the Second Resolution, "in a speechto a conference of 10,000 cadres in Beijing on 16 January, Deng Xiaoping explicitly recognized that both the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution had weakened the party's generalsupport because of their impact on the population's standard of living. For Deng that 'crisis' had to be rectified by economic growth and a return to the 'conventional ways of doing things'."(Goodman, 1981) After the establishment of diplomatic relations, Deng Xiaoping said"We believe that the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations will allow the United States to use advanced things to help us realize the Four Modernizations and create more favorable conditions."(*Da Wei*, 2019)

Unlike in the title of the first two Resolutions, where it clearly mentions "resolutions on certainquestions…", the Third Resolution is not worded in the same manner and focuses more on achievements and historical experiences of the party. The first two Resolutions came after a period where fault lines appeared in the party and these Resolutions corrected "erroneous" linesovercoming ideological conflicts and subsequently heralding China in a new direction. However, the Third Resolution does not address any such ideological conflicts. But it still mentions that the preceding period (Pre-New Era) was mired with various issues reflected in the eight out of thirteen areas of governance mentioned in the resolution. Thereby giving a verdict on the past events that it was not governed in the best of manner.

Consolidating the Party Leader's Position

The First Historical Resolution is considered to be of great epoch-making significance in the history of the party. Chinese scholars have pointed out that "it is the first political resolution onhistorical questions in the history of the Communist Party of China. It was an answer to how to correctly understand and treat Marxism on the basis of inspecting problems, clarifying rightand wrong, and analysing the root causes of errors deeply. It proved the rationality and historical inevitability of Mao Zedong Thought as the party's working policy by practice and hard facts, and made the whole party recognize and practice Mao Zedong Thought. It created a new stage of Marxism."(*He Fenqing*, 2021) The Resolution repeatedly affirms Mao Zedongrole in advancing the party's revolutionary cause in the correct way and credits him for creatively applying the scientific theory of Marxism-Leninism to China which was a semi feudal semi colonial society at that time. Thus, helping Mao who was already a tall leader in the party at time, further consolidate his position. The Party Constitution that mentions Mao Zedong Thought as a guiding ideology.(Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,1945a) was adopted 2 months after the adoption of the First Historical Resolution.

The Second Resolution also helps consolidate Deng's position within the party by affirming decisions taken in the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Party which was held under Deng's paramount leadership. It notes that a turning point came with thePlenary Session in December 1978. Following the session, there was a renewed emphasis on emancipating the mind and seeking truth from facts. The party worked to combat bourgeois ideology and eradicate the influence of feudalism. Economic reforms were implemented, including readjustments, restructuring, and improving the economy. Agriculture and rural workwere given attention, leading to increased grain output and improved living standards. The concluding part of the Second Resolution emphasizes its objective of transforming China intoa powerful socialist country with modern agriculture, industry, national defence, science and technology.

The timing of the Third Resolution is pivotal not only because the party celebrated its 100th anniversary in the same year (i.e. 2021), but also because a long-term confrontation with the U.S. has been in the offing which will likely sustain for a long time to come. In the Third Historical Resolution, the section dedicated to "A New Era of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" occupies twice the space as the three previous eras combined: The New Democratic Revolution, Socialist Revolution and Construction, and Reform and Opening Up.This section elaborates on the "New Era of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" divided into 13 areas and further analyses the conditions, risks, and challenges faced by the party in theNew Era. This basically reflects that the New Era under Xi is being emphasized more stronglyin the resolution thereby consolidating the position of Xi. Furthermore, Xi is only the third General Secretary of the CPC under whom a Historical Resolution has been adopted that too before starting his unprecedented third term. Outside China, the Third Resolution has been mostly seen as a way to help Xi cement his position and ambition to stay in power for a third term. (Tan, 2021) (Sun, 2022)

THE THIRD HISTORICAL RESOLUTION: UNDERSTANDING ITS EXTERNAL DIMENSION

The Third Historical Resolution titled "Resolution of the Central Committee of the CommunistParty of China on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the PastCentury" 《中共中央关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议》was adopted at theSixth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee. (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2021)

It comes at a historic juncture when the party has completed 100 years, achieved its first centennial goal, and is charting a course to achieve the second centennial goalin an international situation that is becoming increasingly complex for China.

As noted earlier, in the Third Historical Resolution, the section dedicated to "A New Era of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" occupies twice the space as the three previous eras combined. In the discourse within China, scholars have noted the importance of the New Era in the Third Resolution. They have pointed out that the systematic summarization with a focuson the New Era can also prove to be a valuable asset for opening up a new path to Chinese- style modernization and realizing national rejuvenation. (*Zhang Ying* et al., 2022) The Third Resolution has been seen as a manifesto that sums up the party's centennial history of struggleto strengthen its faith, innovate and win new victories in the New Era and new journey. Scholarsin China have noted that while the domestic and international vision of the Third Historical Resolution is broader than that of the first two Resolutions, the fundamental purpose of the Third Historical Resolution is to draw forging strength and historical experience for the New Era and new journey. (*Lin Daibiao*, 2022) (*Yuan Jie*, 2022)

It is in this light the Third Resolution becomes important to be looked at through an external dimension. It is evident that the New Era is the defining arch over the canvas of the Third Historical Resolution. The Resolution outlines 13 areas that define the New Era including national security and the diplomatic front, national reunification, and national defence. It appears that the external dimension of the New Era concept is built on the premise that both China and the U.S. have crossed the Rubicon and entered a phase of long-term confrontation. Chinese scholars have noted that "In the New Era of Sino-U.S. relations, competition betweenthe two sides in the four fields of geopolitics, ideology, economy and humanities, and global governance will tend to intensify, while cooperation will tend to weaken, resulting in an overallfierce Sino-U.S. strategic competition."(*Liu Jianfei*, 2021) The New Era concept could be understood as a means to consolidate the CPC's rule in the wake of external challenges. Hence,the Third Resolution enables the CPC to recognize the external threat and prepare to face the threat with unified thinking. The New Era concept also establishes a new historical starting point that is defined by the current situation and needs of the party.

The New Era discourse picked up pace after Xi Jinping took charge as the General Secretary in 2012, while "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era"was formally added to the CPC constitution in 2017. (*Yan Xiaofeng*, 2017) In the report presented by Xi in the 19th Party Congress, while explaining what the New Era means, Xi statedthat "It will be an era of securing a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous societyin all respects, and of moving on to all-out efforts to build a great modern socialist country. It will be an era that sees China moving closer to centre stage and making greater contributions to mankind."(*Xi Jinping*, 2017)

It is increasingly evident that the U.S. and Western countries are firmly determined to containing China's rise. The last G7 summit in Hiroshima, along with the involvement of keyleaders from the Global South, emphasized their intention to counter China's influence.(Roubini, 2022) The escalating tech and economic war between the West and China, The Taiwan Policy Act, the U.S. government chip and semiconductor embargo, and the U.S. National Security Strategy reflect that the West's commitment to contain China's rise is now more apparent than ever.

Xi in his recent speeches has also directly named the U.S. stating "Western countries led by the U.S. have implemented all-round containment, encirclement and suppression against us, bringing unprecedentedly severe challenges to our country's development."(Reference News Network, 2023) He recently also gave the rare call to CPC officials to be ready to deal with "worst-case and most extreme scenarios" as national securityissues facing China were "considerably more complex and much more difficult."(ChinaNational Radio Network, 2023). The Third Resolution has been widely studied inside China. Many have noted that the Third Resolution has not only the theme of realizing the "great rejuvenation of China" in it but is alsoa declaration to the world that China has ushered in a great leap from "standing up", and "becoming rich" to "becoming strong".(*Wang Jianxin*, 2022)

Scholars have argued that "Xi Jinping's New Era is defined by the economy in command paving the way for the politics in command as challenges continue to mount for China on boththe domestic and international fronts." (Deepak, 2023) Many also argue that at the core of theNew Era is a change in the principal contradiction. By correctly identifying the current contradiction, the CPC will be able to adapt to the changing reality of society and thereby further the socialist cause. While others have opined that the New Era "appears to be crafted tocreate a compelling foundation for strong leadership centred around Xi. By emphasizing that unprecedented times and challenges besiege China both internally and externally, Xi is makinga case for extraordinary measures." (Kumar, 2022)

This view has been affirmed by various international media that state "The *New Era* – connoting a fundamental historical shift – has been systematically fused with the persona of Xiin Chinese official discourse. This process began in earnest with the 19th Party Congress in 2017 and Xi's keynote speech, in which a *New Era* was mentioned 46 times. Since then, the *New Era* has been retroactively applied in official statements to refer to the period following the 18th Party Congress in 2012, equating the *New Era* to all of Xi Jinping's tenure as generalsecretary of the CCP."(Jones, 2022)

It can be seen that the three Historical Resolutions fulfilled different purposes but all of them had a mix of internal and external elements in them albeit in different degrees. The First Historical Resolution was used by Mao to overcome the ideological contradictions in the partytowards determining the correct party line. It focused on internal contradictions but was also aclarion call of the CPC's revolution not relying on the CPSU line which reflects an external factor in the Resolution. The Second Historical Resolution had a strong focus on settling ideological issues and contradictions but at the same time, it was also used to bring out the ambitions of the CPC which now focused more on modernization while seeking a favourable external environment. Whereas the Third Historical Resolution's timing and a strong focus onthe discourse of the New Era show that it was adopted not to address a major internal ideological rift – as was the case in the adoption of previous two Resolutions. Instead, to focusmore on unifying the party behind the New Era thinking while entering a period that is likely to be marked by challenges due to various factors such as a long-term confrontation with the U.S. posing serious challenges to China's development and achieving national rejuvenation.

In the wake of an increasingly complex international situation, China faces many points of resistance in achieving its goals. The sharpening competition with the U.S. in many sectors poses a major impediment in its attempt to catch up with the most technologically advanced countries in the world. Now, the biggest challenge that China faces in the New Era is maintaining growth when the U.S. is

becoming hostile towards China. Economic, military, andtechnological competition with the U.S. in today's time appears to be at its highest than it has ever been.

In similar light, some scholars (Mittelstaedt, 2017) have also described that the New Era concept provides an ontological foundation and a terminological starting point for Chinese polity. "Having been written into the CCP constitution, the New Era ideology has far-reaching implications for China's mode of governance, economy, society, and foreign policy." He furtherstates that "the term *New Era* is a linguistic device intended to provide a common terminological starting point. Policy-makers, local governments, social groups, and individualsare already reimagining this plan and deploying its language to frame and legitimate their pastand future actions. New Era terms are already being used to restructure the party's history."

The international media views Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era as a "blueprint for consolidating and strengthening power at three levels: the nation, the party and Mr. Xi himself".(Buckley, 2018)

It is apparent that the second centennial goal and national rejuvenation are what China aims to achieve. The New Era thinking is what may guide China to achieve it. The first two Resolutionsguided China in the respective periods following their adoption, similarly, the New Era thinkinglaid down in the Third Resolution will guide China to achieve the second centennial goal and national rejuvenation. However, in the wake of an increasingly complex international situationfor China, it faces many points of resistance in achieving its goals.

IN CONCLUSION

In essence, Historical Resolutions appear to represents a significant institutional practice withinthe party. They provide ideological and theoretical clarity to the party members about past andcurrent issues, and evaluation of historical events which unifies their thinking and guides themfor the future. Historical Resolutions act as a galvanizing force in unifying the whole party andin essence reflects the goal of "moving forward through reflection."(*Huang Daoxuan*, 2021) Although the three Historical Resolutions were adopted in different and distinct periods, they have common elements. Historical resolutions help the party in building consensus, adoptinga unified thinking thereby equipping itself for the upcoming tasks and challenges.

The First Historical Resolution played a crucial role in unifying the party's ideological thinkingand consolidating Mao Zedong's leadership. It provided a verdict on past events, labelling certain actions as erroneous and certain leaders as counter-revolutionaries. Most importantly, it also marked a shift away from relying on the CPSU line and laid the foundation for Mao's authority within the party. The contents of Second Historical Resolution focused on evaluatingthe mistakes made during Mao Zedong's leadership, particularly during the Great LeapForward and the Cultural Revolution. It emphasized the need to prioritize economic development and open up to the outside world, and played a crucial role in courting a favourable external environment.

The Third Historical Resolution reflects the importance of the "New Era" in the party's discourse, underlining China's achievements and challenges. It comes at a time when China faces increasing external complexities, particularly in its relationship with the United States. To face the challenges,

the CPC needs firm united struggle, and a strong leadership under the core leader. Hence, this resolution consolidates Xi Jinping's leadership and emphasizes the needto confront external challenges while pursuing China's development goals. Notably, all the three historical resolutions have an external dimension to it and it appears to be the strongest in the third resolution. It underscores the significance of the "New Era" concept and China's response to an evolving international landscape, emphasizing the party's commitment to achieving its centennial goals and national rejuvenation despite growing external challenges.

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Mao’s China and the first School Textbook Controversy in Contemporary India, circa 1949-1959

Shaan Kashyap

ABSTRACT

The global histories on Maoism have hardly investigated the existence of the ideology in school textbooks. Setting aside a few examples like Timothy Cheek that offers a comparison on World

History textbooks, there are no studies in Textbook and Curriculum Studies that have captured and contextualized Maoism as a trope of world history, or political ideology in school textbooks. Investigations on Mao Zedong (1893-1976) and Maoism are usually restricted to textbook controversies, and commentaries that follow periodic textbook revisions by Chinese Communist Party (CCP). CCP's Central Committee Party History and Literature Research Institute publication Brief History of the Communist Party of China has occasionally came under the scholarly scrutiny of Ian Johnson and Rana Mitter. Moreover, these discussions are usually confined to significant campaigns of Mao era, including, Anti-rightist campaign (1957), The Great Leap Forward (1958-62) and The Cultural Revolution (1966-1977). Addressing the lacuna of not engaging with school textbook contents as far as Maoism is concerned, this paper attends to a lesser-known history of first textbook controversy in contemporary India, which squarely associates itself to Maoism.

In the Indian state of Kerala, Communist Party of India (CPI) formed the first-ever democratically elected Communist government in 1957, with EMS Namboodiripad (1909-1998) as the Chief Minister. CPI's radical socio-economic policies led to an anti-Communist backlash called Vimochana Samaram, especially after the Communists set out to withdraw existing school textbooks and replaced them with new ones. This development set out a national controversy with the deep involvement of the Jawaharlal Nehru-led Union Government. The figure of Mao Zedong and myriad representations of Maoism is central to this textbook controversy. The controversy has not been recorded in larger political history of the nation so far because of its brief life, since the CPI government was constitutionally dismissed by the Government of India within a year of its election.

These developments lead us to certain key questions. How was Maoism represented in Kerala school textbooks much before it became a tour de force in Europe following French radicals? What were the responses of different stakeholders in India on representations of Maoism in school textbooks, viz. Union Government, Ministry of Education, Central Bureau of Textbook Research, Kerala School Managers' Association, Catholic Congress Local Committee, and different Parents' Association? Using the tools of Microhistory and rich archives of Ministry of Education, CPI, and the contemporary sources such as English and Malayali newspapers, this paper will investigate the rise and decline of Maoism in school textbooks, and how it led to the making of first textbook controversy in the contemporary India.

***Keywords**: Textbook Controversies, Maoism, Kerala, Mao Zedong*

KG Saiyidain (Ministry of Education, Government of India) on August 19, 1958, made a noting in the files informing he has received two enclosed press cuttings from 'Organiser' and 'Hindustan Standard' regarding textbooks in Kerala. He proposed to send the books to be examined and find out the truth to the allegations in the press.[11] The first enclosed press cutting was from a Delhi-based English weekly, *Organiser,* titled 'Communist Propaganda in Kerala Text-Books'.[12] The report first attacked Kerala Education Bill (1957), and then suggested that Communists have found another way of propagating their ideology among students and youths. "They have found in the nationalisation of text-books a fertile ground for indoctrination."[13] The report further reported that in 'Social Studies Third Series' prescribed for the eighth standard, there are essays on Russian and Chinese revolutions, with "large size portraits of Karl Marx, Lenin and Mao Tse-Tung." The Russian revolution, the report suggests, described Russian revolution as, "What a great revolution that was! By an agrarian

[11] File No. 15-72/58-SE- I, 'Communist Propaganda in Kerala Text-Books' *National Archives of India*. Delhi, 1958, p 2
[12] *Ibid* p 42. Organiser Bureau, 'Communist Propaganda in Kerala Text-Books', *Organiser Weekly*, BPDL, August 11, 1958. Newsclip attached in the *NAI* file. *Organiser Weekly* (Bharat Prakashan Delhi Limited) is English mouthpiece of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).
[13] *Ibid* p 42

revolution, an industrial revolution and a psychological revolution, a big community of people was elevated to the modern world within four years as if by magic."[14]

Another news report in 'Hindustan Standard' (published from Delhi), a month before 'Organiser' on July 22, 1958, informed how even though nationalisation of textbooks was a long pending demand in Andhra and Kerala, the CPI government in Kerala has published textbooks solely intended for communist party purposes, even though the CPI denied involving Communists in the textbook production.

In the Kerala school textbooks, a sub-section on China titled "Communist Victory", according to the press report, expressed the views of EMS Namboodiripad, the Chief Minister of the state, suggesting that "China will be repeated in Kerala if the parties in opposition form a common anti-communist front."[15] The indirect reference, it seems, is to Anti-Rightist campaign in China (1957-59) which was a political campaign to purge alleged "Rightists" within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and abroad. The campaign was launched by Mao Zedong, but Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen also functioned crucially. The Anti-Rightist Campaign significantly damaged democracy in China and turned the country into a de-facto one-party state.[16] The report concluded by stating the fears of a systematic attempt to indoctrinate the youth by stuffing the textbooks with communist propaganda.

Controversies around historical facts and school textbooks are not new. The disputation over historical facts, historical negationism, political contestations, and therefore, changes and revisions in the textbooks could be witnessed right from the nineteenth-century. Why textbooks, and especially, History textbooks are so 'hotly contested' in the public sphere? This question which is primary to this paper has been emphasised here, "The fact-respecting, secular historian in India can bring his or her reasoning to the public, but there is no guarantee that public will bring their attention. Given their expertise, it is only understandable that historians in India should seek a role in adjudicating disputes about the past in India."[17] And it then grips the issue with another pertinent query, "...What prevents them from realizing this aspiration?"[18] Therefore, it seems, to locate the school History textbooks, and History Textbook Controversy, one needs to seek out 'The Public Life of History' in India andelsewhere.

It is only pertinent to add here that History Textbook Controversy is not unique to India. They have a global history! They are thematic and spatial in their expanse, for instance, Holocaust denial, Lost Cause of the Confederacy, Myth of the clean Wehrmacht, Japanese war crime denial and the denial of Soviet crimes are recurrent themes which are contested in the textbook production, circulation

[14] File No. 15-72/58-SE- I, 'Communist Propaganda in Kerala Text-Books' *National Archives of India*. Delhi, 1958, *Organiser Weekly*, p 42

[15] *Ibid* p 42

[16] Chung, Yen-lin. "The Witch-Hunting Vanguard: The Central Secretariat's Roles and Activities in the Anti-Rightist Campaign." *The China Quarterly* 206 (2011): 391–411. doi:10.1017/S030574101100034. Also, Wang, Ning. "Victims and Perpetrators: Campaign Culture in the Chinese Communist Party's Anti-Rightist Campaign." *Twentieth-Century China* 45, no. 2 (2020): 188-208. doi:10.1353/tcc.2020.0019.

[17] Dipesh Chakrabarty, 'The public life of history: an argument out of India' Postcolonial Studies, 11:2, 2008, pp 169-190

[18] *Ibid* p 170

and dissemination; and also Japanese,[19] Korean[20] Pakistani,[21] etc. There are other strands of historical revisionism in the textbook production under the different Communist regimes.[22]

Why History textbooks need to be revised, rewritten, and re-examined by the State and political power persistently? What explains the interest and investment of the state in the textbook production and dissemination? Answers to these questions have been provided by the sociologists of education.[23] The development of national education systems in the nineteenth century led to the creation of binding curricula. From that point onwards, textbooks were written to conform to these national curricula, and the state exercised control via approval procedures. These differed starkly in terms of organisational form and scope. The scope for exemption from the approval process established itself in France during the second half of the nineteenth century and spread to other countries over the course of the twentieth century.[24] However, uniform textbooks only managed to establish themselves under authoritarian regimes.[25] They were the default in education systems of the socialist states and a few states in the developing world[26].

India and Mao's China

This paper doesn't concern itself with the rather complicated relations of the CCP with the Communist Party of India (CPI) and the Indian government in the early years of independence. We shall overlook it. It really interests itself in the representation of Mao Zedong, CCP, and Communists in the Kerala school textbooks which led to a national controversy in India. A brief background to the event is warranted.

Ever since the 1953 Madurai congress the majority of the Indian communists supported Jawaharlal Nehru's peace policy reinforced by the China-India agreement of April 19, 1954 (on the status of Tibet) enunciating for the first time the five principles of co-existence. Visits of Chou En-lai to India

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[19] Ryo Oshiba, 'Globalization and Education in Japan: The Case of Junior High School History Textbooks', in Jim Dator, Dick Pratt and Yongseok Seo (Ed.) *Fairness, Globalization, and Public Institutions*, University of Hawai'i Press. (2006) Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv3zp081.25. Also, Yoko H. Thakur, 'History Textbook Reform in Allied Occupied Japan, 1945-52', *History of Education Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Autumn, 1995), pp. 261-278, Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/369749; Terri Seddon, 'Politics and Curriculum: A Case Study of the Japanese History Textbook Dispute, 1982', *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, Vol. 8, No. 2, Political Struggles, Curricular Provisions (1987), pp. 213-226. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1392737; Kazuya Fukuoka, 'School History Textbooks and Historical Memories in Japan: A Study of Reception', *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, Vol. 24, No. 3/4 (September/December 2011), pp. 83-103. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41478430; Claudia Schneider, 'The Japanese History Textbook Controversy in East Asian Perspective', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 617, The Politics of History in Comparative Perspective (May, 2008), pp. 107-122. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/25098016

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[22] Victor Shnirelman, 'Stigmatized by History or by Historians? The Peoples of Russia in School History Textbooks', *History and Memory*, Vol. 21, No. 2, Special Issue: Historical Scholarship in Post-Soviet Russia / Edited by Gabriel Gorodetsky (Fall/Winter 2009), pp. 110-149. URL Stable: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/his.2009.21.2.110

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[24] Stephen Sammler, 'History of the School Textbooks', in Eckhardt Fuchs & Annekatrin Bock (Eds.) *The Palgrave Handbook of Textbook Studies*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, p 14-16

[25] *Ibid* p 17

[26] P Altbach & GP Kelly (Eds.) *Textbooks in the Third World: Policy, Content and Context,* New York/London: Taylor & Francis, 1988

and of Nehru to China were followed by the enthusiastic support of the Third World for Panch Sheela at Bandung.[27]

However, it is crucial to mark the differences which arose among the three parties on three questions: de-Stalinization, peaceful transition, and character of the India. In the debate on transition to socialism the CPI line was closer to the CCP than to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In an article in *New Times* in July 1956, Modeste Rubinstein had contended that the objective conditions for a non-capitalist path in India existed, and that, as a matter of fact, Nehru was advocating such a path.[28] CPI General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh took up the argument in the *New Age*. He agreed that there was a non-capitalist path but contended that it was an illusion that the Indian government, led by the bourgeoisie, would follow that path.[29] CCP merely translated the articles by Rubinstein and Ghosh and it was clear that the party stood on the side of Ghosh. This position was restated by Liu Shao-political report to the eighth party congress and in an article, "Again on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" in *Jenmin Jibao*.[30]

Up to 1959 the CCP had an understanding of the class nature of Nehru's government, which was close to that of the CPSU and it was not until after the incidents in Tibet in 1959 that they started having second thoughts about it. In the Central Committee's political report to the first session of the eighth national congress in 1956, Liu Shao-chi had declared that "there are a number of countries in Asia and Africa which have shaken off the colonial bondage and achieved international independence. These nationally independent countries, our great neighbour India included ... are all pursuing a peaceful, neutral foreign policy."[31] In the 1958 session of the People's Congress, Chou-En-lai in his report on the international situation spoke about "our great neighbour which is always concerned for world peace and international security", and on "Jawaharlal Nehru with his basic idea of expanding the area of peace", which was the same as "what the Chinese people have always proposed."[32] But events escalated for the worse after Tibet and also led to the split of CPI into two factions.[33]

As far as the suspension of CPI government in Kerala is concerned, there are almost no records of Chinese disapproval. It seems the textbook controversy and how Mao figured centrally in it didn't trigger any notable reaction from CCP, at least, in the publicly accessible evidence.

Usually, in the literature, withdrawal of first set of NCERT textbooks authored by Romila Thapar, Bipan Chandra, and RS Sharma, and two other books by Amles Tripathi, Bipan Chandra, and Barun De; and a booklet on Communalisation in History (PPH, 1967) by Romila Thapar, Harbans Mukhia, and Bipan Chandra, during the Janata Party Government (1977) is marked as the first textbook controversy in independent India.[34] However, this section would make a revisionist point to the consensus on NCERT History Textbook Controversy, 1977-79, by suggesting and showing that

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[27] Georges Kristoffel Lieten, 'China and the Undivided Communist Party of India,' *Social Scientist*, Jul., 1975, Vol. 3, No. 12 (Jul., 1975), pp. 3-28

[28] Modeste Rubinstein, "Non-Capitalist Path for Underdeveloped Countries," *New Times*, Moscow, 5 July and 2 August 1956. The article was also reprinted in *New Age*, October 1956

[29] *New Age*, October 1956, pp 6-18

[30] *Jenmin Jibao*, 29 December 1956. This and some other articles are quoted by Chi Hsi Hu, op. cit., pp 50-51

[31] Liu Shao-chi, *The Political Reports of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist to the Eighth National Congress of the Party*, Peking 1956, p 77

[32] Chou En-lai, "The Present International Situation and China's Foreign Policy", quoted from Robert Bowre and John Fairbank (Eds.), *Communist China 1955-59: Policy Documents with Analysis*, Harvard 1962, p 405

[33] John B Wood, 'Observations on the Indian Communist Party Split,' *Pacific Affairs*, Spring, 1965, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring, 1965), pp. 47-63. Also, Bhagwan Josh, *Struggle for Hegemony*, Vol II, Sage: Delhi, 2011

[34] Majid Hayat Siddiqi, 'History-Writing in India', *History Workshop*, No. 10 (Autumn, 1980), pp. 184-190. Accessed from https://www.jstor.org/stable/4288319. Also, Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, 'Rethinking Secularism: Genesis and Implications of the Textbook Controversy, 1977-79', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Spring, 1983), pp. 15-37, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2758768

independent India had already witnessed its first textbook controversy in Kerala in 1958 when CPI formed a democratically elected government in the state, with EMS Namboodiripad (1909-1998) as the Chief Minister.

Communism in Kerala has a long history. CPI entered into Kerala in late 1930s, when erstwhile members of Congress Socialist Party (CSP) where expelled from Kerala Provincial Congress Committee in 1940. Before that not siding with All India Congress Committee on the question of war, Left-led KPCC had already drifted formally towards CPI, leading to its official birth in the state in December, 1939.[35] In 1957 the CPI was elected to rule the state government of Kerala; the first democratically elected Communist government anywhere in the world.[36] The first general elections to the Kerala State Legislature were held in February and March 1957. The CPI and a few Independents supported by it secured 65 of the 126 seats in the Legislature President's Rule came to an end on 5th April, 1957 and a communist Ministry under the chief minister ship of E.M.S. Namboodiripad came to power.[37] In the election to the state Assembly held in March 1957, each party decided to face the election single handed without making alliance with any other party therefore there was triangular contest and even a four cornered contest in several constituencies. The Communist government of Kerala under the leadership took numerous revolutionary steps to enhance the condition of people through their policies in agriculture, industry, education, public health, public distribution system, social security measures, decentralization of power, police policy, administrative reforms etc.

The significant contribution of the communist government was in the field of agrarian reforms. The governments passed several policies to improve the condition of the peasantry, the Kerala Agrarian Relations bill being the most decisive step. It had to face several challenges on different grounds. The government acted for the welfare of the people but faced extreme opposition from some sections of society. The educational minister, Joseph Mundassery implemented new educational policies in the field of education which benefited a large section of people. The Education Bill controls the unlimited powers enjoyed by private management in the field of education.[38]

First Textbook Controversy around Mao

In the middle of 1958 it was also alleged that communists' "sinister motive is seen in full nakedness in the preparation and prescription of textbooks" which were intended to "enslave the minds of the students to the ideology of the rulers by a rigorous control over syllabus...common to all totalitarian governments".[39] Government indeed in November 1957 had ordered various committees to prepare new textbooks for the primary classes, and these books were introduced in the schools from the next school year onwards. The charge made by the Catholic Church evoked from Joseph Mundassery the remark that "this is ironic to the extreme, coming as it does from spokesmen of a world religion

[35] Thomas Johnson Nossiter, *Communism in Kerala A Study in Political Adaptation*, Hurst for Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1982; Victor M Fic, *Kerala: Yenan of India, Rise of Communist Power, 1937-1969*, Nachiketa Public Limited, Bombay, 1970.

[36] See, Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, Aditya Mukherjee, *India Since Independence*, Penguin, Delhi, 2000. Ramchandra Guha, *India After Gandhi*, Penguin, Delhi, 2007. Also, Bidyut Chakrabarty, *Indian Politics and Society Since Independence*, Routledge, London, 2008

[37] S. Ramachandran Pillai, 'E.M.S. Namboodiripad and the Communist Government of Kerala', *The Marxist*, XXV, 3rd–4th July–September, 2009, p. 1

[38] The managers are plundering money and the teachers are not getting the deserved salary. The managers justified the decision by saying that they were running short of resources to run the school. Sometimes, the teachers got their salary after a gap of many months. They were forced to accept the situation, buying the argument that they did not have any other employment opportunities. The Education Bill aimed at changing the prevailing situation of that time and thus builds a healthy atmosphere so that teachers and management get along well. Cited in D. Dhanuraj, *Story of 1957 Education Bill in Kerala*, Supported by a grant from Centre for Civil Society, New Delhi, August 2006

[39] KPCC Memorandum, presented to the President of India, New Delhi, 1959, p 22; K Padmanabha Pillai, op cit., p 117

which has sought, through the centuries, to enforce the dogmas and punish... those who question or challenge them, besides forbidding the faithful from reading books arbitrarily put on the index."[40]

Side by side the Catholic Church and Nair Service Society (NSS) had been clamouring for the withdrawal of the controversial provisions of the Kerala Education Act and the Kerala Agrarian relations through the petitions and demonstrations. A reactionary movement was started with the help and instance of the Christian church and the opposition parties together with the orthodox sections of the society, conspicuously known as the "Vimochana Samaram (Liberation Struggle)". Vimochana Samaram (English: Liberation Struggle) allowed for a backlash on Kerala state textbooks as well. It was alleged by Ministry of Education, Government of India that textbooks were indulged in "Communist Propaganda", and even an enquiry committee was formed to look into the matter.[41] Viewing the significance of this episode as the first History Textbook Controversy in independent India, and a significant issue which has not been reported in literature so far, the section demands a keen reporting on the same. The Nehru government in Delhi dismissed it and President's Rule was declared in 1959 following the Vimochana Samaram.[42]
The representation of Mao's China in school textbooks have not been discussed in any detail so far. The global histories on Maoism have hardly investigated the existence of the ideology in school textbooks.[43] Setting aside a few examples like Timothy Cheek that offers a comparison on World History textbooks, there are no studies in Textbook and Curriculum Studies that have captured and contextualized Maoism as a trope of world history, or political ideology in school textbooks.[44] Investigations on Mao Zedong (1893-1976) and Maoism are usually restricted to textbook controversies, and commentaries that follow periodic textbook revisions by Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

July 1, 2021 marked the centenary year of the establishment of CCP. To mark the event, CCP's Central Committee Party History and Literature Research Institute published a new 'Brief History of the Communist Party of China' in April, 2021. It is newest addition in a series of editions (read, versions) of the CCP's long history. The 'Brief History' as a text has political campaign and for the study-campaigns. The study-campaigns in China engirdles the 92-million party members, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and schools and universities across the country. It is prescribed as a mandated teaching resource in schools. Various extracts from 'The Brief History' are regularly published in 'People's Daily' (party's mouthpiece), CCTV (party's official broadcaster), and other state-owned media services.[45] It is believed that the new version is in place to make space for Xi Jinping along with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, and push the narrative after 2013 as the driving force of history and the present. A comparison with the older editions of the 'Brief History' shows that the emphasis on Mao era in the 2021 version has been dramatically reduced. Moreover, while the older editions of the 'The Brief History' (viz. 1991, 2001, and 2011) have a long 11,000 words chapter on the Cultural Revolution (1966-77), the new version carries the discussion in just one page. While the older editions had detailed entries on "Lin Bao Group", "Gang of Four" and campaigns on rectify the "ultra-Leftist trends", the new version sums up the discussion superficially not allowing any theme to expand and illustrate itself.[46]

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[40] Government of Kerala, *The Kerala Education Act and Its Opponents*, p 14.
[41] File No. 15-72/58-SE- I, 'Communist Propaganda in Kerala Text-Books' *National Archives of India*. Delhi
[42] Vimochana Samaram (1958–59) was an anticommunist backlash against the Kerala state government- led by EMS Namboodiripad of the CPI. Organised opposition to the government was led by the Catholic Church in Kerala, the Nair Service Society and Indian National Congress.
[43] Alexander C Cook, *Mao's Little Red Book, A Global History*, Cambridge University Press, 2014; Also, Julia Lovell, *Maoism, A Global History*, Knopf, 2019
[44] Timothy Cheek (ed), *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, Cambridge University Press, 2012
[45] Jayadeva Ranade, 'China's Communist Party Revises its History Yet Again in Time for Use by Xi Jinping', Centre for China Analysis & Strategy', April 24, 2021. Accessed from https://ccasindia.org/XI-CHINA-HISTORY.pdf
[46] For a discussion on Cultural Revolution see, Jospeh W Esherick & Paul G Pickowicz (ed.) *The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History*,Stanford University Press, 2006. Also, Frank Dikotter, *The Cultural Revolution, A People's History, 1962-1976*, Bloomsbury, 2017. Andrew G Walder, *Fractured Rebellion The Beijing Red Guard Movement*, Harvard

In fact, this is not the first time, when such radical changes have been made to 'The Brief History'. The role, or rather the changing role of historical narratives has remained paramount in the CPC-led China. Ian Johnson has argued in his essay 'The Presence of the Past A-coda' (2016) how a persistent rewriting of History is crucial to any Communist state.[47] Rana Mitter suggests the persistence on rewriting of history is also coupled with a strong prohibition on historical nihilism, which means, CCP do not wish for Chinese people to question and doubt the historical narrative which is circulated through the party.[48]

Indian Nationalism and Mao's Threat

Going back to the reports received by Ministry of Education in Delhi in 1958. The news report in 'Hindustan Standard' carried an extract from a booklet in Malayalam called 'Kammunist Vijayam' (Communist Victory) which was prescribed for Class VII. Elucidating on the Russian revolution, the extract reads, "The properties in possession of the landlords were confiscated and distributed among peasants..." On the Chinese revolution, 'Kammunist Vijayam' told the students, "The Soviet Union helped the Chinese Communists and Americans helped the Nationalists of Chiang. The corrupt nepotist regime of Chiang suffered defeat after defeat and under the Chinese communist regime, China is progressing swiftly whether America recognised it or not. In China now there is neither begging not unemployment."[49] Another news report from *Malayala Manorma* was added to the file as acquired from Press Information bureau, dated July 23, 1958, which drew the attention of the Central Government to certain lessons prescribed for high school students of Kerala in which emphasis was laid upon Russian and Chinese revolution, and at the same time "underrating the nation building efforts in India."[50] The paper also made a pitch for scrutiny of each lesson and appealed to the people to bring the episode to the notice of the Central Government in Delhi.

Soon after KG Saiyidain bought the press reports to the notice of Ministry on August 19, RK Kapur, on August 27, 1958, noted that in a discussion of Consultative Committee of Parliament (August 27, 1958), it has been directed that the Ministry must get the books from Kerala and examined them quickly. Kapur added in his note, "It might be added that when the Director, Central Bureau of Textbook Research (CBTR), visited Kerala recently, she too in her report brought out the point which has since been taken up by some newspapers."[51] The noting of Kapur is important in the regard because it suggests that it was the remarks and observation of Director, CBTR, which triggered newspaper reports, rather than the opposite. Rukmini Krishnaswamy, the Director, CTBR, agreed. In her response, on October 23, 1958, Krishnaswamy suggested that Kerala textbooks have to be examined on the following basis:

1) The extent to which actual facts of history have been distorted in these books.

University Press, 2012, uses the memoirs of Red Guards to understand the nature of the social conflict as it started in Beijing.

[47] Ian Johnson, 'The presence of the past- A coda' in Jeffery N. Wasserstrom (ed.) *The Oxford Illustrated history of Modern China*, Oxford University Press, 2016

[48] Adrija Roychowdhury, 'Chinese Communist Party at 100: How the Party uses history to build its future', *Indian Express*, June 30, 2021. Accessed from https://indianexpress.com/article/research/chinese-communist-party-at-100-xi-jinping-how-the-party-uses-history-to-build-its-future-7382741/

[49] File No. 15-72/58-SE- I, 'Communist Propaganda in Kerala Text-Books' *National Archives of India*. Delhi, 1958, *Hindustan Standard*, pp 46-47

[50] *Ibid* p 48, *Malayala Manorma,* July 23, 1958

[51] *Ibid* p 7, Note by RK Kapur, August 27, 1958. CBTR stands for Central Bureau of Textbook Research. It was one of precursors of National Council of Education, Research and Training (NCERT). NCERT was established in 1961 by merging seven existing national government institutions, namely the Central Institute of Education, the Central Bureau of Textbook Research, the Central Bureau of Educational and Vocational Guidance, the Directorate of Extension Programmes for Secondary Education, the National Institute of Basic Education, the National Fundamental Education Centre, and the National Institute of Audio-Visual Education. See, *Leading the Change, 50 Years of NCERT*, National Council for Education, Research, and Training, Delhi, 2011.

2) The extent to which certain parties in the world have unnecessarily been vilified.

3) *The extent to which any one ideology is given as the very best in exclusion to all others...*[52]

However, the Director, CBTR, lamented that they do not have any language expert with them. And to examine about 60 books which are published by the Kerala state, an expert in Malayalam is required, since all the books are in that language. But the books which were most objected to, four books, two in Social Studies, and two on languages were scrutinised by CBTR with some help from the representatives of Kerala School Manager's Association, and they attached the original passages and translated word from the books in its report to the Ministry. The Director in her report to the Ministry concluded, "There is no doubt that here and there the books have overrated the case of communism and understated the achievements of the non-communistic countries of the world."[53] Krishnaswamy then raised the pedagogic concern suggesting,
"But if any action is contemplated, it is necessary to know where the proper education ends and indoctrination begins... While I have no doubt that the literature produced by the Kerala government lacks proportion as between delineation of the achievements of the communistic and the non-communistic governments of the world, I have not really been able to discover anything to which we could take serious objections on Constitutional ground."[54]

However, what marks a textbook controversy is an immense interest and involvement into it, of parties, other than experts and the state. Textbook controversies are crucial because it involves 'the public'. Therefore, it is only important and imperative to look into and document the various responses of other parties in this episode, other than Ministry of Education, and CBTR. Setting aside the expertise of Director, CBTR, and qualifications in her remarks, Ministry of Education went ahead aggressively to examine the textbooks. In his note to the Ministry, Prem Kirpal, Secretary, on November 1, 1958, ordered a 'go ahead' into inquiry, and suggested that "scrutiny may be confined to textbooks in Social Studies, including History."[55]
A memorial by The Kerala School Managers' Association, Kotayyam, was presented before the President of India.[56] The Association in its memorial, led by VO Abraham, President, firmly complaint to the President that earlier the system of writing textbooks was such that preparation and publication was left to competent individuals, and even private organisations. The Association also informed that the government's role was limited to approving the texts. However, the CPI government in Kerala scrapped the system in place, and made the publication and distribution of textbooks to be done only by the government. Moreover, the government nominated the ruling party members and its affiliates to author the textbooks.[57] The Association further added that all through the present textbooks, "several methods of indoctrination have been adopted with an expert skill. The purpose of most of these books would seem to be, to place before the children, Communist ideals, Communist social order, Communist states, and Communist achievements… for appreciation and acceptance."[58]

In the Appendix added to the memorial, the Association even reproduced some objectionable passages from the textbooks. For instance, in 'Social Studies Series Book 2 for Standard VI', in Chapter VI dealing with history and teachings of some world famous persons, it was reported that "The name of Mahatma Gandhi, the father of the Indian nation, does not find a place."[59] While in

[52] File No. 15-72/58-SE- I, 'Communist Propaganda in Kerala Text-Books' *National Archives of India*. Delhi, 1958, *Ministry of Education CBTR*, pp 13-15
[53] *Ibid Ministry of Education CBTR,* p 15
[54] *Ibid Ministry of Education CBTR,* p 15
[55] File No. 15-72/58-SE- I, 'Communist Propaganda in Kerala Text-Books' *National Archives of India*. Delhi, 1958, Note of Prem Kirpal, p 18
[56] *Ibid* 'Kerala: The Present Textbooks'
[57] *Ibid* 'Kerala: The Present Textbooks'
[58] *Ibid* 'Kerala: The Present Textbooks'

[59] *Ibid Appendix A,* 'Kerala: The Present Textbooks'

the same book, a short biography of Karl Marx was provided (pp 45-47) suggesting, "The Russian revolution is the first triumph of the Social Equality theory of Marx."[60] In another instance, 'Book 3 for Standard VII' contained a reference on 'Stalin and Trotsky conflict'. While the Association was perturbed that this reference was summed up in just one sentence, "Rivalry arose between Trotsky and Stalin. Stalin triumphed.", one could ask, why the students of Standard VII were being even taught about such a grievous outcome of Russian revolution is phrasal emphatic of brevity.[61]

Even the members of Planning Commission of India were curious and taking interest in what was going on in Kerala textbook controversy. Shriman Narayan, a member, wrote to Minister of Education, KL Shrimali, on September 2, 1958, inquiring about the same. He asked the Minister to be informed about the steps taken in this regard so that, "adequate steps may be taken in this connection."[62]

A few Parents' Associations at Karthigapally and Kotayyam also got involved by writing letters to Ministry of Education in Delhi. They reiterated the concerns of the Kerala School Managers' Association, suggesting how textbooks only seem to place before the children, "the Communist ideals for appreciation and acceptance."[63]

A curious party in this textbook controversy was Catholic Congress Local Committee. They sent their resolution, through Committee's President SC Joseph, straight to the President of India, suggesting that new textbooks introduced by the CPI government were an infringement of their fundamental rights.[64] The Catholic Committee was perturbed that Communist Govt in Kerala had monopolised the rights and privileges of the publication of textbooks, and these textbooks have degraded the religious, moral, cultural, and social aspects of life.[65] Moreover, they added, the textbooks while mentioning the achievements of nations under communist supremacy beyond imagination, have chosen to illustrate the greatness of India and her culture in a low tone.[66] Thus, the committee made an argument of nationalism, while also adding the difficulties of government monopoly on the production and distribution of textbooks.

Conclusion

In the end, much didn't happen in Kerala state textbooks controversy, primarily, because of two reasons. Firstly, Ministry of Education was not sure and certain that how to deal with the case, since Education was a state subject. The confusion over the course of action loomed large from the very beginning. Veda Prakash, Asst Educational Adviser, Ministry of Education, in an office memorandum, dated January 29, 1959, noted, "As education is a state subject and the writing of textbooks is entirely the concern of State Government, it is not clear what course of action the Ministry of Education can take in this matter."[67] Ministry of Education requested Ministry of Law in this regard to suggest the possible course of actions. Meanwhile, others were demanding different recourse.

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[60] File No. 15-72/58-SE- I, 'Communist Propaganda in Kerala Text-Books' *National Archives of India*. Delhi, 1958, *Appendix A, '*Kerala: The Present Textbooks'

[61] *Ibid Appendix A, '*Kerala: The Present Textbooks'

[62] File No. 15-72/58-SE- I, 'Communist Propaganda in Kerala Text-Books' *National Archives of India*. Delhi, 1958, Shriman Narayan to KL Shrimali, Letter on September 2, 1958. Also, Georges Kristoffel Lieten, 'Education, Ideology and Politics in Kerala 1957-59,' *Social Scientist*, Sep., 1977, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Sep., 1977), pp. 3-21

[63] File No. 15-72/58-SE- I, 'Communist Propaganda in Kerala Text-Books' *National Archives of India*. Delhi, 1958, Letters of Parent Associations

[64] File No. 15-72/58-SE- I, 'Communist Propaganda in Kerala Text-Books' *National Archives of India*. Delhi, 1958, Resolution by Catholic Congress Local Committee, November 19, 1958.

[65] File No. 15-72/58-SE- I, 'Communist Propaganda in Kerala Text-Books' *National Archives of India*. Delhi, 1958. Resolution by Catholic Congress Local Committee, November 19, 1958

[66] *Ibid*. Resolution by Catholic Congress Local Committee, November 19, 1958

[67] File No. 15-72/58-SE- I, 'Communist Propaganda in Kerala Text-Books' *National Archives of India*. Delhi, 1958. 'Office Memorandum', January 29, 1959

For instance, Kerala's Schools Managers' Association was unhappy about the Kerala state govt's proposal of putting the books for scrutiny of S Radhakrishnan, Vice President, India. On contrary, they suggested in their memorial to the President of India that a Committee of Parliament Members should be appointed to examine and inquire into the issue. The second reason is purely political. Vimochana Samaram triggered wildly across the state in the subsequent months, and Union Govt dismissed the CPI govt in Kerala on July 31, 1959, imposing the President's rule in the state, under Art 356 of the Constitution of India, from July 31, 1959 to February 22, 1960. When the assembly elections were organised again, Pattom Thanu Pillai (1885-1970) of Praja Socialist Party became CM, followed by Raman Sankar (1909-1972) of Indian National Congress. CPI was out of power, and textbook controversy became a non-issue.

Nevertheless, the government appointed a committee under Kuruvilla Jacob, a member of Government of India's Secondary Education Council, to enquire into these allegations. The committee of enquiry noticed the occurrence of inadequate passages, but attributed it to the absence of an adequate machinery of supervision. The main conclusion of this report, however, was that "there has not been any concerted attempt on the part of the authorities...to indoctrinate the pupils in anti-religious ideas", or "at indoctrination of communist ideology, or an intention...to belittle the achievements of India."[68] A comparison of some passages in the old and new textbooks moreover wo the old version contained unhistorical facts, value judgements and a slandering misrepresentation of communism.' Although Jacob rejecting its case was submitted in January, 1959, opposition kept harping on this very sensitive issue.

Despite, having its little moment in the contemporary history of education in India, Kerala textbook controversy is important with respect to the theme of "ideological indoctrination" in the textbooks, and the control and monopoly of state over the production and distribution of textbooks. It is also, the first History textbook controversy in independent India, which has gone unreported in the literature so far. However, what interests us is the fact that how the incorporation of Mao's China, lengthy discussions on Communism, and Soviet Russia was seen as an act against the idea of national integration and as a drift away from the nationalisation of the school textbooks. And when the Indian state examined these discussions, it chose to focus more on the alleged "anti-religious indoctrination" in the textbooks which it found missing, and underplayed other controversies by just calling them "unsuitable passages."[69]

China's Approach to the Global Commons: A Critical Analysis of China's Outer Space Policy

Aastha Binzani

Abstract

Given the critical role played by space science and technology to life on earth, especially in terms of economic and security interests of nation-states, China's growing capabilities and long-term plans in 'Outer Space' have attracted increasing international attention. China's emergence as a major space actor has set off a new space race not just in terms of capabilities but also in the arena

[68] Kerala Government Reply 1959, pp 43-44. Democratic Research Service. *Kerala under Communism*, Bombay 1959, pp 46-49; K Padmanabha Pillai, op cit., pp 11-124. Also, *The Hindu*, 3 October 1958, for Catholic attack on "canons of materialistic Hedonism." Also, *The Times of India*, January 26, 1959, "No Anti-Religious Indoctrinations, Textbooks in Kerala," p. 7

[69] *The Times of India*, January 26, 1959, "No Anti-Religious Indoctrinations, Textbooks in Kerala," p.7

of international rule-making and norm-setting. With the U.S.–China rivalry spilling over into outer space, the arena has emerged as yet another frontier of global geopolitics. In the 21st century, domination of Outer Space is regarded as one of the contributing factors to achieving global domination and Great Power status akin to the importance accorded to domination of the Seas in history.

China's rising economic, technological, and military capabilities have impinged upon the use of Global Commons, leading to several complex issues and problems of norms, rules, and institutions to deal with them. Outer space is one of the domains wherein China has enhanced its technological capabilities in the last few decades. China's rise on the global stage has witnessed the arena of outer space accorded a central place in its grand strategy, with the country declaring its goal of 'building itself into a Space Power.' Given the absence of an adequate governance mechanism in the domain, the country's rising activities and interests have been accompanied by concerns and attempts in rule-making/norm-setting. This paper examines China's approach to Outer Space as a 'Global Commons.' It particularly focuses on rule-making/norm–setting in the domain.

The paper, therefore, traces the Chinese domestic debates and China's approaches to outer space since the early 1990s to the present. It looks at China's capabilities, interests, and objectives in outer space and contextualizes them within larger debates and approaches to China's approach to Global Commons and the grand strategy of a rising power. In this context, it provides an in-depth analysis of China's negotiating positions and debates on international norms and regimes in outer space. The paper will use document and discourse analysis methods and will use government reports, newspaper articles, books, and journal articles. By doing so, the paper attempts to contribute to debates on China's approaches to the international order and Global Commons.

Key Words: China, Global Commons, Outer Space, International Order, Rules and Norms.

INTRODUCTION

International law recognizes four Global Commons: the High Seas, the atmosphere, Antarctica, and outer space. This implies that these domains are beyond national jurisdiction, with any sovereignty claims over them being prohibited. Specific international regimes provide for the governance of these arenas by laying down the rules, regulations, and norms for their effective utilization, exploration, and exploitation. One of the most important events of the 21st century has been China's unprecedented rise in terms of economic growth, military strength, and technological might. China's growing capabilities have impinged upon the use of Global Commons, leading to several complex issues and problems of norms, rules, and institutions to deal with them.

Given the critical role played by space science and technology to life on earth, especially in terms of security and economic interests of nation-states, the domain is increasingly being seen as contributing to global influence and Great Power status. China's emergence as a rising power has witnessed the arena of outer space being accorded a central place in its grand strategy. On June 24, 2013, Xi Jinping, in a video call to the three Shenzhou-10 astronauts aboard Tiangong 1, stated, 'The space dream is part of the dream to make China stronger' (Xinhua 2021). In its 'White Paper on China's Space Activities' published in 2016, the country put forward the goal of building itself into a 'space power'. China's technological capabilities, activities, and interests in the domain have been expanding in the last few decades. This has, however, taken place in an international context where technological advancements and new issues facing the domain have rendered the existing governance mechanism inadequate, resulting in the recognition of the need for a further development of rules and norms (Freese 2017). China's outer space engagements have, therefore, included concerns and attempts in rule-making/norm-setting.

China's rise has led to concerns and debates on its implications for international law and legal order. In this regard, Cai (2019) has argued that as China rises, it has come to adopt a distinct legal strategy wherein a discourse on its good record of compliance with the existing legal order goes hand in hand with efforts to enhance its 'norm entrepreneurship'. However, his analysis of China's 'norm

entrepreneurship' remains confined to 'new areas' of global governance that largely remain lawless (cyberspace for instance). This leaves the question of China's strategy in the domain of outer space, marked by the existence of an international regime, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (and the Rescue Agreement, the Liability Convention, the Registration Convention, and the Moon Agreement), that provides a basic framework for its governance but nonetheless has proven inadequate in dealing with issues that have arisen over time, unaddressed. This paper, therefore, attempts to examine China's approach to outer space as a 'Global Commons.' It particularly focuses on rule-making/norm-setting in the domain.

The article consists of four sections. The first section traces the Chinese domestic debates and China's approaches to outer space since the 1990s to the present. The second section examines the debates in the existing literature on the interests and objectives of China's outer space program. The third section analyses China's approach to outer space as a 'Global Commons' with particular attention being paid to its approach towards rule-making/norm-setting in the domain. In this context, it provides an in-depth analysis of China's negotiating positions and debates on international norms and regimes in outer space. The section will also contextualize the discussion within the larger debates on China's grand strategy as a rising power. The fifth section summarizes the main findings and arguments of the study.

China's approaches to outer space since the 1990s

Political support, economic resources, and technological capability are necessary for any country to have a space program. While the inception of China's space program has been traced as far back as 1956, the Cold War dynamics (rivalry between the two superpowers, the United States of America and the then Soviet Union and their allies) meant a prioritization of the development of nuclear capabilities and ICBMs for delivering nuclear warheads on the part of the superpowers. For an economically and technologically backward China, which found itself in a hostile international environment facing threats from the United States and increasingly from the USSR (from the 1960s onwards), ensuring national security remained the primary objective. Therefore, during the formative years of PRC's space program, the development of missile technology was the top priority.

Thus, while the first satellite project was approved by Chairman Mao in 1958, it was discontinued in 1959 owing to insufficient resources to be restarted only in 1965 while the missile program continued unabated (Handberg and Li 2007). Domestic political upheavals like the anti-rightist campaign (1957), the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960), and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1967) slowed progress, but the program remained resilient as it continued to receive political support (Chen 1991). This resulted in the initial establishment of China's space program. China launched its first satellite, Dong Fang Hong 1, in 1970, first ICBM in 1971, first recoverable satellite in 1975, and began its first manned program (Shuguang 1) in 1968 (cancelled in 1972 because of political and economic difficulties).

A fundamental change in the program's orientation occurred with the leadership change affected by Mao's death in 1976. After firmly consolidating power, the new leadership led by Deng Xiaoping changed the direction of China's outer space program. With the leadership's single-minded focus on economic development, the rationale of the space program now moved from being purely military and political to one geared towards economic reconstruction. This resulted in support for only those space projects that would prove to be economically or socially beneficial. Budgetary allocations declined. However, given the dual-use nature of space technology, the emphasis on civilian use nonetheless resulted in the enhancement of military space capabilities (Handberg and Li 2007). Attention was now on the practical capabilities like communication, recoverable, science, and meteorological satellites and further enhancing launch capabilities while projects like manned spaceflight were suspended. This period also saw commercialization of China's space efforts and greater international cooperation. Despite key developments, progress remained patchy, inconsistent, and piecemeal, with no coherent space policy in place up until the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The changing international context with plans for rapid development of high technologies exemplified by the 1983 U.S.' Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) as well as the 1985 European Eureka project led the leadership to refocus attention on Science and Technology development. In 1986, four Chinese scientists submitted a letter to the Central government underlining the importance of the need to focus on development in the field of high technologies (Embassy of the PRC in the Republic of Poland 2004). This caught the attention of Deng Xiaoping, resulting in the adoption of the High-Tech Research and Development Programme, also known as the '863 Plan'. Space technology was amongst the eight priority areas identified for the purpose. However, the most important development in this regard was the revival of the manned space efforts. Chen (1991) argues that this put China's space program firmly back on track. This was aided in no small measure by the reconstruction of the economy and technological resources undertaken in the preceding decade. By 1989, China had placed 25 satellites (11 recoverable) in LEO, GEO, and SSO, serving a range of purposes (Chen 1991). Moltz (2019) argues that it was only in the 1980s that China began to emerge as a fledgling space power under Deng's leadership.

The 90s saw an overall expansion in China's space efforts (both civilian as well as military), therefore heralding the evolution of a comprehensive space program and policy. In 1989, a change of guard occurred with the promotion of Jiang Zemin to the post of General Secretary of the CCP. While Zemin emphasized a continuation of the policy of economic construction, trumping concerns of national defense and military construction in rhetoric, the military aspect of outer space began to receive greater attention during this period. The Gulf War of 1991, also deemed the first Space War, highlighted the importance of space-based assets in future conflicts. This importance was not, however, immediately apparent to the Chinese, and space operations came to be seen as playing a supportive rather than a leading role (Cheng 2012). This position was to change in 2002, with changes in the assessment of the future of warfare as 'local wars under modern, high-tech conditions' (Cheng 2009). The manned space program was launched in 1992, the driving force behind which appears to be prestige concerns, something that had been shunned during the Deng era.

On the other hand, Besha (2010) has argued that the lunar probe was initially rejected in 1993 (on the grounds of it being motivated by political considerations rather than scientific objectives) and was finally approved in 2000. The denial of GPS services to the Chinese by the U.S. in the Yinhe incident (1993) and interruptions during its 1996 military exercises in the Taiwan Strait resulted in plans for the development of China's own satellite navigation system (Beidou) (Hagt 2014). The growing scope of China's space program finally culminated in the publication of its first White Paper on space activities in November 2000.

The support to the overall program continued during the Hu Jintao period (2003-2012). The developments during the period included the progress in the manned space program as well as the initiation of the lunar probe. While all the White papers on outer space issued since 2000 mention the space industry as a critical element of the overall national strategy, emphasis has been on the civilian aspect of the space program, most notably on economic, scientific, and technological development. However, a look at the defense White papers since at least 2002 shows that the military role of space has been even more firmly embedded over the years as the assessment of future conflicts has evolved to 'informationized local wars' (Information Office of the State Council of the PRC 2004). The adoption of Medium and long-term Plan for Science and Technology Development (MLP) (2006-2020), the 16 megaprojects within which included those in the space sector, further demonstrated long-term planning, increased funding and investment and the critical importance accorded to the domain (Pollpeter et al. 2020). In 2007, China conducted its first Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test, which involved the destruction of its own weather satellite using a kinetic kill vehicle.

Apart from creating massive debris and receiving widespread international condemnation, the confusion that followed the test (later presented as a scientific experiment) raised important concerns.

The 12-day silence on the part of the Chinese government raised questions about the civil-military relationship and control over the space program. Scholars have pointed out the possibility of the civilian leadership being insufficiently informed about the test (Mulvenon 2007, Kulacki and Lewis 2008). In 2010, and again in 2013, China conducted a mid-course missile interception test, which have been speculated as ASAT tests (Weeden 2013).

Xi Jinping's accession to power saw a further elevation of the status of the space program in the overall national strategy, evident from his characterization of the program as providing strong support for the realization of the Chinese dream for the renewal of the Chinese nation (Information Office of the State Council of the PRC 2016). The Space White Paper issued in 2016 marked a watershed as it put forward the goal of acquiring the status of a 'Space Power'. Furthermore, the emphasis placed on innovation and independent capacity since 2016 is indicative of greater support and funding for the program. The military aspect of the program has been more clearly laid out, as evidenced from the 2015 Defence White Paper that provided for an extension of the policy of civil-military integration calling for a joint building and utilization of military and civilian infrastructure in outer space.

The Strategic Support Force (SSF) was established in 2015 within the People's Liberation Army (PLA) towards this end. The 2016 launch of Aolong-1 spacecraft equipped with a robotic arm for debris removal was seen as a further attempt at enhancing ASAT capabilities (Chen 2016). China's 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) emphasizes innovation-driven development and identifies aerospace as one of the emerging industries of strategic importance, promising increased investment and support.

It puts forth plans for an integrated approach to development and security and further underscores the focus on the aerospace sector in the modernization of national defense and military, coordination in the planning of military development, and economic development to better serve the strategic needs of national security and development, boosting military-civilian collaborative innovation in science and technology; advance both military and civilian development, collaboration and resource-sharing in the field aerospace facilitating two-way application of military and civilian scientific research achievements and do better in meeting national defense needs in economic development projects. China's intention to utilize its space program in an all-around manner implies that it has also emerged as a component in China's broader foreign policy initiatives, like the Space Information Corridor of the Belt and Road Initiative (Cheng 2020).

Thanks to the political support, funding, and formulation of comprehensive longer-term space plans and policy over at least the last three decades, China now possesses a wide range of space technologies and capabilities, including a variety of satellites and launchers, a manned space program, a lunar exploration program (Chang'e), considerable progress on establishing an International Space Station, and counterspace capabilities. As China's space program expands and progresses further, the question of interests and objectives driving its space efforts acquires significance.

China's Space Program – Interests and Objectives

China's expanding efforts and capabilities in outer space have been accompanied by a growing scholarship dealing with the question of motives, aims, and objectives of such an expansion. Concerning the objectives and interests driving China's outer space program and policy, scholars have alluded variously to both external (enhancing international status/standing, enhancing soft power, great power competition) as well as domestic internal drivers (enhancing comprehensive national power, developmental goals, military empowerment, national security, and access to energy and material resources).

Cordesman (2016) sees China's space program as inextricably linked with its goal of military modernization and suggests it should be seen within the broader context of its attempt at acquiring capabilities to fight informationized wars. While military defense and security considerations are an essential aspect of China's space program and have acquired greater significance over time, this view leaves out of consideration those projects, the military logics of which are either negligible or unclear. Pollpeter (2020) suggests that national security is the prime motivation driving China's development of space technologies; however, arguing further that as the program develops, commercial and scientific nature activities will take center stage. Our submission, however, as evident from the discussion above, is that the view of outer space as critical to national security and military considerations has become entrenched over time; it is, therefore, difficult to say if activities of commercial or scientific nature will gain priority over those of military nature. Also, given the dual-use nature of space technology, those programs that are presented as serving non-military objectives could also be deployed in the service of military objectives.

Many scholars have identified the goal of enhancing international status as the primary motivation driving China's space efforts. Scholars in this category have pointed out both internal and external drivers underlying this goal and have generally adopted a constructivist perspective. Kulacki and Lewis (2009), in their study of China's space program from 1956- 2003, concluded that the guiding objective behind China's space efforts had been to gain a place among space-faring nations, which they argued was important for the country's 'view of itself and its place among nations'. According to the authors, the primary driver behind it is the belief that their past humiliation was a result of their failure to embrace science and technology. In a similar vein, Cunningham (2009) suggests that China's interest in manned space undertaking, marked by a combination of the absence of benefits and high costs, has been the result of elite political leadership's perception of it being one of the vital status markers of the superpower club/ status group, the membership of which they desired.

Basing her study on social constructivism, she further argues that China has 'learned' the value of manned space program from the superpowers and therefore pursued it to acquire its desired place in the international hierarchy and that the country's concern concerning its image and status in the existing international system is a manifestation of this socialization. Similarly, Lele and Singh (2012) argue in favor of moving away from viewing China's space program from a limited technological and military perspective and suggest that it is as much about achieving great power status and boosting its soft power. While certain projects are undoubtedly aimed at international prestige enhancement and achieving the 'Great Power/Space power' status, it remains but one of the objectives that China pursues through its space program.

On the other hand, scholars have highlighted the primacy of internal domestic considerations as drivers of China's space efforts. Scholars in this category are of the opinion that China's space program is driven by domestic economic and political concerns like economic development and enhancing the legitimacy of the CCP. Goswami (2018) suggests that China's activities in space are aimed more toward access to energy and material resources to fulfill its economic and energy needs. This view, just like other either/or perspectives, is problematic because it is difficult to determine the exact balance as to the military, economic, or other objectives. Sheehan (2013) suggests that the primary objective is the pursuit of prestige to provide political benefits to the Chinese government and the party. The ruling elites desire to gain legitimacy by convincing the Chinese people of the party's success in recovering past glory and position, high economic growth, and great power status for the country, as reflected through the space program. However, it appears that rather than being the primary objective, domestic political legitimacy is, at best, a desired byproduct of the program.

Still others have discussed myriad objectives like national development, military empowerment, great power competition (Julienne 2021), and economic, social, defense, and technological development (Wu 2008). In a similar vein, we argue that China's space program is geared towards simultaneously achieving a variety of interests and objectives, including the ones that have found

mention in all the space white papers it has issued so far, namely, to meet the demands of economic, scientific, and technological development, national security, and social progress; and to raise the scientific and cultural levels of the Chinese people, protect China's national rights and interests, and build up its overall strength, though not necessarily in that order. The quest for international prestige and, increasingly, great power competition are other important factors driving the program. It appears, however, that some of the objectives (like national security or defense for instance) undoubtedly outweigh the others, especially so far as China's approach to rule-making/norm-setting in Outer Space Commons is concerned, as we shall see in the next section.

Approach to Outer Space as a 'Global Commons' and China's Grand Strategy

Global Commons are domains that remain beyond the exclusive jurisdiction of nation-states, with claims of sovereignty over them forbidden. Rules and regulations in the form of international regimes provide for their governance. Therefore, this section on China's approach to outer space as 'Global Commons' would essentially concern itself with the country's attitude towards the provisions contained in the Outer Space Treaty, 1967 (and the other four treaties), which provides for the basic framework and principles for the governance of the domain. Secondly, given the existence of new issues and the recognition of the need for further rule-making/norm-setting in the domain, an analysis of China's negotiating positions and debates on international norms and regimes in outer space in the light of its interest and objectives in the domain will be undertaken.

The policy of reform and opening-up pursued by Deng Xiaoping saw China integrate itself with the international system. China joined many international organizations and institutions and became party to many regimes in the 80s and the 90s. The PRC acceded to the Outer Space Treaty in 1983. While the PRC was not part of the United Nations when the treaty was negotiated and adopted, China's accession formalized its acceptance of the provisions of the treaty, the most consequential of which are: outer space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty either by means of use or occupation or by any other means, the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries and shall be the province of all mankind, and that states shall not place nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in outer space.

Like other major powers, China is not a signatory to the Moon Treaty (1979). China has repeatedly affirmed its support for these in all the White papers on Space it has issued to date. This has led some scholars to suggest that China largely remains a 'rule-taker' in the governance of outer space when compared to its approach in the case of other 'Global Commons' governance, though they have simultaneously pointed out its attempts at rule-making in the domain (Freeman 2019, Burnay and Chaisse 2020). The debate on China's approaches to the 'Global Commons' has focussed on the implications of China's rise for the Global Commons as a result of its approach to the question of their governance. Freeman (2019), in her comparative study of China's approach to the high seas and outer space, suggests that one should desist from 'blanket characterization' of China's strategic approach to Global Commons and argues that its approach to the specific regimes depends on how they affect its perceived national interests in that while it has espoused the free and open access principle it has challenged the same in case of high seas.

On the other hand, Govella (2021), in her comparative analysis of the maritime and cyber domains, argues, in a similar vein, that China poses a challenge to the global commons as its focus on national interest disrupts more collaborative conceptions of their governance, she however argues that China employs the mixed strategy of both compliance and contestation/subversion with the regime governing a Commons depending on whether it benefits or conflicts its strategic aims.

While Freeman's study is confined to China's approaches to the principle of international access in outer space, Govella's study looks at domains at two extremes, one characterized by the existence of a relatively strong regime and the other a lawless arena not yet identified as a Global Commons. While agreeing with the proposition that there has been no single standard Chinese approach to the

Global Commons, we suggest that its approach to outer space has been characterized by a consistent affirmation of its compliance with the existing principles of the OST and other existing mechanisms while attempting to influence rule-making/norm-setting in the domain to align them with its objectives. Even with a deadlock over its proposed draft PPWT, China's strategy has been to employ the situation in service of the larger objectives of its foreign policy and to legitimize its activities, which contradict the purposes of the PPWT.

As the then superpowers began developing and testing Anti-Satellite weapons in the 1980s, the shortcoming of the OST in dealing with this development and preventing the weaponization and arms race in space has been recognized by the international community. This led to a series of discussions and proposals by various countries for negotiating a treaty towards this end at the Conference on Disarmament (CD). While the U.S. has deemed the existing provisions of international law sufficient and has consistently denied the need for new legally binding instruments, China has been at the forefront of this effort (Detlev 2006).

In 1985, China submitted its first working paper to the CD calling for a ban on space weapons and military satellites of all types, a view expressed consistently in its submissions to the CD till 2002. In 2002, China, in concert with Russia, submitted a working paper on 'POSSIBLE ELEMENTS FOR A FUTURE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AGREEMENT' calling for a ban on the deployment of space weapons and against the threat or use of force against outer space objects without any provisions for prohibition of testing and stockpiling of such weapons. In 2008, China, along with Russia, submitted to the CD a draft of the "TREATY ON PREVENTION OF THE PLACEMENT OF WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE AND OF THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST OUTER SPACE OBJECTS (PPWT)," in which it reiterated the provisions put forth in 2002. The United States rejected this on the grounds 1) The draft treaty does not prohibit research, development, production, and terrestrial storage of space-based 2) It does not prohibit research, development, testing, production, storage, or deployment of terrestrial-based anti-satellite weapons like direct-ascent ASAT interceptors, ground-based lasers, and jammers 3)The deployment of terrestrial-based ASATs would not be prohibited if such deployment is not read to constitute a threat of force making it possible to conduct tests against a country's own outer space objects like China's 2007 ASAT test 4) There is no integral verification regime to help monitor/verify the limitation on the placement of weapons in space and it is not possible with existing technologies and/or cooperative measures to effectively verify an agreement banning space-based weapons (Conference on Disarmament 2008). An updated version of the draft PPWT was issued by the parties without any substantial revision in 2014, only to be rejected by the U.S. on similar grounds.

In their response to U.S. objections, Russia-China combined argued that by acceding to the PPWT, which bans the placement of weapons of any kind in outer space and the use or threat of force, there will virtually be no grounds for developing or using anti-satellite capabilities against objects of other countries as it would render the development of anti-satellite weapons pointless. The political nature of the response document becomes evident as it uses U.S. concerns regarding the verification mechanism to suggest that by making this argument, the U.S. is calling into question the credibility of the OST, which lacks such a mechanism.

It further accuses the United States of America of trying to 'impose on the international community its politicized assessment of the programs of certain States' and avoiding having to 'shoulder any additional international legal obligations as far as outer space is concerned' calling upon it to play a more constructive approach to PAROS and the draft PPWT (Conference on Disarmament 2015: 6,7). China's strategy of pushing its draft PPWT is aimed at 1) enhancing China's international image by presenting itself as a power opposed to an arms race in outer space and a weaponization of the domain 2) legitimating China's ASAT endeavors as they are undertaken simultaneously as it pushes

for an arms control mechanism (China has long been concerned about the U.S. missile defense program) and 3) portraying the U.S. as a hegemonic actor and an irresponsible power in outer space.

Secondly, China has emphasized that it has paid great attention to the issue of space debris, carrying out research work since the 1980s (Space White Paper 2000). In 1985, China's National Space Agency (CNSA) acceded to the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee. While continuously taking up the issue of space debris in all her space white papers and highlighting its positive contributions (technical as well as in standards and regulations) towards its reduction and removal, China went ahead with its ASAT test, which created more than 3,000 pieces of debris which remain in orbit. Additionally, China's testing and deployment of Aolong 1 robotic arm with the stated purpose of debris removal raised concerns of space militarization (Chen 2016). By advertising its compliance with Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines and the Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, China's strategy is geared towards portraying itself as a responsible space power and legitimizing its testing and development of technology with a potential for dual-use.

The grounds for China's objection to the European Union's proposed Code of Conduct for Outer Space (2008, updated in 2014) give credence to the above arguments. China has 1)opposed the inclusion of security aspects in the code, arguing that it should deal with only be peaceful uses of outer space activities 2) rejected the right to self- or collective defense put forth in the code even when the proposed draft PPWT contains provisions to that effect on the grounds that one is an arms control mechanism whereas the other is merely a transparency building measure (TCBM) 3)opposed the provision on sharing of information about regarding national space policies and strategies, including objectives for security-related policies and called for moving the discussions to a more multilateral platform such as the U.N. 4)refused to agree to any mechanism that might have an adverse effect on the development of its space-based military capabilities (Rajagopalan 2014).

China's strategy towards rule-making/norm-setting in Outer Space Commons closely aligns with Cai's (2019) description of a 'distinct legal strategy' that was adopted by the PRC as it continued to rise wherein a discourse on its good record of compliance with the existing legal order goes hand in hand with efforts to enhance its 'norm entrepreneurship'. China has assigned a critical role to the domain of outer space in its military, economic and technological development, international prestige concerns, as well as the great power competition underway with the U.S. This has led to the consolidation of its activities, policy, interests, objectives and positions and approaches to rule-making in outer space as evident from its articulation in white papers as well as its submissions to the CD and its response to norm-setting initiatives of other states. Goldstein (2020) argues that China under Xi has adopted three approaches to the Grand Strategy of 'Rejuvenation' (i.e., attaining the status of one of the world's most advanced countries and a respected great power), namely, Reassure, Reform, and Resist.

Apart from identifying the space dream as critical to achieving the rejuvenation of the Chinese people, China's strategy in its approach to outer space as 'Global Commons' seems to overlap with Goldstein's three approaches. First, China has tried to reassure the international community about the benign nature of its rise in outer space. Second, China has sought to (in the case of outer space) shape the international system as it evolves to meet new challenges to align with its objectives as it emerges as a major space actor; thirdly, it has tried to resist challenges to its core interests through efforts like military modernization in which outer space has come to play a critical role as evident in its establishment of PLASSF.

Conclusion

The growing political, economic, and technological support for the development of its outer space capabilities in the last three decades has not only resulted in a tremendous increase in China's outer space activities but also resulted in the development of a comprehensive outer space policy. This has coincided with developments that have rendered the existing international regime for the governance of outer space inadequate. China's rise and its emergence as a major actor in outer space has come at a time when the international community has recognized the need for establishing additional rules and norms for the effective governance of the domain. Given the critical role it has assigned to outer space in its overall national strategy, China has adopted a two-pronged approach to outer space as a Global Commons in the service of its strategic objectives; on the one hand, it has emphasized its compliance with the existing rules while attempting to influence rule-making/norm-setting in the domain on the other. This strategy dovetails with its larger grand strategy aimed at achieving the objective of 'national rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.' China's space policy is geared towards building itself into a 'Space Power' and ultimately attaining the Great Power status.

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A Resurgent Rising Sun? Japan in Chinese Socio-Political Discourse

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Abstract

In a region as dynamic as East Asia, the relations between states are often dictated by a combination of aspects, apart from established international frameworks. Amongst these, the role of historical memory and how it is perceived and perpetuated gains prominence. When placed in this context, the relations between Japan and China today can be viewed in a more comprehensive manner. Japanese imperialist advances in China in the early 20th Century, up until Japan's defeat in 1945, left their bilateral relations deeply damaged. The relations between Japan and the Peoples' Republic of China were normalised only in 1972, yet in how true a sense can one actually describe it as a holistic reconciliation? For purposes of domestic political mobilisation, the Communist Party of China has often utilised Japan's imperialist past and its aggression against China, despite the normalisation of relations, and the so-called reconciliation between the two states. The same has been done through a decidedly negative and antagonistically hyperbolic representation of Japan through the formulation of "sites of memory" such as memorials and museums. In such a milieu, social memory is bound to become intertwined, and could slowly be replaced by a significantly altered, if not a completely manufactured, memory. Employing the theoretical framework of memory politics, this paper seeks to navigate the dynamics of Japan's representation in Chinese socio-political discourse and how it has influenced the course of bilateral relations between the two East Asian states in the last several decades.
Keywords: Japan, China, historical memory, memory politics, Japanese representation

Introduction

The East Asian states of Japan and China are far more closely linked than meets the eye. Their relationship, beyond modern-day conceptualisations of inter-state relations (Kissinger 2015), extends thousands of years into the past, to an age of hierarchical co-existence (Fairbank 1968; Kang 2010), cultural borrowing (Beasley 1999), and even wars (Swope 2009; Paine 2005) surpassing in sheer scale most other conflicts that arose during the same time. Although Japan found its place, like

many other East Asian states, within the China-centred international order of the time[70], periods of inward cultural contraction and outward expansionist ideation punctuated this fabric of hierarchical co-existence. The Sino-Japanese relationship, inherently connected and deeply rooted in history, is therefore marked by a complex and multifaceted interplay of diplomatic relations, economic interactions, cultural exchanges, disputes, and power competition. It is of great consequence, therefore, to note that the historical engagements between these two states have left an indelible imprint on the shaping of their respective perceptions of each other, and has furthermore, allowed for distinct manners of remembering their interconnected pasts. Such remembrances often intertwine with aspects of nationalism, especially in the context of the 20th Century, where Japan had played the role of the coloniser and China that of the colonised[71]. It is in such a milieu that the concept of memory politics gains importance, as contemporary Chinese endeavours to utilise memory as a tool towards the crafting of internal socio-political discourse have created another dimension within Sino-Japanese relations.

Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi and Levy (2011) have theorised memory politics as an elaborate interaction between concepts such as identity and power dynamics, intertwined with history and memory. Events from history are interpreted in a manner that seeks to augment narratives that suit political aims. Within such a theoretical framework, memory is envisaged as an active participant in the development of discourse, which stands to influence and direct the perceptions of society. Pioneering the theorisation of memory as an agent, Nora (1996) introduced the concept of *lieux de mémoire*, or sites of memory, wherein physical or allegorical "sites" are knowingly conceptualised or chosen by a society in order to represent particular aspects of their history, towards a defined end.These sites can range from the more popular embodiments of memory such as museums and monuments, to the more intellectually prominent and influential artefacts such as state-endorsed historical texts. Taking this theorisation forward, state-driven efforts towards such endeavours allow for the development and enforcement of specific narratives which are tailored to support political ends. An example within Sino-Japanese relations, is the Memorial Hall of the Victims in the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders, which was built in the 1980s. This particular site of memory popularises and reinforces state-endorsed discourse as well as the Chinese narrative of this contentious historical issue, which goes far beyond the bounds of plain remembrance.

In the context of East Asia, where history and memory are invariably intertwined (Iokibe et al. 2020), memory politics finds a prominent place. Taking this as a given, placing the East Asian experience, in this case the Chinese experience with history and memory, within Nora's (1996) theoretical framework of *lieux de mémoire*, allows for a more comprehensive understanding of how historical memory has been constructed and maintained in China. These sites of memory in China have been utilised in a manner where, beyond conceptualisations of identity and remembrances of the past, they have become instrumental in perpetuating an antagonistic portrayal of Japan. When required, anti-Japanese sentiment is often fomented towards political ends (Beech 2014; The Economist 2014).

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[70] Conceptualised within traditional academic literature by scholars of the Fairbank school of thought, the Chinese tributary order envisioned a "Sino-centric" international order in East Asia, entry into which was granted through investiture by the Chinese Emperor. The states that were included into this order were categorised according to varying degrees of how civilised they were, with China embodying the essence of civilisation itself. There were other, more practical reasons for becoming a part of this order, which included, but were not limited to, avenues for legal trade with China, among others.

[71] Breaking away from the traditional East Asian order in the late 19th Century, Japan had pursued a policy of rapid modernisation, characterised by intense industrialisation, Westernisation and militarisation, as enshrined in the political refrain *fukoku kyōhei* (富国強兵 rich country, strong army) in response to the threat from the West, and Japan emerged as the first modern Asian empire. Empire-building also encompassed the amassing of territory beyond Japanese borders, and China was among the first to face the brunt of such an endeavour. Although not completely colonised, vast territories of China, especially in North-East China fell under Japanese control. See Duus, Peter. 1976. *The Rise of Modern Japan*, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, and Drea, Edward. 2009. *Japan's Imperial Army*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.

Japanese attempts, in recent years, to augment its own security and foreign policies, have often been linked to Japan's imperial past by the Chinese (Reuters 2023), raising the idea of a *resurgent Rising Sun*, or a return to Japan's militarist past. Whether Japan's emerging policies fall within the ambit of the militarism of old or not, it has become an imperative for the Chinese state-driven discourse to portray it as such. Invariably, this narrative is often linked to the Nanjing Massacre, a site of memory, which provides the Chinese with ample grounds for perpetuating anti-Japanese sentiment, towards a political end.

In pursuit of understanding the contours of Sino-Japanese relations in contemporary times, this paper attempts to investigate the intricacies that define this relationship through the lens of memory politics. This shall allow for an inquiry into the manner in which historical events are brought within the fold of political narratives within China, how the same resonates with the Chinese public, and the broader implications of the same on bilateral relations between these two East Asian states.

Historical Contours of Sino-Japanese Relations

> In spite of the differences in their social systems existing between the two countries, the two countries should, and can, establish relations of peace and friendship. The normalization of relations and development of good-neighborly and friendly relations between the two countries are in the interests of the two peoples and will contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and peace in the world.[72]

The 1972 normalisation of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and Japan came about in the backdrop of a larger, more prominent series of occurrences, that is, the events that led up to the Sino-American Rapprochement (Siniver 2008; Kissinger 2011). The US-Japan Alliance, secured under the 1952 San Francisco Treaty, ensured as a fallout that the Japanese had to toe the American line, and given the changing American perceptions regarding relations with China, it became increasingly important for the Japanese to follow suit. At the same time, there was a more pragmatic inclination on the Japanese side as well, which even the Chinese conceded to, as became clear from the Joint Communique signed in 1972. Normalised and enhanced relations "between the two countries are in the interests of the two peoples" give way to an underlying, yet significant, importance granted to mutual interests, which were embodied prominently in economic interactions (Calder 1996; Nakamura 1998). Japan saw a market for its burgeoning economic output, while China saw it as way to develop itself at a rapid pace. Yet, this picture, no matter how pragmatically envisaged, blurred by way of more deep-rooted issues that lingered unresolved in the background.

At the turn of the decade, the Chinese began to grant more focus upon their history, which naturally, included the Japanese, in the form of the coloniser, the invader, and the plunderer. Social discourse was based on the experiences of the previous generation of Chinese, and the wounds were still visible, if not festering in latency, allowing for a point of intervention by the Chinese state. Among the scars left by Japanese aggression against China, the deepest were felt in terms of the Nanjing Massacre (Chang 1997). The manner in which the Chinese state took up the issue of the same hints towards a deliberate attempt towards assuaging public sentiment. At the same time, the elaborate narrative that was being built around the Nanjing Massacre[73] by the Communist Party of China,

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[72] Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China, signed on 29 September 1972, at Peking (Beijing). Accessed at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint72.html.

[73] Known as the "Nanjing Incident" in Japan, it has received less than a passing mention in Japanese text-books, which has, in recent years, led to a heightening of tensions between the two states, with allegations at Japan for not owning up to its aggression.

reveals that there was a deeper aim to it. Memory of the massacre could be used as leverage against the Japanese, in the event it be required. In terms of Nora's (1996) theorisation, Nanjing thus became a site of memory, which was then intentionally melded into a narrative that allowed the Chinese to create a latent point of conflict, which could be utilised to their advantage. A concerted focus also began to be granted to Japanese atrocities, including the matter of "comfort women" which arose as a grievance from both China and the Republic of Korea (Tanaka 1996). As social discourse on the such matters gained traction, the addition of deliberate attempts at the political end, further gave rise to simmering elements of discontent with regard to Japan within Chinese socio-political discourse. At the same time, the pragmatic element mentioned above should not be fully discounted. As noted by Fogel (2007: 270) "It [the CPC] exploits the issue [Nanjing] both to keep the Japanese in their place and to show its own people how it has gained the upper hand in Sino-Japanese relations, but it never mobilizes the masses to the point of seriously damaging trade".

An avenue for reconciliation emerged at the 50th anniversary of the end of the World War II in 1995, when the then Japanese Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi stated that:

> During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history.[74]

This marked the first such incidence of an overt acceptance of Japanese aggression during the Second World War by a serving Japanese Prime Minister. As mentioned this came about as an avenue for reconciliation, and could have been taken up as grounds for settling the past, salving unresolved trauma, and reconciling with their shared history, it became another aspect to be leveraged against Japan. The constant invocation of Nanjing allowed for the shaping of social memory in China, also allowing for the employment of victimhood as a factor in the development of Chinese domestic and international policies (Wang 2012; Vogel 2019). At the same time, efforts at memorialising events such as the Nanjing Massacre, which included memorials in honour of the victims, allowed for the fostering of collective memory, which in turn became an integral aspect of the formation of national identity in China. It also served to delegitimise the Kuomintang (KMT) government that had been in power during the massacre in 1937, and now ruled over Taiwan, and legitimise the CPC as it placed itself as the sole saviour of the Chinese public. In this manner, the crafting of Nanjing as a site of memory, and its employment by the CPC towards directing socio-political discourse in China, enabled the CPC to achieve two primary aims, that is, foster a point of leverage against Japan, and discredit the KMT and its claim over Mainland China.

Taking the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall as a site of memory, one can see how the narrative surrounding the event rests largely upon framing Japan as the aggressor, and less upon remembrances of those who had perished. Here, it can be posited that victimisation (Wang 2012) and fomentation of anti-Japanese sentiment has taken precedence over honouring memory. The official website of the Nanjing War Memorial[75] provides heaps of information, albeit well-within the Chinese narrative. However, the most important section of the website deals with the testimonies

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[74] Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama "On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war's end", 15 August 1995. Accessed at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html

[75] The website can be accessed here: http://www.19371213.com.cn/en/.

of the survivors. Providing a view into the grim reality of this horrific historical incident, this section allows for a strong case to be made against the Japanese. As mentioned, any attempts by the Japanese to alter their security policies are often granted the colour of militarism by the Chinese.

In these cases, the utilisation of survivor testimonies gives the Chinese the required leverage against the Japanese. Furthermore, the Nanjing Massacre has been the subject of various popular films. Here, we shall take the example of two Chinese films namely, *Black Sun: The Nanking Massacre* (1995) and *City of Life and Death* (2009). Both films take up the same historical event, however, the directions taken are significantly different. The first film seems less historical in nature, beyond its title and setting, and presents the Japanese as pillagers, engaging in acts of violence and mass murder as they go on to destroy the city of Nanjing. The second film, however, presents the very same event in a different manner. Featuring graphic visuals, the film *attempts* to present a more true-to-reality version of events, even going so far as to depict the Japanese perspective. However, it suffers along similar lines, with regard to the representation of the Japanese.
On the issue of fostering collective memory by the state, Reilly (2011: 466) states that:

> Efforts by the state to appropriate and promulgate individual memories and experiences to advance a favoured narrative require negotiations with society. After all, only people can remember. Individuals' personal memories engender them with a certain power of authenticity. Furthermore, people are the ultimate consumers of the collective memories promulgated by the state.

With the domestic population at the centre of its narrative, the CPC has also raked up the issue of Japanese leaders visiting the Yasukuni Shrine[76] in Tokyo, where the Japanese war dead since 1868 have been enshrined (Nelson 2003). It has often become a point of confrontation between Japan and other states that had once faced the brunt of Japanese imperialism, most notably China (Takenaka 2015). Chinese reactions to the visits of Japanese Prime Ministers to the shrine, beginning with Nakasone Yasuhiro's visit in 1985, became more and more critical, reaching a crescendo when Koizumi Junichiro continued to visit the shrine throughout his tenure from 2001-06. While this served to assuage Japanese nationalistic tendencies, it also gave the CPC enough impetus to further influence Chinese collective memory, and shape the socio-political discourse with regard to Japan.

Within the historical contours of Sino-Japanese relations, memory politics has, thus, come to play a significant role in shaping discourse among the population, as well as towards crafting a national identity. This has played the dual role of enabling the CPC to engender a deep sense of legitimacy among the Chinese population, and of granting it points of leverage against Japan to be employed in the pursuit of its own national and international aims. China's attempts to re-envision its own war-time history (Coble 2007; Mitter 2020), has also resulted in a reinforcement of the need to employ memory politics, as aspects of political legitimacy, national identity, diplomatic leverage, and general victimhood meld further, creating a situation where the CPC needs to be continuously cautious of the manner in which it engenders collective memory, lest it entrap itself, and in turn discredit itself.

Chinese Responses to Japanese "Revisionism"

[76] The Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo was established in 1869 to honour those who had fallen in service of the Meiji Emperor during the Boshin War, which had culminated with the Meiji Restoration, marking the beginning of Japan's Modern Era. Since then, those who fell in service of the Emperor in Japan's wars abroad began to be memorialised at the Shrine. The Shrine has come under criticism from states like China and the Republic of Korea due to the enshrinement of those convicted as war criminals by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, or the Tokyo Trials. See Takenaka, Akiko. 2015. *Yasukuni Shrine*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

“Revisionism” has often been associated with Japanese attempts to re-interpret its own past, with a specific focus on how Japanese imperialism is comprehended, and projected to the Japanese populace. Such tendencies, although common among most nations including China (Mitter 2020), in Japan have been the centre of criticism. Oh and Ishizawa-Grbić (2000: 46) write:

> Historical revisionism is saying that victims' silence proves atrocities had never occurred. Even if they had occurred, their magnitude was in no way close to any existing historical description, such as that of the Nanking [Nanjing] massacre or the forced slavery of countless men and women. Indeed, historical revisionism is an attempt to release historical facts from the display box. Yet, its attempt is not to speak what has been unspeakable. Its aim is to remove these facts from the display box altogether, leading to yet another "assassination" of our memory. The underlying objective of historical revisionism is to blur the distinct line that exist between the victims and the aggressors.

In the case of China, where revisionist tendencies have served to engender a sense of victimhood (Zheng 2012), quite successfully so, Japanese revisionist attempts have not fared as well, given the and aggressor and coloniser aspects often ascribed to Japan. It is, however, worth noting that the CPC has played this, in tandem with other Japanese attempts such as visits to the Yasukuni shrine, to further its narrative that Japan seeks to avoid accountability for its imperialist past (Pollman 2016). Further, Japanese attempts at revising educational textbooks (Kushner 2007) has also drawn sharp criticisms from nations that had suffered under Japanese imperial rule, especially China. Needless to say, such attempts have negatively affected Sino-Japanese relations, at the same time, they have also allowed for grounds for the CPC to further manipulate memory discourses against Japan. Moreover, Chinese socio-political responses to Japanese revisionist tendencies have taken different forms. Chan and Bridges (2006: 128) write:

> In April 2005, autonomous anti-Japanese mass movements broke out in more than thirty Chinese cities, including several economic and political centers such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen. Activities included gatherings, demonstrations, protests, signatory campaigns, boycotts of Japanese products, and even violent actions such as damaging Japanese-brand cars, Japanese capital department stores, and signs of Japanese enterprises. The anti-Japanese demonstrations, the intensity of which shocked the Japanese, were primarily triggered by the coincidence of Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro's publicly-stated refusal to stop visiting the controversial Yasukuni shrine, the authorization of new history textbooks, and the raising of Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). But the demonstrations also reflected an underlying tension in the relationship that had been slowly building.

Careful fostering of collective memory in China by the CPC had allowed for the wounds of the past to remain open among the populace, and active engagement with the manipulation of memory had ensured the foregoing of any hopes at reconciling with Japan in terms of their shared past. Within this, political ends can be witnessed as well, as in the case of Japan’s attempt at securing a permanent seat at the UNSC, and how it became embroiled within the broader popular agitation against Japanese revisionism. Using the past and its memory as a point of diplomatic leverage thus comes to fore as an active part of China’s Japan policy, where the CPC’s deliberate and conscious cultivation of popular discourse surrounding memory allowed it to further a political end.

By fostering public local sentiment against any Japanese action within the folds of its own domestic and international policies as an attempt to deliberately avoid accountability and as an endeavour towards a resurgent international stance, the CPC has been fairly successful in influencing social responses within China. Fears of a re-armed Japan, aimed with a revised and reconciled view of its

own past, have been played by the CPC to keep the Japanese in check. This reveals the efficacy with which the Chinese state has employed memory as a point of diplomatic leverage, using it effectively to influence Japanese policy-making endeavours.

However, it is important to note that such attempts emanating from Beijing exist within the realm of normalised relations. On the face of it, Sino-Japanese relations have remained normalised since the Joint Communique of 1972, yet in how true a sense have relations been normalised? Within the sites of memory created by the CPC and the collective memory cultivated among the Chinese populace, Japan is envisaged in an antagonistically hyperbolic manner, with a constant association with its past as the coloniser.

It is, therefore, safe to posit that the CPC's manipulation of collective memory, and in turn socio-political discourses within China, has had a significant effect on the trajectory of Sino-Japanese relations, leading to a never-ending conflict, rooted in the lack of avenues for historical reconciliation. The deliberate and carefully crafted aspect of Chinese national identity, that of being a historical victim of Japanese aggression, has been employed with fair success towards engendering the image of Japan shying away from acknowledging its past aggression (Wang 2012). Such utilisation of the politics of memory is a means for the Chinese government to assert moral authority by placing the Japanese as aggressors.. By constantly highlighting these stories through state-controlled media, education, and public commemorations, thereby creating sites of memory, China has sought to strengthen domestic support, and nurture international perceptions to its own suiting, and thence, employ diplomatic leverage against Japan. While this has worked in favour of the CPC, it also raises questions over any potential hopes for reconciliation between the two East Asian States.

Conclusion

Japan and China share a long-standing historical relationship, preceding modern-day conceptualisations of world order and interstate relations. Yet, the one aspect that binds them so closely, has emerged as a point of conflict, often leading to a conflagration of competing nationalisms, with severe ramifications for the future course of their bilateral relations. This paper has sought to examine the positioning of Japan within Chinese socio-political discourse, through the lens of memory politics as defined by Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi and Levy (2011) and Nora (1996). The theoretical framework of memory politics has allowed for a more in-depth analysis of the issues that plague and hinder the trajectory of bilateral relations between Japan and China. Collective memory is influenced and manipulated through state-led efforts in China, especially through the creation and cultivation of sites of memory such as the Memorial Hall of the Victims in the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders. In tandem with China's attempts at shrouding itself as a victim of Japanese aggression, such manipulation of memory has enable the CPC to employ Japan's imperial past as a point of diplomatic leverage against Japan. Furthermore, the cultivation of manipulated collective memory among the Chinese populace has been successful at exerting pressure upon Japan, thereby granting grounds for influencing Japanese policy-making.

Popular narratives, controlled as they are by the Chinese state, have envisioned Japan as an aggressor in perpetuity, often raising the spectre of a return to militarism. Through this, Japan's attempts at re-arming and assuming a greater security role in East Asia have also been brought under international scrutiny, while allaying Chinese fears of a resurgent Japan posing a direct threat to its own aims in the region and beyond. Chinese socio-political discourse with regard to Japan has been framed and fostered in a manner that it has made reconciliation near-impossible to achieve. It has also raised questions over the extent of normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations.

Through an exploration of socio-political narratives towards Japan, and how they influence Chinese popular attitudes and views, the complex dynamics of Sino-Japanese relations have been brought to the fore. In this endeavour, memory politics as a theoretical framework has been instrumental in laying a thorough conceptualisation of how memory plays an active role in the shaping of bilateral relations between Japan and China. At the same time, it also lays emphasis on the significance of

navigating the interconnected issues of a shared past, and on finding avenues of reconciliation, while moving beyond political aims.

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6.	Prof. Rajat Kathuria	Dean, School of Humanities and Social Sciences; Professor, Department of Economics, Shiv Nadar University, Delhi NCR.
7.	Prof. K.K. Kailash	Head of Department & Professor, Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad.
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70.	Amb. Gautam Bambawale	Former Ambassador of India to China, Pakistan and Bhutan; Adjunct Fellow, Institute of China studies, New Delhi & Distinguished Professor, Symbiosis International University, Pune.
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5	Dr. Saul Wilson	Assistant Professor, Ashoka University
6	Maj. Gen. G. Jaishankar (retd)	Retired, Indian Army
7	Dr. Diki Sherpa	FLAME University, Pune
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11	Dr. Parimal Maya Sudhakar	MITWPU School of Government
12	Pranitha Pullamaraju	Kautilya School of Public Policy
13	Amit Meena	Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi.
14	Dr. Anuprita Lele	K.J Somaiya Institute of Dharma Studies. Pune
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18	Srimali Kari	U.S. Consulate General Hyderabad
19	Siba Prasada Tripathy	U.S. Consulate General Hyderabad
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69	Abhirami JB	MA I Year, Department of Political Science, UoH
70	Gopi Tejaswi	MA I Year, Department of Political Science, UoH
71	Ayan Datta	MA I, Year, Department of Political Science, UoH
72	Akash Kumar Mahato	MA II Year, Department of Political Science, UoH
73	Dushyant Yadav	MA II Year, Department of Political Science, UoH
74	Anamika PK	MA I, Year, Department of Political Science, UoH
75	Siddhi Lodha	MA I, Year, Department of Political Science, UoH
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81	Joe	Doctoral Scholar, Department of Political Science, UoH
82	Haile Chuluke	Doctoral Scholar, Department of Political Science, UoH
83	Dr. Abdul Moshin	Post- Doctoral Fellow, Department of Political Science, UoH
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85	D. Preetham Chowhan	MA II Year, Department of Political Science, UoH
86	Md. Shafiq	MA I, Year, Department of Political Science, UoH
87	Rajendra Das	MA II Year, Department of Political Science, UoH
88	Inderjeet K. Sahu	MA I, Year, Department of Political Science, UoH
89	Utkarsh K. Singh	IMA Political Science, UoH
90	Lipun K. Sahu	MA I, Year, Department of Political Science, UoH
91	Yash P. Sinha	MA I, Year, Department of Political Science, UoH
92	K. Rahul	IMA Political Science, UoH
93	Athul T. Dharan	MA I, Year, Department of Political Science, UoH
94	Niraj Kumar	MA I, Year, Department of Political Science, UoH
95	Manish Sharma	MA I, Year, Department of Political Science, UoH
96	Pradeep K. Gautam	MA I, Year, Department of Political Science, UoH
97	Sudeep K. Kesharwanee	MA I, Year, Department of Political Science, UoH
98	Rajat P. Singh	MA I, Year, Department of Political Science, UoH
99	Sachin	MA I, Year, Department of Political Science, UoH
100	Aga Syed Muntazir Mehdi	Independent Researcher
101	Pallavi Pradhan	Doctoral Scholar, Department of Political Science, UoH