

Transcript of
V.P. Dutt Memorial Lecture 2021
Institute of Chinese Studies

About Prof. V P Dutt



Prof. V P Dutt (1925-2011) was a pioneering Indian scholar on China with a long and distinguished career in research, teaching and public life who mentored a large number of China scholars in India. He completed his higher education from Lahore in pre-independent India, Stanford University and Beijing University. He was also a visiting researcher at Harvard University. He was Pro-Vice-Chancellor of Delhi University. He set up the Centre for Chinese Studies at Delhi University which became the Department of Chinese and Japanese Studies and he was its Head for many years. He was a prolific writer and commentator. He authored several books, including China's Foreign Policy: 1958-62, China and the World, China's Cultural Revolution (which he co-authored along with his wife Prof. Gargi Dutt), China after Mao, and India's Foreign Policy. He also contributed in public life as a nominated member of the Rajya Sabha and a former member of the Parliamentary Consultative Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The Institute of Chinese Studies hosts an annual lecture in memory of Prof. V P Dutt. This year, the VP Dutt Memorial Lecture was held in online mode on the topic 'Biden's China Policy: Old Wine in a new Bottle?'. The lecture was delivered by Prof. Andrew J. Nathan, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University.

About the Speaker



Andrew J. Nathan is Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University. His teaching and research interests include Chinese politics and foreign policy, the comparative study of political participation and political culture, and human rights. Nathan's books include Chinese Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985); The Tiananmen Papers, co-edited with Perry Link (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001); China's Search for Security, co-authored with Andrew Scobell (Columbia University

Press, 2012); and *Will China Democratize?*, co-edited with Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013). Nathan has served at Columbia as director of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, 1991-1995, chair of the Executive Committee of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, 2002-2003, and chair of the Department of Political Science, 2003-2006. He is currently chair of the Morningside Institutional Review Board (IRB). Off campus, he is the regular Asia and Pacific book reviewer for *Foreign Affairs*, a member of the steering committee of the Asian Barometer Survey, and a board member of Human Rights in China. He is a former member of the boards of the National Endowment for Democracy, Freedom House, and Human Rights Watch.

TRANSCRIPT**Biden's China Policy: Old Wine in a new Bottle?****By Prof. Andrew J. Nathan**

Thank you (Prof.) Sreemati and Dr. Nair for that very nice introduction.

I am very honored to be here and speak to honor Dr. V.P. Dutt. I am sorry that I cannot be there in person, but of course the pandemic makes that impossible. And I have been very alarmed by the news that I am reading about the pandemic in India and I am happy to see that there are so many people participating in this event because I guess it means that you are all in good health, those who are participating. So that is a bit of good news, and I hope you will stay in good health.

When Sreemati and I started studying - I started studying China a little bit earlier than Sreemati did, in the 1960s as an undergraduate but even in the 70s, when she came to Columbia to study it and she had already been studying it in India - China was not a subject that so many people were interested in. But it has become extremely important to all of us in the United States and to all of you in India. So obviously, Professor Dutt was very foresighted as Sreemati has already said, in launching this field of study in India, and it has developed to a great extent, and you have a distinguished cadre of China specialists in academia and in the diplomatic corps and in the business community now. So, it is really an honor for me to speak with you.

My topic today has a question mark after it. At least, that is what I had sent over for the announcement -- "Biden's China Policy: Old Wine in New Bottles?" -- because I am not saying that there is nothing new. What I am saying is that on the surface, Biden's China Policy looks similar to that of Trump but deep down inside, it is rather different in some important ways.

In a superficial sense, Biden has continued some of - has not abandoned, let us put it that way, so far - Trump's important policies that he implemented, including the tariffs, including the emphasis on the Quad, including the stepped-up naval patrols in the South China Sea, and including the upgrade in the protocol status of Taiwan. These continuities are grounded upon a deeper continuity, which is that, in the Trump Administration, it was the time when American policy decisively pivoted from engagement to a position that the Trump Administration in one

of its documents labelled “strategic competition”. That pivot had been in the making, for some time.

People had been, of course, noticing the so-called rise of China, especially since the 1990s – the tremendous growth in the Chinese economy, the tremendous increase in the sophistication of Chinese technology, the steady double-digit growth, in most years, of the Chinese Defense Budget and the creation by China, gradually, of a bigger and bigger navy, in particular. The debate had been ongoing for some time as to what this really meant.

Under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the Chinese Government continued to project an image of relative modesty and cooperation. With the rise of Xi Jinping, the more assertive Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Policy became evident and that intensified the debate in the United States. With the rise of Trump, this line of thinking came to the forefront in the United States, and there is now, a very broad consensus among both Republicans and Democrats, in government and academia, even in the business community, in media, that China is some kind of a threat and, as I say, the official slogan that has risen to the top and around which everyone can agree is that China is a Strategic Competitor.

Looking back, the emergence of China as a strategic competitor was, I would say, inevitable. That doesn't mean that everybody predicted it but the reasons for it are very understandable. Some of you may know that in 2012, I published a co-authored book with Andrew Scobell called “China's Search for Security,” and in that book, we pointed out that, from a Beijing point of view, from a China-centric point of view, China's security was - and this is still the case now - was very vulnerable.

China had many internal problems. China had important territorial control issues like Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (which is, from their point of view, an issue of territorial integrity). They had a rapidly rising middle class that was ideologically unstable in terms of its commitment to the vision that the Chinese Communist Party had. But very importantly, for the current US-China relationship, China was surrounded by the United States and its allies, which remains the case today. The United States has, as you all know, very large military deployments in the region, in Asia, and has been the dominant military power in the Western Pacific, in the South China Sea and so forth, for decades.

No government of China - whether it is a Communist government or a democratic government or if Sreemati and I became the President and Vice President of China and we were responsible for China's Security - could really accept permanently this position, of the United States

surrounding China and having the capability, if it wanted to do so, to cut off China's access to imports of oil and raw materials and things of that kind. It is just not an acceptable situation for a sovereign state.

I remember when Donald Rumsfeld, then the US Secretary of Defense was at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore and asked the Chinese Defense Minister “Why are you building up your military? Nobody is threatening you”. That was a hypocritical question because Rumsfeld knew better than anybody else that the United States had a potential stranglehold on China in the military and economic sense. So of course, the Chinese Government has done the things that it has done. There is a question of its the way it has done it, the timing that it has done it, but it was inevitable that China would push back against the United States.

It was inevitable that, in due course, American policy makers would become alarmed about this, because for the United States, ~~the preservation of our, I say our, I mean, I am not in the government that~~ the preservation of the United States inherited, incumbent position of dominance in Asia is also a natural behaviour in international politics. One has an advantage and one wishes to maintain it. So, the emergence of this situation of strategic competition was inevitable and make sense in terms of International Relations theory, or what we know about the behaviour of states.

However, the way in which the Trump Administration dealt with that problem was short-sighted, lacked strategy and lacked coordination. Trump himself, as we all know, is not a long-term thinker, not a strategic thinker, and if anything, his major concern was always with his domestic political support and how he could sell himself to the American public and he chose to do so by placing an emphasis on the trade deficit and said that trade wars are easy to win and put in these tariffs and he really had no other interest in the issue of China than the trade deficit.

As you all know, his strategy for dealing with the trade deficit was a failure. On other issues, he allowed other members of his administration to run wild with their own China policies and there were many different such policies. One of his trade advisors, Peter Navarro, had an ambition to achieve the complete decoupling of the two economies and he pushed on that as much as he could, although with little ultimate success. The official chief trade negotiator, Robert Lighthizer, a much more professional individual in this area, tried to change the Chinese economic model to make it more like what the United States viewed as a so-called level playing field. That didn't work either.

Mike Pompeo, the Secretary of State, along with Mike Pence, the Vice President, put forward an extremely alarmist view of China as a threat to Western Civilization. And, in one of his last speeches as Secretary of State, Pompeo even advocated that US Policy should be to encourage the Chinese people to overthrow the Chinese Communist Party. Other members of the administration were focused on domestic security issues in the United States. So the head of the FBI, Christopher Wray, launched a so-called China Project to try to root out Chinese spies in the United States, who were stealing technology. Matt Pottinger, the senior China official in the National Security Council, was concerned about China sending security agents to the United States to threaten Chinese who had taken refuge here, and so forth. So, they all had their different agendas and there was no coordination.

This is where the question mark in my talk title comes in, because I don't think that the Biden Policy is completely old wine in new bottles. I think that the Biden policy is different from the Trump Policy in one very big important way, which then has a number of categories underneath it. The one big important difference with the Trump Policy is that the Biden Policy is not just labeled "strategic competition," but is actually strategic. It is based upon a long-term view of how the United States can defend its position in the international system against the ambitions of China and how in doing so, the United States can gradually shape the options that China faces and in doing so, shape the behaviour of China. It is strategic, and it is coordinated.

I am sure that everybody in this audience knows the facts that I know about how the Biden China policy is being coordinated. So, I will allude to them briefly. Biden has appointed Kurt Campbell as the so-called Asia Czar in the National Security Council. Kurt Campbell is an official who has served many times in Democratic administrations and has great depth of knowledge about Asia and knows all the leaders in Asia and all the issues in Asia, and he is in charge of coordinating Asia policy. Biden has hired a lot of other China experts throughout the administration, others in the National Security Council, others in the State Department, the Defense department, the office of the Trade Representative and so on. Campbell will be coordinating their activity.

What is this strategy that the Biden administration has begun to show us in managing the China relationship?

The first part, and this has become a cliché, is that competition begins at home. Dr Nair, I think, mentioned that I do the Asia and Pacific Book Review section in *Foreign Affairs*, the magazine that's considered the most influential and the oldest US journal on foreign policy. I read the

whole magazine, of course. It used to be that every third issue would have an article on China, but now just about every article in *Foreign Affairs* will have a number of paragraphs, at least, on China, even if it is about health, technology, Russia, or the Middle East, because China is now everywhere. And what has become a cliché in these articles is the final paragraph that says “Our China Policy needs to start at home, in the United States, fixing what's wrong with the United States”.

And yes, that is Item Number One of Biden's China policy, to take this word “competition” in the phrase “strategic competition” literally and say, okay if we're competing, we have to compete. The idea that we will change China either by making China more friendly to us or by somehow preventing the rise of China and pushing China back down, those ideas are gone from Biden's Policy. They haven't disappeared from the public discourse, but they are marginalized in the public discourse, because neither of those concepts really makes any sense. We have to accept China as it is. China may change. China is bound to change. We are all bound to change as time goes by, in one way or another. But China's change is not going to be done by us. And it may not be -- probably won't be -- the changes that we would prefer. So competition has to start from home.

This is actually convenient for Biden because Biden's first priority really is at home. His domestic policy is not really driven by China. It is driven by his progressive agenda, by his concern to restore the middle class, to restore the economy and so on, but China becomes very convenient as a motivator for this domestic policy. So, as you know, Biden ran on the platform of “Build Back Better”. Then, having become President, he gave this speech, where he said, if we are going to compete with China, we have to show that democracy really works. So it is a kind of “Sputnik moment”. I am old enough to remember when the Russians launched Sputnik and the then-President Kennedy said, we have to compete. It is a convenient reason to try to persuade the public and the Republicans and others that the Federal Government needs to be active and take a lead and spend money.

But it is not just an excuse. It actually is a strategy for dealing with China, because if the United States doesn't have an attractive model, doesn't have the money to build up its defense, doesn't have the money to compete with China's Belt and Road Initiative and so forth, then China will win (whatever winning means, which is a debatable question).

The Second Element of Biden's China strategy that is very different from the Trump Strategy, is to work with allies and partners. You saw Japanese Prime Minister Suga visit the White

House recently and meet with Biden. The Japanese alliance is extremely important, of course, for the United States' position in East Asia. People like Kurt Campbell have worked on that alliance for years and years. It is an alliance that has plenty of problems in it, but which is essential to the success of US China Policy. That is where it makes sense that Biden inherits the Quad and looks to a country like India, for whatever cooperation India would be able and willing to offer, in offering the world alternatives to Chinese influence.

Biden is cultivating the European partners, trying to put credibility back in NATO. Biden is re-entering the World Health Organization, re-entering the Kyoto Climate Accord, re-entering the Iran deal, and becoming engaged again in the United Nations Human Rights Council and in the United Nations in general, with a very good new UN Ambassador Linda Greenfield-Thomas. He hasn't said so yet, but I think he may re-enter what used to be called the Trans-Pacific Partnership. So, the second strategic idea is that the big alliance network of the United States is a huge asset that we have that China does not have.

On the other hand, the administration is clear that the Allies are not going to solve the China problem for the United States, because none of the allies has the identical interests with respect to China that the United States has. The Europeans don't have a major security concern in East Asia. They are not committed, for example, to the defense of Taiwan. The Japanese don't want to be dragged into a war over Taiwan. At the end of my remarks, I want to come back to the question of India-US relations, to ask the audience to help me with this important question, but it seems obvious that India doesn't share all the security interests of the United States, nor does the United States, place the same priority that India places on some of India's concerns. So, the allies are important, but alliance relationships inherently are difficult and limited. So, the administration is sophisticated enough not to expect too much out of the alliances.

Another problem about the alliances is as many people have pointed out, that the allies cannot, as the saying goes, "unsee Trump". They cannot forget that under Trump, the United States was capable of insulting its allies and ceasing to cooperate in many respects with its allies. So, because of Trump, the US commitment has come to be regarded as something that is only good for as long as a particular President is in office and unpredictable after that.

The third element of Biden's China Strategy that is different from the Trump Strategy is a much heavier emphasis – or, I should simply say an emphasis -- on Human Rights, in the sense that Trump himself placed no emphasis whatsoever on Human Rights. Some of his officials did, again the Pompeo-Pence group did emphasise human rights, but in a narrow fashion as

essentially, religious rights. Part of Pompeo's and Pence's individual political strategies for their political lives after Trump was to appeal to the Trump base. Both of these men have strong political bases in the American Evangelical Christian community. So, to the extent that either of them talked about human rights, which, from time to time, they did very emphatically, they were chiefly concerned with religious rights. That meant the rights of Christians around the world, and then, to show sincerity, they would also speak about the rights of Muslims in China, the Xinjiang Uyghur issue, but their concept of human rights was, first of all, narrow, and second, was not coming from the President, it was their own freelancing.

In the Biden administration, it is different. They are interested in the full range of human rights. Now, I teach an undergraduate course called "Introduction to Human Rights" and I am 100 per cent aware of the issue of so-called American exceptionalism -- that the United States wants to use human rights against other countries, but doesn't itself accede to core treaties and so on and so forth, and this is true. I teach about that in my class, but though that is true, nonetheless the Biden Administration has elevated Human Rights in its Global Foreign Policy and has made it an important part of its China Policy. I think there are five reasons for this.

The first reason Human Rights is important in the Biden China policy is that Biden himself, Anthony Blinken, Kurt Campbell, and the other key policymakers honestly believe in the importance of human rights. This is perhaps a somewhat overlooked feature of American Foreign Policy -- that the people making the policy often have a very deep personal commitment to human rights, despite the problems of getting certain treaties through the Senate and things like that. So that is important, and I know when I have contacted members of the administration, even in the Trump Administration, in the State Department and the NSC, about certain human rights cases, the person on the other end of the line honestly wants to help out of personal commitment.

That said, though, another reason why Human Rights is part of Biden's China Strategy is a more political reason, which is that it has always been difficult in the United States to explain to the broad American public why the United States is spending so much money on far-flung defense bases, a diplomatic corps (even though it is under-budgeted), foreign aid. ~~why you know~~ We are a continent, separated by two oceans from the rest of the world. Why do we have to be involved in Asia at all, is something that has always been difficult to sell to the average American voter and this has for long been the case. Under President Truman, under President Carter, under Clinton, you could explain these foreign policy commitments to the American

public in a sentence or two by talking about Human Rights and Democracy, and you didn't have to get into all the complexities of strategy, and that still works. So, the administration is presenting the struggle with China as a clash of values and a clash of systems, to again repeat what Biden said, "we have to show that democracy works better than authoritarianism".

A third strategic value, if you will, of human rights in American China Policy is that it is the one thing that most of our allies agree with us about. So, with the Europeans, they may not disagree, but they don't have a deep national interest in, say, the security of Taiwan. But the Europeans do believe in the importance of human rights and that is true with the Japanese, the Australians and with many of our allies, so it provides a sort of a core basis for the work with the allies.

Another value of human rights in a strategic sense, is that it remains a weak point of Chinese Foreign Policy. As China seeks to expand its soft power, its influence around the world - although some authoritarian leaders and some parts of the global public like the Chinese model for its efficiency and effectiveness - a lot of the public in Europe, Japan, Australia, and to some extent in other parts of the so-called Global South, and I am sure very much so in India, and in the Muslim world, are aware of the human rights violations in China and consider that to be a negative feature of the Chinese model.

Finally, I think we need to keep up pressure on China's Human Rights because it encourages human rights activists within China and makes life more difficult for the Chinese Government.

The fourth element of Biden's China policy that is different from the Trump Administration is a search for areas of cooperation with China. The Biden Administration does not interpret strategic competition as a 100 percent "zero sum relationship" with China. It believes that cooperation is possible with China and is, in fact, imperative on certain issues.

The obvious example of this is climate change. Without cooperation between China and the United States on Climate Change, the world is going to burn up and we are all going to die. Recently, Foreign Minister Wang Yi of China was quoted as saying something about this, that I think was misinterpreted by the media. He was misunderstood as saying that if the United States criticizes China on Human Rights, China will not cooperate on Climate Change. The fine print of what he said was more nuanced. I don't have the quote to give you right now, but it was more of a vague threat. I think it is safe to say, and I think that the Biden administration believes, that China will cooperate on Climate Change if the United States takes significant measures itself. If the United States takes significant measures on Climate Change, then China

has to do so or otherwise, the benefit of American actions will disappear and China will suffer the consequences. If, on the other hand, the United States does not take measures on Climate Change, then it is of no use to China to do so and they might not. In other words, China has to do it if the United States does it, absolutely for their own interest. The trip of John Kerry to China last week shows that this is the Biden administration policy, and my impression is that the policy is going to work with respect to climate change.

The other big area of mandatory cooperation is with respect to global health. And then, there are other areas of cooperation that are very desirable although not mandatory - Global Infrastructure, the Iran problem, the North Korea problem – there is a lot of potential for cooperation where interests overlap, and the Biden Administration Strategy is to pursue those potentials.

Now, sitting in New Jersey, being a university professor, it is easy for me to talk about cooperation in very broad terms, but I would like to point out, and I am sure that you have thought of this already, that when one gets down into the details of cooperation, it becomes much more difficult. There is always the question, if we embark on a cooperative program with respect, for example, to climate change, who will benefit more from the projects that are undertaken. Who is going to control the new technologies that are needed to ameliorate climate change? We saw the struggle play out in the solar panel business where there was a big struggle between the Chinese, the Europeans, and the Americans for who would control the solar panel business and the Chinese won that struggle. All of the new technologies - hydrogen powered vehicles, carbon dioxide recovery technology and so forth - whoever controls those technologies is going to make a lot of money and have a lot of influence in the 21st century. So, you can cooperate, but as you cooperate, you are still competing. The same thing is true with global public health and with all of these other areas: cooperation has within it intense competition.

There is also the question of the distribution of costs. Who is going to pay more for these cooperative efforts? And there is the problem of distrust which can never be ameliorated. I see some writing by people saying the two countries distrust each other, and they should trust more. That is impossible. Distrust is built into international affairs. So, cooperation is not an easy strategy to pursue, but it is part of Biden's China Strategy.

The final element of Biden's China strategy is what I will call "Partial Decoupling". As I said, some members of the Trump Administration wanted to pursue complete or nearly complete

decoupling. I don't know that Trump bought into that vision, because he doesn't think long term, but he allowed Peter Navarro to advocate quite a few policies, including the trade war, the ban on Huawei, and the effort to dissuade allies from using Huawei, ZTE equipment, and so forth, that Navarro thought would be pushing towards decoupling. And there was also a faction in the Trump Administration, the so-called "Wall Street faction" - Gary Cohn, who was for a time the economic advisor, and Trump's son-in-law Kushner - who didn't want decoupling, because they felt that the finance industry still could make a huge amount of money in China. I think that full decoupling is not really feasible. It is not imaginable. It would be bringing back very complex supply chains from all around the world to the United States, where they wouldn't be economically viable.

But partial decoupling, I think, has become inevitable, and that is the creation of at least two and maybe three, if you count Europe as a third one, three independent cyber economies. Because of the crucial nature of 5G and all kinds of cyber infrastructure to the security of any nation, if you are using Chinese equipment, the Chinese are going to be able to spy on you. I do not claim to be a cyber expert, but I think this is something that even an ordinary person like me knows. If you use Chinese equipment, the Chinese can spy on you and the Chinese can turn off your electricity and your water.

If you use American equipment, the Americans can spy on you and can turn off your electricity and water and if you are using European equipment, the Europeans can do it. In the cyber domain the defense is always behind. The only way to be secure is to have your own system, and in that area, I believe, decoupling is going to occur. But in terms of many other big parts of the economy, decoupling will not occur. So, I think that what I have just described is the Biden Policy on Economic Relations.

So my answer to the question, "Is it Old Wine in New Bottles" is no: Biden's policy is quite new compared to the Trump Policy.

In its strategic details, is the Biden policy going to work? Is it a good policy? There is, of course, criticism of it. So there remains the criticism on the right, from people like Pompeo, Pence, Newt Gingrich, Steve Bannon, and others, that China represents an existential threat to American civilization and we have to really do everything to fight back. You can't cooperate. We've got to beef up military, political pressure and have a so-called new Cold War.

There is also a critique, from I would say, China doves - I wouldn't necessarily put them on the Left - who argue that China has legitimate security aspirations that should be acceptable to the

United States. The US should find a graceful way to abandon Taiwan, it should not go so hard on human rights, and it should try to negotiate a kind of new G-2 global condominium.

The Biden Administration Policy is in between these two extremes. In my opinion, the Biden Administration policy makes sense. I do not think China is an existential threat to Western Civilization. It doesn't have an ideological program like the old Soviet Union had for the whole world. It doesn't have an alternative view of the world order. It wants more influence in the world order. It is not militarily expansionist in the sense that Taiwan is a territory that China has always claimed, and which I think under international law it has a good claim to, and beyond Taiwan, it is not planning to invade other countries and has not articulated a new territorial claim against anybody. The same thing can be said about the ~~two~~ Indian territorial disputes with China. I don't see these as aggression, in the sense that they are long-standing claims that have some legal foundation. I am not trying to take sides on it, but it seems to me that they are legacy claims, rather than representing an expansionist ambition.

A further reason for measured optimism is that the Chinese leaders are realists and not adventurists. They are not crazy. They are not Hitler, and they will they will respond in a rationally calculative manner in their own self-interest to American policy. If American policy is effective, then Chinese policy will adjust.

But we cannot be complacent. There are some very hard issues between the two sides, the most important of which is Taiwan. The Taiwan situation is dangerous. It is hard for most Americans to understand why Taiwan is so important to China. Why don't the Chinese just let the Taiwanese have what they want? And why is it important to the United States? It is far away and relatively small, and it is in China's natural sphere of influence. But the fact is that Taiwan is very important to both sides for good strategic reasons as well as for reasons of, in the Chinese case, nationalism, and in the American case, democracy. For hard, material, strategic reasons Taiwan is important to both sides. China will, in my opinion, never give up. Even if Sreemati and I become the Government of China, we won't give up our ambition to control Taiwan, nor will the United States readily abandon Taiwan, which is so important to our credibility and to our position in Asia.

There is a new paper out from the Council on Foreign Relations by Robert Blackwill and Philip Zelikow about the Taiwan issue, that says that the American military strategy for deterring a Chinese attack on Taiwan is no longer viable. I can explain why, and I agree with that, if we

have time in the discussion. They recommend a very sophisticated, nuanced, largely political strategy. At the same time, the Pentagon is debating over different deployments and equipment.

So, I come out at the end with a mixed pessimistic-optimistic view of the US-China relationship. I think it is possible for us to navigate our way through this strategic competition over the course of some decades without a catastrophe. But it is not guaranteed because the Taiwan issue is so important to both sides.

Finally, if I can just have a sentence or two about what all of this means for India -- and I put this forward in all humility because you have thought about this in a lot more depth and you know a lot more about it than I do -- when I think about what are India's most important strategic concerns and what are the United States' most important strategic concerns, I see only one case of an important overlapping of interests. In the case of India -- and here I am not talking about domestic security for the moment but international security -- it's going to be Pakistan; Chinese influence in Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh; and, and none of these things is a primary security concern for the United States. Of course, the United States is aware of them, but they are not at the top of the list. And in the case of the United States, the primary concerns as regards China have to do with Japan, North Korea, Taiwan, and South China Sea, which are issues in which India has an interest, but not a primary security interest. The chief area where very important security interests overlap between the two countries is whether the Chinese Navy will become a big factor in the Indian Ocean. I think we have seen some room for cooperation there.

My conclusion on this question is a conventional one, which is that the prospects for India-US cooperation around the China issue are quite limited. They do exist, they are important and valuable to both sides, but they are limited. I put that out there, as a question really to ask for your feedback. So let me stop there. I look forward to questions, comments and discussion.