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Akshat Mayne

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Author: Akshat Mayne

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Institute of Chinese Studies
B-371 (3rd Floor),
Chittaranjan Park, Kalkaji
New Delhi 110 019, India
Ph.: +91-11-40564823
Email: info@icsin.org
Website: www.icsin.org

About the Author

Akshat Mayne is a Research Assistant at the Institute of Chinese Studies, and a doctoral scholar in Japanese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi He holds a Master's degree in East Asian Studies, with a specialisation in Japanese Studies, from the University of Delhi. His research looks at Japan's place in the broader East Asian international order. His research interests include Japanese domestic politics, security and foreign policy in the post-war era, and the emerging dynamics between various players in the region, especially Japan and Taiwan. Beyond this, he is also interested in the historical interactions, and political and cultural exchanges between Japan and other East Asian states.

Contact: akshatmayne1998@gmail.com

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Pacifism as Policy in Post-War Japan[1]

Abstract

The rise of Japan, in the aftermath of World War II, from a catastrophically devastated and vanquished land to an advanced nation needs to be understood in the context of a series of domestic and international developments. Arguably, the most critical of these developments, was the formulation of 'pacifism', and its institutionalisation as state policy. Thrust upon Japan by the victorious Americans as a binding constitutional provision, pacifism was employed efficiently and adeptly to focus the national energies towards economic reconstruction while security was outsourced to the US. This strategy however, had its own costs. This paper has sought to analyse the historical trajectory of pacifism as policy from 1947 to 1991, contextualising and grounding it within the framework of the US-Japan Alliance. Three major conclusions are made in this paper. First, that pacifism does not have a domestic origin in Japan as it has had in the West; rather the experiences of World War II shaped Japanese receptivity to the idea, thus granting it the shroud of an enforced ideal. Second, through an assessment of four succeeding Japanese leaders since 1948, it has been posited that extant conditions outmoded any inclinations towards altering the pacifist clause. Third, it has been argued that the First Gulf War brought with it an effective end to pacifism as policy.

Keywords: pacifism, post-war era, Article IX, US-Japan alliance, Yoshida Doctrine

[1] An earlier version of this paper was presented at the **2nd Young Scholars' Webinar on *Recent Trends in Japanese Studies***, organised by the Centre for Japanese Studies (CJS), School of Language, Literature & Culture Studies (SLL&CS), Jawaharlal Nehru University; and, the Japan Foundation, New Delhi, on 10 December 2022.

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Part - I

1. Introduction

> "We see in the future a new era among nations, an era of peace and harmony as described in the opening words of the Charter of the United Nations. We seek to take our place among the nations who are dedicated to peace, to justice, to progress and freedom, and we pledge ourselves that Japan shall play its full part in striving toward these ends. We pray that henceforth not only Japan but all mankind may know the blessings of harmony and progress."
>
> - Yoshida Shigeru[2]

As Yoshida Shigeru, in his capacity as the Prime Minister of Japan, signed the Treaty of San Francisco[3] in 1951, a new era had indeed already begun to dawn over the island nation. The long and tragic years of imperialism, national mobilisation and war, followed by defeat and the American Occupation were now in the past, as the 'Land of the Rising Sun' rose anew. In his speech, Yoshida stressed upon the ideals of 'peace' and 'progress' as integral to this new era that Japan had entered, thus pointing to the centrality of pacifism to the path taken towards reconstruction and progress. This centrality can be accredited to the binding pacifist clause enshrined within Article IX of the 1947 Constitution. However, in the decades that followed, pacifism was institutionalised[4] as policy and employed in an altogether ingenious and adept manner. It is therefore important to begin with an understanding of pacifism, and thereafter, chart out its trajectory within the Post-War Japanese experience.

Teichman (1986) theorises that pacifism can be viewed from multiple standpoints. In terms of

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[2] Yoshida Shigeru. 1951. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida's Speech at the San Francisco Peace Conference, 7 September. Accessed at: https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPUS/19510907.S1E.html.

[3] The Treaty of San Francisco signed on 8 September 1951, between the Allied Nations and Japan, marked an end to the American Occupation of Japan, and allowed, in essence, for Japan to be a self-governed nation. The document can be accessed here: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume 136/volume-136-I-1832-English.pdf.

[4] Here, "institution" and "institutionalisation" retain the definition accorded by Sun-ki Chai. He states that it refers "to a stable pattern of interactions within a shared set of beliefs, whether or not these beliefs are derived from any formal structure. Institutionalization refers to any process that embeds certain policies into an institution." See Sun-ki Chai, 'Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine'.

opposition to, or acceptance of, coercion, and by extension violence, different actors respond differently with varying degrees of opposition or acceptance, or a combination of both. Pacifism, therefore, is not an isolated concept which can be defined in a universal manner. Further, she weighs it against the theory of just war, critiquing it effectively to an extent. Even so, Teichman's arguments pertaining to pacifism remain ambivalent with regard to the right to self-defence. In his review of Teichman's work, Lackey (1993: 546) appreciates her treatment of pacifism as a "cluster of theories" as against a singular theoretical notion, but is scathing in his critique towards some of the near-equivocal aspects of her theorisation and subsequent arguments. This also reveals the problem with defining pacifism as a concept — it could easily have a multitude of definitions, moulded to suit specific or particular requirements. Alexandra (2003: 590), drawing from scholars like Teichman and others, notes that while pacifism today has a "variety of senses", historically, it emerged "as a name for opposition to war as a means to the resolution of conflict between states". This broad historical, and rather ambiguous definition, when read in tandem with the pacifist clause in Article IX of the post-war Japanese Constitution, presents a sense of convergence[5]. Nonetheless, there is a lingering ambiguity in the said clause, thus leaving, if only barely, some space for interpretation and manoeuvrability. It is in this space that the divergences with respect to theoretical pacifism start to become apparent in post-war Japan.

Following the end of World War II, two nations, namely Germany (then West Germany) and Japan, enshrined pacifism as a central feature in their respective developmental paths in the post-war order. Both nations were also key players in the US-led alliance against communism[6]: Germany in Europe (Kohn 1966; Schwartz 1995), and Japan in East Asia (Sherman 1985; Komine 2016; Pyle 2018). Concomitantly, both nations, operating within the American defensive umbrella, went on to achieve major economic successes (Sakaki et al. 2020). However, there existed differences between Germany and Japan with regard to how they were located in the overall Cold War context.. Whereas the Cold War battle lines cut

[5] Under Article IX of the Japanese Constitution, the Japanese people forever renounce "war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes". The 1947 Constitution of Japan can be accessed here: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.

[6] The Soviet communist threat to Europe, west of the developing Iron Curtain, was compounded by the communist takeover of China, resulting in a two-pronged threat, to both Europe and Asia at the same time. Although the U.S. appreciated concern over this situation, the greater focus was directed towards the defence of Europe. For a detailed account, see John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War*.

right through the heart of Germany, with American policy directed in full force towards the defence of Europe against Soviet communist influence (Gaddis 2005), the lines were not as clear in Japan. Although Japan became a hub for US operations against communism in Asia, as was first witnessed during the Korean War[7] (1950-53), the Japanese experience was significantly different.

While Germany, under the aegis of the US and other Allied Powers, was afforded the opportunity to rearm with the creation of the *Bundeswehr* in 1955, Japan was limited to a National Police Reserve (NPR) which "was formed to fill the country's military vacuum by providing for national defense capability, as well as to serve as a lightly armed national police force" (Kuzuhara 2006: 95). The NPR eventually evolved into the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (JSDF), or *Jieitai* 自衛隊, due to the emerging threats in the region, especially in the aftermath of the Korean War (Kuzuhara 2006). Given that the Cold War battle lines were apparent, emergent and defined in Europe, the *Bundeswehr* was organised and armed accordingly, as a conventional military. The *Jieitai*, on the other hand, stood in stark contrast, in that it was "a de facto military technically deemed a police force to avoid conflict with Article 9 [IX]" (Kapur 2018: 10). By implication, the broader role of the *Jieitai* was constrained to internal security, unless there emerged an external military threat to the Japanese home islands. Such a threat, however, would have been deterred by the American defensive umbrella, and so the chances of the *Jieitai* playing anything more than a supporting role to American forces were negligible. This allowed Japan to manoeuvre in a comparatively different manner, which shall be discussed in the following sections.[8]

The institutionalisation and development of Pacifism as policy in post-war Japan is assessed within a time-frame beginning in 1947, when the current Japanese Constitution came into effect, and ending in 1991, when Japan was met with the stark realities of an altered scenario in the wake of the First Gulf War. This paper is divided into three sections. The first section

[7] As the Korean War began while Japan was still under the American Occupation, there was a considerable American military presence there. Given the proximity of Korea to Japan, the U.S. could easily deploy, and reinforce troops, and military and logistical materiel to the Peninsula at short notice. For a detailed history of the Korean War, including the use of Japan as a base of operations, see Bruce Cumings, *The Korean War*; and, for a military history of the war, see Edgar O'Ballance, *Korea: 1950-53*.

[8] Noting the importance of the US in the course taken by Japan after 1945, this paper is grounded in the framework of the US-Japan Alliance, and the analysis operates within the realist realm, as followed by Kenneth Pyle in the case of Japan.

contextualises/historicises the origins of the pacifism in Japan, and argues that far from being an organically developed concept in the post-World War II period, pacifism was essentially an enforced ideal, non-negotiable from the American standpoint, and that a pacifist Japan was integral to the broader aims of the US in the region.

The second section traces the pattern of development that informed the trajectory of 'pacifism as policy' within the aforementioned time-frame. Here, the methodology employed in Iokibe et al. (2020) is used to divide the post-war era into sub-eras, making up integral compartments of a whole, through which pacifism can be assessed. This section, therefore, reviews how pacifism as policy developed in succeeding decades, and how the prevalent conditions weighed against the same. The third and final section of the paper views pacifism as policy at its breaking-point, and looks afresh at the problems that had arisen by 1991.

2. The Origins of Pacifism in Post-War Japan

2.1 Domestic Roots

Western scholars such as Brock (1968, 1972) and Ceadel (1980, 1996) have sought to locate the roots of pacifism and peace movements within the realm of religion, that is, in Christianity. In the context of the 20th century, they have stressed on World War I, given its massive scale and the concomitant destruction, as a major turning point for the relevance of pacifist thought. Ceadel's classifications of "pacifism" and "pacificism" indeed merit focus as they allow for a comparatively nuanced theorisation of the concept, but have their limitations in the Japanese context. The former categorisation advocates an absolute repudiation of war, while the latter centres on regulated violence within the larger ambit of preventing war.

While Ceadel's classifications may work well within a Western setting, the same cannot be applied, even in a rudimentary sense, to Japan, as noted quite accurately by Yamamoto (2004). She points out that the categories of "pacifism" and "pacificism" developed from the extant Western tradition emanating from the socio-religious roots of peace movements, wherefrom Ceadel drew these two strands. This implies that for such categorisations to be applicable to another region, the existence of at least a broadly similar extant tradition, whether religious or not, is an imperative. The question that arises thus, is that did such a tradition precede the acceptance of pacifism in Japan? If one were to explore the dimension

of religious, or even social, roots of pacifism, and thence try to incorporate Ceadel's categorisations, barriers of consequence tend to appear.

In the case of Japan, religious sensibilities have often been an amalgamation of complexities and syncretic tendencies. Whilst both the native Shintō and the nativised Buddhist tradition (de Bary 1969) spoke of being in harmony with nature, neither seem to have contributed towards a concerted exercise in the development of pacifist thought, or a peace movement of any consequence. War and peace were as much a part of Japanese socio-religious dynamics, as was historically prevalent in other parts of the world; however, a historical reading of socio-religious trends in Japan does not throw up a consistently dominant, let alone unified, strand of pacifist thought. However, a convergence can be seen in that just as the experiences of World War I resulted in a wider social acceptance, and therefore relevance, of pacifism in Europe and the US, as stressed upon by both Ceadel (1980; 1996) and Brock (1968; 1972), destruction and defeat in the World War II allowed for the same[9] in Japan to a great extent.

From a reading of Yamamoto's (2004) analysis of pacifism in Japan, one can also infer that for the "ordinary" Japanese, there was neither a complete repudiation of war ("pacifism"), nor was there any social consensus on regulated violence in the post-war era ("pacificism"). Yamamoto (2004: 9) states:

> "At the grassroots level, ordinary Japanese, in thinking about war and peace issues in general, tended to derive their chief inspiration from their own experience of the [Second World] war, and to develop their ideas in terms of their own existential questions posed by such experience, rather than embrace ideas elaborated from an international perspective."

[9] This is not to say that activism in the name of some semblance of pacifism and peace was non-existent in pre-war Japan. During, and after, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, with its massive rate of casualties, pacifist activism sometimes emerged through writing, as in the case of Uchimura Kanzō (1861-1930), Yosano Akiko (1878-1942) and Sakai Toshihiko (1871-1933), among others, but was fairly limited in scope. Such writings did not receive as great a public response, and were met with counterarguments in support of the war, often in an overwhelming manner through newspapers and magazines supportive of the government. Pacifism was also an element within the broader politics of the socialists in Japan, however, it was neither a mainstay of their agenda, nor was there any ideological consensus with pacifism at its core within the socialist quarters during the early 20th century. For an overview of the ideological inconsistencies among socialists, including with regard to pacifist ideas, in Japan during this period, see Takafusa Nakamura, *A History of Shōwa Japan*.

Furthermore, over the course of Japan's long history there have been periods of both war and peace. Even when the latter prevailed for centuries, as during the Heian era (794-1185) and the Edo era (1603-1868), it was often punctuated with violence, and the central government, whether the Imperial Court in the first case or the Tokugawa shogunate[10] in the second, would order military expeditions (Sansom 1958, 1963; Beasley 1971) at its discretion to quell dissidence of any sort. Even in the case of Imperial Japan (1868-1945), the decision to wage war or maintain peace remained solely with the central government. The avenue of war and peace changed drastically, however, in post-war Japan. When Article IX, or the pacifist clause, was added to the 1947 Constitution by the Americans, it took away something integral to the sovereignty of any nation-state: the ability to choose whether to wage war or maintain peace; to be knowingly belligerent or wilfully pacifist.

2.2 The Occupation Years: Pacifism as an Enforced Policy

The post-war period was ushered in by the American Occupation of Japan (1945-51) under the authority of the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), and saw various changes and reforms in a very short span of time. General Douglas MacArthur of the US Army, appointed as the SCAP, arrived in the vanquished nation with three primary aims, that is, demilitarisation, democratisation, and the political decentralisation of Japan. These were to be achieved by the demobilisation of all Japanese troops, the dismantling of the Japanese military establishment (MacArthur and his General Staff 1994; Masuda 2009), disbanding of the *zaibatsu* 財閥 (McClain 2002), and the framing and promulgation of a new democratic constitution (Long 1979). Ostensibly, these measures were to prevent the rise of militarism in Japan again, and to guide the nation towards peace and prosperity. However, it is also pertinent to note that a pacified Japan was a necessity for the US and its interests in the region, especially in light of the communist threat emanating from the USSR, and the uncertainty with regard to the simmering situation in China[11]. Further, within the broader

[10] The term "shogunate" is a derivative from the Japanese term *shōgun* 将軍, used to signify the *de facto* military ruler of Japan, operating within the authority so vested in his office by the Emperor of Japan. This system began in 1192 and lasted until 1868. The original Japanese term for the "shogunate" is *bakufu* 幕府, literally "tent-government".

[11] The Chinese Civil War continued after the end of World War II, and culminated with the establishment of the People's Republic of China under the rule of the Communist Party of China led by Mao Zedong, and the retreat of the Chiang Kai-shek-led Guomindang to Taiwan. Tensions between the Mainland and Taiwan continued thereafter, with Japan lying in the periphery. The US' support for Chiang additionally necessitated

security network that was being engineered by the US in the Asian region, Japan found an important role to play. It became one of the "spokes" within the American "hub and spokes" model (Cha 2016) of multilateralism through bilateralism. Defining the rationale behind such an institutional framework in Asia, as against the close-knit multilateral alliance system prevalent in Europe (in the form of NATO), as "powerplay" in the broader American post-war strategy, Cha (2016: 3) writes that, in the context of Japan "the powerplay rationale was to create a tight, exclusive hold over the defeated imperial power to ensure that the region's one major power [Japan] would evolve in a direction that suited US interests".

Interestingly, the Americans had first arrived at Uraga in 1853 with the purpose, among others, of using Japan as a safe haven for their ships travelling onwards to China (Fillmore 1852) and the rest of Asia. Japan, thus, became a supporting element in the broader scheme of American aims in the region. Nearly a hundred years later Japan came to serve a similar purpose. While Japan had earlier played an economic-interest based role for the Americans, it now came to play a security, and even ideological, role as well.

General MacArthur arrives at Atsugi Airfield, 30 August 1945
Source: Harry S. Truman Library and Museum

In his broadcast to the American public soon after his landing in Tokyo, the SCAP, General MacArthur (1968: 395) mentioned how under the military government in Japan, democratic rights had been denied "through appeal to superstition, and the application of force", and he stated that:

the presence of American forces nearby. Japan thus became a strategic location for American presence.

> "We are committed by the Potsdam Declaration of principles to see that the Japanese people are liberated from this condition of slavery. It is my purpose to implement this commitment just as rapidly as the armed forces are demobilised and other essential steps taken to neutralise the war potential. The energy of the Japanese race, if properly directed, will enable expansion vertically rather than horizontally. If the talents of the race are turned into constructive channels, the country can lift itself from its present deplorable state into a position of dignity."

From the agenda of the SCAP and the mandate placed upon his office, the General Headquarters, one can begin to see how pacifism, from its commencement as a key factor in Japan's post-World War II policy orientation was predominantly a by-product of American aims. The quote above is unambiguous with regard to MacArthur's understanding of his mandate, and how he saw it as his responsibility, even ambition, to be the harbinger of a new era in Japan (Jacob 2015). The "energy of the Japanese race" was to be directed towards peaceful ventures that would help it emerge out of its "present deplorable state", and this could only be achieved if Japan were to move forward with a policy of pacifism. Rigid controls and regulations were also put in place to ensure that the domestic leaders chosen to work with the SCAP's office, would, essentially, fall in line with the American directives (Long 1979). Whether the domestic leaders, representing the people of the vanquished nation of Japan, desired or intended to accept a pacifist path after the end of the War, was of little consequence in the American perception. The benefits of such a national stance in Japan were actively projected. Institutionalising pacifism, and thence creating a new Japan, far removed from its pre-World War II political stance, became a matter of utmost importance to the SCAP. This was manifested, most notably, in the Constitution of 1947, and enshrined specifically in Article IX of the document.

Pacifism, consequently, developed less organically, and more in an enforced fashion during the Occupation years. From the American point-of-view, a constitutionally-sanctioned pacifist stance for Japan was not up for negotiation. Even so, the social environment prevalent in Japan at the time was conducive to the enforcement of the same. As mentioned earlier, the Japanese social response to pacifism drew from their war-time experience (Yamamoto 2004), and rendered it easier for pacifism to be accepted at large. On the political front, the Occupation authorities were careful in their vetting and selection of domestic political leaders who were to assist the office of the SCAP. The Occupation authorities

brought in such domestic figures as had opposed the leaders of Imperial Japan[12] in the previous decades. Such a move gains importance in two regards. First, these figures had been at the receiving end of the Imperial Japanese authorities and harboured a deep-set resentment, largely political, towards the pre-war government. It can be said that in the eyes of the SCAP, it was comparatively easier to manage them, rather than drawing political leaders who held resentment towards the Americans instead. Second, it was simpler for the SCAP to justify the involvement of these domestic leaders in political roles to the authorities back in the US.

In a broader sense, for at least the sake of appearances, the SCAP considered it important to ensure that the Japanese were working closely with its office. This further legitimised the role and long-term objectives of the Occupation, and also provided a sense of legitimacy to the Japanese political class which would carry forward the democratic and peace-loving ideals that formed the core of the SCAP's policies, after the inevitable end of the Occupation. One of the major aspects of creating a democratic Japan was the drafting and promulgation of a new Constitution. The domestic leaders brought in by the SCAP were to work under supervision to draft the document, and a committee was set up in this regard. It is, however, necessary to understand that the constitution would not be drafted by the Japanese as such. Jacob (2015: 214-15) writes:

> "The Japanese Commission [Committee] did not understand the need for a new constitution, and their first draft had no major changes to offer, so on February 4, 1946 MacArthur ordered his staff to create a more liberal and democratic draft in just nine days. The general's role in Japan's post-war policy was apparent, because "MacArthur's guidelines gave direction on several key points" of the new Japanese constitution."

The role played by the Japanese leadership in the overall process of the drafting of the Constitution merits closer attention. Initially, the responsibility of preparing a draft was placed upon Matusmoto Joji by Prime Minister Shidehara Kijūrō. The "Matsumoto Draft"[13],

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[12] Often referred to as the *gunbatsu* 軍閥, or "military clique" government. Although dominant in Japanese politics throughout the Modern Period (1868-1945), it reached a crescendo in 1936 after an attempted coup in Tokyo (the February 26 Incident, also called the *Ni ni roku jiken* 二二六事件). The last civilian cabinet headed by Prince Konoe Fumimaro fell in October 1941, allowing for the military to assume overt control. See Edward John Drea, *Japan's Imperial Army*, and John Toland, *The Rising Sun*.

[13] A brief version of the Matsumoto Draft titled, "Gist of the Revision of the Constitution", can be accessed here: https://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/074shoshi.html. The original document is available at the National Diet Library in Tokyo.

presented in early 1946, did not pass muster at the SCAP's office, primarily because it did not provide a satisfactory improvement over the pre-war Constitution. Interestingly, Berkofsky (2010: 14) notes that MacArthur had ordered that the draft of the Constitution introduce "what he [MacArthur] requested would have to be a 'war renouncing article'". Furthermore, according to Long (1979: 191), the Japanese drafting committee included two groups, the liberals "who wanted radical changes" and the conservatives "who wanted virtually none at all". This apparent impasse within the commission pushed MacArthur, who was "anxious that the Japanese leaders should write their own constitution rather than have an American-style constitution imposed on them" to task his staff to draft the document. In this simpler version of history, MacArthur's hand was ostensibly directed by a lack of consensus amongst the Japanese, which somehow also led him to have the Constitution drafted without the knowledge of the serving Japanese cabinet.

There is also a version, which argues that Article IX, and the new Constitution, were not thrust upon the Japanese. Instead, it is posited that the idea of a pacifist position in the post-war era was indeed Japanese in origin, and can be traced back to the discussions between Prime Minister Shidehara Kijūrō[14] and General MacArthur. This, as well as the broader question of whether or not Article IX was a Japanese idea has been discussed in Basu (2023). Nevertheless, an objective assessment of the Japanese origins of Article IX needs to be juxtaposed with the American push to include such a clause in the Constitution.

In the post-war era, with rising tensions between the Soviets and the Americans, in addition to the threat from Communist China and the potential spread of communism in Asia looming in the background, Japan essentially became a foothold, across the Pacific, for the US to project its power in the region, becoming a bulwark against communism. That Japan could not possess or maintain a military of consequence for its own defence due to the pacifist clause and, therefore, had to depend upon the US for its security, also served to legitimise a continued US military presence on Japanese soil, after the end of the Occupation. This

[14] Shidehara Kijūrō had served as the Foreign Minister of Imperial Japan in the interwar years (1924-1927, and 1929-1931), and was known widely for his liberal and peace-based approach, especially in terms of diplomatic relations between Japan and the West. Within the broader ambit of the period of Taishō democracy, Shidehara's ideals existed at the same time as simmering nationalist sentiments among the young and mid-rank officers of the Imperial Japanese military. It is possible that his leaning towards a peace-based approach to international relations during his earlier governmental tenures also fed into the position that the pacifist clause could be traced back to him. For more information on Shidehara's tenure as Foreign Minister, and his approach to Japan's foreign relations during the interwar years, see Ian Nish, *Japan's Foreign Policy*.

allowed the Americans to remain in close proximity to the Asian mainland, with a sizeable force ready to be deployed anywhere in Asia whenever required, much like in the case of the Korean War. American interests had thus effectively mandated not only the inclusion of the pacifist clause, but also severe constitutional limitations with regard to its amendment.

Among the Japanese leaders, who found a place in the emerging domestic decision-making circle under the supervision of the SCAP, Yoshida Shigeru rose to a position of prominence. As part of the pre-war governmental set-up, he had opposed war with the Americans (Dower 1979; Nakamura 1998), and in the post-war environment he emerged as the Prime Minister (1946-47; and 1948-54) under whom the new Constitution was promulgated. Yoshida understood Japan's predicament quite well, and, much like his predecessor Shidehara, chose the path of cooperation with the office of the SCAP. Given that there was little choice but to accept the imposition of a pacifist constitution, he went on to both interpret and implement it in a manner that would set the tone for Japanese policy for the next several decades. Beginning with Yoshida's tenure as Prime Minister of post-war Japan, the concept of pacifism imposed and enshrined in the 1947 Constitution, was harnessed to Japan's efforts on nation-building and development, while outsourcing its security needs to the US. This came to be known as the Yoshida Doctrine.

Part - II

3. Pattern of Development

A variety of interpretations have emerged with respect to the American Occupation of Japan that lasted from 1945 to 1951, its impact on the vanquished nation and its subsequent trajectory (Fishel 1951; Reischauer 1957; Goodman 1968; Scalapino 1976; Long 1979; Sugita 2003; Cooney 2007; Jacob 2015; Pyle 2018). By and large, these approaches have invariably focussed on MacArthur's tenure as the SCAP, and the run-up to the establishment of the US-Japan Alliance. In stating that "these six or so years of occupation for the most part established the patterns for modern Japan's political, economic, social, legal, educational, and cultural reality", Masuda (2020) presents the impact of the Occupation in fairly simple terms. This stands true, especially in terms of the changes brought about in the political realm.

As highlighted in the preceding section, the new system established by the Americans centred on an enforced pacifist ideal, which was accepted, based less on choice than on the gravity of circumstances. The same was then followed through by the Japanese leaders who took the helm after the end of the Occupation. Yoshida, of course, was at the forefront, and his interpretation and employment of pacifism developed into a path that successive leaders would take up, both wilfully and with an ever so slight hint of reluctance, as shall be seen in this section.

The pattern of development that allowed for the advancement of pacifism as policy in post-war Japan has been analysed by employing the methodology used by Iokibe et al. (2020), where the post-war era is compartmentalised into sub-eras, forming "integral components of a whole". Iokibe et al. (2020) divides the first several decades of the post-war era in accordance with the tenures of Prime Ministers Yoshida Shigeru, Satō Eisaku, and Nakasone Yasuhiro. Even as the compartmentalisation facilitates an understanding of historical memory and political developments in the aftermath of World War II, it has been specifically employed in this paper to trace the development of pacifism as policy. Further, another sub-era is added for a more comprehensive understanding, that is, the tenure of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke. Therefore, the trajectory of pacifism, and the Yoshida Doctrine, shall be assessed from 1947 to 1991, across the following sub-eras: Yoshida (1948-54), Kishi (1957-60), Satō (1964-72), and Nakasone (1982-87).

3.1 Carving the Path: Yoshida Shigeru (1948-54)

The Yoshida Doctrine can essentially be understood as the framework through which the Japanese directed their post-World War II efforts towards economic and political reconstruction, while outsourcing all of their security needs to the US (Cooney 2007). While the Americans did supervise the establishment of the NPR, and its evolution into the *Jieitai*, the Japanese military, for the next several decades, remained effectively a small-scale organisation, severely limited in operational scope due to Article IX. As mentioned earlier, even in the event of an external threat, the *Jieitai* would have ended up playing a supporting role to the US forces, which would protect the Japanese home islands, as long as the threat was common, which it was, at least for the time being.

The end of the Occupation coincided with the outbreak of the Korean War, the ripples of which reached Japanese shores as well. As Dingman (1993: 32) notes, “the war also brought to the fore the question of Japanese rearmament, creating, in the process, the anomaly of a nation with a “peace” constitution building up its armed forces”. Yoshida and his cabinet were in consensus about retaining American bases on the Japanese home islands, with the larger aim of guarding against external threats (Dingman 1993). Although American pressure pushed Japan to increase the size of the *Jieitai* in the 1950s (Sugita 2016), the expansion of the *Jieitai* into a conventional military, and changes to its operational scope, were opposed by Yoshida and his cabinet, citing Article IX (Chai 1997). Chai (1997: 397) ascribes three reasons for Yoshida’s apprehensions regarding the same, which ranged from endangering Japan’s post-war economic recovery, to his “strong aversion to the Imperial military establishment”, and his “desire to minimize worries on the part of neighboring countries”. Of greater focus is the first reason, which was instrumental in institutionalising the Yoshida Doctrine.

Yoshida Shigeru
Source: Portraits of Modern Japanese Historical Figures,
National Diet Library Online.

It is important to note, however, that the term ‘Yoshida Doctrine’ does not feature anywhere in Japanese official parlance. This term was first employed by Masashi Nishihara (1978), a Japanese political scientist, “as a way to define a consistent, pragmatic strategy in postwar Japan” (Sugita 2016: 123). In the years since, various scholars have analysed the same through a multitude of approaches. While Chai (1997) has assessed the defence policy

aspects of the Yoshida Doctrine, Togo (2005) and Cooney (2007) have reviewed its role within Japanese foreign policy. Sugita (2016) has asserted that the so-called 'Yoshida Doctrine' would not have been able to stand its own had there not been tacit acknowledgement of Japanese aims from the Americans, whilst Hoshiro (2022) critiques it as a "flawed" policy. This paper appreciates the position taken by Sugita (2016) to an extent, while granting due credence to Yoshida's skilful manoeuvring. The Doctrine does hold ground, in that successive leaders, found it difficult to move away from it, and either wilfully chose, or saw no other option but to continue with it, and the associated benefits so derived from it for as long as possible.

To comprehend this deft usage of enforced pacifism, one needs to look at how Yoshida formulated such a framework. The key lies in Yoshida's acceptance of the fact that Japan had lost, the pre-war order was a thing of the past, and that there was no point in remaining attached to it (Dower 1979). With the Occupation of Japan, there was little to absolutely no advantage in resisting the Americans. Yoshida later recalled (1961: 58):

> "Being a good loser does not mean saying yes to everything the other party says; still less does it mean saying yes and going back on one's word later. It was obviously important to cooperate with the Occupation authorities to the best of one's power. But it seemed to me that where the men within the GHQ [General Headquarters] were mistaken, through their ignorance of actual facts concerned with my country, it was my duty to explain matters to them; and should their decision nevertheless be carried through, to abide by it until they themselves came to see that they had made a mistake. My policy, in other words, was to say whatever I felt needed saying, and to accept what transpired."

What one sees, therefore, is how Yoshida aimed to influence the office of the SCAP where he could, as it drafted policies for a new era in Japan. He believed that, for the time being at least, the Occupation authorities were there to stay, and resistance would not be fruitful. Yoshida also mentioned that he would go along with the Occupation authorities, until they realised that "they had made a mistake". Even if that did not work out, changes could very well be considered at a later point in time, for the Americans would leave, sooner or later. This highlights Yoshida's shrewd political and strategic understanding.

Another aspect of pacifism that attracted the Japanese leaders, Yoshida in particular, was that after Japanese war potential had been completely neutralised, the "Americans accepted in

principle its [Japan's] 'right' to be rehabilitated as a sovereign nation whose entrepreneurs could engage in foreign trade" and that this granted "Japan access, within the American sphere at least, to the requisite global resource base" (Totman 2000: 441). This access allowed a pacifist Japan to re-emerge among the nations of the world as a responsible state, facilitated increased trade and better foreign relations, and ultimately assisted economic reconstruction. Jansen (2002: 702-703) provides a historical analogy to illustrate the costs involved:

> "In Meiji times the price of full sovereignty after the abolition of the unequal treaties had been the admission of foreigners to unrestricted residence throughout Japan. A half century later the price proved to be virtually unrestricted use of Japanese territory by the United States. Nevertheless, the gains, from the point of view of Yoshida's conservative government, were greater than the drawbacks."



IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

MACARTHUR ARCHIVES

Tokyo,
May 2, 1947.

General of the Army Douglas A. MacArthur,
G.H.Q., Tokyo.

My dear General,

On behalf of the Japanese nation, I wish to express my profound gratitude and appreciation to you for restoring the national flag to the people of Japan for unrestricted display within and over the premises of the National Diet, the Supreme Court and the Prime Minister's residence as well as the Imperial Palace.

I assure you that the Japanese people shall respond to the trust and confidence shown in them by this significant step and shall devote their utmost endeavors to attain the high ideals embodied in their new Constitution.

The effectuation of the new Constitution tomorrow does indeed signify the start of a new and enduring era of peace based upon personal liberty, individual dignity, tolerance and justice. The restoration of the national flag to the Japanese nation at this historic moment is most fitting and shall spur them on to new and higher efforts to become a truly democratic and peaceful nation.

Very Sincerely Yours
Shigeru Yoshida

[Shigeru Yoshida]

Cy. in RG-5, SCAP, "Mil. Sec. Corres."

Letter from Shigeru Yoshida to General MacArthur dated May 2, 1947
Source: National Diet Library, Tokyo
https://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/05/002_23/002_23_001l.html

As mentioned, the key to US interests was a pacifist Japan, on whose territory they could maintain a sizeable force in order to project power in the region, given the Communist threat from the USSR, and later the People's Republic of China (PRC), as well as North Korea (Cha 2012). In Yoshida's view, the Soviet Union and the PRC posed a threat not only to the US, but also to Japan and he was therefore "willing to accept a degree of reform under American tutelage as a defence against it" (Beasley 2000: 218). The Soviets had retaken the southern

half of Sakhalin and had occupied the Kurile Islands[15] after Japan's surrender in 1945. Their proximity to the Japanese archipelago, as also the campaign of ideological indoctrination undertaken by the Soviets upon Japanese POWs before they were repatriated, were further concerns (Dähler 2003).

Given the volatile state of affairs on the Korean peninsula, and the role played by ideology in the orchestration of such volatility, the Japanese were evidently wary of Chinese and Soviet influence anywhere within, or even near, their borders. The American presence, therefore, acted as a defence against these threats, given Japan's weak domestic resources to counter external threats. Herein lies the bargain, where Yoshida swallowed his pride, but ensured a security umbrella for Japan[16], safeguarding Japanese borders from any external threat, and also allowing for greater efforts towards economic reconstruction. Article IX of the Japanese Constitution, which enshrined the spirit of pacifism and placed dire limitations on Japan, was therefore turned into an advantage. Pacifism as policy, used as a tool, enabled Japan to maintain a popularly elected civilian government without fears of military intervention in the political sphere as in the pre-war period; allowed Japan access to markets in the capitalist bloc, and ensured that Japan was able to stand among the nations of the world, mindful of its past and focused on the future. These facets formed the core advantages of the Yoshida Doctrine, and their appeal was such that it found continuity even after Yoshida's tenure ended.

3.2 An Attempt in Earnest: Kishi Nobusuke (1957-60)

The Yoshida Doctrine can be viewed as a gamble that enabled Japan to adapt to its situation, and make the most of it, but there did emerge criticism, especially on the domestic front, largely from Yoshida's political detractors. One noteworthy aspect of said criticism was that it focused more on Japan's considerably weak military capabilities, and it's inability to protect itself effectively. However, the advantages of following the Doctrine were tacitly acknowledged by Yoshida's critics, creating a scenario nothing short of a dilemma; rearm and strengthen Japan, thus losing the benefits of following the Yoshida Doctrine, or maintain the

[15] The Kurile Islands continue to be a point of dispute between Japan and Russia.

[16] The US-Japan Alliance, formalised in 1951, and renewed with amendments in 1960. Popularly called the *Anpo* 安保, short for *Anzen hoshō jōyaku* 安全保障条約, which can be translated as "Security Treaty". This security treaty was, of course, one among many such bilateral arrangements that translated into a broader security framework fostered by the U.S. in the region. See Victor Cha, *Powerplay*; Nick Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*; and Yukinori Komine, *Negotiating the US-Japan Alliance*.

status quo and carry on with a weak capacity for national defence. Beasley (2000: 237) notes that the leaders that came after Yoshida "broadly followed the same line" and sought respectability and reputation through participation in the United Nations and "through non-political gestures like the Tokyo Olympics of 1964". While this shows a leaning towards Yoshida's line of thought, the manner in which the "geopolitics of Japan's place in the world was left to be determined by the American alliance" was not "wholly popular within Japan". This is commensurate with an assertion that Yoshida chose to implement a policy knowing full well that it might cost him in domestic politics.

From among the critics of Yoshida, one particular figure was of great consequence, namely Kishi Nobusuke, who served as the Prime Minister of Japan between 1957 and 1960, and was the maternal grandfather of the late former Prime Minister Abe Shinzō. Kishi had been an active member of the pre-war government, and unlike Yoshida, retained a nostalgic connection with the old order. Even though both Yoshida and Kishi were part of the same political party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) or the *Jiyū-Minshutō* 自由民主党, there was hardly any policy convergence, with both belonging to different factions within the same party. This also reveals the factional nature of Japanese politics, which had existed in the pre-war era, and continued to persist in the post-war era.

On Kishi, Nakamura (1998: 340) notes that "it was Kishi's strong ambition to do away with the subordination inherent in the defence pact [the US-Japan Alliance] that Yoshida had signed with Washington and to put Japan's relations with the United States on an equal footing". It is, however, interesting to see that Kishi wanted a renegotiation (Kapur 2018), and not an abrogation, of the alliance that would put Japan on equal terms with the US, much in line with how the Meiji leaders had renegotiated the unequal treaties. Nakamura (2008) sees this as Kishi's desire to view himself as a "spiritual heir" of other major Chōshū leaders like Yamagata Aritomo and Itō Hirobumi[17], who had carved the path for Imperial Japan, and thus, set their legacies in stone.

[17] The government that was established in 1868 in the wake of the Meiji Restoration comprised primarily of figures from the former domains of Chōshū (present day Yamaguchi) and Satsuma (present day Kagoshima and Miyazaki), both in Southern Japan. Those from Chōshū would go on to dominate the Imperial Japanese Army while the leaders from Satsuma found their foothold within the Imperial Japanese Navy. The pre-war Japanese government continued to see leaders from these two domains dominate the decision-making processes until 1945.

Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki (R) and Minister Kishi Nobusuke (L), October 1943
Source: Wikimedia Commons

One factor that drew attention throughout his tenure was the drive to revise the *Anpo*[18] to an arrangement less subservient to the Americans. Togo (2005) reveals a relevant factor in his study of Japanese foreign policy, where he notes that under the 1951 treaty, the Americans were not under obligation to protect Japan. At that point in time, the threats were considered common, and therefore, the Americans would come to Japan's aid, when required, however, there still loomed a degree of uncertainty. This aspect found an integral place within the amendment negotiations during this time, led by Kishi. Even so, the amended treaty did less to alleviate Japan's standing vis-a-vis the US, and more to ascertain that the Americans would now protect Japan out of treaty-bound obligation, while Japan, despite Kishi's leaning towards rearmament (Hoshiro 2022), maintained ambiguity through an implicit invocation of Article IX and Japan's policy of pacifism. While this may seem like another advantage, it highlighted concerns over Japan's "unwilling involvement" (Togo 2005: 61) in American war efforts elsewhere, in the event that the Americans demanded reciprocity from the Japanese. This situation, therefore, eliminated one level of uncertainty, but created another in its place.

Kishi's endeavour to raise Japan's standing, especially in terms of its military capabilities, evidently, fell short of its rather grand aims. The revision and renewal of the *Anpo* led to a series of major protests across Japan, which ultimately led to Kishi's resignation from office in 1960. However, one can also observe another development within pacifism as policy: Kishi was able to obligate the Americans to protect Japan by mandate of treaty, regardless of common threat perception. His attempt further insitutionalised the Yoshida Doctrine in that the US would now play an even more deliberate role to protect Japan, while Article IX

[18] The revised treaty can be accessed here: https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html.

continued to be invoked, seemingly protecting Japan from reciprocal involvement. This shows that while resistance to Japanese submission under the *Anpo* existed, the successors of Yoshida were willing to follow a similar framework, with renegotiations, wherever possible.

3.3 Not on Japanese Soil: Satō Eisaku (1964-72)

Satō Eisaku assumed office soon after the 1964 Summer Olympics, which marked a symbolic, albeit non-political affirmation of Japan's re-entry into the order of responsible nations. The Olympics also took place during a decade of massive economic growth in Japan. However, post-*Anpo* revision protests erupted across the country (Sasaki-Uemura 2001; Miller 2014), with Tokyo turning into a melting-pot of voices from various quarters[19], and Japanese pacifism finding a renewed relevance (Kapur 2018). In his study of Satō's foreign policy, Mendel (1967: 447) has attempted to gauge the impact of the revised *Anpo* upon the populace, and found that "the average Japanese could not decide whether or not the Security Treaty [*Anpo*] should continue" and that "over one-half had no opinion and the rest were almost equally divided among the three alternatives of revision, cancellation, or maintenance of the status-quo". But the fact that the *Anpo* protests had been the first such major protest of its kind against the US-Japan Alliance, became a cause for serious concern among Japanese policymakers. Although the protests had died down by 1960, the ripples traversed far and wide.

These protests revealed the underlying friction within the US-Japan Alliance, and focussed on two primary fronts. First, there were concerns over Japan's "unwilling involvement" (Togo 2005: 61) as mentioned in the previous section. Now that the Americans were obligated to defend the Japanese, fears emerged that Japan may be called upon to aid the Americans in their ventures as the Cold War progressed, particularly in terms of military assistance. This did not go down well with Japan's now-entrenched pacifist position, among both the political leadership and the populace, and thus, fed into the renewed relevance of pacifist principles. Izumikawa (2010) has argued that this fear of "entrapment" was an integral element in Japan's anti-militarism, and hence, pacifism. Second, it brought up questions on the

[19] The first, and the most devastating, series of *Anpo* protests, or the *Anpo tōsō* 安保闘争 occurred during the negotiations for the renewed treaty, between 1959 and 1960. One of the key centres of the agitation was the University of Tokyo. Although the treaty negotiations went through regardless, it did bring to the fore the stark reality of what the Japanese leadership would have to take into active consideration with regard to any change in Japan's pacifist position, which had now become entrenched within society.

sovereignty of the nation, and the continued US military presence on Japanese soil, which was now further solidified after the *Anpo* negotiations. It seemed that Japan had entered into a Faustian bargain, sealed between Yoshida and the US. Both of these challenges featured predominantly during Satō's tenure.

Prime Minister Eisaku Satō and President Richard Nixon at the White House, November 1969
Source: *Kyodo*/*The Japan Times*

The decade of the 1960s, as mentioned, witnessed an economically stronger Japan, and with it came a nation-wide desire for a more independent identity, giving rise to nationalistic tendencies that had been latent for the previous decade-and-a-half. Due to the fact that the US still held administrative control over Okinawa, an entire prefecture of Japan,[20] and had nuclear weapons stationed there (Inoue 2007) despite public sensitivity towards the same, it became increasingly difficult for the Japanese government to keep the populace convinced of the necessity of such an arrangement. The sheer number of American troops across Japan, from Yokosuka and Yokohama to Okinawa, and the associated questions on Japanese sovereignty and extra-territoriality that came with their presence served to further incense public sentiment. It may be recalled that extra-territoriality had been a prominent feature of the unequal treaties that had been forced upon Japan, and other East Asian states in the 19th

[20] American administrative control over Okinawa was legitimised through Article III of the Treaty of San Francisco, which granted the US "the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters". See, Treaty of San Francisco, 1951, available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume 136/volume-136-I-1832-English.pdf.

century, and control of Okinawa may well have been seen as an extension of Western colonialism.

Unlike his elder brother Kishi, Satō belonged to the Yoshida school of thought (Nakakita 2020), given his long association with Yoshida himself (Hattori 2021), and was in favour of broadly continuing with the Yoshida Doctrine. At the same time, it was also considered necessary to achieve at least a semblance of a more sovereign Japan, which stood by its pacifist principles. This was increasingly relevant in the wake of the tumult that had shaken the nation in the last several years. Pacifism as policy, which drew from the Yoshida Doctrine, was further developed during Satō's tenure, and played out in two respects: first, the reversion of Okinawa to the Japanese, thus ensuring complete territorial sovereignty; and, second, the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Japanese soil, by invoking Article IX if necessary.

While the reversion debate gained momentum in the course of the 1960s, it assumed an identity within an identity, with the emergence of an Okinawan strand within the broader national, Japanese line. Whereas the Okinawans were in favour of reversion and withdrawal of US forces from their land (Inoue 2007), the leadership in Tokyo had its apprehensions about such a drastic measure, especially with regard to the American forces, which were integral to the continuation of the Yoshida Doctrine and pacifism as policy. Satō tried to steer a course between the Charybdis of the return of Okinawa and the Scylla of the continued presence of American forces on the island. The negotiations resulted in an agreement signed in 1971, which reverted administrative control of Okinawa to the Japanese, but allowed for the US to maintain their bases on the island. According to the reversion agreement:

> "Japan will grant the United States of America on the date of entry into force of this Agreement the use of facilities and areas in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands in accordance with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan signed at Washington on January 19, 1960 and its related arrangements."[21]

[21] Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, signed on 17 June 1971. The document can be accessed here: https://web.archive.org/web/20101004181232/http://www.niraikanai.wwma.net/pages/archive/rev71.html.

With administrative sovereignty over the island reverting to Japan, Satō had been successful in "fulfilling Yoshida's peace diplomacy" (Hattori 2021: 113), and through the retention of American forces on Okinawa, he had also ensured the continuation of the Yoshida Doctrine. Further, Satō's invocation of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles[22] in 1967 gained greater credence. With Okinawa back under Japanese control, the Americans gradually withdrew all nuclear weapons from Japanese territory. Satō was, therefore, able to interpret and employ pacifism as policy in a manner that worked in Japan's favour. Even though the Okinawans did not achieve their aims, the broader Japanese aim of complete administrative sovereignty was achieved. Therefore, even though Satō's tenure saw another series of *Anpo* protests in 1970, when the treaty was automatically renewed, his utilisation of pacifism as policy to regain control over Okinawa and get the Americans to withdraw nuclear weapons from the island, worked in his favour.

3.4 Whither Self-Defence: Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982-87)

If Yoshida had laid down a path for successive leaders of Japan, Kishi had attempted a renegotiation, and Satō had utilised pacifism to regain full administrative sovereignty, Nakasone raised the question of Japan playing a greater security role, while remaining a pacifist nation. Such a position had existed as an undercurrent in the preceding decades, often emerging from the background only to then subside[23], domestically and internationally. Nakasone, who took the helm as Prime Minister in 1982, had been an active figure in the LDP and the government since the establishment of the post-war political order in Japan. He also emerged as a resonant voice in the upper echelons of the government during Satō's tenure, despite belonging to a rival faction within the LDP. As Satō proceeded with the Non-Nuclear Principles, announced in 1967, it was Nakasone who had "suggested the addition of a third principle, that the [Japanese] government would also not 'permit their introduction into Japan'" (Hattori 2023: 91), notwithstanding his known leaning towards rearmament

[22] Statement by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato at the Budget Committee in the House of Representatives, 11 December 1967. Accessed here: https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/nnp/index.html#:~:text=My%20responsibility%20is%20to%20achieve,line%20with%20Japan's%20Peace%20Constitution.

[23] This often fell under the bounds of Japan's "unwilling involvement", or entrapment dilemma. Such a dilemma was increasingly apparent during the American war in Vietnam in the 1960s and 70s. Japan's proximity to Vietnam, as well as the possibility of being asked to live up to a reciprocal obligation under the amended *Anpo* made up for genuine fears for the Japanese leadership, the ripples of which could very well transude into society, potentially resulting in more protests along the lines of the *Anpo* protests of 1959-60.

(Komine 2016). This underscores the political significance of remaining within the confines of pacifism, even as he argued for a better armed Japan.[24]

Nakasone had served as the Director-General of the Japanese Defence Agency (reorganised as the Ministry of Defence after 2006) in the early 1970s, and his views on Japan's security role developed significantly during this tenure. According to Komine (2014: 98), Nakasone "had been frustrated with Japanese citizens' aversion to acquiring strong self-defense capabilities, an aversion that he viewed as stemming from Japan's post-1945 pacifism." He was "especially critical of the so-called Yoshida Doctrine." Given his strong views on a renegotiated security and defensive posture for Japan, when he assumed power in 1982, it is necessary to situate both Nakasone and his desire for a rearmed Japan in the broader context of the developments that took place before, and during his tenure.

While on a visit to Guam in 1969, Richard Nixon, then President of the US, announced a foreign policy position, which has since come to be known as the Nixon Doctrine. It is important to note that the President's statements came at a time when the Americans were in the process of strategically retreating from the war in Vietnam. Answering a question about potential concerns among Asian nations regarding how the US planned to continue playing a significant security role in Asia in light of their retreat from Vietnam, Nixon affirmed that the US would provide military assistance to nations that asked for it. He further went on to state:

> "… as far as the problems of internal security are concerned, as far as the problems of military defense, except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons, that the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will be increasingly handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves."[25]

[24] This position is quite similar to that taken by Japanese leaders in the 21st century, beginning with Koizumi Junichiro, and gaining concerted relevance under Abe Shinzō. During Abe's tenure, the emergence of the strategy of 'proactive pacifism', or *sekkyokuteki heiwashugi* 積極的平和主義, further placed Japan in the international security arena. See Daisuke Akimoto, *The Abe Doctrine*; and, Michael J. Green, *Line of Advantage*. Interestingly, Abe's father, Abe Shintarō, had served as the Foreign Minister of Japan during Nakasone's tenure as Prime Minister, between 1982 and 1986.

[25] Nixon, Richard. 1969. Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen, 25 July, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/informal-remarks-guam-with-newsmen.

This foreign policy directive served to place in doubt the position of Japan's security within the US-Japan Alliance. Would the Americans solely come to Japan's aid in the event of a nuclear threat? How then was Japan to defend itself in the case of a conventional threat short of nuclear war, given the pacifist clause which the Americans themselves had included? By way of such an announcement, was the US attempting to shy away from its obligation to defend Japan under the revised *Anpo*? Needless to say, the Japanese found themselves in a dilemma with regard to the constraints of the pacifist clause, as well as the Yoshida Doctrine, which had espoused a limited operational scope for the *Jieitai*. Nakasone, who took over the Japanese Defence Agency in 1970, was faced with these questions, especially with regard to the self-defence capabilities of Japan, rearmament, and a greater security role for Japan, not only in the case of its own defence, but eventually, also towards the defence of the nations in its immediate vicinity.

The Nixon Doctrine hinted at changing attitudes in the US, and for Nakasone it was critical to bridge any potential divide between the US and Japan, especially in the arena of security. As Prime Minister, he made deliberate attempts to develop a relationship of mutual understanding and cooperation, with a personal touch, between himself and the then US President, Ronald Reagan. While doing so, Naksone also intended to pursue his own desire for a more independent Japan with enhanced self-defence capabilities, while fostering deeper relations with the US. This endeavour was quite successful, and as noted in Onishi (2019):

> "Nakasone's calls for a stronger military and for a larger role in the world for Japan resonated with Reagan. Their close relationship became known in Japan as Ron-Yasu after they began addressing each other by their first names — a practice imitated, though with far less success, by later presidents and prime ministers."

During Nakasone's tenure, and given Reagan's tacit acknowledgment of his aims for a more security-oriented Japanese position, his critics, both domestic and international, made known their fears of what they saw as an attempt towards a complete abrogation of the pacifist clause. This could potentially lead to "revived Japanese militarism", which according to Johnson (1986: 558-59) can be understood as the "first horn of the contemporary Japanese defense dilemma". On the other hand, the second horn emerged in the form of a "persistent charge that Japan is taking a "free ride" on the backs of the Americans, Koreans, Taiwanese, and all the other people of the Pacific Basin who take seriously their responsibilities to try to

maintain a stable and secure environment". Concerns over a Japanese return to pre-war 'militarism', hyperbolic though the claim is, nevertheless did exist among nations that had been under Japanese occupation.

Given these developments, Nakasone faced limitations on his attempts to move forward with his aims for Japan. The only option he was left with, was to continue within the ambit of the Yoshida Doctrine, regardless of how it was perceived by other nations in the Asia-Pacific. Charges of not contributing to security weighed far less than those of revived militarism. Despite Nakasone's attempts to raise the standing and relevance of the Japanese military and its role (Hattori 2023), he ultimately had to return to, and continue with, pacifism as policy. His contributions, however, are not without merit as it was Nakasone's legacy that informed and, to an extent, influenced the policies of Japanese leaders in the 21st century.

President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone
Source: *The New York Times*

4. Pacifism as Policy at Breaking Point

The preceding section reviewed the trajectory of 'pacifism as policy' in post-war Japan under four different leaders, revealing a pattern of development emerging from the prevalent milieu as well as the given leader's aims (which also reflected the aims of their respective factions within the LDP). However, circumstances often outweighed these leaders' aims, leading to compromises of one sort or the other. 'Pacifism as policy', therefore, did not emerge unscathed, and by 1991 it had reached breaking-point.

Japan's role in the Korean War had been twofold. First, it provided the US the requisite foothold in the Asia-Pacific region, in close proximity to the Korean Peninsula, allowing for rapid deployment of men and materiel. Japan, thus, acted as a base of operations. Secondly, Japan also served to fill in the production gap, where it fulfilled the needs for required materials, which gave the Japanese economy a much-needed boost as well (Nakamura 1998). Such a give-and-take arrangement worked well, largely in Japan's favour.

In the following decade, when American President Lyndon B. Johnson decided to intervene militarily in Vietnam, the silhouettes of silent doubts over Japan's possible role began to take form in Tokyo. The fears of "unwilling involvement", or the entrapment dilemma, remained firm in the minds of policymakers, due to the amended *Anpo,* as the statements made by the Foreign Minister, Miki Takeo (later, Prime Minister from 1974-76), in 1967 would testify. He reaffirmed Japan's commitment to the spirit of Article IX, and said that it did not intend to dispatch troops to Indochina (Havens 1987). At the same time, there was acquiescence with regard to the use of bases in Japan in the broader war effort. The Japanese leaders walked on a tightrope as they continued to uphold 'pacifism as policy', and managed to remain dislodged, at least militarily, from the American war in Vietnam.[26]

However, when the American-led coalition offensive began against Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1990, the fragility of 'pacifism as policy' came to the fore, as the entrapment dilemma reached its peak. US demands for greater Japanese participation in "international efforts in the Middle East" were expressed by then US President George H.W. Bush to his Japanese counterpart, Kaifu Toshiki (The Japan News/Yomiuri Shimbun 2021).

In a declassified White House document pertaining to a bilateral meeting between then US Vice-President Dan Quayle (1989-93) and Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki (1989-91), it was asserted that the Americans "would welcome a presence of Japan in the Persian Gulf" (Memorandum of Conversation 1990). Quite naturally the Japanese Diet embarked on serious discussions, when proposals to deploy the *Jieitai* to the Persian Gulf were brought up. At the

[26] Beyond the war in Vietnam, 'pacifism as policy' was also employed by Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo as he sought to build deeper relations with Southeast Asian nations, in what has come to be known as the Fukuda Doctrine, in Japanese foreign policy parlance. Formalised in a speech at Manila in 1977, Fukuda essentially reiterated the same tenets that had been promoted by his predecessors, in that Japan "rejects the role of a military power".
The speech can be accessed here: https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/docs/19770818.S1E.html.

same time, proposals for non-military aid were vehemently opposed as well (Beasley 2000). Despite growing American pressure, Kaifu had been careful not to pledge direct military support but endeavoured instead to work within the UN's peacekeeping framework, which was potentially acceptable under Article IX; this too hinging on a new interpretation of what was applicable under the clause. Here, one sees again how the Japanese desired to retain their earlier stance of remaining dislodged from American war efforts by invoking the pacifist clause, while easing their their position by allowing for monetary aid, despite opposition in the Diet. Even so, the Japanese ended up dispatching six Maritime Self-Defence Forces minesweepers to the Gulf. The same document also mentions a Japanese financial contribution of $4 billion to the US-led Coalition efforts in Iraq. This, as well as other monetary contributions made by Japan, have come to be known as Japan's 'chequebook diplomacy'.[27]

Kaifu's attempts should be viewed less from the standpoint of succumbing to American pressure, and more from an attempt to continue with pacifism as policy. However, this exercise between the Americans and the Japanese revealed the cracks that had been accumulating over Japanese pacifism, and raised a pertinent question on the need to envisage a policy framework beyond pacifism (Kelly and Kubo 2015). Nonetheless, the undercurrent of resistance to do the same was palpable. In addition to the existing security dilemmas mentioned earlier, yet another emerged from this episode. First, whether and how should the Japanese continue with their policy of invoking the pacifist clause, despite growing American pressure. Second, should Japan now commit to playing a more definitive security role, which might require either a decisive new interpretation or an amendment of Article IX. In the latter case, the Japanese would lose out on the benefits of pacifism as policy, effectively decimating the system introduced by Yoshida in the early years of the post-war era. In the immediate aftermath of Japan's participation in the First Gulf War, scholars such as Inoguchi Takashi (1993) assessed Japan's emerging role in international security affairs, within the framework of Japan becoming a "normal state"[28], This debate over Japan's quest for "normalcy"

[27] 'Chequebook diplomacy' can be defined as a method of advancing foreign policy objectives by employing monetary incentives. In Japan's case, such incentives were often provided as a means to avoid military involvement in US-led wars. Under the revised *Anpō*, the Japanese were under treaty obligation to aid the US, even militarily, when called upon to do so. In order to offset such demands, Japanese leaders often invoked the provision of military bases on Japanese soil and logistical and financial support as being commensurate with the terms of the treaty. This form of diplomacy, however, reached its limit during the 1990-91 Gulf War. See Balbina Hwang, 'Japan's Troop Dispatch to Iraq'.

[28] This was first popularised by former LDP stalwart Ozawa Ichiro in the early 1990s. Ozawa suggested reforms to the existing Japanese political structure, institutions and security and foreign policies in order to cope with a changing world. The influence of the Gulf War, and Japan's less-than-impressive performance

stemmed in essence from the unravelling of pacifism as policy, and has since fed into a developing discourse.

This new dilemma was further worsened by the defeat of the LDP in the 1993 elections, and the ascendancy of the Japan Socialist Party, with Murayama Tomiichi as Prime Minister in 1994. This also marked the establishment of the first non-LDP government since 1955, disrupting the hitherto uninterrupted '1955 system', which Yoshida and Kishi had actively contributed towards establishing, and which had been continued under Satō and Nakasone. As it stood in 1991, pacifism as policy had seemingly received its hitherto worst shock, making it difficult to visualise its employment in the future. Although the LDP returned to power in 1996, a newer variant of pacifism as policy would not emerge until Koizumi Junichiro became Prime Minister in 2001, whereupon it further mutated into what has come to be understood today as 'proactive pacifism', or *sekkyokuteki heiwashugi* 積極的平和主義. It can thus be seen that pacifism was employed, under varying circumstances, by successive leaders, and through each cycle of its employment, the force of circumstances contributed to further evolution, ultimately leading to a point in 1991, where the Japanese were confronted with arguably the worst of their dilemmas..

5. Conclusion

The path taken by Japan in the post-war era is defined by two decisive factors: Article IX of the 1947 Constitution, that is, the pacifist clause, and the American Occupation of Japan, which culminated with the establishment of the US-Japan Alliance. The former has been integral to Japan's foreign policy decisions, while the latter exerted a seminal influence on the evolution of the same. In this regard, this paper has attempted to understand pacifism as a theoretical notion, and seek out the origins of pacifism in Japan. The case for pacifism as rooted in the domestic context, does not hold. The origins of pacifism in the West can be traced to peace movements against a religious backdrop, whereas this was not the case in the development of pacifism in Japan. Instead, it emerged from the experiences of the Japanese population during World War II. Further, one of the primary takeaways from the American Occupation was the imposition of pacifism upon Japan through the inclusion of Article IX.

in holding its ground is quite evident in the suggestions made by Ozawa. See, Ozawa Ichiro, *Blueprint for a New Japan*.

By assessing American aims in the region, and the centrality of a pacifist Japan to the said aims, it has been posited that pacifism was an enforced ideal, rather than an organically developed concept.

This enforced ideal of pacifism was taken up by former Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, and was interpreted in a manner that allowed Japan to focus on reconstruction while outsourcing its security needs to the US. This came to be known as the Yoshida Doctrine, which in turn became integral to pacifism as policy. The second section of the paper employs the methodology used in Iokibe et al. (2020) by dividing the post-war era into sub-eras between 1947 and 1991, as integrated compartments within a whole. The trajectory of pacifism is thereby examined as policy under four Prime Ministers: Yoshida (1948-54), Kishi (1957-60), Satō (1064-72), and Nakasone (1982-87). Here, the a pattern of development emerged, where Yoshida established the system, Kishi tried to alter it, Satō used it to Japan's greater advantage, and Nakasone tried to move beyond it. However, as has been discussed, the prevalent conditions of the time often weighed against the same, and each of these leaders had to manoeuvre around pacifism.

Even as 'pacifism as policy' evolved over the decades, it shifted forms in accordance with prevailing conditions and, therefore, did not remain intact. By 1991, a breaking-point was reached. Growing pressure from the US, which gave substance to Japanese fears of entrapment in US-led wars since the amendment of the *Anpo* in 1960, reached a crescendo during the First Gulf War in 1990-91. The realities of the time shook the foundations of 'pacifism as policy' to the core, leaving Japan with little choice but to consider options beyond this framework. This particular development also gave rise to the concept of a "normal Japan", and allowed for the foundations of a new interpretation, in the form of 'proactive pacifism'[29] which emerged in the 21st century (Akimoto 2018; Green 2022).

Pacifism as policy played an integral role in Japan's foreign policy throughout the time-frame of 1947 to 1991, and one can see its function/relevance and usage in all major turning points, as discussed in this paper. This analysis has also sought to present a historical background to

[29] 'Proactive pacifism' falls within the ambit of what scholars have called the Abe Doctrine. This approach involves a re-interpretation of Article IX of the Japanese Constitution, spearheaded by late former Prime Minister Abe Shinzō. It includes the restructuring of Japan's security and foreign policies as well institutions, with the aim of playing a more decisive security and leadership role in East Asia and beyond. Japan's first National Security Strategy, released in 2013 during Abe's second tenure, introduced Japan as a "proactive contributor to peace", while laying down several focal points which required further "proactive" contributions. The National Security Strategy 2013 can be accessed here: https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf.

policy decisions that were taken in the 21st century by leaders such as Koizumi and Abe, which have come to define Japan's role in the broader Asian context. Pacifism as policy, since its inception under Yoshida, remained a double-edged sword. While it was undoubtedly integral to the path undertaken by Japan in the post-war era, it came to be increasingly seen as an anachronism, often placing Japan in dire situations and restraining its broader aims, particularly as Japan became an advanced economy.

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

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Landline: +91-11-40564823

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